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INmOOOCTION 
Saudi Arabian foreign policy decisions are made by a small group in 
private and with little public discussion or explanation. Open debates 
on issues are not encouraged, particularly those that have a direct 
relation to the nation's security. No concept of public accountability 
exists. Secrecy is stressed to ensure internal security, as well as 
stability in the society. However, foreign policy decisions are not made 
without considerable thought and time spent in discussing the issues with 
those the leaders of government believe can make a contribution to their 
understanding of the problems. 
The deciSion-making process has the following four characteristics 
(1) There is a strong link between domestic and foreign policies because 
of the historical legacy of the state. For this reason, decision-
making includes members of the royal family and religious 
establishment. 
(2) Other groups do participate and wield differing degrees of influence 
depending on the issue area. 
(3) ~fuch bargaining occurs hefore an important decision is announced. 
(4) The process is slow, as the leaders are not preDared to meet crisis 
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situations. For this reason, the leadership usually turns to outside 
powers to settle the problem. In addition to the delay in making a 
decision, there is also the failure to follow through. 
These characteristics are influenced by the increasing complexity of 
Saudi Arabia's regional and global environment, and by the growing demand 
on the country to playa larger role in global politics. 
The methods used by the government result more in a reactive rather than 
a pro-active policy. The Saudis are more likely to react to events, 
panic in crises, and delay making decisions at the time the decisions 
should be made. The consequences of the methods used in making foreign 
policy decisions has created a political environment that varies from 
country to country, and from situation to situation. Policy decisions 
are not consistent. Those concerning Arab Islamic Nations will differ 
significantly from those made when the United States or the Soviet Union 
is involved. The main goal is to protect the regime, to ensure the 
monarchy remains in power, the principles of Islam are supported, and 
stability is maintained throughout the Kingdom. 
Purpose of the Study 
Saudi Arabia is encircled by hostile forces. The Saudis find themselves 
at the intersection of a number of strong crosscurrents. This creates 
for them a web of involvement with the world that prevents them from 
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returning to isolation. With the discovery of oil, the Kingdom entered 
into a foreign political environment which was not understood, but in 
which the Kingdom was expected to play a major role whether or not they 
were prepared to do so. 
The review identifies the many problems encountered by the government's 
inconsistencies, and the consequences of using a reactive rather than a 
pro-active foreign policy decision-making process. 
The purpose of this study is to review the Saudi Arabian foreign policy, 
its strengths and wealcnesses, and make recommendations for improving 
foreign policy decision-making to strengthen the Kingdom's position in 
the Middle East and the world. 
Statement of the Problem 
The role of Saudi Arabia as a regional and international power has 
changed dramatically over the past few years. From a country whose 
interests lay almost exclusively in preserving political stability 
domestically and in its immediate border area, Saudi Arabia has developed 
into a pmverful influence that extends beyond the Arabian Gulf, into the 
entire f.1iddle East, as well as into Africa and Asia. 
Saudi Arabia's foreign policy traditionally has been reactive rather than 
pro-active which has made foreign policy decisions often ineffective. 
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The fact of the frame of reference in which decisions are made - that of 
keeping the monarchy in power, adherence to Islamic principles, security 
of the nation, and stability within the society - has had a very negative 
effect on foreign policy decisions. 
Foreign policy decisions should be based on strengthening the Kingdom's 
role in the }liddle East as well as in international politics. Saudi 
Arabia should contribute more than any other nation towards maintaining a 
balance of power in the Middle East to maintain peace in the area, and to 
playa larger role in global politics not only because of its wealth of 
oil reserves, but because of the influence the government can have in the 
international marketplace and the development of other Third ,,Jorld 
nations. 
Importance of the Subject 
The history of the Niddle East is filled i.,rith wars, uprisings, 
revolutions, and the like. Throughout the history of man there never has 
been a century in which men lived in peace. The first step was taken by 
King Ahdul Aziz Ibn Saud by unifying the different trihal groups in 
Arabia. Since the discovery of oil in the fuddle East, the nations have 
been experiencing rapid change. Theorists argue that such changes can 
have a destabilizing effect on any nation. In this sense ,ye can ask 
whether the stability of the monarchy, as a governmental system, is 
diminishing. The most important issue to recognise is the new forces 
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that have been imposed on these nations since they have been forced into 
global politics. It is the view of some that monarchies are not prepared 
to deal with these new forces. As a consequence, violence, corruption, 
and manipulation are expected to continue to exist in the ~liddle East. 
Comparing political systems with that of Saudi Arabia, it can be seen 
that others appear to be more stable and even more durable than the Saudi 
system. lIDless the monarchy is able to deal with external threats and 
changes taking place internally, the future of the Kingdom could be in 
jeopardy. It is believed that if foreign policy decisions were made pro-
actively rather than reactively, the decisions would strengthen the 
nation's position in the ~tiddle East as well as in the world. 
Hypotheses 
It is the intent of this study to test the following hypotheses 
(1) The foreign policy decision-making process of Saudi Arabia is based 
on the need to keep the monarchy in power; retention of Islamic 
principles; the security of the Y~ngdom, and stability of the 
society. 
(2) Foreign policy decisions made within this framework have 
necessitated decisions being made on a crisis-to-crisis basis, 
forcing policy makers to be reactive rather than pro-active. 
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(3) The foreign policy decisions are not consistent, but are based on 
ideologies influenced by Islam. As an example, policy decisions 
favour other Arab Islamic nations. 
(4) Foreign policy decisions made within this framework have weakened 
the potential of the Kingdom in relations with other countries. 
(5) The development of a stronger foreign policy based on a global 
perspective could give the Kingdom more influence over the stability 
of the Middle Fast, development of Third IV-orld countries, and the 
international marketplace. 
Methodology 
This study provides an analytical and qualitative examination of the 
Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy based on a study of scholarly works and 
professional literature as well as primary sources published in Arabic 
and translated into English. 
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Defini tions 
Foreign policy: The actions of a state toward the external environment 
and the conditions under which these actions are formulated. 
Reactive ~mking of decisions after a crisis has occurred to handle 
problems created by the crisis. 
Pro-Active The making of decisions in anticipation of future problems. 
Limitations of the Study 
The study is limited to the years 1920 through 19RO. Before the 1920's 
Saudi Arabia was a land made up of provinces governed by various tribal 
groups. The Kingdom was unified in 1925. In the 1930's oil was 
discovered, which not only changed the face of the Kingdom but also 
increased its importance in the Ivorld. These changes are reflected in 
the foreign policies made through the 1970's. 
~~e study is limited to foreign relations decisions as they pertain to 
Saudi Arabian foreign relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, 
North and South Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, and the Arab League. 
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CHAPrER ONE 
POLITICAL HI51'ORY OF SAUDI ARABIA 
I Introduction Heart of Islam and Oil Giant 
II Saudi Arabia The Nation State 
A The House of Saud and Hahhab 
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C Towards a Nodern State 
III Conclusion 
Figures : 
Figure I Saudi Arabia, r~vernment Organization, 1965 
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Figure 3 The Saudi Council of Hinisters 
Figure 4 Ministry of Foreign Mfairs 
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Country 
Formal Name Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Short Form Saudi Arabia. 
Terms of Nationals Saudi(s) or Saudi Arabian(s). 
Adjectival Forms Saudi or Saudi Arabian. 
Capital Riyadh (Ministry of Foreign Affairs located in Riyadh). 
Government and Politics 
Form Monarchy. King also serves as prime minister. 
Administrative Division Six major and twelve minor provinces. 
Legal System : Law consists of the Sharia (sacred Islamic law) - which 
includes the Quaran, the Hadith, and the Sunna - and of administrative 
decrees. 
Politics : Political parties, interest groups, and similar organizations 
are not permitted. 
Najor International Hemberships : United Nations and many of its 
specialized agencies, League of Arab States (Arab League), Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting r,ountries (OPEC), Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC), and various Islamic conferences. 
- 10 -
I Introduction Heart of Islam and Oil Giant 
Saudi Arabia is of unparalleled importance to the 800 million 
Hoslems of the world. Never colonized by a western power, it is the 
core of both Islam and the Arab race, and the keeper of their 
purity. The migration that began from this Arab-Islamic state 
spread Islam as far as China, Russia, and Yugoslavia. Two of 
Islam's holy places, Mecca and Medina, are in Saudi Arabia, and it 
is toward these that practising Hoslems allover the world turn five 
times a day to pray. Islam is not the only determinant of Saudi 
policy, whether domestic or foreign, but it is paramount. 
Saudi Arabia, two-thirds the size of India, is a barren land. 
Occupying roughly three-quarters of the Arabian Peninsula (about t,.,o 
million square km), Saudi Arabia would have continued - at the 
, 1 1 db 'f d' 'I 1 econOrnlC eve - as a san ox were lt not or one commo lty : 01 • 
The country has a quarter of the world's supply, is the third 
largest producer and the largest exporter of oil, and has 
accumulated six times more overseas assets than the United States. 2 
Yet before the early 1970's, no books and only a handful of articles 
had been published on this country's foreign policy. Other aspects 
of Saudi Arabia were only slightly better analysed. 
Scarcity of information also characterized newspapers and other non-
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scholarly sources. ~1alcolm Peck puts it succinctly 
"In 1968, the New York Times Index revealed twice as nruch 
reporting on Albania as on Saudi Arabia, five or six times as nruch 
on Halaysia in 1969 and four times as nruch on Burma in 1970. Time 
had only one story relating to Saudi Arabia in 1969, reporting the 
death of King Saud and commenting on his physical ailments and the 
size of his harem. No mention was made of King Faisal's visit to 
Hashington in 1971. U.S. News and ~.Jorld Report did not mention 
Saudi Arabia in 1969 or 1971 ••• [For] the duration of the 90th 
and 91st Congresses, 1969-72, the index to the Congressional 
Record reveals that no reference was made to Saudi Arabia". 3 
The quality of resources was equally poor. The information provided 
was frequently careless, shallow, erroneous, or stereotyped. For 
instance, in covering the fourth non-aligned summit in Algeria 
(September 1973), the New York Times mentioned that Saudi Arabia did 
not attend, although the country's delegation was headed by King 
Faisal in person. A month later the oil embargo and price rises 
followed. The quantity of reporting on Saudi Arabia increased 
greatly, but its quality did not improve. 
To earlier shortcomings was added a new distorting factor - a 
compound of fear and hostility in face of the threat which the oil 
weapon and visions of endlessly accumulating petro-dollars 
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conjured up. While a Washington Post editorial of April 1973 
dismissed the first Saudi warning linking oil and politics, it 
suggested that the "more important oil becomes, the less important 
the Arab-Israeli dispute". An editorial of 2nd January 1974, in 
the same newspaper, noted the threat of a reduction in Saudi oil 
production and attacked the "feudal government and its ageing 
monarch" over the King's position on terms of a settlement. 4 
---~--~--
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II Saudi Arabia: '!be Nation State 
A The House of Saud and Hahhab 
Tne history of Saudi Arabia as a nation-state begins in its most 
concise form in 1932. On September 18th of that year, Abdul Aziz 
Ibn Saud assumed the title of King and proclaimed his domain to be 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, a more extensive history must 
consider hO'iv the nation-state came into being, for the foundations 
of authority and legitimacy which exists in the contemporary 
sovereign nation-state were begun two centuries earlier. 
Such a consideration must of necessity be a family story ... a story 
of the House of Saud. It was through the accomplishments of the 
House of Saud that divided and separate regions, peoples and tribes 
were united into a singular, functioning nation. 
Eighteenth-century Arabia was for the most part a land politically 
fragmented where scores of independent tribal leaders and urban 
lords held small domains. Hore often than not, these separate and 
independent leaders were in conflict, each with the other. 5 
Hohamrnad Ibn Saud, one of the earliest members of the House of Saud, 
was one such leader, overseeing his small domain in an area north of 
the present day capital, Riyadh. 
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There arose within a nearby area a religious leader, Mohammad Ibn 
Abdulwahhab. Appalled by what he saw as sacreligious and idolatrous 
practices, Ibn Abdulwahhab called for a return to the original 
principles of Islam. Stirring up both a fervent following and 
violent opposition, he was forced by the opposition to leave his 
home and to seek refuge elsewhere. 
Forced out of his own region, Mohammad Ibn Abdulwahhab sought and 
was granted refuge by Mohammad Ibn Saud. The religious leader and 
the tribal leader shared the same ideology and saw the possibility 
of its expansion if they joined together for the same. In 1744, 
they s'vore a joint oath to support and further their common cause 
both within and without the realm of Mohammad Ibn Saud. 6 Thus was 
born what was eventually to become the monarchy of the House of 
Saud. 7 
The combination of Saud's tribal militancy and Abdulwahhab's 
messianic ideology made for a fervent force which was to eventually 
transform the Arabian peninsula into a unified Kingdom. 8 The House 
of Saud and the Wahhabi religious conservatism were further united 
by inter-marriage between the two families, the most important of 
which was Saud's to the daughter of Abdulwahhab. 9 In 1788 with the 
House of Saud's family concurrence, 1'lohammad Abdulwahhab designated 
the rule of succession which ,.;ras to continue into the t,.;rentieth 
century. Saud's eldest son ~,Tas designated as Hali al-Ahd, Holder of 
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the Covenant of Heir Apparent. Instructions then went out 
throughout the realm for the traditional baiah or pledge of 
-- . 
allegiance to be sworn to Saud. This remains the procedure of the 
Saudi monarchy today. As George Rentz points out, the often heard 
reference to the Heir Apparent as Crown Prince is inaccurate for 
there is not a Crown Prince in Saudi Arabia~O Hohammad Abdulwahhab 
died in 1792 but the Hahhabi conservative ideology lived on to be 
practiced by the House of Saud and to be the foundation of Saudi 
Arabia society today. 
The period subsequent to Abdulwahhab's death up to the beginning of 
the twentieth century was a period of both victory and set-back for 
the House of Saud. At one point in the early nineteenth century, 
the House of Saud, combined with Hahhabi ideology, had expanded its 
realm to include most of the Arabian Peninsula and was approaching 
11 Damacus. However, the Ottoman Sultan, having already been 
humiliated by his loss of the Holy Cities, Necca and Medina, decided 
that the limit had been reached. The Sultan commissioned his 
Eqyptian viceroy, ~IDhammad Ali, to send an expedition to the 
peninsula to regain both this territory and his honour. 12 There 
followed a series of campaigns between the House of Saud and both 
Hohammad Ali and other tribes that lasted l.mtil 1891. In that year, 
the House of Saud, weakened by both external and internal strife, 
lost even its homeland, the central province of Najd. A rival 
tribe, the AI-Rashid, took power in the Najd forcing the House of 
------ - -----:-----------
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Saud into exile in Kuwait. 13 
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B Rise of the Nation State 
In January 1902, the eldest son of the exiled House of Saud left 
Kuwait and returned to Riyadh. In a daring dawn raid with less 
than fifty men, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud (connnonly known in the 'tvest as 
Ibn Saud) reconquered Riyadh from the Al-Rashid. Thus began the 
consolidation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as it is known today. 
And thus at the age of 21 began the rise of King Ibn Saud, the 
founder of the contemporary Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and father of 
h Ki 14 t e present ng. 
The consolidation was accomplished in a step-by-step process from 
the central province, the Najd, to the eastern provinces, then the 
south western-most province, the Asir; and finally the western-
t . th Hi' 15 mos prOV1nce, e Jaz. 
Ibn Saud's 1913 movement toward conquerine the eastern provinces 
was to have special significance in al-Absa. Whereas past 
conquests had been on more of familial basis the attack on al-Absa 
was against a foreign power.16 Al-Absa was a Turkish garrison 
17 
manned by Turkish troops. And since Rashid and Hussein were both 
indirectly supported by the Ottomans, the conflict at al-Absa was 
Saud's first direct confrontation with the Turks. Ibn Saud had also 
heretofore placed primar)T dependence for his manpower requirements 
tlpOn temporary alliances. But such assistance was usually inversely 
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proportional to the difficulty of the ensuing struggle.18 It was 
herein then that the evolution of the Ikhwan (Brethren) began.19 
In terms of difficulty and primordial significance, the Hijaz was 
predominant. For it was here that Hussein, the great grandfather of 
the present King Hussein of Jordan, reigned supported by the 
British. 20 British subsidies to both rulers could not quell the 
rivalry between them and in 1926 the Saudi-Wahhabi movement took 
control of the Hijaz. 21 Hussein went into exile in Cyprus and Ibn 
Saud was declared the King of the Hijaz and Sultan of the Najd and 
Dependencies. After a further period of consolidation, Ibn Saud 
declared his realm on September 18th, 1932, to be called the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 22 
Those foundations of legitimacy and authority which enabled Ibn 
Saud to consolidate the Arabian Peninsula into a unified Kingdom 
continue to this day to be pillars of the Saudi State. Starting 
with the single source of tribal leadership, the Saudi family had 
expanded by taking up the Wahhabi religious ideology and cemented 
that consolidation by intermarriage with the Wahhabs. Ibn Saud used 
the same technique. As he conquered or consolidated additional 
tribes or regions, rivalries were erased and bonds established by 
marrying leading daughters of conquered tribes and religious leaders 
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(Ulema) , thus giving everyone a vested interest in the furtherance 
of the House of Saud. 23 Ibn Saud's marriages left more than 30 
living sons. "Rather than mere procreation ••• it was creative 
Y~ngdom building".24 Furthermore, the ideology of Wahhabism made 
individual tribesmen brothers in a greater community, the community 
of Wahhabist Islam. Thus in 1932, Ibn Saud had established the 
superstructure upon which his successors would claim rulership of 
Saudi Arabia. As King he was the chief ruler within the state; as 
head of the lvahhabist movement he was the central religious figure; 
as leader of the House of Saud, he was the leading tribal chief of 
all tribes; and as protector of Islam's holiest shrines, Mecca and 
Medina, his Kingdom occupied a position of prominence throughout 
the entire Islamic world. 25 
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C Toward a Modern State 
With his nation-state newly consolidated, Ibn Saud had to turn and 
face conflict from an adjoining state. A border dispute developed 
in 1933 between his south eastern province, Asir, and the state of 
Yemen. Hith Imam Yehya of Yemen provoking what had originally 
started as a challenge of rulership within the Asir, King Ibn Saud 
decided to strike at the root of the problem. Ivar was declared on 
Yemen in March 1934, and Ibn Saud sent his two eldest sons to lead 
an invasion force. The counter-attack was successful and the Imam 
sued for peace with Ibn Saud's forces commanding a large portion of 
Yemen. A treaty was signed on June 23rd, 1934, wherein Ibn Saud 
demanded neither reparations nor territorial changes of any sort. 
The statesmanship of Ibn Saud impressed the Imam Yehya in such a 
manner that he thereafter did his best to refrain from hostile 
actions against Ibn Saud. 26 Border relations with neighbouring 
states were further improved on April 2nd, 1936, when a treaty of 
Arab brotherhood and non-aggression was signed with the Hashemite 
King of Iraq. 27 
Hith his state fully expanded and affairs with neighbouring states 
in a peaceful mode, Ibn Saud could demobilize his war machine and 
devote primary attention to development of a nation-state 
infrastructure. Ninistries of foreign affairs and finance were 
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established by 1932 and governors were appointed in the provinces of 
Najd, Hijaz, Absa, and Asir. Internal development proceeded slowly. 
Social services were initiated, experimental agricultural projects 
were established, and the state began to acquire the paraphernalia 
necessary to function as a nation-state. 
The need for finance to maintain the state was the catalyst which 
prompted the sale of an oil concession to an American firm in 1933. 
Oil in commercial quantity was discovered in 1938, thus seemingly 
ensuring financial solvency for King Ibn Saud's Kingdom. However, 
\\forld Har II delayed development of production and export facilities 
and it was not until the late 1940's that the Kingdom was able to 
enjoy substantial income from the Arabian American Oil Company 
(Aramco) • 
During Horld Har II, King Ibn Saud kept his Kingdom neutral. 28 He 
did, however, approve an agreement with the u.S. for airfield basing 
rights in Saudi Arabia. Hm.,rever, construction was not completed 
until after the war and both negotiations and construction were 
played down in order to avoid public infringement of his declared 
neutrality. As the war ended, Saudi Arabia declared war on ('~rmany 
on Barch 1st, 1945, thus allowing participation in the United 
Nations Conference at San Francisco. 29 
The increasing income from oil development subsequent to the war 
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allowed for increased internal development. Annual revenue had 
changed from $4 million in 1944 to $85 million in 1945.30 
Transportation, power generation, education, agriculture, health 
care and water supply all benefited from the development funds. The 
Kingdom experienced significant progress in regard to technology but 
governmental leadership remained very much patriarchal. 
The government was the House of Saud. Ibn Saud was a monarch guided 
not by any sort of constitution (as defined by Western standards) 
but by Islamic law. Positions of leadership and responsibility were 
filled by members of the royal family or close confidants. llis sons 
Saud and Faisal served as viceroys of the two most important 
provinces, Najd and Ilijaz. Saud was heir-apparent and Commander of 
the army; Faisal foreign minister. In October 1953, King Ibn Saud 
issued a royal decree establishing a ministerial system and forming 
a Council of Ministers to act as an advisory body to the King but 
its makeup was predOminantly royal. Although it was a significant 
step toward modern government, the Saudi Council of Ministers 
possessed no executive powers; the King continued to exercise his 
prerogatives as Chief of State, head of the royal family, prince of 
the faithful (Amir al-mu'm-inin), and head of all tribal sheiks 
(Shaikh al-mashayikh). 31 The transfer of the ministries from Jiddah 
in the Hijaz to Riyadh in the Najd in the mid 1950's signalled the 
complete consolidation of the authority of the House of Saud as a 
l ' d 'Ar b' 32 ru lng ynasty lTI ala. 
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King Ibn Saud died on November 9th, 1953, and was succeeded by his 
eldest son, Saud. 33 While there had been significant development 
under Ibn Saud, this was not his most significant accomplishment. 
His most significant accomplishment was the feat of more than two 
decades prior to his death. Ibn Saud had unified a vast area of 
conflicting tribal regions into a nation-state. Moreover, he had 
maintained that unity for nearly a quarter of a century. Such an 
accomplishment required a tremendous skill in maintaining a 
delicate balance. On the one hand he faced the fervent, often 
labelled fanatical, conservatism of the Hahhabi Ikhwan whose 
"fanaticism" had served him so well in military campaigns. On the 
other hand there existed the relatively liberal, almost secular, 
views in peoples such as those in the Hijaz. 34 King Ibn Saud had 
for a quarter of a century walked that tight-rope without being 
dra,Yn off-balance by either faction; thus ensuring continued unity 
of his new-found Kingdom. 
The demands of the Kingdom were not so well met by Ibn Saud's 
successor, Saud. From within the Kingdom there developed a 
dissatisfaction over alleged wasteful expenditures and a lack of 
development. From ,'lithout, there developed the challenge of 
Nasserism, originating in the Egyptian revolution of 1952 and 
spreading throughout the Arab world. r~ng Saud defined the duties 
and function of the Council of Hinisters in Nay 1958. 35 According 
to this significant decree, the Council of Ninisters was given 
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executive and legislative duties for the first time in the history 
of the Saudi State. It was a definite indication that a gradual 
process of political modernization was taking place in the country, 
that a process of de-tribalization was occurring, that the 
government of the state had become a complex responsibility which 
the monarch alone could no longer discharge, that Saudi Arabia was 
becoming a welfare state due to its increasing oil revenues, and 
that a central bureaucratic government organization was being 
created. 
In accordance with Article II of the 1958 Statute of the Council of 
t1inisters, the Council is composed of a president (the prime 
minister), a vice-president (deputy prime minister), departmental 
ministers, ministers of State, and advisors to the King. 
Appointments to the Council of Hinisters are made by royal decree. 
Article 18 of the same statute states that the Council of J·tinisters 
shall legislate in all major aspects of the State. The Council was 
also entrusted with the execution of this policy.36 Faisal, the 
Y~ng's brother, was appointed prime minister and Crown Prince. 
However, problems reached crisis stage in November 1958, and Y~ng 
Saud decreed that CrOlm Prince Faisal would assume full powers of 
government in the fields of internal, foreign, and fiscal policy. 
Under Faisal, fiscal policy was greatly improved and the nation's 
debts were significantly liquidated. But Faisal's strict programme 
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of austerity was not without criticism, especially from Saud's 
patriarchal faction. Resultantly, there developed a power struggle 
for leadership of the Kingdom which was not fully resolved until 
November 2nd, 1964. 37 In the period 1958-1964 there occurred 
several transfers of power between Saud and Faisal, with Saud 
always retaining the title of King and Faisal dutifully 
relinquishing control whenever challenged by his brother and King 
Saud. 
Faisal's last submission was on Narch 15th, 1962. 38 King Saud 
resumed power and Faisal left the country shortly thereafter for 
the United States. His departure was due partly to undergo medical 
treatment in the United States and partly to express dissatisfaction 
with the state of affairs in Saudi Arabia. Within a few months, 
however, he was persuaded to return and resume government 
leadership. The September 2nd revolution in Yemen precipitated 
another crisis for Saudi Arabia requiring Faisal's expertise. 
Faisal continued de facto leadership of the ~ingdom from 1962 to 
1964 until Y~ng Saud again challenged for resumption of power. On 
this occasion, however, there evolved a consensus from all the 
sources of power within the Kingdom, the Tnema, the council of royal 
princes, and the tribal sheiks: Saud's challenge was rejected. 
Y~ng Saud was formally deposed and Crown Prince Faisal was 
proclaimed King on November 2nd, 1964. 39 
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Under Faisal's leadership, the country underwent significant 
development while still adhering to the traditional principles of 
Wahhabi Islam. He had introduced a ten-point programme for the 
modernization of the country in November 1962.40 The ten-point 
programme called for many of the basic elements of modern 
government. 
(1) Promulgation of a "Basic Law" (or Constitution) based on the 
shari a and the Koran. 
(2) Regulation of local government. 
(3) Creation of a Supreme Judicial Council and a ~tinistry of 
Justice. 
(4) Establishment of a Judiciary Council. 
(5) New emphasis on the spread of Islam. 
(6) Re-organisation of the Committee for Public Horality. 
(7) Social legislation to improve the standard of living of the 
average Saudi citizen. 
(8) Co-ordination of economic development programmes and efforts. 
(9) Establishment of priority items in the economic development 
plan, such as an industrialization program~e. 
(10) Abolition of slavery.4l 
Host of the social and economic provisions of the ten-point 
programme have been implemented. Ambitious prograrrunes in 
industrialization, health, education, and ,yelfare have been set in 
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motion. In the political sphere, however, no constitution has been 
written. The King's authority has not been diminished. 
Nevertheless, the organizational structure has been formalized, new 
ministries have been created, and the central bureaucracy has grown 
in size. The government structure has not significantly changed. 42 
In Arab affairs, the Kingdom began to assume greater authority by 
financing rehabilitation of "front-line" Arab states after the 1967 
war. After Nasser's death in 1970, King Faisal emerged as the 
leading spokesman for the Arab world. 
Under Faisal's leadership the first two five-year development plans 
were drawn up. The first in 1970 called for development expenditure 
of $9.2 billion and the second in 1975 called for $142 billion.43 
In international affairs, the increased revenues resulting from 
quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-1974 literally sky-rocketed the 
Kingdom up the international hierachy. Saudi Arabian crude 
increased from $3.01 to $11.65 per barrel and the Kingdom's oil 
revenues rose from $4.34 billion in 1973 to $22.6 billion in 1974.44 
Balance-of-payment surpluses rose by a factor of ten ••• from $2.5 
billion in 1973 to $25 billion in 1974.45 1·1oreover, the Kingdom's 
possessions of the world's largest proven reserves ••• 25% of free 
world total ... and production of 8.5 million barrels per day ••• 
again 25% of free world total ••• gave it overwhelming status in a 
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world economy frightened by energy prospects.46 
In development of the country, propagation of Islam and the Arab 
cause, and emergence of the nation as an international factor of 
significance, King Faisal was approaching a position of historical 
significance equal to that of his father, Ibn Saud. It was then a 
tragic occurrence that on March 25th, 1975, he was assassinated by a 
47 young nephew. 
The Crown Prince, Khalid, Faisal's brother, assumed the monarchy and 
his half-brother Fahd assumed the position of Crown Prince and first 
Deputy Prime Hinister. The position of head of the National Guard 
was assumed by Prince Abdullah while Prince Sultan retained the 
Ministry of Defence and Aviation. As first Prime .Hinister, Prince 
Fahd has conducted most of the day-to-day affairs of the Kingdom, 
for Y-ing Khalid is troubled with medical problems. However, there 
is no doubt that the loyalty is to Y.ing Khalid and he retains full 
authority as King. 
King Khalid has carried on in much the same \vay as Paisal had re-
oriented the IQngdom. Just as Ibn Saud and Faisal had before him, 
lChalid had been required to strike a finely tuned balance between 
Islamic traditionalism and modernization. The most recent emanation 
of this policy of balance was evidenced by expansion of 
governmental bureaucracy, under demands of the expanding 
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technocratic class, to include the urban middle class.48 Such a 
move not only met demand but broadened the regime's power base. The 
most significant of such movements occurred in October 1975 when the 
Council of }tinisters membership was expanded from fourteen members 
to twenty. Whereas the Council began with a majority of members 
being royal princes, its make-up changed to include only eight 
royal princes. Eleven of the new members had higher degrees, one 
had a bachelor's degree and two were prominent Islamic 
th~ologians.49 The dynamic of the oil economy and the 
traditionalism of Islamic society require that the fine tuning be a 
. 1 50 contlnua process. 
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III Conclusion 
Although by the mid 1970's the political system in Saudi Arabia was 
becoming increasingly complex because of the country's attempt to 
develop rapidly, the procedures for making decisions (domestic or 
foreign) remained much as they were during Ibn Saud's reign. Policy 
was determined in the final analYSis by one person, the King; its 
formulation depended on few other individuals. In 1976 many Saudis 
might be involved in formulating any single decision, but it was 
still the King who decided what policy should be. 
Since the legitimacy and therefore the authority of the office of 
the King was based on his ability to maintain a consensus among 
numerous factions within the country, his power was not truly 
absolute. This need for consensus has been a traditional feature in 
maintaining leadership in the Saud dynasty and is well documented. 
Although there are not political parties in the Kingdom, the 
position of the royal family in the deCision-making process can best 
be described by using an analogy with a political party or political 
interest group. After being selected by his peers, a leader 
constantly consults his committee of senior advisers in the process 
of making decisions that concern the party (royal family) or 
conditions affecting the society (Saudi Arabia). The leader's 
ability to make decisions and maintain legitimacy, however, is 
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determined through the support of party leaders and members. Party 
leaders (princes, Ulama, and others) who are close to the leader 
fill positions (such as governors, ministers, military officers, and 
others) that maintain influence over the party members (remaining 
members of the royal family, tribal leaders, and the general Saudi 
population). 
This analogy presents a model of a single-party system, and the 
decisions that are made depend on the functioning of the party at 
all levels. The royal family is open to dissension from inside and 
outside its rarli(s, but no organized opposition is permitted. This 
was the system that evolved under the rule of Ibn Saud, and it 
remained a primary rule in the 1970's and 1980's. 
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Introduction I Overview 
As discussed in chapter one, Saudi Arabia has evolved into a conservative 
~fuslim monarchy ruled by a powerful King whose authority derives from a 
large, closely knit royal family (Al-Saud), an influential group of 
religious scholars (Ularna), and tribal support as expressed by the 
allegiance of powerful tribal chiefs throughout ninety per cent of the 
Arabian Peninsula. It was found that the constitutional basis of 
government is lodged in Islamic Law (Shari 'a), as the two primary 
supports of this Islamic Law are the Sunna, or traditions, and the 
Hadith, or the sayings and actions of the prophet }fuhammad. 
Also, it was revealed in chapter one that Saudi religious conservatism 
and support for such a strict adherence to the faith are based on the 
Wahhabite movement founded by eighteenth-century religious reformer 
t.'fuhammad Al-Hahhab in the heart of the Najd region of the Arabian 
Peninsula. It was observed that the Saudi royal family has assumed, by 
fact of geography, the role of defender of the faith and protector of 
Islam's two holiest places, Hecca and Hedina. In addition to Saudi 
Arabia's special position for ~·fuslims throughout the world, the oil-
derived wealth of recent decades has added a new dimension of political 
power and influence far exceeding the country's size or religious 
stature. 
Obviously, this contemporary power and influence has given Saudi Arabia 
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international stature and has drawn the world's attention to the country 
and its institutions. So, as a result of this international prominence, 
the connection between Saudi Arabia's internal political system and the 
country's regional and international foreign policy has come into sharp 
focus. There is little doubt that its political leverage in 
international affairs stems primarily from economic factors, mainly its 
control over key deposits of petroleum and its petrodollar surpluses. 
- 48 -
I Saudi Arabia and United States Evolution of Special Relationship 
The United States-Saudi Arabian relationship evolved through many 
steps. The foundation of the relationship was established just one 
year after Ibn Saud declared his newly consolidated realm to be the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And from that basis of private economic 
interests, the relationship broadened to include national interests 
of oil, geostrategic, military, political and economic interests. 
Each of these factors remains today as an important sustainer of the 
relationship. For there has been both constant growth in depth 
within each individual factor and lateral growth of the total 
relationship by encompassment of additional factors. 
The year 1973 marked a watershed in the evolution of the 
relationship. It was in that year that the junior member of the 
bilateral relationship exercised fully independent actions to the 
detrDnent of the senior member. The results of that action so 
affected and impressed the United States and its interests, both at 
home and abroad, that the relationship thereafter would be on a 
revised basis. Nany of the old bases for the relationship would 
continue but the partnership would be on revised share interest 
proportions. Saudi Arabia has proven in a most dramatic manner that 
it \\Tould jeopardise its interests in the partnership in favour of 
regional concerns and interests. Hhile many events of the past had 
focused the attention of the policy-making elite upon the importance 
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of Saudi Arabia, no event had ever been so impressive in the scope 
of its reach and effect. Saudi Arabia gained world notoriety in 
both its importance to free-world interests and its ability to 
jeopardise those interests in favour of more nationalistic 
interests. The United States - Saudi Arabian relationship was to be 
thereafter both on a more even footing and intertwined complexity. 
In following the evolution of the relationship, this chapter will 
then approach the topic via two separate eras ••• pre-1973 and post-
1973. 
A Pre - 1973 
The genesis of the lJni ted States-Saudi Arabian relationship was in 
the form of private economic enterprise ••• economic enterprise 
between a tribal chieftain whose new-found conquests required 
financing and a private oil company which was willing to risk 
advancing the required financing in exchange for exploration rights. 
King Ibn Saud quickly found that the financial requirements of his 
newly formed state exceeded those revenues provided hy the Kingdom's 
primary source of revenue ••• the annual pilgrimage to Islam's two 
holiest cities, Hecca and Hedina. An oil concession was a possible 
source of revenue and oil had been already discovered in 
neighbouring Bahrain; thus there were a few private oil companies 
mildly interested in exploring the !~ingdom for petroleum resources. 
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As early as 1923, before complete consolidation of his kingdom, Ibn 
Saud had granted oil exploration rights to the Eastern General 
Syndicate of London. There was much opposition to such a move, 
especially from the religious leaders ••• the Ulema. They feared 
the infidel influence which would accompany outsiders drawn to the 
rangdom by oil. Undoubtedly, Ibn Saud shared some of that fear but 
his movement required funding and the sum of £2000 annual concession 
rental fees provided sorely needed income. However, Eastern General 
lost interest after two unsuccessful seasons of exploration and the 
concession was formally terminated in 1928.1 
The depression of the 1930's impacted the Kingdom's meagre revenues 
severely. Pilgrims to Mecca and ~~dina decreased from over 130,000 
in 1927 to 40,000 in 1931. 2 Further, Ibn Saud's realm had now 
expanded to include all of contemporary Saudi Arabia. And he was 
involved in a costly dispute on the border with Yemen which would 
eventually lead to 'iolar. Thus, 'i'li th increasing fiscal demands of an 
emerging nation-state escalating drastically while income decreased 
(from 'iolhat was a meagre amount to start with) Ibn Saud was forced to 
look outward for assistance and to relegate any fears of outside 
influence which his Hahhabi conservatism might suggest. 
H. St. John Philby, a former British army officer converted to 
Islam, played an important role in the United States' entrance upon 
the scene. Philby spent the last forty years of his life in Arabia 
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and was accepted in Ibn Saud's tent as confidant and adviser. 3 Upon 
Philby's advice, Ibn Saud met in 1931 with the American 
philanthropist, Charles Crane, who had represented the united States 
President Wilson a decade earlier in the King-Crane Commission to 
the }tiddle East. Crane was sponsoring development in Yemen and Ibn 
Saud asked for his assistance in assessing mineral and water 
development potential within his kingdom. The experience with the 
Eastern Syndicate Concession had raised doubts about oil resources 
and emphasis was now to be on water and possibly gold. Crane agreed 
to employ at his own expense an American mining engineer, Karl 
Twitchell, to survey the Kingdom. Twitchell completed his survey 
and returned to New York in 1932 whereupon Crane authorized him to 
make known his results to any interested company. Twitchell's 
survey still rated oil as the greatest mineral potential of Saudi 
Arabia. Only one company expressed any interest, Standard Oil of 
California (Socal). Socal had found oil in neighbouring Bahrain in 
June 1932; thus, there was some hope of realization of ~vitchell's 
reports. 
~vitchell returned to Saudi Arabia with a senior Socal executive and 
in Nay 1933 in Jidda, Socal signed a sixty-year oil concession with 
King Ibn Saud for the variously disputed sum of 35 to 50 thousand 
gold sovereigns.4 
In 1930, Texco joined in partnership with Soca1 in the Saudi venture 
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to afford the benefit of Texco's worldwide marketing facilities. 
Together the two companies formed the basis of what would later be 
known as the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). They were later 
joined by Mobil Oil Company and Exxon Oil Company, thus completing 
the American Consortium membership. Oil was not discovered in 
quantity until 1938 but that discovery was cause for re-negotiation 
of the sixty-year concession. Payments were substantially higher 
and the concession period was extended to 1999. 
Just as the concession was being re-negotiated in 1939, competition 
appeared in the form of a Japanese offer. The Japanese offer had 
been transmitted by the Italian ~linister to Saudi Arabia. At the 
same time, the German Hinister to Iraq who was also accredited to 
Saudi Arabia called in Jidda to further the drama. Twitchell 
asserts that the offer was so "fantastic" that Aramco had to admit 
that, for its part, such terms were not commercially practicable and 
that Aramco could no match such an offer. 5 Tempting or not, King 
Ibn Saud chose to continue dealing with his American friends, thus 
leaving the Japanese and the Germans empty handed. The United 
States still had not political interests in Saudi Arabia ••• there 
was no U.S. diplomatic representation accredited to the country at 
the time ••• thus it is felt that this i'78S Ibn Saud I s prime 
consideration. The Japanese and German offers could incur 
political associations while the pxamco association offered no such 
liability. 
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Adhering to his policy of non-involvement, King Ibn Saud steered his 
Kingdom on a course of neutralism in the rising political storm 
which was to be World '-Tar II. However, in spite of his neutralism, 
the Kingdom was to suffer from the war. Revenue from the new found 
life blood of petroleum exports was vastly curtailed as markets 
assumed the polarity of allied or axis camp. Tankers could no 
longer venture the long trip between the Arabian Gulf and market and 
war priorities on strategic materials such as steel curtailed Aramco 
development. Also, the Kingdom's final, basic source of revenue ••• 
the pilgrimage traffic ••• ,vas vastly curtailed by the war. King 
Ibn Saud was again in dire fiscal straits. 
He appealed to Aramco, the United States and Great Britain for 
assistance. Aramco advanced a loan of three million dollars in 
6 1940. However, this was only half of what Ibn Saud felt his 
country needed. Hith obvious concern for the future of its 
operation in Saudi .~abia, an Aramco representative, James A. 
Hoffett, met with the Roosevelt administration in April 1941 in an 
attempt to secure United States aid for the King. Secretary of 
State, Cordell Hull, prepared a memorandum for President Roosevelt 
relaying Hr. Noffett's concern that "unless King Ibn Saud receives 
financial assistance at once there is grave danger that the 
independent Arab kingdom cannot survive the present emergency ,,7 
Lacking legislative authority for such an action, President 
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Roosevelt collaborated with Britain to funnel financial assistance 
to Saudi Arabia by way of funds made available to Britain through 
American Lend-Lease Assistance. 8 Thus was established the 
precedent of United States economic aid to Saudi Arabia. 
Exactly ten years after the birth of the relationship in 1933 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia by way of an American oil 
consortium concession, the relationship was to take on more official 
overtones. In February 1943, President Roosevelt's declaration that 
"the defence of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defence of the United 
States" was a catalyst for a chain of events which would make 1943 a 
year of special significance in the evolution of United States-
Saudi Arabian government relations. 9 The primary reason for the 
declaration was to enable direct lend-lease aid to Saudi Arabia, 
thus avoiding the indirect method through Britain which had existed 
for the past two years. The growing Aramco operation had relayed 
to U.S. policy makers a perception of U.S. strategic interests in 
Saudi Arabia. Resultantly, American diplomatic representation in 
Jidda was raised in rank in July from charge to minister, an 
agreement was made in December for airfield construction at 
Dhahran and a U.S. mission arrived in July to determine Saudi 
Ar b ' , t f '1' t 't 10 alan reqUlremen s or ID1 1 ary assls ance. 
Dhahran air base was to be the initial physical evidence of the 
United States government's expression of military interests in Saudi 
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Arabia. Moreover, it represented a significant step in the 
gradual change in paramount foreign influence in the country from 
British to American. Located on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia, 
Dhahran represented a site for an air base linking Southern Asia 
with the \vestern Horld. It also represented a position of strategic 
importance in executing the Pacific war effort which was to continue 
after the war in Europe ended. And as the headquarters for Aramco 
operations in Saudi Arabia, the location would support allied oil 
interest in the country. The significance of such a project in 
diminishing British influence in the area with resultant increase in 
American influence was not lost to the British, however, for the 
American minister in Saudi Arabia reported that the British had 
engaged in "anti-American coercion of the Saudi Government" in an 
attempt to effect Saudi Arabian rejection of the American project. 
The British yielded, however, after the U.S. Secretary of State, 
Cordell Hull, protested to the British Government characterizing 
their opposition as a "reversion to dog-eat-dog policy v,Thich, if 
continued, has possibilities we are not presently able to 
appraise. ,,11 In late 1943, an agreement was reached between the 
U. S. Legation in Jidda and the 80vernment of Saudi Arabia ,vherein 
the U.S. was allowed to construct an air base at Dhahran in exchange 
for U.S. assistance in training the Saudi military.12 Negotiations 
were carried out without public notices in an attempt to avoid 
discrediting Y~ng Ihn Saud's avowed neutrality. Construction 
began at Dhahran in 1944 and was completed in 1946. 
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The July 1943 u.s. military mission to Saudi Arabia represented 
another manifestation of more active pursuit of U.S. interests in 
the country. Secretary of State Hull ordered the newly appointed 
minister to Saudi Arabia to inform King Ibn Saud and British 
representation in Saudi Arabia that Saudi Arabia and the United 
States would deal, henceforth, directly with each other in matters 
regarding arms transfers and not through the British as 
intermediary as had been the custom heretofore. And the United 
States further informed the British government that the U.S. 
believed that its contribution to King Ibn Saud's military needs 
should at least equal that of Great Britain.13 The mission was 
followed in the fall of the same year by a visit to the U. S. by 
Prince Faisa1 in negotiations for U.S. arms aid. The February 1944 
grant to Saudi Arabia of seven million riyal lend-lease package 
represented then the culmination of those significant inroads which 
had been made in 1943. 
The war prompted a view' of Saudi Arabia as something more than an 
area "Therein U.S. commercial interests were involved. Hhat Aramco 
had started as a private commercial interest had developed to 
include both diplomatic and military ties. Thus, it is not 
surprising that President Roosevelt "lished to meet the leader of the 
tribal kingdom. Indeed, Roosevelt's image of the great King had 
been sparked many years earlier by people such as Charles Crane, 
Karl 1\vitchell and l.,cmell Thomas, and by the American press. 
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Roosevelt may have considered Ibn Saud as a fellow man of his time, 
like himself and Churchi11.14 
In February 1945 while returning from Yalta, President Roosevelt met 
ICing Ibn Saud aboard the American cruiser U.S.S. Quincy in the 
Bitter Lakes of Suez~5 Subsequent to their meeting, Roosevelt 
sent Ibn Saud a personal letter referring to the "memorable 
conversation we had not so long ago" and re-stating his promise that 
there would be no United States action in regard to the question of 
Palestine "without full consultation of both Arabs and Jews".16 It 
was also as a result of the meeting with Ibn Saud that Roosevelt 
remarked to Congress, "of the problems with Arabia, I learned more 
about the whole problem, the Arab problem, the Jewish problem, by 
talking with Ibn saud for five minutes than I could have learned in 
17 
exchange of two or three dozen letters". 
Two months later, Roosevelt was dead and Harry Truman succeeded him. 
A year later, in 1946, there occurred an open tension between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia, the root cause of which was to 
continue as a source of conflict betw'een the t'YlO nations, hOivever 
great and vast their other shared interests. Tne end of the war 
brought the question of Palestine and the Je",-r1.sh refugees to a peak. 
President Truman made a public appeal for the admission of 100,000 
Jews to Palestine. Obviously offended, Ibn Saud sent President 
Truman a letter which was made puhlic, recallin8 President 
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Roosevelt's promise of no decisions without Arab and Jewish 
consultation. 18 Hithin a few months, however, in February 1947, 
King Ibn Saud and his son, the Heir Apparent Saud, were in the 
United States visiting President Truman. During the visit, 
President Truman presented both Y~ng Ibn Saud and the Heir Apparent 
with Legion of Nerit commendations for "support and encouragement 
to the cause of the allies" during Horld Har I1.19 
Any appeasement of the Saudis, however, whether intended or not, 
was rather short-lived. For the United States' de facto 
recognition of a Jewish State in Hay 1948 prompted strong reaction 
from Saudi Arabia. The American Minister to Saudi Arabia, J. 
Rives Childs, forwarded to the Secretary of State a forecast of a 
possible Saudi break in relations with the lfuited States. Further, 
he provided a rather bleak assessment of a situation ,vith so many 
ominous possibilities that he was requesting the Consulate in 
Dhahran to confer with U.S. military authorities at Dhahran with a 
"view to perfecting without delay plans of evacuation ••• ".20 
Although the situation never developed to the extent of Childs' 
worst fears, 1:1alcolm Peck reports that Faisal, ,'7ho was then Foreign 
Hinister, told Childs that he would have broken relations with the 
United States had he been in a position to do so.21 The Jewish 
State issue effected a thorn into the U.S.-Saudi relationship but 
other policy formulations of the era were to serve to strengthen it. 
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The Truman doctrine, 'Harshall Plan, war in Korea, and American and 
European rearmament were all issues of the era serving to strengthen 
the evolving United States-Saudi Arabian relationship via oil. The 
post-World Har II oil shortage scare, like that of post-~\Torld War I 
and that of a future era, served to emphasize the importance of 
Saudi Arabian oil. Oil exports from the United States to Europe 
decreased after the war, and in 1948 the United States became, for 
the first time, a net importer of crude oil. Saudi Arabia's rapidly 
increasing production and proven reserves paralleled the increasing 
needs of the free world. Saudi Arabian crude production increased 
from less that one-half million barrels in 1938 to nearly eight 
million in 1944, over 21 million in 1945, and about 200 million 
barrels by 1950. 22 By 1951, ~liddle Eastern oil was to supply 80% of 
the European Economic Recovery plan needs, thus inextricably 
intert\yining U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia via its Atlantic pact 
II " 23 a 1es. It was then in support of these interests that within the 
era the U.S. Legation in Jidda was expanded to full Embassy status 
in 1949; the agreement covering the Dhahran air base was re-
negotiated in 1951, allmving u.s. access for a long-term basis (five 
years); and concurrently with the Dhahran agreement there evolved a 
Hutual Defence Assistance Program whereby Saudi Arabia became the 
first Arab state to be designated, by the United States, as a nation 
whose ability to defend itself ,vas deemed important to the United 
24 States. 
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In 1957 there was great American concern over the inroads that the 
Soviet Union had made into the Middle East after the Suez war. As 
Lenczowski observed, 1955 was the watershed regarding Soviet 
relations with the }1iddle East. For it was in that year that they 
began rapproachement ,vith non-communist governments in the area by 
offering economic, technical and military aid. 25 As a countermove, 
President EisenhO\ver proclaimed, in January 1957, the Eisenhower 
Doctrine as both a warning to the Soviets and an offer of aid, both 
economic and military, to any ~tiddle Eastern state which requested 
it. lh thin a few weeks, King Saud was in Hashington visiting 
President Eisenhower. This was Saud's first official visit to the 
U.S. since his father's death in November 1953 and his assumption of 
the title of King. After the meeting a joint communique was issued 
wherein Saud spoke of the purpose of his visit "to continue close 
co-operation with the United States" and Eisenhower spoke, regarding 
military defence of Saudi Arabia, of his assistance to King Saud of 
the willingness of the United States to "provide assistance for the 
strengthening of the Saudi Arabian armed forces".26 King Saud 
returned to his country with a $180 million increase in American 
economic and military aid to expand training programs for the Saudi 
ftxabian Army, Navy and Air Force, and to improve Saudi civil 
aviation facilities. In return, the U.S. was granted another five-
year basing right agreement on the Dhahran air hase. 27 
Hm-7ever, that Has to be the last agreement on Dhahran basing rights. 
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For on March 19th, 1961, the Saudi government announced that the 
agreement would not be renewed upon its official expiration on April 
2nd, 1962. The perception of foreign military forces upon Arabian 
soil had become too much of a liability relative to both domestic 
and inter-Arab nationalist sentiment. 
In the summer of 1962, King Saud's brother, the Heir Apparent 
Faisa1, came to the United States. Officially, the trip was to 
undergo medical examinations but there is reason to believe that his 
exodus was also an expression of dissatisfaction with the state of 
government in Saudi Arabia. In September 1962, while Faisa1 was 
still in the United States, the monarchy in Yemen was overthrown by 
a military coup d' etat. There fo110w'ed a civil war between forces 
loyal to the royalists and those loyal to the cause of the 
revolution. Within a month, President Nasser had sent Egyptian 
troops in support of the revolutionary forces. Thus Saudi Arabia 
nOl,1 not only faced the fiscal and economic problems of YJ.ng Saud's 
regime but the government also faced a crisis situation involving 
foreign intervention in a border state. Thus in October, Prince 
Faisa1 ~.;ras persuaded to return to the IUngdom with the understanding 
that he would again be given a free reign in government. 
Upon Faisal's resumption of government, President Kennedy sent a 
personal letter to Faisal dated October 25th, 1962, wherein he 
recalled their \'Jhi te House discussion of three weeks before and 
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stated that he wanted it "understood clearly, that Saudi Arabia can 
depend upon the friendship and co-operation of the United States in 
dealing with the many tasks which lie before it in the days ahead". 
Further, President Kennedy assured Faisal of the U.S. support for 
"maintenance of Saudi Arabia's integrity". 28 
Shortly thereafter, U.S. resolve in supporting Saudi Arabian 
territorial integrity was given opportunity for demonstration. In 
November 1962, Egyptian aircraft bombed Saudi territory adjacent to 
the border of royalist forces. The United States Department issued 
a public statement deploring the incidents and making kno,vn U.S. 
"interests in the preservation of [Saudi Arabia] integrity".29 A 
squadron of United States fighter aircraft was deployed to Saudi 
Arabia as both a demonstration of lJ.S. resolve to aid Saudi Arabia 
and as a deterrent against further Egyptian bombings. 
In 1965, there evolved another linkage in the United State-Saudi 
Arabian relationship which continues today, representing to both 
countries one of the Corps of Engineers' involvement in developing 
Saudi Arabia infrastructure which has "no comparable program 
elsewhere abroad, neither in scope or context".30 The Saudi 
Arabians alli~ration of the quality of construction in the DhahrCh~ 
airfield and terminal which had been turned over to them in 1962 
prompted queries of further corps involvement in Saudi Arabian 
nation-building. Thus in 1965, a country-to-country agreement \·73S 
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concluded between the U.S. Department of State and Saudi Arabian 
}linistry of Foreign Affairs whereby the Corps of Engineers would be 
consultant, planner, administrator and general overseer for military 
construction within Saudi Arabia. Costs are fully reimbursed by 
Saudi Arabia. The agreement has been extended three times with the 
consent of both governments : 1970, 1975 and 1978. As will be seen 
in a following section, the prograw~e remains one of the most 
visible, comprehensive and important of linkages in the U.S.-Saudi 
Arabian relationship. 
Hith the struggle over Saudi Arabian political leadership 
permanently resolved in 1964, Faisal made his first official visit 
to the United States as King in June 1966. After visiting President 
Johnson, a rather non-impressive joint statement was issued wherein 
both "noted with approval the close and cordial relations which have 
long existed" between the two countries. However, the lack of any 
other substantive statements combined vlith the diplomatic 
colloquialism referring to "frank and comprehensive exchange of 
vie,vs" may suggest that all was not hannonious accord between these 
two leaders. 31 
During the 1967 Arab-Israeli 'ivar, United States-Saudi Arabian 
relations again became strained over lJ.S. policy regarding Israel. 
lung Faisal placed an embargo on oil shipments to the United States 
although its consequences were far less than a similar action would 
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be later in 1973. The United States was, in 1967, practically 
invulnerable to a Saudi Arabian oil embargo. Only 19% of 
American oil consumption consisted of imports and only 2.5% came 
from Saudi Arabia. The United States' short-fall was made up 
through imports from Iran and Venezuela, and utilization of an 
internal spare production capacity of four million barrels per 
da 32 y. Saudi Arabia abandoned their boycott within a month of 
implementation, thus allowing the incident to pass without 
significant effect upon the United States-Saudi Arabian 
relationship. 
In lfuy 1971, King Faisal visited President Nixon and in turn 
President Nixon visited King Faisal in Riyadh in July 1974. 
In 1972, Saudi Arabia made a bid for strengthening the relationship. 
In an address to the Hiddle East Institute in \~ashington on 
September 30th, 1972, Saudi Arabian Oil llinister Yamani, called for 
"a commercial oil agreement between the two countries that would 
give Saudi .~abian oil a special place in this lJnited States 
Country".33 The proposed agreement would have exempted Saudi 
Arabian oil from import restrictions and duties, and encouraged 
Saudi Arahian capital investment in the United States. The United 
States would have had first calIon Saudi Arabian oil, apparently 
even at the expense of Europe and Japan. 
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There were inherent advantages for both countries. The United 
States advantages would have included re-cycling of the growing 
American dollars being spent for oil imports and interdependency 
,Yhich would have diminished the possibility of interruptions of 
crude supplies to the country. Saudi Arabian advantages would have 
included a stable market for its increasing oil production and 
opportunity for safe, profitable investment interests were mainly in 
the downstream facilities of oil production such as refineries, 
chemical plants and possibly even a share in the owners of Aramco-
Exxon, Texaco, Hobil and Standard of California. United States' oil 
imports were being "conservatively estimated to reach 12 nunpbd by 
1980" and Saudi Arabia Ivas planning for a production capacity of 20 
mmpbd by same time period".34 The two escalating factors would then 
be mutually supportive. 
The motivation for such an offer by Saudi Arabia was felt to be a 
fear that the United States would, in tackling its energy problems, 
"enter into arrangements with Hestern hemisphere producers which 
would discriminate against Arab countries".35 Saudi Arahia was 
concerned ,.,rith a tendency to regard the !'liddle East as a volatile, 
basically anti-Hestern area. She was thus attempting to assure a 
future place for herself in the world oil market and economy. 
}Jowever, the proposal never reached a state of development beyond 
just that •.• a proposal. The United States Department of State 
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officials initially categorized the proposal as "interesting" but 
there was also speculation that such an agreement would signify "a 
new relationship with the United States".36 In the end, the 
complexity and delicacy of such an agreement and the possible effect 
upon United States oil relations with other countries made the 
proposal untimely in the United States perspective. 
Time moves quickly, however. Just one year later, on September 27th 
1973, United States Acting Treasury Secretary Hilliam Simon was 
proposing to the Saudi Arabian Hinister of State, .Hr. Hisham Nazer, 
"an economic partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia 
to ensure a continuing flow of oil to America".37 Between Yamani's 
1972 proposal and the 1973 proposal of the United States Treasury 
Secretary, the United States had lifted oil import quotas in an 
effort to meet the country's rising energy demands with cheap 1'1iddle 
Eastern oil. The lJnited States expected its then current imports 
from Saudi Arahia of 365 mbDd to rise to 8.5 mtpd by 19~O.3R 
However, the atmosphere had changed. Saudi Arabia now questioned 
,vhether or not such an arrangement ,.;ras in its political interests. 
Political tensions het\\Teen Israel and the .tu-ah countries were 
peaking and there was strong feeling hy the l~,rah countries that 
United States support of Israel was promoting "Zionist 
exPansionism". Thus, in one short year, a drastic change had 
occurred in memher perspectives within the United States-Saudi 
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Arabian relationship. The United States was seeldng a stronger 
linkage and Saudi Arabia was avoiding one. We now know that 
Egyptian President Sadat had visited King Faisal in August 1973. 
Saudi Arabia probably knew in September then that pending some 
drastic development, the line of another Arab-Israeli war would 
soon be drawn. 39 
B Post - 1973 
In 1973 there began a series of events which were to prompt an 
eventual transformation of the {mited States-Saudi Arabian 
relationship ••• a transformation Ivherein the dependent member 
became less of a dependent and the independent became less of an 
independent. 
As has been seen earlier, Saudi Arabia had always been unhappy with 
the United States policy toward Israel. lv!Uch of that first contact 
between FDR and Ibn Saud had been taken up with the subject of 
Palestine. And Truman and Ibn Saud also had public disagreement 
40 
over the matter. In 1973, however, the objections were much more 
specific. The Israeli occupation of Arab territories since the 1967 
,<Tar and the Palestinian prohlem were points foremost in the .Arab 
mind. 
King Paisal ,vas becoming increasingly frustrated by Anerican suuport 
- 68 -
of what he felt to be Israeli expansionist policies. As a leader in 
the world Islamic movement, he was equally concerned about the 
question of Jerusalem and frequently expressed a desire to pray in 
Aqsa Mosque as part of Arab Jerusalem. It must be remembered that 
his thoughts here ~vere concerned not only with his role as a leader 
of Horld Islam but also his role as King of the Hejaz and thus 
protector of the holy cities ••• one of which is Jerusalem. 
Faisal worked diligently after July 1972 in an attempt to convince 
the Nixon administration to make its Biddle East policy more "even 
handed". For it was in this month that Egypt expelled her Soviet 
advisers. Thus Faisal argued, u.s. support for Israel could no 
longer be justified by pointing out the Soviet influence in Egypt. 
By mid-1973, however, there had been no change in U.S. policy. 
In April 1Q73, Paisal sent ~tr. Yamani, the Saudi ~linister of 
Petroleum and Hineral "Resources, to 'iolashington arpressly to urge the 
iIixon administration to work for Israeli \vithdra~val from occupied 
territories. Tnere 'ivas no favourable United States response. 41 
Ha\Ting thus been frustrated in every attempt to date in changing 
u.s. policy, Faisal turned to that which he had avoided heretofore 
••• the oil 'veapon. Faisal had long advocated that [oil and 
politics should be kept senarate] but nOlv he beg-an hints that the 
t'ivO elements could he mixed. 
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In May 1973, at a meeting with the chief executives of Aramco, King 
Faisa1 warned that unless there -';vas a shift in unqualified U. S. 
support of Israel, the "traditional friendship for American business 
interest ••• in Saudi Arabia will not be preserved". He added 
further that he expected Aramco to use its influence to help make 
42 that change come about. 
In response, Aramco effected a broad campaign to influence American 
foreign policy toward the ~liddle East. Aramco representatives 
relayed their fears to the Nixon administration but the response was 
su~ed up by Aramco in this way : 
The general atmosphere was attentiveness to the message and 
acknowledgement that a problem did exist but a large degree 
of disbelief that any drastic action was imminent or that any 
measure other than those already under-.;vay were needed to 
prevent such from beginning. The impression ~7as given that 
some believe RM [His Najesty King Faisal] is crying wolf ,vhen 
1f . 43 no T,vo eXlsts. 
lJ.S. military officials and congressional delegations visiting Saudi 
Arabia T,vere briefed by }\ramco that whereas it was in .America' s 
interests that Saudi ,~abia continue its high levels of production, 
such levels were not necessarily ahvays in the best interests of the 
Saudis. Thus, the u.S. should avoid any polarity Hhich ,vQuld 
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alienate Saudi opinion by "adopting a neutral position on the Arab-
Israeli dispute and a pro-American rather than a pro-Israeli policy 
in the Niddle East". 44 The individual Aramco partners also 
approached the American public. The New York Times carried a Hobil 
advertisement which stated that "the United States must recognise 
the legitimate interests and aspirations of the Saudis ••• because 
in the last analysis we need the oil more than Saudi Arabia will 
45 
need the money". Halcolrn Peck reports that there were two basic 
American responses. 46 One group led by Secretary of State ~~illiam 
Rogers and George Schultz felt that the Saudis were bluffing while 
another was inclined to take the threat seriously but saw no 
response feasible without upsetting Israeli and United States 
domestic politics. Thus, faced with the dilemma of any response 
upsetting one of the two opposing factions ••• Israel or Saudi 
Arabia ••• the Nixon administration withheld any response. 
Paisal was undoubtedly informed of the Aramco efforts; however, 
their sincere and enthusiastic efforts as much as his own to date 
were unsuccessful. Thus, when the Egyptian President Sadat 
visited Riyadh in August 1973 to relay his war plans, Paisal made a 
decision. Saudi Arabia was able to use the oil weapon. Faisal told 
Sadat : "Give us time, we do not \-Tant to use the oil as a weapon in 
a battle which p;oes on for t"lvO or three days and then stops. He 
want to see a ~attle which goes on long enough for the ,vorld opinion 
to he Dohilized". 47 
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On October 6th, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and 
penetrated the Israels' Bar-Bav Line, thus, beginning the war which 
no official U.S. government consensus had expected. Israel suffered 
unexpected military reverses and war material was being rapidly 
depleted, that prompting the possibility of re-supply from the 
United States. On October 12th, the four executive officers of 
Aramco sent a message to Hashington urging the Nixon administration 
not to re-supply Israel with arms. They stressed "more than our 
commercial interests in the area are now at hazard" in that Japanese 
and Hestern European reliance on }liddle East oil was so deep that 
they would in no way jeopardize their own positions. Thus, should 
the United States jeopardize its own positions it may result in 
"Japanese, European and perhaps Soviet Union interest largely 
supporting United States presence in the (~liddle East J area ••• ".48 
However, U.S. re-supply of Israel may have already begun, for U.S. 
Secretary of State Y..issinger reportedly told the Israeli Ambassador 
to the United States on October 8th that Israeli El Al aircraft 
could begin picking up supplies the following day provided their 
Israeli marldngs were obliterated. 49 On October 13th, however, all 
attempts at being discreet about re-supply were a~andoned when the 
United States administration committed itself to open re-supply of 
Israel by launching U.S. Air Force giant C-S transport aircraft. On 
October 14th, the first C-S arrived in Israel initiating an 
, h 'd hI f h d d sn alr rl ge capa e 0 one t, ousan tons per _ ay. . 
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On October 19th, President Nixon asked the U.S. Congress to approve 
$2.2 billion in emergency aid to Israel. On October 20th, the Saudi 
government announced that "in vieW" of an increase in American 
military aid to Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has decided to 
halt all exports to the United States of America ••• ,,51 while a 
cease fire was declared on October 22nd, the embargo ~vas not lifted 
until Harch 19th, 1974. 52 
The United States had suffered both economically and strategically 
from the embargo. During the embargo, Saudi Arabia threatened to 
nationalize Ararnco at "gunpoint" if the consortium had sought to 
circumvent the embargo and Ararnco, realizing that the tJnited States 
could not intervene, complied fu1ly.53 The embargo W"as so effective 
that the United States could not get Aramco oil through third party 
distributors. However, the four American parent companies and three 
other of the "seven sisters" pooled their world,vide resources to 
nitigate the effects of the e~barp,0.54 Non-Arah wellhead 
production was increased and the oil companies allocated 
production as equitably as possible, thus keeping shortap,es in any 
individual country to a minimum. However, to a degree Aramco's 
forecast carne true. For in re-supplying Israel by airlift, the 
United States ,vas denied landing rights by all NATO nations 
excepting Holland and Portugal. 55 Thus, the NATO nations had 
chosen uninterrupted Arab oil flO'iv over allied friendship. 
- 73 -
Hhile there is wide variance in subjective evaluation of the overall 
effect of the embargo, there is little doubt that it made a point. 
Saudi Arabia was no longer a silent, dependent partner in the 
"special relationship". It could no longer be taken for granted. 
Politics and economics had propelled Saudi Arabia to a position of 
preeminence in the world. The oil price had increased to $22.6 
billion in 1974 and the gross domestic product increased by over 
200% in a year. 
Her possession of vast oil reserves enabled her political influence 
to spread throughout the world. 56 
The point had undoubtedly been made with the Nixon administration 
just as it had with the world. For afterwards there was intense 
international scrambling by individual countries to attempt to make 
deals and establish institutional structures to forestall such an 
occurrence again. President nixon, President Ford and Hr. Kissinger 
worked both aspects ••• that of the interests of the international 
community and that of the interests of the United States. 
In November 1973, President Nixon announced Project Independence, an 
ambitious, elusive plan for U.S. energy independence by 1980. In 
September 1974 in a speech to the United Nations (',Emeral Assembly, 
President Ford spoke of global economic interdependence and co-
operating as the only viable future approach if human survival was 
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to be guaranteed. 57 Likewise in November 1974, Secretary of State 
Kissinger, speaking in Chicago, called for oil-consuming nations to 
conserve, search for alternative energy sources and co-operate. 58 
In September 1974, as a result of U.S. initiative, the major oil-
importing countries concluded the Brussels agreement establishing 
the International Energy Agency (lEA) wherein emergency oil sharing 
agreement members would share oil with any member nation boycotted 
in the future. 59 And finally, the most important outcome for this 
study occurred as a result in part of bilateral discussions between 
U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger and Saudi Arabia Heir Apparent 
Prince Faud. 
On June 8th, 1974, as a result of Secretary Kissinger and Prince 
Faud's discussions, there evolved the United State-Saudi Arabian 
Joint Commissions on Economic and Security Co-operation. Through 
these commissions the governments "expressed their readiness to 
expand co-operation in the fields of economic, technology, and 
industry, and in the supply of the Kingdom's requirements for 
defensive purposes".60 These two commissions are formal 
organizational structures which, while acknowledging inter-
dependence between the United States and Saudi Arabia in the fields 
of economics and security, provide facilities for advancement of 
that interdependence to the mutual benefit of both countries. The 
lJnited States receives for its part, in addition to oil, a Saudi 
interest in the vitality of t1-}e economies of the lJestern norld while 
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the Saudis receive, for their part, technological goods and services 
to further their internal development and defence. 
The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and his Saudi counterpart, the 
Hinister of Finance and Economy, serve as co-chairmen of the 
economic commission while the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence 
for International Security Affairs and the Saudi Vice ~linister of 
Defence serve as co-chairmen of the Security Com~ssion. 
The first and most significant accomplishment of the Joint 
Commission on Security was a survey conducted hy the U.S. Department 
of Defence, carried out at Saudi Arabian request, on the Y~ngdom's 
defence needs for the next ten years. Resulting from that survey, 
there evolved a long-range plan of order and priority for upgrading 
and modernization of the Kingdom's defence structure. The plan 'ivas 
the most significant and encompassing effort to date within the 
kingdom. It recognized the disparity betw'een Sl. 5 trillion in 
resources (valued at 1976 prices) in a terrain as vast as the area 
of the United States east of the Hississippi and limited defence 
potential. The plan calls for maxinization of the defence potential 
through mobility and superior technological effectiveness. 
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II Current State of Relationship 
From all that has gone on before one can see that there is now a 
special relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. 
That relationship is partly a process of evolutionary events which 
started nearly a half-century ago and partly as a result of events 
which have occurred within the last decade. The two nations have 
reached a significant level of interdependence wherein there are 
vested national interests each in the other. 
From the United States perspective there is interdependence with 
Saudi Arabia in areas of : U.S. balance of payments; stability of 
the dollar as the primary, singular world currency; rate of world 
economic development; promotion of U.S. interests in the Arabian 
Gulf region; promotion of U.S. interests in the ~1iddle East region; 
promotion of U.S. interests in the Islamic world; and assistance in 
the tJ.S. objective of an overall Arab-Israeli solution. 
Similarly, from a Saudi Arabia perspective there is interdependence 
",ith the United States in Saudi Arabian internal and external 
political stability; internal development and modernization; 
financial investment; petroleum markets; and national security. 
That which is perceived as national interest can be very much a 
value judgement; thus there is room for "ride interpretation. But in 
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this chapter, I tried to minimize value judgement and emphasize 
those national interests which are evidenced by substance such as 
espoused and enacted foreign policy, organizational structures, 
commercial transaction, alliances, treaties and associations. 
This chapter then details the current national interests which 
sustain the United States-Saudi Arabian relationship. That which 
has occurred in the past has been combined with current evidence of 
substance, under the limitations previously cited, to conclude that 
there are five broad categories of national interests between the 
two countries. They are : (1) geostrategic; (2) political; 
(3) mili tary; ( 4) economi c and (5) oil. It will be evident that the 
interests are not always mutually shared to the same degree and in 
some cases may be one-sided. However, the five categories basically 
cover the most substantive sustenance of the "special relationship". 
A \£ostrategic Interests 
.A. former United States Ambassador to the Hiddle East has noted that 
the very term "Biddle East" does not refer to characteristics 
internal to the area, but arose out of the "relations to forces 
'ivhich lie beyond its borders, to external centres of power".l His 
explanation of the term's origin well describes the geostrategic 
importance of the region relative to global security and the 
international order. Hbile the ;.riddle fast is the p:101,al 
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geostrategic focal point, Saudi Arabia is the regional geostrategic 
focal point. 
The Arabian Peninsula occupies a position of geostrategic prominence 
in regard to : the Middle East; the Arabian Gulf*j the Red Sea and 
Horn of Africa; several strategic waterways; and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Comprising four-fifths of the peninsula, Saudi Arabia is 
without question the dominant power on the peninsula whether 
measured in land area, wealth, or (excepting North Yemen) 
population. 
The ~tiddle F~st is located at the junction of three continents and 
thus forms a strategic crossroad : a land, air and sea bridge 
joining Asia, Africa and Europe. Saudi Arabia dominates that 
junction both as geographic centre and as the largest single land 
mass within the juncture. Closing or restricting access to those 
bridges would have considerable adverse effect llpon both the United 
States and the free world as a whole. 
The Arabian Gulf represents a major source of energy for the United 
States and, even more, for its European and Japanese allies. Saudi 
Arabia commands the western shore of the Gulf. To the west, Saudi 
Arabia com~ands the eastern shore of the Red Sea and the eastern 
approaches to the Horn of Africa. A significant portion of Europe's 
oil traverses the Red Sea, a much shorter route than going around 
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the African Cape. The Red Sea route also provides oil for the 
United States Hediterranean fleet. 
Saudi Arabia commands the eastern shore of the Straits of Turan ••• 
Israel's only southern sea access. Egypt's closure of the Straits 
in 1967 was one precipitant of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. 
Although Saudi Arabia is not immediately adjacent to three other 
strategic waterways, its close proximity is of strategic importance. 
They are the Straits of HOrmuz, the Suez Canal and the Straits of 
Bab-el-:Nandeb. Over half of the free '~orld' s oil imports, two-
thirds of European oil imports and nearly three-quarters of Japan's 
oil imports traverse the Straits of Hormuz. Of direct concern to 
the United States is the fact that nearly 15% of the petroleum 
consumed in the lJnited States in 1979 ••• 31% of imports 
traversed the Straits. Looking at U.S. allies, over 50r of western 
Europe's petroleum consumption and 70% of Japan's Petroleum 
consumption traversed the Straits. 2 And last but certainly not 
least, virtually all of Saudi Arabia's export production traverses 
the Straits. 3 
--------~- -
------
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Geostrategic Importance of Saudi Arabia 
U.S.S.R. 
U.S.S.R. 
TURKEY-
SAUDI ARABIA 
SUDAN 
SOMALIA 
Source Robert G. Irani, "U.S. Strategic Interest in Iran and Saudi 
Arabia", Parameters Vol. 1. VII, ~To. 4,1977, p. 253. 
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The Strait of Bab-el-rmndeb, like the Suez canal, serves as a 
passageway for substantial shipping traffic between the 
Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. Additionally, it serves as a route 
of approach for sea cargo destined for the Saudi Port of Jidda, 
Jordan's Port of Aqaba, Israel's Port of Elat and various other 
Egyptian, Sudanese and Ethiopian ports. Like the Suez Canal and the 
Strait of Turan, Bab-el-Handeb plays a potentially significant role 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Fach is bounded on both sides by Arab 
or .Arabic speaking countries and serves as the only passage\Vay for 
the Israeli Port of Elat. Ship passage through Bab-el-Handeb in the 
mid-1970's averaged seventy ships per day.4 
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B Political Interests 
There is strong mutuality of national political interests between 
the United States and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia represents to the 
United States a Prominente vlithin three spheres ••• Arab, Islamic 
and Third Horld nations ••• each of which the United States is 
vitally concerned with. Moreover, each of these three spheres plays 
an ever-increasing role of importance in a world of rising 
multipolarity and interdependence. 
To Saudi Arabia, the United States represents the arch-defender in a 
world still possessing vestiges of bi-polarity. The ideology of 
communism is abhorred by the Saudi Arabians, for its atheism, its 
revolutionary basis and its socialism. Thus, the United States 
represents the alternative force of strength, that which has the 
capability of ultimate opposition to that which the Saudi Arabians 
abhor. 
l'lhile Saudi Arabia began to exercise international intercourse to a 
degree after 'hTorld Har II, the era of King Faisal is perhaps a 
better point in history to mark as the turn from semi-isolationism 
to active intercessor. Saudi Arabia was a founding member of the 
Arab League in 1945 and attet11pted to commit troops in the Arab-
Israeli was of 1948. Rut the troops never made it to the front 
because of transportation problems ane'! the "Arab Cold t':ar" ,vhich 
- 83 -
ensued after the Free Officers' Coup in Egypt in 1952 forestalled 
any widespread success for the Arab League. S Under Faisal's 
leadership, the country seemed to have fully visualized the linkage 
between internal security and external affairs. To this day, 
foreign policy is very much motivated by the perception of how 
internal security will be affected by external affairs. 6 
The psychological successes of the oil boycott of 1973-1974 and the 
vast surpluses reSUlting from the price increases propelled Saudi 
Arabia from a mere regional role to a political actor role of 
international consequence. Saudi Arabia ~.;ras then sought after as an 
international market, a financier of both regional and international 
significance, a mediator of disputes, a source of energy and for a 
voice of moderation within OPF~ pricing policy. Thus, the role of 
regional actor which was effected late in 1967 w'as now expanded to 
include the Islamic "Oorld, Third T\Torld and industrialized nations. 
The role played by Saudi Arabia within the World of Islam and Third 
World nations is very much like that played as a regional leader. 
The Saudi Arabians' great influence w'ithin the Islamic I'iorld is 
prompted by the combined historical facts of cultural heritage, 
possession of Islam's holiest shrines and financial utility. The 
Saudi Arabian's Hahhabi School of Islamic Jurisprudence represents 
perhaps the most orthodox within Islam. The responsibility 
entrusted by possession of the holy places is one \·7hich the Saudi 
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Arabians have met with full resource. The transformation of the 
annual pilgrimage in less than fifty years from an arduous journey 
involving banditry and exploitation occurred primarily because of 
the policy and effort of the Saudi Arabian government. 7 
Financial resources provide a method of levering within each of the 
spheres in which Saudi Arabia plays a role plus opening 
opportunities outside the spheres. Aid, both grant and loan, is 
given most heavily to members of the Arab and Islamic spheres with 
the former receiving the predominant portion. According to the 
Financial Times of London, $1.55 billion was disbursed in 1977, $3.6 
billion in 1976, $3.87 billion in 1975, and $2.37 billion in 1974.8 
In 1978, Saudi Arabia spent about 2.32% of gross national product 
(G1W) on foreign aid, compared with 4.3% the year before. This is a 
significant drop but 2.32% is still far ahead of industrial 
countries lending in percentage terms. If aid performance were 
measured as a proportion of a country's fixed assets, then Saudi 
Arabia would be still further ahead. Armed with such figures, 
Saudi Arabia can exercise significant political leverage 1;vithin its 
spheres of influence. 9 Table I shmvs the relative priority of Saudi 
Arabian aid. 
Dig Saudi .krabian aid reCipients other than the Arab confrontation 
states include Sudan, a friendly government just across the Red Sea; 
Horth Yemen, a buffer against Harxist South Yemen; ami Pakistan, 
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where moves toward a more rigid Islamic law are viewed with favour. 
Non-Arab Africa and Asia have also received Saudi Arabian aid but 
emphasis remains strongly with Arab countries. The Saudi 
government increased the grant element of its foreign loans from 45% 
of loans in 1976 to 51% in 1977 and 57% in 1978. Three-quarters of 
those new grants committed in 1978 were to Arab countries. In 
addition to these OEeD publicized grants, there are more discreet, 
direct government-to-government grants between Saudi Arabia and 
"Israeli confrontation" states such as Jordan and Syria. 10 
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Table I 
Saudi Arabian Foreign Aid in 1975 and 1976 
Recipients 
Afghanistanb 
Bahraina 
Comergunc 
Chada c 
Comaro Islands 
Congo
a
C 
Egypt b 
Ethiogia c 
Gabon b 
Gu " c J 1nea 
Indonesia 
JordBna }Ja1i c 
~1 "t "ac 
·aur1 aR~a 
Noroc§o 
Nigerh
C 
A....~ a_ 
vwan 
PakistfSg 
Rwanda c 
Senegal b 
S 1 " a c ,oma 1a 
S "a yr1a 
Thailand 
TogaC 
Tuni . ac S1a 
TurkeYbc 
Uganda b 
Yemen (North~~ 
Yemen (PDRY) 
Total 
Arab States 
Islamic States 
Least Developed States 
African States 
Non-Arab African States 
Afghanistan, India 
Pakistan & bangladesh 
1975 
18.3 
1.7 
17.4 
1.7 
948.9 
1.0 
10.4 
49.3 
16.0 
25.0 
13.2 
100.0 
74.8 
5.0 
17.2 
242.2 
2.0 
19.5 
10.0 
5.3 
94.8 
1,780.0 
1,603.9 
1,603.9 
269.2 
1,187.5 
70.6 
93.1 
% of 
Total 
1.0 
0.1 
1.0 
0.1 
53.3 
0.1 
0.6 
2.8 
6.9 
2.0 
0.7 
4.6 
4.2 
0.3 
1.0 
13.6 
0.1 
1.1 
0.6 
0.3 
5.3 
90.5 
99.5 
15.1 
66.9 
4.0 
5.2 
1976 
7.8 
100.0 
0.1 
2.1 
4.1 
496.8 
0.2 
6.9 
165.0 
94.1 
2.1 
514.8 
5.0 
22.8 
189.8 
75.6 
1.1 
0.1 
121.8 
100.0 
2,073.7 
1,453.8 
1,990.8 
418.4 
789.9 
12.7 
522.8 
% of 
Total 
0.4 
4.8 
0.005 
0.1 
0.2 
24.0 
0.01 
0.3 
8.0 
4.5 
0.1 
24.8 
0.2 
1.2 
9.1 
3.6 
0.05 
0.005 
5.9 
4.8 
70.1 
96.0 
20.2 
38.2 
0.6 
25.2 
Islamic States sho,vn in italic aArah State bLeast developed cAfrica State 
Source: Arabia and the Gulf, 24th July 1978 
Dawisha, Saudi Arabia's Search for Security, (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), p.lR. 
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Saudi Arabia also stands as a supporter of Third World developing 
nations by acting as a chief proponent for North-South dialogue and 
establishing special petrodollar recycling funds for the Third World 
oil importers. 
And lastly but certainly not least, two recent examples have sho,vu 
Saudi Arabia's international influence even outside these spheres of 
special affinity. Canada reversed a decision to re-locate its 
embassy in Israel to Jerusalem after being reminded of national 
economic interests in Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom issued a 
diplomatic apology when its national media carried a controversial 
film on Saudi Arabia (Death of a Princess). 
Saudi Arabia also represents to the United States a vital transducer 
of sorts within the overall goal of Arab-Israeli conflict 
resolution. Herein lies the area in which the two nations' 
interests are askew. Both seek the same ultimate objective 
resolution of the conflict ••• but each nation sees a different path 
to the ultimate goal. The United States represents the chief 
financier of the State of Israel while Saudi Arabia is a leading 
f " " f' PI'" 11 lnanCler 0 tne a estlnlans. This divergence of national 
interests has existed from the earliest period of formal diplomatic 
relations between the two nations and has been overcome only by the 
moderation and conservatism of the two. It should be pointed out, 
however, that the United States-Saudi Arabian relationship is older 
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than the United States-Israeli relationship. 
As previously mentioned, ultimately the TJnited States represents to 
Saudi Arabia the arch-defender against communism, the leading world 
advocate of the status quo and the largest free-world power within 
the vestiges of a bi-polar world. However, in more immediate 
interests, the United States represents to Saudi Arabia the prime 
leverage, short of hostilities, toward "Israeli intransigence in 
zionist expansionist policy". A former American Ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia reports that King Faisal saw specific linkages between 
zionism and communism. Although committed to American friendship, 
Faisal believed that United States support of Israel "opened up the 
entire Huslim world to Soviet penetration" and that such support was 
"an aberration" for America's more important interests "ally in the 
Arab and 11uslim world, not in Israel ••• " .12 There is little reason 
to think that present Saudi Arabian views differ. 
Thus, 1·,rhile seeking continued interests in the United States, the 
Saudi _~abians can become exasperated by lJnited States' policy 
toward Israel. This gives rise to a faction of oDposition Ivithin 
Saudi Arabia very much opposed to current policy regarding United 
States friendship and Soviet rejection. Like that faction of 
opposition regarding oil policy (and likely the same faction), this 
group suggests that Saudi Arahian political alignment \vith the 
United States is more to the country's detriment than good. "I:.Jhile 
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many signals have occasionally been lit that Saudi Arabia may move 
toward a more conciliatory status with the Soviet Union, none have 
been fulfilled to date. l3 
Thus, the most direct political interest that Saudi Arabia has in 
the United States is inherent with problems. For while most Saudi 
Arabians probably view the United States as a primary stimulus upon 
~tidd1e East regional security and tranquillity, the effect of the 
stimulus is viewed in differing ways. Some may see the United 
States as a required actor in any type of settlement while others 
may see United States policy as the primary stimulus of regional 
turmoil. Like the United States, Saudi Arabian foreign policy must 
be considerate of domestic perceptions/politics. 
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c Military Interests 
There exists within the military field a mutuality of national 
interests also. Saudi Arabia has always been dependent to a 
certain degree upon external sources for military security, 
assistance and Western governments, the United States paramount 
among them, have been amenable in providing that assistance. For 
each has viewed the security of Saudi Arabia as within their own 
national interests. But like the relationship as a 'whole, the 
events of 1973-74 have heightened the area of military interests 
in both intensity of interest and scope of complexity. 
The British wtthdrawal from east of Suez, the Arab-Israeli war of 
October 1973 and increased w'orld oil demand were each events of the 
era which served to propel the area of military interests to a scale 
of greater intensity and complexity. The British withdrawal 
represented the departure of a powerful overseer, leaVing a sense of 
vulnerability in the Arabian Gulf* region and, indeed, in the 
l-Vestern Horld. The vulnerability was further heightened by the vast 
appreciation of the area's oil resources within a Horld perceiving 
oil shortages. There resulted thereafter a vast effort within the 
area, aided and even prompted in large part by the Hestern Horld, to 
increase inherent military capahility. The P.S.A. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency cites the total value of military deliveries to 
the I·fiddle F.ast as increasing from ,S4.6 billion in the period 1970-
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72 to $10.6 billion in the succeeding three years. Oil-exporting 
countries such as Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were particularly 
active in developing military capability with their new-fol1nd 
revenues. 
Saudi Arabia still faces problems which severely limit its self-
defence capability in spite of its vastly increased financial 
capability to acquire the best in military training and equipment. 
These problems, which are not likely to change significantly over 
the next decade, are : 
(1) A large geographical area to defend ••• as large as 
the United States east of the }tississippi P~ver 
with an extended coastline ••• over 2,000 miles along 
the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf. 
(2) A severely limited population hase ••• estimated at 
five million ••• from which to draw military manpower. 
(3) An untested and hence unproven military capability 
outside the realm of small horder disputes. 
At first glance, a large geographical area suggests an advantage of 
being able to trade space for time. But such an attrihute comhined 
'-lith a sparse population makes defence of the entire p,eography 
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nearly impossible. The most coveted target for an enemy of Saudi 
Arabia would most likely be the oil industry which is vulnerably 
concentrated within a small area along the Arabian Gulf Coast. The 
destruction or capture of the oil industry would mean the demise of 
14 Saudi Arabia as a regional power of any consequence. Saudi 
Arabia's security problem of geography is, therefore, dramatic. 
Nanpower problems are no less severe. Saudi Arabian armed forces, 
like u.S. forces, are all volunteer. The rapidly expanding private 
sector within Saudi Arabia has offered competition, within an 
already limited market, for manpower. It has thus become 
increasingly difficult for the armed forces to meet manpm.;rer 
requirements. The Saudi Arabian government has for quite some time 
considered instituting a draft to remedy the situation but, to date, 
h t ff d f · 1 d .. 15 as no 0 ere up any lna eC1Slon. Thus, as a sort of 
substitute for manpower, the Saudi Arabians are concentrating upon 
highly effective, mobile military defence hardware. Emphasis is on 
manpmoler effectiveness. 
The Saudi Arahian military capability is largely untested. F1hile 
it is true that ICing Ibn Saud's unification of the Kingdom in the 
early part of the century was due in large part to his military 
might, it was the last significant test of military effectiveness. 
The basis of Saudi Arabian military structure since becoming a 
nation has been defence strategy. Ahility heyond that strategy has 
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thus been weak to non-existent. Support units were contributed to 
the Palestine Har of 1948 and the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 
1973, but these actions were more symbolic than substantive. In two 
other cases, Saudi Arabian troops have been rallied in defensive 
displays of strength ••• 1957 in Amman in a show of support for King 
Hussein against Syrian threats and a 1961 massing on the Yemen 
border in a show of support for royalist forces in Yemen. But, even 
one of these, the Yemen case, required a deployment of United States 
fighters to Saudi Arabia in support of the country's territorial 
. . 16 lntegrlty. 
The country's financial resources now enable it to acquire the 
latest in defensive technology but there is some question as to 
whether or not Saudi Arabia's technology absorptive capacity is 
equal to its financial capacity. The past and present social, 
economic, and cultural isolation from the rest of the world exceeds 
that of any other regional state excepting Ye~en and Oman. Thus, 
financial ability does not necessarily include the ability to 
rapidly absorh the human ability to operate them. A 1977 C~neral 
Accounting Office Study, vn1ile supportive of arms sales to Saudi 
Arabia as within the U.S. national interest, was critical of the 
fact that there had been no assessment of Saudi Arahian self-
sufficiency in operating and maintaining its arms. 17 
For all the reasons cited above and shown quantitatively in Table 
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II, Saudi Arabian military strength falls far short of representing 
any regional military power. Those powers which Saudi Arabia 
regards as threats include Israel, Iran, Iraq and the Yemens. 
Israel has made repeated suggestions that whereas Saudi Arabia was 
excluded from active confrontations in past Arab-Israeli wars, any 
future Israeli war strategy would have to include consideration of 
the Saudi Arabian F-15's and the oil weapon. Such suggestions, 
along with Israel's historical reliance upon pre-emptive strike 
strategy, are sufficient grounds for regarding Israel as a possible 
adversary in active conflict.1S 
Iran and Saudi Arabia represented ••• until the fall of the Shah 
the supposed "t,Yin pillars" of Gulf security. However, it was a 
wary, imbalanced partnership. There were social, cultural, economic 
and military differences 'vhich could never be reconciled. Moreover, 
Iran's seizure in 1971 of the Gulf islands Abu ~fusa and Greater and 
Lesser Tu~bs raised grave questions in _Arab minds as to what purpose 
Iranian power was destined. The present transition in Iran has 
weakened the military power but such ,.;reakening may only be a 
momentary product of the transition. Regardless, the social, 
clutural and economic differences remain. Although the Saudi 
Arabians do not espouse it publicly, there is little doubt that they 
regard Khomeini Shiisrn as a threat equal to any that existed 1L.'1der 
Iranian monarchical rule. 
Saudi l\rabia 
Israel 
Iran 
Iraq 
Kmmit 
Yemen Arab Republic (North) 
People's Democratic Repuhlic 
of Yemen (South) 
lTAE 
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Table II 
Hiddle Eastern Nilitary Forces 
Armed Forces 
--
44,500 
If 00,000 
415,000 
222,000 
11 ,100 
36,600 
22,800 
25,150 
Battle Tanks 
550 
3050 
1985 
1900 
280 
232 
260 
30 
Combat Aircraft 
217 
576 
447 
339 
50 
11 
109 
52 
Naval Vessles 
134 
63 
40 
49 
31 
10 
16 
9 
Source The t.Tilitary l")alance, 1979-19110 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
Hote Iran's figures are pre-revolution. Current manpower and serviceability are questionable. 
I. I 
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Iraq has, since its 1958 revolution, represented a leftist, 
revolutionary oriented regime which, on occasion, has been 
identified with activity to undermine Saudi Arabian security. 
Moreover, its communist contacts and Soviet supplied military have 
caused apprehensive concern within Saudi Arabia. Revolution in Iran 
and a perception of common danger have nm.;r caused Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq to seek discreet mutual ties. However, the collaboration is 
most likely much like that of the "twin pillar" scheme under 
monarchical Iran ••• a ,.;rary association full of apprehension 
regarding the imbalance in military power and the contrasting 
doctrines of Baathism versus traditionalism. 
A consolidated North and South Yemen has long been a prospect 
outside Saudi l\rabia' s interests. Hith perennial border conflict 
between Saudi Arabia and North Yemen, a consolidated Yemen would 
represent a potential power of consequence. l'foreover, with a 
marxist government and communist-supplied military in South Yemen, 
lq 
the threat takes on a double-edge. / Saudi Arabia has long sought 
to influence both countries through aid and to aid North Yemen in 
any military conflict with South Yemen. Results, however, have been 
. 20 
more momentary than representative of any long-term realignment. 
m1ile the discussion heretofore has dealt ,.;rith external security, 
there is another aspect which must he mentioned and that is internal 
security. For it is undoubtedly a common interest of both the 
- 97 -
United States and the Saudi Arabian government that there not be any 
radical reversal of the status which presently exists therein. 
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger summarized this United 
States interest in a London speech by saying that the fall of the 
House of Saud would represent a "major blow to Hestern interests in 
the Arabian Gulf region". 21 
The threats to Saudi Arabian internal security are numerous. A vast 
expatriate labour force comprising every nationality and degree of 
fervour and emotion from American through Palestinian to Yemeni is 
one; some estimate their numbers comprise to as much as 16 to 40% of 
the native Saudi population. A religious duty to maintain an open-
door policy for two million annual pilgrims is another; many stay 
over in the country after completing the pilgrimage and their 
political leanings may prompt all sorts of problems from lChomein 
Shiism to Iranians and Iraqis trying to simultaneously complete the 
pilgrimage while their two countries conduct war against each other. 
Another possible threat to internal security is the view taken by 
many lluslims of conflict bet,veen Islam and all the vestiges of 
modernism; the TUngdom's interest manifestation of this threat 
occurred at Necca during the 1979 pilgrimage. Add to each of these 
the vulnerability of the TZingdom' s oil facilities to sabotage and 
disruption, and one ,\Till see the importance of internal security 
T..;rithin the Kingdom. 
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Saudi Arabian interests in the United States, therefore, lie in the 
area of U.S. assistance in closing the gap between military security 
requirements and military security capability. Such assistance can 
be in the form of weapons transfers, advising, administering, 
training, manpower assistance and ultimately ..• support by U.S. 
military forces. Alfred L. Netherton, U.S. Department of State 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, confirmed the lJnited 
States' involvement in that interest in 1977 testimony before 
Congress. He described arms sales to Saudi Arabia as reflecting 
"U.S. interests in the security of Saudi Arabia affirmed by every 
President since FDR ••• current [arms sales] policy seeks to 
maintain the continuity of this relationship ••• ".22 The 
relationship was maintained by $4.5 billion in arms sales in 1978, 
$6.0 billion in 1979 and a projected $5.7 billion in 1980. 23 These 
arms sales are administered by an in-country U.S. }lilitary 
Assistance and Advisory Group ~.;rhich, in 1978, was exceeded in size 
only by those in Iran and South Korea. 24 The total U.S. personnel 
commitment to Saudi Arabia of 27,300 is made up of 700 diplomatic 
personnel, 2,600 Department of Defence personnel and 24,000 private 
A.' •• h . 1 d' d d 25 nnerlcan cltlzens, eac catef,ory lnc u,lngepen ants. Hhile many 
of the private U.S. citizens are under contract to private 
commercial interests, a significant number are involved in privately 
contracted defence technological support and training. The Horthrop 
Corporation F-5 aircraft program and the Vinnell Corporation's 
involvement in training of the National Guard are t~;ro current 
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examples. Assimilation of the recently purchased F-15 fighter 
aircraft will be a future demand for manpower assistance. 
u.s. Corps of Engineers involvement in security assistance to 
Saudi Arabia represents both a unique and highly successful aspect 
of the programme of U.S. assistance. There are 1450 U.S. government 
employees devoted full-time to fulfilment of the Corps programme in 
Saudi Arabia, 950 within the Kingdom (plus 1200 dependants) and the 
remainder in the 1J.S. In administering a program estimated at $20-
25 billion in the next ten years, the Corps' success has prompted 
enquiries from close political associates of Saudi Arabia (Yemen, 
Sudan and Oman) as to the possibility of acquiring similar aid. The 
key probably lies in whether or nor the Saudi Arabians would be 
26 
willing to finance such programmes. 
The ultimate Saudi Arabian military interest in the United States of 
defence by D.S. military forces has been evidenced on several 
occasions, both in an earlier period of the relationship and more 
recently. It has already been mentioned how U.S. fighter aircraft 
were deployed to Saudi Arabia in 1962 in demonstration of United 
St t ' t f S d' Ar b' .. 1 . . 27 a es suppor 0 LaU·l a .. lan terrltorla lntegrlty. Similar 
acts were taken in 1979 and 19AO. In January 1979, a unit of United 
States F-15' s 'i'laS deployed to Saudi )\rahia in the wake of the 
Iranian crisis; in ~!arch of the same year, tuo airborne "larning and 
control (AI·,JAC) aircraft 'i{ere deployed to Saudi ilrahia during a South 
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Yerneni threat against North Yemen; and in fall 1980, four AlvAC's 
were deployed to Saudi Arabia during the Iraq-Iran war. While each 
act was publicized as "unarmed aircraft", it was a clear message of 
United States commitment to Saudi Arabian security.28 
Unlike Saudi Arabian military interests in the United States, United 
States military interests in Saudi Arabia are not so formally 
structured or evidenced. To be sure, the United States would 
welcome lJ.S. basing rights in Saudi Arabia along with some form of 
defence alliance. 
Source 
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u.s. Corps of Engineers Locations in Saudi .~abia 
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The former justification for basing rights in Dhahran would now have 
to be modernized only slightly to accommodate the so called Carter 
"Doctrine" for protection of vital U.S. interests in the Arabian 
~llf*. But the same forces which caused Saudi Arabia to abrogate 
the Dhahran agreement in 1961 exist today in even stronger 
proportions. The increased threat represented by the Soviet move 
into Afghanistan has still been insufficient to move Prince Fahd 
from the position that his government would not grant the United 
States "military bases or facilities" in Saudi Arabia. 29 Likewise, 
the Saudi Information Hinister declared to his populace in 1980 that 
there were no foreign military bases in the Kingdom and that there 
would never be any foreign military bases in Saudi Arabia. 30 
Sovereignty, nationalism, nonalignment and eschewal of any vestige 
of imperialism are the accepted basis for international stance 
within the Arab world. The United States, therefore, must look 
toward countries who consider the losses to he incurred in 
extending U.S. basing rights offset by other gains. Saudi Arabia is 
not one of them. As Hilliam Quandt has noted, "Saudi Arabian Arab 
and Islamic ties ivill often prevail over relations ,vith the U.S.". 31 
The present and continued United States involvement in Saudi Arabian 
military affairs is, however, a vital U.S. interest even short of an 
ultimate aspiration of basing rights. (And many, including myself, 
would argue as to whether or not basing rights are in the ultimate 
interest of the TJnited States or Saudi Arahia). Hhile the Saudi 
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Arabians espouse Arab defence of their own interests, there is 
little doubt that they would welcome or possibly even expect u.s. 
aid in defence against an outside force. Thus, the familiarity with 
the locality, individuals and equipment, and the standardization 
resultant from United States' involvement in Saudi Arabian military 
security programmes are a vital u.S. military interest in Saudi 
Arabia. The absence of formal alliances and basing rights makes 
Saudi Arabia no less of an American military interest. It is a 
characteristic of the regional environment which must be met with 
innovative defence strategy. 
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D Economic Interests 
u.s. trade with Saudi Arabia, together with the interdependence which 
it fosters, is of considerable significance to the United States. 
Over the past few years, Saudi Arabia has become the seventh largest 
foreign marlret for U.S. goods, services, and technology, exclusive of 
military sales. It is the most rapidly expanding market for u.s. 
exports. Total Saudi imports, estimated at S25 billion in the 
calendar year 1979, have been increasing at a 25% annual rate. 
u.S. exports to Saudi Arabia in 1980 were 85.76 billion - a 20% 
increase over 1979 - and represented approximately one-fifth of the 
total Saudi imports and 2~~{' of u.S. exports in 1980. The following 
Table indicates the scope of U.S. trade with the Kingdom. 
u.s. Trade with Saudi Arabia 
[In billions of dollars] 
1977 1978 
U.S. imports: Petroleum (Crude) 2.29 5.28 
Other 0.05 0.02 
Total 6.34 5.30 
tJ. S. exports: Food/ A"1imals o.ib 0.30 
!'1anufactured (',(lods 0.43 0.55 
Hachinery/Transport Equipment 2.10 2.53 
Other 0.85 o. (n 
Total 3.54 4.2q 
Source U. S. DeDartment of Commerce, Bureau of the 
1979 
7.85 
0.13 
7.98 
0.30 
0.63 
2.86 
l.rn 
L~. 80 
Census. 
1980 
12.30 
00.20 
12.50 
00.30 
00.74 
03.61 
01.11 
05.76 
--
U.S. 
Exports/General Imports: Horld Areas by Schedule B Commodity 
Grouping (ftnnual). 
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\·fuile u.s. merchandise trade with the Kingdom is in deficit, this is 
offset by U.S. earnings on services, including substantial earnings 
of American oil companies, and U. S. military sales. Horeover, there 
is a huge flow of Saudi investment funds into the United States. 
During the 1974-78 period, for example, the average annual net 
capital inflmv into the United States was $5.1 billion.1 
There appears to be considerable promise for increased U.S. exports 
and trade growth following the inauguration of Saudi Arabia's third 
5-year plan 1980 - in May 1980. Total Saudi Government expenditures 
during the plan period, exclusive of military expenditures and Saudi 
foreign aid donations, have been projected as exceeding S285 billion. 
\~ile concentration in the second 5-year plan 1975 - had been on 
basic infrastructure, including ports, airports, highways, and 
telecommunications, investment in infrastructures under the third 
plan it will be reduced to 35% - compared to 50% previously - and 
spending in the productive sectors will increase from 25 to 37.3%. 
The emphasis appears to lie in maintaining and even increasing the 
Kingdom's strength in the Horld Oil market and its international 
financial reserves. Domestically, the goal is to encourage 
industrial development, decreasing dependence upon the use of foreign 
manpmver, and fostering a more efficient and skilled Saudi labour 
force. 
Emphasis on rapid industrialization is aimed at reducing, in relative 
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terms, the Saudi economy's dependence on the oil sector. There is a 
stronger commitment toward distributing the benefits of modernization 
throughout Saudi society in part through the development of 
indigenous labour resources. Such a commitment is perceived to be an 
important element in balanced economic grmvth and essential to 
maintain traditional social and political structures ,.;rhich had shown 
signs of stress during the second plan. 2 The large increases in 
social welfare expenditures reflect the desire to maintain internal 
stability. At the same time, the even larger increases in economic 
development allocations indicate the government's priorities in this 
area. Construction is forecast at a total of some $132.53 billion 
under the third plan. Private sector investment growth, an important 
feature of the plan, is expected to expand by more than 10% per year 
to reach a total of 860.24 billion by 1985. 
The petroleum industry objectives are stated in broad terms : Output 
will be governed by the resources required for the implementation of 
the development plan and the need to conserve reserves, rather than 
an automatic response to world market requirements. 3 No specific 
level of crude oil production has been targeted, while prices are to 
be set to maintain the real value of a barrel of crude. Recent 
events and statements by Saudi spokesmen, however, have indicated 
that Saudi Arabia attaches greater value to relatively lmver and 
stable oil prices than the thirn plan docUJ11ent would suggest. 
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An entirely new emphasis has been placed on regional development. 
Concern with the potential problem of massive migration of rural 
populations into cities is addressed in the third plan by programmes 
to make secondary towns and villages more habitable. Accordingly, 
increased expenditures have been planned for agriculture, housing, 
schools, rural development, communications, rural electrification, 
health and city beautification. Some 15 major provincial to,~s have 
been designated as national development service centres, and 52 
smaller towns or villages as district centres. 
Total Saudi imports, estimated at about $25 billion in 1977, are 
increasing at an annual rate of 25J.:. '\-lith a market share somewhat 
greater than 20%, the United States recently remains the Kingdom's 
leading supplier of goods and services. Although Saudi Arabia has 
overvlhelmingly favoured American contractors in its construction 
imports, U.S. companies are increasingly finding competition from 
Asian and European firms. A~erican businessmen in Saudi Arabia have 
pointed out that awards to u.S. contractors in the field of 
construction have steadily dropped from 9% of the total in 1975 to 
6% in 1978 and to 3% in 1979 and 1980.4 In military and civil 
construction contracts let to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 
Saudi Arabia, the U.S. share of \vork has decreased from 35r~ in 1975 
to 57:< in 1978 and to 27; in 1979. 5 The American businessmen pointed 
out that, as a result of these declines, u.s. exports to Saudi 
Arabia have shown no real dollar gro~Tth when adjusted for a 12~~ 
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inflation rate. 
The declining competitiveness seems to have resulted from a 
combination of government and corporate characteristics. The firms 
themselves emphasize the relative disadvantage they believe 
themselves to be at because of more liberal practices of governments 
of competing foreign firms. They argue that foreign firms receive 
support from their respective governments, ranging from effective 
subsidies to outright ownership, control, and supply labour. The 
single factor most often cited by American firms operating in the 
Kingdom has been the current tax and interpretation of the individual 
foreign-earned income legislation, sections 911 and 913 of the 
Internal Revenue Code which require Americans to pay tax or income 
earned in Saudi Arabia. In addition, American firms have reportedly 
been placed at a disadvantage by anti-boycott, anti-corruption, and 
anti -tariff lmvs. 
A number of u.s. construction and engineering firms operating in 
Saudi Arabia - including E-echtel, PI vor, Ralph A. Parsons, Dravo, 
Raymond International, and Horrison-T~udson listed reasons for their 
declining performance in the JQngdom that included private sector as 
6 
'vell as government factors. These include : 
A lack of government assistance compared '-lith that given by 
competitor's goverTh~2nt; 
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- U.S. products lack competitiveness because of poor quality control 
and unreliable deliveries; 
The application of U.S. moral standards under U.S. legislation 
with respect to anti-bribery, tax rules and environment; 
High freight costs to the Niddle East from the United States make 
American equipment excessively expensive; 
Because American engineers are taxed at lJ.S. rates, they must be 
paid from two to four times what a "lest C'..erman or British engineer 
earns; 
U.S. technology is no longer superior; and 
Some other countries, unlike the TJnited States have government 
agencies that are prepared to back construction firms with 
government insur&~ce against political risk or to supply 
performance bonds and advance payment bond coverage. 
A General Accounting Office (GAO) survey of 250 American companies in 
rfarch 1981 showed that about 55~ of firms resDonding to a GAO 
questionnaire stated the costs of compliance ,"ith the accounting 
standards of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act were greater than 
henefits received. 7 In addition, more than 30~ of the respondents 
engaged in foreign husiness cited the anti-bribery provisions of the 
act as a cause of U.S. companies losing overseas business. According 
to the survey, aircraft and construction firms claim to have heen 
particularly hard hit. 
- 110 -
Aircraft and high technology firms would be affected by cuts in the 
U.S. Export-Import Bank's lending authority and could face increasing 
competition from foreign contractors whose governments subsidize 
their bids with tax and supplier credits. 
That the factors determining U.S. competitiveness relate to both 
government and corporate circumstances is suggested by the fact that 
U.S. service firms in non-construction areas possess 56% of the 
market in Saudi Arabia. Under the third 5-year plan, the Saudi 
government \vill likely continue to seek P~erican expertise in service 
and intellectual areas. There \07ill be increasing demand for the 
operation and management of buildings and all types of facilities in 
the Kingdom. The stress being placed on improving health and social 
services, education and training of all kinds ,viII provide ne\07 
opportunities for U.S. companies in areas where TJ.S. contractors and 
consultants already are successful. 
A grmoJing contract field for u.s. firms has been that of manpower 
training. Such training is part of every major contract and is 
frequently responsible for the repeated renewal of contracts. Nan-
power training represents a major concern of the United States-Saudi 
Arabian Joint Economic Commission, established in June 1974. Tne 
Commission was designed to bring together Saudi development needs and 
u.S. technological and managerial expertise. For this purpose, the 
U. S. Treasury DeDartment \\Tas selected as the logical counterpart of 
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the Saudi sponsoring agency - the ~tlnistry of Finance and National 
Economy. The Saudi ~tlnistry sets development priorities and plans 
projects for the Commission. Since its founding, the Commission has 
initiated, inaugurated, or implemented contracts ranging into several 
hundred millions of dollars in such fields - in addition to manpower 
training - as electrification, census administration, customs 
management, information and communication systems, transportation 
design, consumer protection, agriculture, and solar energy research. 
(See Table on United States-Saudi Arabia Joint Commission on Economic 
Co-operation: Summary of Projects). 
Another feature of the United States-Saudi economic relationship is 
the flow of money into the U.S. capital market. Direct, in contrast 
to portfolio, investment by Arab government and individuals in the 
TJnited States has represented less than 1% of all direct foreign 
investment. (European countries account for more than two-thirds of 
that investment). 
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services 
EXecutive 18.11.78 lEvelop executive & I:ept. of Trea<:trry, 0 
dev=-J orTIr:!1t (irdef.) ~':f'.Iia1 effect- 1. fi..rristry of F'in:lnce aril 
iverESs of selects:l tiltimll F.a:xrrny 
gove.r:mmt officials 
Arid larrls, 25.11.79 Wrriculun develcp- IEpt. of 'Jl:'eaSJry arrl n 
rreteorology & (Wef.) rrmt and teaCring Cmsortiun .for ]ht?--r-
educatim assistance mtimli IBvelCXJTEl1t, 
King Afxhl. Aziz 
UJi versity 
U.S. rep::eSEnt- Co--orditntim fept. of Treacmy, 13 
atim office ~t & Sl1pfXlrt !1inistry of F.imnce 
S2..-rvices arxl l'aticnll E'comny 
'Ibtal Pr'Ofessicral Staff 173 
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Completed Projects 
Procurement and installation of pmver - Department of Treasury and 
generation and warehouses Overseas Advisory Associates, 
Ministry of Industry and 
Electricity, Electricity 
Corporation and }1inistry of 
Finance and trational Economy 
Procurement and electrical power for 
Eastern Province 
- Department of Treasury and 
Overseas Advisory Associates, 
Saudi Consolidated Electric 
Company (SCCCO) 
Source Department of the Treasury, Washington D.C. 
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The vast majority of Saudi investments in the United States are 
portfolio investments - purchases of capital or money market 
instruments, or equity positions which do not permit the buyer to 
exert any meaningful influence over management. Through the Saudi 
irrabian Nonetary Agency (SAPiA), the Saudi C'..overnment has placed the 
bulk of its investments in U.S. government securities and into 
deposits. The remainder is in government agency bonds, corporate 
bonds, and corporate equity, with a very small percentage going into 
d.. 8 1rect 1nvestment. 
The surplus assets accumulated by S~1A by mici-1980 amounted to more 
than 870 billion and were estimated to be increasing at a rate of 
more than $2 billion each month. Almost all of these funds were 
being held abroad: nearly 40% in foreign banks as either deposits or 
trust funds, and about 60% in what was categorized as foreign bonds, 
principally government securities. In terms of geographical spread, 
approximately half of the Saudi investments were on U.S. territory, 
although about three-quarters of the total were denominated in U.S. 
dollars. 
SPJtA.' s portfolio has been confined virtually entirely to financial 
assets, which range from short to medium term. This has created a 
problem in that such assets are most vulnerable to the erosion of 
inflation and to exchange risk. By far the largest segment of the 
portfolio is represented by holdings in Treasury hills and Pederal 
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agency obligation, most of which are in new issues purchased through 
the Federal Reserve Board, ,yith ,yhich SAMA has a close relationship. 
A smaller part of the purchase of u.s. r~vernrnent securities is 
executed through the secondary market, generally through 
correspondent banks. SAl'IA places large amounts on deposi t ,yi th 
leading U.S. banks, both in the United States and elsewhere. These 
banks also manage the bulk of SANA's portfolio of American Corporate 
bonds and stock holdings. 
The investment managers of the bafh~s act on a discretionary basis 
within guidelines set hy SAN.<\.. A fundamental feature of these 
guidelines is that at no time maya SM'ffi investment reach 5% of the 
voting stock of any company. Another restraint is that SM'l.A will not 
invest in a number of sectors; these include the ne"iiTS media, 
entertainment, liquor, and tobacco industries, as well as the defence 
industries. SA}lA places large amounts on deposit wi th leading U. S. 
a banks, both ,-lith the United States and elsew"'1ere.' 
There has been increasine concern by Saudis over aDparent hostility 
to Arah investment in the United States. Since 1974 , more than go 
hills have been introduced in the Congress to investigate or restrict 
foreign inflows of money into the cOtmtry. Saudi investment in the 
United States has been cautious and pragmatic. During the period 
1974-78, the flov,T of Saudi funds into U.S. capital markets Has: 
$5.22 billion, 1q74; 53.55 billion, 1975; 54.477 hillion, 1976; 
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$3.172 billion, 1977; and $1.539 billion, 1978.10 The decline in 
1978 was attributed in part to a drop in Saudi Arabia's current 
account surplus and in part to the weakness of the dollar. 
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E Oil Interests 
\~at started as a pure economic venture for Socal and Ibn Saud in 
1933 very quickly turned into a matter of national interest for both 
countries. It has already been noted how in 1943 hoth diplomatic 
representation and financial aid were extended to Saudi Arabia by 
President Roosevelt's administration because of oil. \~ithin seven 
years there occurred another event prompted by national interests of 
both countries. 
As the decade of the 1950' s started, Saudi Arabia ~vas putting a 
tlventy-per-cent royalty on each barrel produced while Aramco was 
netting 31.10 after taxes. ll Saudi _krabia had heard of a Venezuelan 
agreement whereby the producer and government shared profit equally 
and began pressing Aramco for an increased share of profits. Aramco 
was, of course, highly reluctant to cut its income by half. 
There ,vas at the same time within United States foreign policy a 
concern for the stability of conservative governments ,vithin the Arab 
Horld. Perceptions were that it would he in the United States' 
national interest for such governments to be on a more sound 
financial basis. 
There evolved out of all this a policy enactment ,\Thich solved the 
prohlems of all three participants -- the Lnited States Government, 
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the Saudi Arabian Government and Aramco. 
The U.S. Treasury Department in the summer of 
1950 agreed at the urging of the Department of 
State to a system whereby companies who 
increase their payments to oil-producing 
governments would be allowed to reduce their 
U S t d ' 1 12 .~. ax payments correspon lng y. 
The result of this arrangement was to vastly increase the financial 
income of the Saudi Arabian government while reducing the taxes paid 
to the U.S. government by Aramco. Another consideration Ivas the fact 
that oil prices would not have to be increased to cover the ne,v 
"royalties". Obviously, U.S. tax revenues decreased significantly 
over S50 million in the first year after the decision. 13 Government 
revenues from Aramco increased similarly from $39.2 million in 1949 
to S111.7 million in 195Q.14 
The mutual interests of the United States and Saudi lrrabia were again 
protected in 1953 via the intermediary ••• L~amco. A year earlier a 
National Security Council memorandum had spoken of the 
interdependence of political stability in the Hiddle East and the 
goverT1r.1ent incomes derived from the rate and terms on \vhich it is 
produced. It stated that : 
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Since the rate and terms [oil quantity and 
price] are to a large extent under the control 
of the companies ••• the American oil 
operations are, for all practical purposes, 
instruments of our foreign policy tow'ard these 
t . 15 coun rles. 
It naturally follows then that any government attempt at weakening 
those instruments would be the equivalent of self-abasement. It is 
not surprising then that the Eisenhower administration deterred a 
Justice Department attempt to take anti-trust action against the 
Aramco partners by issuing a directive stating : "It will be assumed 
that the enforcement of the anti-trust laws against the Hestern Oil 
Companies operating in the Near East may be deemed secondary to the 
. l' " 16 natlona lnterest •••• The continued availability of oil was thus 
placed ahead of domestic legal considerations. 
As an effective instrument of foreign policy, however, Aramco had 
lost some of its clout and was due to lose more. There were two root 
causes. One, the Tehran Pricing and Participation Agreement of 1971 
Has the first of several agreements to follow in ,hich Saudi Arabia 
would assert more and more control of prices and production. Before 
1971, their control had been minimal, especiall)T after oil left Saudi 
Arabian ports. And secondly, Saudi Arabia completed a participation 
agreement ,.;ith Aramco in 1972 w'hereby the Saudi ~:inistry of Petroleum 
- 121 -
and Hineral Resources (Petromin) would assume a 25% share in Aramco 
in return for agreed upon compensation to Aramco shareholders. 
However, partly as a result of the 1973 war, the Aramco position 
subsequently eroded to 40% ownership for the Aramco partners and 60% 
for Petromin. As of this writing, negotiations are still underway 
for 100r~ takeover by Petromin ,vhich will reportedly be retro-active 
to January 1st, 1976.17 
Although negotiations have been carried out in great confidentiality 
it is assumed that even after Petromin assumes full ownership, the 
arrangement will continue to be one wherein Aramco continues a 
marketing role with a certain allocation of that which has been 
lifted by the company. In 1979, Petromin took 1. 3 mrnbpd for direct 
government-to-government sales and Aramco marketed the remainder ••• 
18 8.S mmbpd. 
l·lliile the policy instrument has been weakened, the policy interest 
has not been so. Instead, the lJ.S. national interest in Saudi "~ahia 
has steadily increased. Like,vise, Saudi Arabia's own national 
interests have become of a world order in magnitude and notoriety. 
The critical importance of her status as an oil producer is now more 
of a fact of life than ever before. T1ere could be no other 
consequence in a world '\vhere the gap has narrO\\1ed bet,veen energy 
supply and demand. For Saudi Arabia 
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Possesses the world's largest proven reserves of petroleum ••• 
25% of the world's total. 
Produces approximately 20% of the Free \.Jorld' s total crude 
production. 
Ranks along ,<lith the United States and the Soviet Union as the 
top three world producers of petroleum. 
Is the world's largest exporter of petroleum. 
\'Jhile her reserves presently rank as the world's largest, the 
11lt~nate recoverable total is wrapped in vagueness and contradiction 
as is the tendency for all oil producers. The Saudi Arabian 
C',overnment cited exploitable reserves in 1977 as 153 billion barrels 
\,1hile Aramco cited 110 billion "proved" and 177 billion "probable". 
Both calculations are probably cautious and underestimates. Aramco 
stated in a 1973 memorandum which was suhsequently published that 
ultimate extraction could be as much as "2Lf5 billion barrels" .19 In 
any event, using the 177 billion figure and a 10 mmhpd average 
20 production figure, one sees enough crude for 50 years. ' 
In assessing U.S. direct interests in Saudi Arahia, the U.S. needs 
continued access to Saudi oil. "Access" infers: (1) availahilitv of 
.' 
oil imports in quantities adequate to meet United States domestic 
demands; (2) uninterrunted £10\\1; and (3) at prices \'l~ich do minimal 
damage to the United States economy. \!ith 1979 imports supplying 
ahout 42~: of U.S. inland oil consuJ:1ption, Saudi lrahia ranks as the 
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leading supplier. Her contribution amounted to 17% of U.S. imports 
while Nigeria ran a distant second at 1Lf~~. Figure III-1 and Table 
III-1 give a more comprehensive picture of U.S. direct interests in 
Saudi Arabian oil. 
Of a less direct U.S. interest is the contribution that Saudi Arabia 
makes to allied oil requirements. Both \·.Jestern Europe and Japan are 
much more dependent on imported oil than the United States. The 
United States still has today an interest in European and Japanese 
access to petroleum just as it did under the Harshall Plan. \'Jestern 
Europe currently depends on imports for roughly 90% of its petroleum 
requirements while Japan is totally dependent on imported oil. Saudi 
Arabia is the largest single supplier to both over 20% of Hestern 
Europe's imports and over 30% of Japan's imports. Figures III-I, 
1II-3 and Tables 111-2, 1I1-3 give a more complete picture of the 
linkages between Hestern European Japanese and Saudi Oil. 
From a Saudi perspective, oil policy presents a dilemma. In an 
econoQY where crude production accounts for 75% of the GNP and the 
majority of all government revenues, the simplest approach \\Tou1d seem 
to be a matching of production to revenue requirements. HOI-lever, the 
Kingdom has never taken such a simplistic approach. Saudi oil 
production and pricing are determined by many different factors, 
including (1) domestic revenue requirements, (2) OPEC stability, 
(3) world market stability, (4) consumer econor:1ics and (5) third 
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world interests. The Saudi Oil Minister, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, alluded 
to these factors by stating that Saudi oil pricing and production 
policy is made in consideration of "internal development requirements 
and economic circumstances in general, by their local, regional and 
international status".21 
Figure 111-1 
united States Crude Oil Consumption and Imports from Saudi Arabia 
~fi11ion 'Barrels per Day (rrmbpd) 
20 IIIllbpd 
Total Inland Consumption 
15 iiJllbpd 
10 mmbpd 
Total Imports 
5 mmbpd 
Saudi Imports 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Source : u.s. Central Intelligence Agency, International Oil Developments Statistical 
Survey; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency; National Foreign Assessment Centre, 
Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1980 and earlier issues; lJ.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency, Mational Foreign Assessment Centre, International Energy 
Statistical Review; U.S. Department of Energy, International Petroleum Annual; 
and U.S. Department of Interior J Bureau of Uines ~finerals Year Rook. 
Total Consmnption 
Total Imports 
Saudi Imports 
Table 111-1 
u.s. Oil Consumption and ]mports from Saudi Arabia 
(Thousand barrels/day) 
Pre-
Crisis 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
17,308 16,629 16,321 17,461 18,431 18,847 
5,471 6,090 6,030 7,295 8,744 8,374 
599 680 850 1,371 1,515 1,231• 
Source Same as Figure 111-1 
1979 1980 
18,488 16,900 
8,460 6,500 
1,445 1,150 
Figure 111-2 
l<.Testern European Oil Consumption and Imports from Saudi Arabia 
Million Barrels per Day (IlIDbpd) 
Total Inland Consumption 
15 IlIUbpd 
Total Imports 
10 IJIllbpd 
Saudi Imports 
5 nmbpd 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Source : Same as Figure 111-1 
Table 111-2 
lfestern Ellropean Oil Consumption and Imports from Saudi Arabia 
(Thousand barrels/day) 
1974 
Total Consumption 13,775 
Total Imports 
Saudi Imports 
14,400 
4,410 
1975 
12,637 
12,080 
3,445 
1976 
13,522 
13,528 
3,445 
1977 
13,832 
13,108 
3,299 
Source Same as Figure 111-1 
1978 1979 
14,070 14,420 
13,128 13,180 
3,049 3,693 
Figure 111-3 
Japanese Oil Consumption and Imports from Saudi Arabia 
ltillion Barrels per Day (m.nbpd) 
6mnbpd 
5 IIIJIbpd 
4 mmbpd 
3 mmbpd 
2 nmbpd 
1 Imlbpd 
1973 
Total Imports 
Total Inland Consumption 
Saudi Imports 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Source Same as Figure 111-1 
1980 
Table 111-3 
Japanese Oil Consumption and Imports fron} Saudi Arabia 
(Thousand barrels! day) 
Pre-
Crisis 
1913 1914 1915 1916 1911 
Total Consumption 5,000 4,812 4,508 4,186 5,015 
Total Imports 4,818 5,230 5,010 5,235 5,454 
Saudi Imports 1,148 1,380 1,460 1,119 1,112 
Source Same as Figure 111-1 
1918 1919 
5,115 5,113 
5,341 5,552 
1,112 1,812 
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Domestic revenue requirements have yet to overtake oil production 
income. Crude production capability combined with crude prices have 
enabled the Saudi budget balances to steadily grow from a deficit in 
1970 of $80 million to a surplus in 1975 of $18.8 billion. One must 
consider also that this balance ~vas accrued in the face of a $41 
billion five-year development plan. 22 Thus, Saudi oil policy is 
clearly not linked solely to domestic considerations. This is not to 
say, however, that there are not some factions within Saudi Arabia 
who think it should be so. Indeed, there are those who argue that 
production should be reduced and prices raised ••• thus, they argue, 
maintaining current income while extending long-term availability of 
their depletable resource. The argument seems to have been coming in 
its strongest, from the newly evolving ne~y middle class. To date, 
Yamani has answered their ar~ments \vith descriptions of the 
Kingdom's pricing and production policy typified by the following. 
If you need money to spend on development, then you must sell 
oil ••• For this reason, the Saudi Arabian Kingdom must at 
least produce oil to meet this development requirement and its 
foreign needs. If it goes beyond this limit ••• and that is 
\·]hat it is doing now ••• then there must be other considerations 
which necessitate its doing so. These considerations are not 
necessarily purely political but both political and economic, 
because, a reduction in the Saudi Prabian Ki:1gdom's oil 
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production will lead to an international economic crisis which 
~~ll subsequently lead to diminishing our capabilities for 
development inside Saudi Arabia, particularly in 
industrialization. These are inter-connected interests which 
sometimes require an increase in production above the limit -
we need to meet our financial requirements. 23 
Saudi production and pricing policy thus remain structured by 
factors more extensive than simply domestic revenue requirements. 
Current Saudi policy makers argue that policy must, of necessity, 
include consideration of conslli~r economies. They theorize a linkage 
between energy costs and world inflation and realize the Saudi 
Arabian impact upon such ••• especially the world's leading 
exporter of crude. Hith vast foreign investments and near total 
reliance upon imports in minimizing world inflation, Yamani stressed 
this linkage by noting: "He know that if your economy (Hestern) 
collapses, we'll collapse with you. Honey in itself COtUlts for 
nothing. It only counts if it is put back into circulation and 
?' 
transformed into industry, technology".-LJ. Thus, the continued 
attempts hy Saudi Arabia to minimize OPEC price increase can be 
explained, in part, hy their interests in consu~er economies. 
There is a direct interest in OPEC too, for which dovishness in 
pricinr; must ~e moderated. The oligo~olistic adva:1tase for OPEC has 
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been one of moderation to the occasional point of confrontation, it 
has never been carried to the extent of threatening the stability of 
OPEC. Indeed, throughout the period 1977-1980, Saudi Arabia entered 
each OPEC conference with well published views, which very nearly 
approached demands, on the moderation in oil pricing which it felt 
necessary for a successful conference. ~~d in each conference, Saudi 
Arabia initially stood firm in its "demands". But in each case the 
end result was a Saudi Arabian pricing and production policy which 
had been amended to more nearly approaching the broad consensus of 
OPEC membership. The Saudi pricing remained the lowest in the 
Cartel. 25 World petroleum stability is a concern shared with other 
members of OPEC with, perhaps, some reasoning unique to the Sauid 
perspective. 
1'·Ii th the majority of its economy dependent upon the oil sector, Saudi 
Arabia finds itself in a position 'vhere the major measures of 
performance of the internal economy are dependent on external market 
events 'ivhich influence the price and demand for Saudi oil. A study 
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies noted that the 
sheer magnitude of Saudi Arabia's oil reserves "places the country in 
a separate category". 
She may be able to produce oil well into the t'i-lenty-first 
century and possibly even into the t'iventy-second ••• Any 
further disruption of the international oil market, 
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therefore, would increase the danger of making Saudi oil 
worthless [in the long run]. For this reason, the country 
cannot be interested in further disturbances of supplies 
and price increases; a stable relationship with consumer 
c01mtries will serve her interest best. 26 
Another Saudi Arabian concern for long-term prospects for her oil 
potential must be in the area of the continuing oil price increase 
impact upon the "irreversible development of new energy 
sources".27 The Saudis seek to strike a balance between high oil 
prices, which reduce consumption and increase investments, and 
research in alternative energy sources, and a need to maintain 
world interest in oil supplies in order to complete Saudi 
development. Y&~ni has expressed fears of intensive research, 
spurred by high oil prices, which would accelerate development of 
alternative energy. 
He are at a point in our development vlhere we are in a 
race with time. Our interest forces us to maintain the 
life of our oil production long enough to build our 
economy until we reach that period of time when there is 
another major source of energy that can replace oil. At 
that time we 'ivill shift to that source as our main 
source of energy. l';e expect that in the next century, 
at some point in its '20s or '308 at the latest, there 
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"II b" f h h "1 28 W1 e a maJor source 0 energy ot er t en 01 • 
'Vhi1e stable pricing and production may seem an attribute 
desirable of any economic market, it offers Saudi Arabia special 
advantages. For in a stable market, Saudi Arabia's relative 
prominence is maintained within the cOlTh'11UI1ity of oil exporting 
markets, ,vhereas an unstable market offers the opportunity for 
vast profiteering by the less prominent members, thus enabling 
them to close the gap between their financial status and that of 
Saudi Arabia. This is another reason ,vhy Saudi Arabia has 
continuously offered production levels higher than necessary under 
purely domestic consideration. 
And finally, the Saudis have always considered the impact of energy 
costs upon development to the Islamic Horld and the developing 
nations at large, and as a heavy investor in the world economy, Saudi 
Arabia has a triple interest in the Third Horld. The first t,'lO 
interests are in the form of aid, assistance and leadershin, and 
Saudi Arabia has played the role well. 
She has been active in both advocating north-south dialogue and of a 
more direct nature ••• financial assistance in the form of direct 
grants, loans and special re-cycling programs for the less developed 
countries. 
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Saudi Arabia's vast production capacity has been a prime factor in 
its dominance both in world affairs and, of a more direct nature, in 
OPEC. How much spare capacity actually exists has been widely 
rumoured from as high as 20 mmbpd to as little as 12 mmbpd; however, 
it now appears that the lmver figure is the most likely. In 1977, 
the government directed .Aramco to take steps to ensure a maximum 
sustainable lifting capacity to 16 mmbpd; however, those projections 
were reduced in 1979 to 12 mmbpd. 
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III 
A Interests Related to the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
The Saudi leadership has frequently emphasized that a 
comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict would bring 
untold benefits to the United States. Hbile Saudi Arabia has 
looked to the United States for assistance in achieving its 
domestic and foreign policy goals the Saudi leadership feels that 
the United States has not been sufficiently forceful ,vith Israel to 
promote a resolution of the conflict. An outbreak of new 
hostilities could seriously disrupt the flow of oil - even in the 
absence of an oil embargo - as a result of shipping restrictions and 
possible damage to Saudi oil fields or destruction of facilities. 
Some observers consider that it would be difficult for Saudi Arabia 
to escape active engagement in a new war. Its prominent political 
role in the Arab lrorld might reduce its options in new political and 
mili tary crises in the region and, 'i/hile the V-ingdom may endeavour 
to avoid involvement, it might be drawn actively into conflict. 
_4rab-Israeli issues assume considerable significance in A~erican 
relations with Saudi Arabia because of Israel's special relationship 
vii th the Uni ted Sta tes • The Camp David accords have been perceived 
by the Saudis as not having taken into account Saudi fundamental 
interests in the status of ,Jerusalem. 1 Hhile Arab critics have come 
forward "lith no viable alternative approaches, they have rejected, 
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with the exceptions of Sudan, Somalia, and Oman, the resultant 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and have isolated Egypt for having 
signed a separate peace. Saudi leaders before the Camp David Summit 
had concluded they would continue to support Egypt, apparently in 
the hope that the Summit would result in intense u.s. pressure upon 
Israel to accomodate Arab positions. Subsequently, however, their 
position has reflected an endeavour to balance a policy of wnrking 
closely w'i.th the United States \\rith the apparently compelling need 
to avoid controversy with other Arab States. The Saudis contend 
that the Camp David framework was insufficiently specific with 
respect to such basic Arab positions as complete Israeli withdrawal 
from the occupied territories, Palestinian self-deterrrd.nation, and 
the status of Jerusalem. 2 
The then Director of Arabian Peninsula Affairs in the State 
Department of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Joseph H. 
Tl:vinam, stated before the House of 'Forei,gn Affairs Suh-committee on 
Europe and the }iiddle East in June 1979. 
I think the number one priority of the Govelllment of Saudi 
Arabia is to preserve the security of the country and of the 
ruling order. The Saudis perceive the !fiddle East problem 
as having a very definite impact, of course, on the 
enviromnent in ",hich they pursue ••• It is our assessment 
that the United States and the Government of Saudi Arabia 
- 139 -
share a commitment to achieve a comprehensive peace in the 
~liddle East, and I think that in all aspects of our military 
relationship with Saudi Arabia we look very carefully at the 
impact of our activites on the prospects for peace in the 
3 
area and on the arms balance. 
Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Fahd, in response to reports in the 
New York Times and the International Heraled Tribune of attempted 
coups, disturbances and corruption in Saudi Arabia, declared in 
January 1980: 
I think there are a few wise men in the United States who 
realize the importance of their interests with Saudi Arabia. 
They must stand up ••• and ask themselves if the American 
mind is identical to that of Israel, which wants to hurt the 
Arabs and monopolize the United States and destroy American 
relations with the U.S. because of our leading role in the 
Arab Horld ••• There are many doors open to us and we can 
replace the Americans any time we want. 4 
In the talks between National Security Adviser Brzezinski and Crown 
Prince Fahd in February 1980, the Saudis were reported to have 
suggested that the United States abandon the Cal1!p David accords as a 
frame~york for U.S. Biddle East policy. And Brzezinski reportedly 
stated that the United States remainec committed to achieving a 
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peaceful settlement between the Arabs and Israelis, 'i'lith special 
.. f k' h PIt" . 5 recognltlon 0 rna lng progress on tea es lTI1an lssue. 
The Saudi C~vern~ent conforms in general to policy approaches that 
are shared in the broader Prab orientation, and it has acted in 
unison with the majority opinion in the Arab Horld. Following an 
interview published in the Hashington Post in Hay 1980, which 
appeared to indicate that the Saudi C~vernrnent might be re-thinking 
its attitude toward the Camp David accords. Crown Prince Fahd 
declared that certain government and news media: 
••• were trying to portray Saudi Arabia as a supporter of the 
negotiations of the current peace process, or as if it ,oJ'ere prepared 
to propose its mm disguised initiatives in this matter. T\fhat is 
certain is that the attitude of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the 
~liddle East problem and the issue of Palestine is finn, clear and 
knmm. It derives from the Arab's unanimous attitude that the issue 
of Palestine is the core of the ~liddle East problem and that a just 
and comprehensive solution cannot be achieved unless Israel with-
armoJ's from all the Arab territories occupied in 1 C)fi 7, including 
first and foremost, Holy Jerusalem, to which Arah sovereignty must 
be restored. No solution of the Palestinian issue can achieve peace 
unless it is hased on recognition of the Palestinian people's 
legitimate rights to return and to self-determination, including the 
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setting up of an independent state on their territory. In all this, 
Saudi Arabia pursues a unanimous Arab attitude, to which it is 
commi t ted and which it supports ••• The peaceful means which Saudi 
Arabia support must realize right and justice, and also a 
comprehensive solution which is derived from a stand that represents 
the unanimous Arab will. 6 
The link between stability in the Gulf region and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict remains as strong as ever. For the Saudis, the United 
States continues to maintain the role of being the only acceptable 
and credible mediator in the conflict because of its capability to 
apply pressure upon the Israeli in efforts tow'ard achieving progress 
in an overall settlement. If, during the course of the forthcoming 
year, negotiations bet'iveen Egypt and Israel produce few results, the 
United States 'ivill find it difficult to justify continuing with the 
Camp David terms of reference in efforts to achieve a broadening of 
negotiations that would include Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The 
questions of stability, u.s. credibility, and Soviet influence in 
the Arab Horld will, to some extent, be affected by the positions 
taken by the United States in the continuing peace negotiations, 
particularly ,-lith respect to the underlying principles of resolving 
h P 1 _., 7 tea estlnlan lssue. An impasse would likely appear to Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf Arab leaders if Israel (and possibly Egypt) 
were dictating U.S. policy, and U.S. prestige and credibility 'ivould 
probably suffer. 
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B Interests Related to the Western Alliance 
The interests and vulnerabilities of members of the western 
alliance and of Japan vary according to each country's dependence 
upon ltiddle-Eastern oil, varying internal political processes, and 
differences over the utility of force to protect Western interests. 
Since 1973, there has been no progress toward development of a 
cor,~on strategy with the United States in the region, despite the 
fact that strategic importance of the ~tiddle East has never been 
8 . greater. The October, 1973 Arab-Israeli war represented a 
challenge to the Hestern nation's attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli 
dispute, and the European Community (EC) and Japan were quick to 
re-assert their good intentions with the Arabs and to disavow any 
association with the U.S. support for Israel. 
TI1e cleavage that had developed as a result of events widened when, 
in November 1973, reDresentatives of the Be adoDted a joint 
statement declaring that a peace agreement should be based on the 
follO\dng points: 
(1) The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force; 
(2) The need for Israel to end the territorial occupation \vhich it 
nas maintained since the conflict of 1967;; 
(3) Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence of every state in the area and their right to live 
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in peace ~vi thin secure and recognized boundaries; and 
(4) Recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting 
peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinians. 
A Euro-Arab dialogue, which emerged in the wake of the 1973 war, was 
formally instituted in Paris in July 1974. Arab representatives 
were particularly anxious to gain support for their position on the 
Israeli-occupied territories and the Palestinian issue. EC 
representatives were willing to criticize Israel openly for not 
relinquishing the territories and to affirm their belief that a 
}iiddle East peace could not be achieved without a resolution of the 
Palestinian problem. On June 29th, 1977, the European Council 
issued a statement to this end, saying the conflict could not be 
solved unless "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to 
give effective expression to its national identity is translated 
into fact, ivhich \·lOuld take into account the need for a homeland for 
the Palestinian people. q But EC members were not \villing to 
recognize the PLO officially or to endorse specifically the 
establishment of a Palestinian State. And they stoDped short of 
approving Arab demands for an arms and econo~c embargo against 
I 1 10 srae • 
In February 1980, Ee foreif,TI ministers were reported to be preparing 
a separate European initiative ai~ed at hringin0 ahout a Palestinian 
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settlement. They had reached agreement that if the United States 
failed to achieve a breakthrough on Palestinian self-rule in the 
near future, they would launch moves of their own independent of the 
Camp David process. Strategy agreed upon included the follO\ving tv10 
elements: 
(1) To supplement U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 with an annex 
definitely recognizing the claims of the Palestinians to be a 
separate people with a right to their Oim homeland, and 
(2) The holding of a new international conference to try to resolve 
the Palestinian problem on the basis ofa supplemented U.N. 
Resolution 242.11 
French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing conducted a tour of 
Arabian Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan in Harch 1980. On 
1'iarch 12th, the French Government formally endorsed PLO 
participation in Niddle Fast peace talks and the Palestinian right 
to self-determination.12 hben the ~~y 26th, 1980, deadline for 
agreement between Israel and Egypt on Palestinian autonomy passed, 
the EC prepared to restart the Buro-Arab dialogue. 
At the Be swmnit in Venice in Jl.me 1980, a statement on the Hiddle 
East Ivas issued indicating broad European agreement on elements of 
an p.,rab-Israeli settlement. T'l.e declaration lvaS designed to 
supplement rather than to disDlace either U.X. Security Council 
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Resolution 242 or the Camp David negotiations. It was intended to 
give momentwn to Middle East negotiations in a period when they 
otherwise would be stalemated by what was seen to be Israeli 
intransigence and the United States pre-occupation with the 
Presidential elections. The elements of a settlement contained in 
the declaration included: A comprehensive peace settlement, 
bolstered with international guarantees; self determination for the 
Palestinian people within the framework of a peace settlement was 
discussed during visits to Hashington in early 1981 by British 
Prime Hinister Nargaret Thatcher and French Foreign Hinister Jean 
Fransois-Poncet. Some news media reports indicated that the Reagan 
administration was less hostile to an independent European 
initiative on the Hiddle East than had been the Carter 
administration, and a State Department official was quoted as saying 
that it appeared the European and u.s. efforts in the !,lidd1e East 
were manageable and integratable.13 At the same time, Dutch Foreign 
rlinister Christoph van der Klaaw, the current EC representative, 
began a tour of ~1idd1e East countries seeking reaction to a 30-page 
draft of optional approaches to the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian 
issues. Reported options included: withdrawal of Israeli forces and 
settlements from the occupied territories, dividing Jerusalem 
between Israel and Jordan, or placing East Jerusalem lll1der some form 
of international control; and a referendum among all former Arab 
inhabitants of Palestine on \'lhether they desired an independent 
Palestinian State outside Israel's 1967 borders or a federation 
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with Israel or Jordan.14 Saudi Arabia, in conjunction with other 
Arab States, including Egypt, has supported the European 
initiative and such support could affect Saudi-United States 
relations. 
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CONCLUSION 
A Paradox and Fortuitous Circumstance 
The beginning of the {mited States-Saudi Arabian relationship is 
full of paradox and fortuitous circumstances. Paradox v7as that one 
Niddle Eastern State ••• Saudi Arabia ••• which had petroleum 
exceeding all others in the area should look outside the bounds of the 
predominant influence vlithin the area ••• British ••• for association. 
And that one of the predominant influences prime purposes for being in 
the area was to exploit the petroleum resources of the area. 
Fortuitous circumstance was that the state ••• Saudi Arabia ••• should 
look to American sources for association even though such association 
was not actively sought by the United States Government. History 
suggests that such a lack of activism, which may have been a prime 
motivation for Ibn Saud to spurn British influence and seek American 
associations, ,",'as in effect an avoidance of political ties ,vith a 
foreign government. 
Paradox I'laS the fact that several American oil companies should turn 
down Karl Twitchell's offer of venture into what ,'7aS to be one of the 
'ivorld's largest petrolet:lr:l reserves. Fortuitous circumstances was the 
fact that Ibn Saud's personal advisor, a British Arabist, should 
advise the King to consult an Jimerican, Charles Crane, on develonment 
of the Kingdom's resources and advise him to accept an American firm's 
offer for concession over a British firm's. Put here again, there are 
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some offerings for explanations for such in that some claim Philby had 
an axe to grind with Britain. 
B Tne Cornerstone: Aramco 
Hith such a beginning in good fortune and paradox, one might expect 
the history of such a long association to settle down to be the 
resultant of planned, programmed action by both associated 
governments. However, it did not. The first decade of association 
was not self-initiated by the United States Government but, rather, by 
the economic association between an Arabian King who needed revenue 
for his newly consolidated lZingdom and an American oil company with 
vested interests in the Kingdom. This economic linkage was the sole 
basis of American-Saudi Arabian relationship for ten years before the 
United States Government ever became officially involved. Financial 
aid was relayed from the United States Government to Ibn Saud in an 
indirect manner, but this too was at the instigation of the American 
half of the economic association ••• Aramco. Thus, the United States-
Saudi Arabian relationship ioTas not only birthed by Aramco but the oil 
company acted as the sole resident guardian of the relationship for 
the first ten years of its life. 
Armaco's part in this relationship deserves further comment. There 
has been of recent times much study of the effect multinational 
coroorations have upon international relations. One theory sees the 
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multinationals as a foreign policy tool of the home country. The 
multinational injects home country influence into foreign countries 
by penetrating national borders. Such a description applies to 
Aramco. Hmvever, for the firs t ten years, Ararnco was not a mere tool 
of foreign policy but rather a manipulator of foreign policy. Its 
role subsided to the more common role of tool when diplomatic 
relations were established with Saudi Arabia in 1943. 
In that role, Aramco played an exceptional part. For it was paradox 
that while other such tools of foreign policy all around the region 
fractured in the stress of nationalization, Aramco remained strong 
and useful. The company itself deserves, perhaps, more of the credit 
than does United States policy. For it was through exceptional 
personnel policies, superior technical performance and conCiliatory 
compromise ',rith the Saudi Arabians that the company came to be 
regarded by Saudi Arabia as a national asset nearly as valuable as 
the oil which it produced. 
The role has now changed, however. The company now more nearly 
fulfils the role of hostage to a host government. The threats in 
1973 of possible nationalization forced the company to assu~e the new 
role in an effort to avoid huge capital losses and complete loss of 
interest in Saudi Arabian petroleum reserves. The 60~ asstlmDtion of 
mmership hy the Saudi '!l.rabian Government weak.ens the company's role 
as a tool of foreign policy ane the completion of present negotiations 
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dependency. Saudi Arabia's mineral resources and revenues therefore 
have made her more an independent actor. No longer dependent upon 
external sources for financial aid, she can shop the markets for the 
best purchases in development aid arms and military training. As a 
political actor of significfu~ce, she is no longer dependent on any 
outside pOVler for day-to-day political clout. '\fuile all national 
sovereignty is relative, Saudi Arabia's post-1973 international 
sovereignty is far greater than any which existed prior to that time. 
D Congruency of National Interests 
In reviewing the national interests by which the relationship is 
maintained, oil remains paramount. It was oil which served to birth 
the relationship, it was oil which served to develop the relationship 
and it ,vas oil which served to re-focus the relationship in 1973. 
Each of the other interests sustaining the relationship is itself 
either enahled or heightened in importance hy oil. 
Such a situation has heen enabled hy the mutually reinforcing 
interests of each member. For Saudi AraJ:)ia, the oil industry 
represents the heart of the nation. 1!ithout it, there would be little 
else for oil is responsible for 7S'f:' of the GDP. For the United 
States, Saudi Arabian oil represents an L~portant energy source for 
itself and, even more il,lportfu'lt, for its Hestern European and 
.Japanese allies. In the latter half of the decade of the 70' s, Saudi 
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Arabian oil supplied approximately seven percent of United States and 
more so to its allies. The exchange for oil is then a vital mutual 
interest bet'iveen the United States and Saudi Arabia. 
The process of actually producing the oil is also a mutually re-
enforcing interest. For whereas the United States has the best supply 
of technology, manpower and equipment for oil production, Saudi Arabia 
has the need. There were still 13,000 Americans woddng for Aramco in 
1980 in spite of the Saudi takeover. 
The national interest of economy is also mutually reinforcing. In 
international monetary affairs, the IJnited States represents to Saudi 
Arabia the largest economy in the world. Thus there is no avoiding 
the significance of the dollar, necessitating Saudi support for a 
strong dollar. And for the United States there is no avoidance of the 
possible effect the vast Saudi revenue excesses can have upon the 
dollar. Pursuit of long-term individual interests by hoth partners in 
the relationship should therefore further serve to strengthen the 
relationship. 
That other aspect of the economic interest, trade and commerce, is 
also mutually reinforcing. Saudi Arabia is currently 1Lndertaking a 
plan of national developnent never before precedented in history. 
l7ithin that plan, she has utilized the United States as her primary 
source of technolop,)7, real goods, and services. Thus, wba t Saudi 
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Arabia sees as a primary source of means for development, represents 
to the United States a vital means of offsetting the significant debt 
incurred in purchasing Saudi oil. Thus the process of "dollar re-
cycling" is of mutual interest to both nations. 
The military interests of the ti'lO members, excepting the case of 
Israel, are mutually reinforced also. Hhile this study has dealt 
primarily \vith events emanating from the central focus year of 1973, 
it must be mentioned the the year 1979 plays a role of prominence 
within the military field. The Soviet intrusion into _Afghanistan of 
that year served to prompt the lfuited States to boldly declare its 
military interests in the Arabian Gulf region. It also served to 
re-define the Soviet Union as an international transgressor to most 
international actors who had recently considered her otherwise. Those 
,·7ho had recently considered some sort of approachrnent \'lith the Soviet 
Union abandoned their efforts thereafter. Another event of 1979, the 
Iranian revolution also served to heighten the ir.1portance of mutual 
interests between the United States and Saudi Arabia. For after Iran, 
Saudi Arabia was the only survivor of the "twin pillar" policy for 
Arabian Gulf security. These two events then prompted the U. S. 
administration to ta1ce a quaDtum leap in military assistance offerings 
to Saudi pxabia, thus confirming her increased L~portance in the 
region. 
Saudi Arabia, impressed likewise by the events of 1979, welcomed such 
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offerings but her view of the threat priority is somewhat different 
from the United States. While the United States views the threat as 
from outside the region, the Saudis consider regional and internal 
threats as the paramount source of disruption. The differing views 
have served them a multitude of actions and arguments. United States 
factions can justify increased military co-operation with Saudi 
Arabia while focussing upon the international issues while their 
detractors can argue against security assistance by focussing upon 
Middle East regional and Saudi Arabian internal issues. Similarly, 
one Saudi faction can justify increased military co-operation with the 
United States by citing Soviet actions while another faction can argue 
against such by noting United States regional policy. Overall, 
however, the military interests can be adjusted to become mutually 
supportive although lacking in the degree of mutuality that exists in 
oil and economics. 
C':reostrategic interests are some,yhat one-sided. As a slJper-pOI,Ter, the 
United States has a strong geostrategic interest in Saudi Arabia. 
That interest is primarily in assuring that no unfriendly power gains 
control over the area or strategic points within. The region 
represents a geostrategic prize mainly to one of the two principal 
super-pov.Ters. Saudi Arabia, as a non-super-power, does not therefore 
share that interest to the extent of United States concern. She would 
not welcome control of the area by unfriendly forces. But the demands 
of nationalism prevent her from expressing strong out,yard allegiance 
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to a friendly super-power protector in order to stave off an opposing 
super-power influence. She is forced then to maintain a position of 
non-alliance within a multi-bipolar world forestalling that day when a 
move toward either pole may be necessitated. Because of these 
concerns, the mutuality of this interest is then scored neutral. 
The area of political interests raises the spectrum from congruency to 
conflict. The United States represents to Saudi Arabia the leader of 
the Free World and the successful example of free enterprise. In 
contrast, Saudi Arabia represents to the United States an important 
lever within regional, Arab, Islamic and 1hird Horld politics. From 
some of these aspects the political interests are basically congruent. 
But as was so clearly demonstrated in 1973, the political interests of 
two nations can turn to direct conflict over the issue of another 
nation-state ••• Israel. This area then will require particularly 
adroit handling by the two partners to avoid conflict in the future. 
E The Future 
The future of the relationship lies primarily within the same area 
from ,vhich the relationship evolved. It was oil which established the 
relationship in the beginning, it \'18S oil "'hich served to re-focus the 
relationship in 1973, and oil remains the principal medium hy which a 
"special relationship" is carried out. It is oil then which 'viII 
serve as the principal indicator for the future of the relationship. 
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For changes in that indicator would serve as the catalyst for change 
in the relationship. Such a reduced dependence could come 
about by many different ways, from simple conservation efforts to 
development of a better, more economical energy alternative. However, 
it must be pointed out that reduced dependence w'Ould have to be within 
the full axis of United States/Western European/Japanese consumption. 
For as has been seen, a major portion of the United States interest in 
Saudi Arabian oil is as lifeblood for the Japanese and European 
allies. 
From the supply side, any factor which prompted reduced supply or 
unreasonable prices would likewise weaken the relationship. Stimuli 
for such could range from a new Saudi Arabian government oil policy 
to destruction of the oil facilities by war or sabotage. A new 
government policy could simply result from a change in the present 
government's policy, prompted by regional concerns and specifically 
United States Hiddle East regional policy or by change in the 
government itself. Har or sabotage in the oil fields could result 
from either an Arab-Israeli war, an inter-Arab war or a revolution. 
It is to be assumed, of course, that the \\Testern nations 'iv-ould ,.;rode to 
prevent such occurrences. Any such occurrence would seriously 
jeopardize their vital interests, just as it would jeopardize the 
vital interests of the present Saudi Arabian government. 
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The specific future of the United States-Saudi Arabian relationship 
remains then like the future itself ••• unknown. But like other areas 
of international relations, the paradigm or hypothesis of the future 
relationship may best be derived by analysing the past. This work has 
done that and it can be seen that the best indicator to be used in the 
paradigm of the future is the indicator of oil; herein lies the future 
of the United States-Saudi Arabian special relationship. 
- 158 -
Footnotes 
I Saudi Arabia and United States Evolution of Special Relationship 
I Philby gives evidence of rather half-hearted interest on the part of 
Eastern General. Saud's termination of the Concession in 1928 was a 
reaction to no response on the part of the Concessionaire after Saud 
had served notice of intent to cancel. Furthermore Eastern General 
had only advanced rental for t,vo years; thus in 1928, they were in 
Ibn Saud's mind two years in arrears. Harry St. John Philby, 
Saudi Arabia (New York: Frederick A. Prager, Inc., 1955) p. 329. 
2 Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand -- A Political Economy of Saudi 
Arabia (London: Ithaca Press, 1978) p. 30. 
3 See H. St. John Philby, Forty Years in the \"Jilderness (London: 
Robert Hale Ltd., 1957). 
4 Various authors of equal credibility cite differing amounts. Philby 
refers to 50,000 pounds of gold. Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, p •• 331. 
K. S. 'J}'7itchell, Saudi Arabia : Hith an Account of the Development 
of its Nat1rra1 Resources, ~rd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 195F1,) p. 222. David ROIvarth, The Desert vine; : Ihn Saud and 
his Arahia CIew York: HcGraw-Hill, 1 q64) p. 222. 
5 K. S. 'J}vitchell, Saudi Arabia, pp. 230-231. 
6 "Saudi Arabia : Bullish on America", NERIP Reports, No. 26, Harch 
1974, pp. 5-22. 
7 Robert E. She n.;rood, Roosevelt and Honkins : An Intimate HistorY, 
(Ne~.J York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 285. 
- 159 -
8 George Lenczowski, The ~tiddle East in Horld Affairs, 4th ed. 
(London: Cornell University Press, 19RO), p. 581. 
9 See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Vol. V 
(lJashington: U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 734-746. 
10 See George E. Kirk, The ~1iddle East in the Far : Survey of 
International Affairs 1939-1946, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1952), p. 357. 
11 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Vol. V, pp. 663 and 
666-667. 
12 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. I (Hashington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 1159. 
13 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. IV, pp. 853, 871. 
14 See "Saudi Arabia In United States Foreign Policy to 1958 : A Study 
in Sources and Determinants of American Policy", Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy, 1970. 
15 Ibn Saud's visit to P..oosevel t, See David Hm,larth, The Desert T'J.n5;, 
pp. 251-256, and Ted Horgan, TI'DP : 1" Biograohy, London and GlasgOioJ: 
Grafton Books, 1987, p. 742. 
16 For full text of Roosevelt's letter to Ihn Saun, see 'Ralph H. 
J'lagnus, ed., Documents on the nidale Fast, (Hashington: A'TIerican 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969), p. 144. 
17 Robert E. SheD-lOOd, Roosevelt and Hon1:ins : An Intimate History, 
pp. 871-872. 
18 See NeH York Times, Octoher If\th, 19Lfh, D. 1. 
- 160 -
19 See Public Papers of the President, Harry S. Truman, 1947 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 133-134. 
20 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. V, part 2, 
(Hashington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 995. 
21 Faisal felt that the United States had again betrayed the Arabs in 
general and Saudi Arabia in particular by moving in regard to the 
Palestine issue without Arab consultation. See Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 19M3, Vol. V, part 1, (Hashington: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 210 and }~lcolm Peck's article 
"The Saudi-American Relationship and King Faisal" in King Faisal and 
the Hodernization of Saudi Arabia, Hillard A. Beling, ed. (Boulder 
Ivestview Press, 1980), pp. 230-245. 
22 Arabian American Oil Co., Aramco Handbook : Oil and the l·uddle East. 
rev. ed., (Dhahran: July, 1968), pp. 134-135. 
23 Leonard Fanning, Foreign Oil and the Free l-lorld, (New York: NcGraw-
Fill, 1954), p. 271. 
24 For text of the second Dhahran agreement see J. C. Hurewitz, 
Diolomacv in the l<Tear and niddle East, Vol. II (London: ~'crrillan Go. 
Ltd., 1956), pp. 323-329. Until 1951, Ibn Saud had been reluctant 
to extend leasing rights at Dhahran on more than a recurring annual 
basis. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1 q!}q, Vol. 1, 
p. 371; lQ5n, '1.,7011, p. 330.. 
25 ('.,eorge LenczO\'7Ski, Soviet Advances in the l'fiddle Bast, (Fashington: 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy >:esearch, lqL(7) p.l. 
26 Documents on American Foreign 11elations, 10 57 (ne,'J York: 1.1arDer and 
Brothers, 1958), pp. 284-286. 
- 161 -
27 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961, (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 120. 
28 See Magnus, Documents on the Middle F.ast, p. 112. 
29 Richard P. Stebbins, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 
1963 (New York: Harper and ROW, 1964), pp. 260-261. 
30 U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Activities of 
the United States Army Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Europe and the ~tiddle East. 96th Cong., 
1st Sess., 25, 1979, p. 40. 
31 See Public Papers of the President, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Vol. 1 
(Hashington: United States Govern.ment Printing Office, 1967), 
pp. 640-646. 
32 Louis Morano, "Hultinations and Nation-States The Case of Aramco", 
Orbis (Summer, 1979), pp. 447-469. 
33 "U.S. Studying Saudi Plan for Oil Investments Here", New York Times, 
October 3rd, 1972, p. 61. 
34 "Overhaul for Hid East Oil", New York Times, October 15th, 1972, 
Section 3, p. 1. 
35 "Saudi Arabia l1akes Conditional Offer of Assured Oil Supply to U.S." 
The Times (London, October 3rd, 1972, Section III, p. 1. 
36 "u.S. Studying Saudi Plan for Oil Investments T-jere", p. 61. 
37 "U.S. Offers Saudi Arabia Economic Partnershin in Return for Oil 
Guara.."'ltee", The 'rimes (London), September 29th, 1 Q73, P. 17. 
- 162 -
38 Ibid. 
39 Hoharmned Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (London: Fontana, 1976), p.266. 
40 See pages 37-38. 
41 Malcolm C. Peck, "The Saudi-American Relationship and King Faisal", 
p. 231. 
42 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, }fultinational 
Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on ~rultinational Corporations, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1974, pt. 7, p. 509. (Hereafter referred to as }iNC Subcommittee 
Hearings) • 
43 J-1NC Subcommittee Hearings, pte 7, p. 509. 
44 tfllTC Subcommittee Hearings, pte 7, p. 528. 
45 New York Times, June 21st, 1973, p. 30. and See Anthony Sampson, 
The Seven Sisters, (New York: Viking Press, 1975), p. 246. 
46 Peck, "The Saudi-American Relationship and Kinf; Faisal", pr. 231-
232. 
47 neikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 26f). 
48 NHC Sub c ommi t tee Hearings, pt. 7, p. 547. 
49 rlatti Go 1 a'11 , The Secret Conversations of Henrv lJ.ssinger (New York: 
Quadrangle Books, 1976), p. 64. 
50 CA' t' T.7 1.; d ~ 'T' 1-.. 1 De In' 1Cl 73 16 l Cl , ,lee _ Vla lon,"ee~, an ,.pace LeClL'10 OF,Y, _c. . tn, ' ,pp. . -'. 
- 163 -
51 George Lenczowski, 1-1iddle East Oil in a Revolutionary Age, 
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1976), p. 14. 
52 Horano, p. 467, and for more information about the embargo see 
Jeffrey Robinson, Yemani : The Inside StOry, (London: Simon and 
Schuster, 1988), pp. 137-149. 
53 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on 
}fu1tinational Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy, 93rd Cong., 
2nd Sess., 1975, p. 146 (Hereafter referred to as Hl\"C Full 
Committee Report). 
54 Exxon, Texco, Standard, Mobil, Gulf, Royal Dutch, Shell and British 
Petroleum are the predominant oil companies in the world oil 
industry and are often referred to as the "Seven Sisters". For an 
excellent narrative on them, see Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters, 
(New York: Viking Press, 1975). 
55 The refuelling problems incurred resulted in subsequent revisions of 
U.S. Air Force airlift strategy and equipment to minimize such 
disadvantages in the future. Training was increased in air-to-air 
refuelling and those aircraft without air-to-air refuelling 
capability 'vere modified to include air refuelling capability. 
56 The rliddle F:.ast and North Africa lQ7G-1977, (London: EuroDa, 1977), 
p. 608. 
57 For full text, see f,]ashington Pos t , September 19th, 1974, p. 1. 
58 "Energy Crisis: Strategy for Co-operative Action", a speech by 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (I.Jashington: u. S. Department of 
State Bureau of Public ?,ffairs, November 14t~, 1974), p. 1. 
- 164 -
59 See Economic Issues and National Security, (Lawrence, Kansas: 
National Security Education Program of New York University, 1977), 
p. 288. 
60 The Persian Gulf, 1974 : Noney, Politics, Arms and Power, 
(Hashington: u.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 5-14. 
- 165 -
II Current State of Relationship 
1 Jo1m S. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World, New York: 
Harper and Row for Council on Foreign Relations, 1968), p.20. 
2 "Flashpoint for the Oil Weapon", Sunday Times (London), April 27th, 
1980, p. 62. 
3 The Trans-Arab pipeline (Tapline) connects the eastern oil fields of 
Dhahran with an ocean terminal in Sidon, Lebanon. However, flow 
ceased in the mid-70's as a result of the civil war in Lebanon. 
Current development plans for the new industrial complexes at Jubail 
on the eastern coast and Yanbu on the Red Sea include pipelines 
connecting the two ••• one ILle for natural gas and one for crude. 
Eastern Province oil and gas can then be transported by pipeline to 
sea from whence tankers would transit the Suez en route to Europe 
thus avoiding transit through the Straits and around the African 
Cape. 
4 George Lenczowslr.i, The !-fiddle East in World Affairs, 4th ed. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 632. 
5 For a detailed analysis of the period tenned the "jl,rab Cold Har", 
see Nalcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold \'Jar, 3rd ed., Ne'\v York: Oxford 
University Press, 1971. 
6 See Adeed Dawisha, "Internal Values and External Threats : The 
Haking of Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy", Orbis, Spring 1979, pp. 
129-143; and David E. Long "ICing Faisal's Horld Vie,v" , in King 
Faisal and the Nodernization of Saudi lirahia, edited r,y \,7i11ard A. 
Beling (Boulder: ,\Testview Press, 1980) pp. 173-183. 
7 See Saudi lrrabia, a special sUDp1ement Financial Times (London), 
April 23rd, 1979. 
- 166 -
8 Ibid. 
9 "Saudi Arabia", MEED Special Report, July 1980, p. 83. 
10 Ibid. 
11 U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Hearing 
before the House Subcommittee on Europe and the ~1iddle East, 95th 
Cong., June 8th, 1977, Appendix, p. 40. 
12 James E. Akins, "Saudi Arabia, Soviet Activities and Gulf Security", 
in The Impact of the Iranian Events Upon Arabian Gulf and United 
States Security, ed. by ~chael Szaz (Washington: American Foreign 
Policy Institute, 1979) pp. 89-90. 
13 Saudi Arabia has not had diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union 
since 1938. Shortly before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 
Egyptians charged that Saudi Arabia had granted the Soviet Union 
overflight rights and territorial water rights for oceanic research. 
In the same period, there were some hints from Saudi Arabian 
officials that the country was considering establishing diplomatic 
relations Iv-ith the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet move into 
Afghanistan resulted in a return to the portrayal of the Soviet 
Union as an adversary. 
14 For analysis of the oil fields as military targets, see Robert \\T. 
Tucker, "Oil: The Issue of American Intervention", Commentary, 
January 1975, pp. 21-31. 
15 Saudi Arabia attempted to instill greater motivation toward 
military service in 1977 by increasing military pay by 20 to 120%. 
A private's monthly pay was more than doubled from 3240 to $528 
"Thile a general's increased from $3150 to S3620. An-Nahar, 
Septel'1ber 13th, 1977, p. 16C). 
- 167 -
16 See "Congress Probes Yemeni Arms Policy", Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, May 26th, 1980, pp. 79-83. 
17 u.S. General Accounting Office, A Report to the Congress, 
Perspective on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, (Washington: u.S. 
C£neral Accounting Office, 1977). 
18 See Lewis W. Snider and R. D. Mclaurin, Saudi Arabia's Air Defence 
Reguirements in the 1980's: A Threat Analysis. A report by Abbott 
Associates, Inc., Alexandria, VA, January, 1979. 
19 The Saudi Arabians view with grave concern a report alleging a 
40,OOD-man troops force in South Yemen, composed "mostly of 
paratroopers". "The Force is composed of Palestinians, South 
Yemenis and Ethiopians under Cuban and Soviet Command. They are 
trained by East Germans". Saudi Review (Jidda) September 8th, 
1979, p. 4. 
20 In 1976, Saudi Arabia began financing a five-year modernization 
program for North Yemeni military forces. The Soviets have also 
assisted intermittently, but the main support comes from Saudi 
Arabia and the United States. Saudi Arabia also finance 60% of the 
cost of four Boeing 727's for Yemen. See Dale R. Tahtinen, 
National Security Challenges to Saudi Arabia n<Jashington: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978) p. 23, Saudi 
Reviel\T (Jidda) October 22nd, 1971, p. q and An-Nahar, Arab Report 
and Hemo, Harch 24th, 1980. 
21 New York Times, June 20th, 1980, p. A7. 
22 D. S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Review 
of Recent Developments in the riidd1e East, Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on EurODe and the Hiddle East. 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 
June 8th, 1977, Appendix 1, p. 89. 
- 168 -
23 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed Arms 
Sales for Countries in the Middle East, Hearing before the House 
Subconnnittee on Europe and the ~tiddle East. 96th Cong., August 1st, 
1979, pp. 13-14. (Hereafter Proposed Arms Sales to Middle East 
Hearing). 
24 Paul Hammond, David J. Louscher and ~tichael D. Solmon, "Grovring 
Dilemmas for the Management of Arms Sales", Anned Forces and Society 
Fall, 1979, pp. 9-10. 
25 U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed U.S. 
Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
International Security and Scientific Affairs, December 12th, 1979, 
p. 21. (Hereafter Proposed Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia Hearing). 
26 U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Activities of 
the U. S. Amy Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia, Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Europe and the ~tiddle East, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess., June 25th, 1979, pp. 51-52. 
27 See Chapter II, p. 42. 
28 Alvin ~T. Cottrell and Robert J. Hanks, The Strategic Tremors of 
Upheaval in Iran, Strategic Review, Spring, 1979, p. 56. 
29 See Ne'w York Times, January 10th, 1980, p. 15. 
30 See Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) , Hiddle East and 
Africa, February 15th, 1980, p. 2. 
31 "Congress Probes Yemeni Arms Policy", p. 70 • 
- 169 -
Arabian Gulf* In 1961, a resolution by the Iraqi Council of ~linisters 
designated the official title of the Gulf as the 
Arabian Gulf the first Arab country to do so. 
* See Marr Phebe, The Modern 11istory of Irag, Great Britain: : (Longman 
Group Ltd., 1985), p. 180. 
- 170 -
D Economic Interests and E Oil Interests 
1 Aburdene, Odeh. An analysis of the impacts of Saudi Arabia on the 
U.S. balance of payments 1974-78. Middle East Economic Survey, 
Vol. 22, September 24th, 1979. 
2 For example, the rapid inflation rate in 1975-76, and in the eyes of 
some observers the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 
1979. 
3 Doctnnent: "Highlights of Saudi Arabia I s Third· National Development 
Plan (1400-1405-1980-1985)", released by the Ministry of Planning. 
In, Middle East Economic Digest, November 7th, 1980, p.8. 
4 American Businessmen's Group of Ryadh. Position paper: "American 
Loss of Business in the :t>fiddle East. September 1980": and Middle 
East Economic Digest, Special report: "Construction and Contracting" 
March, 1981, p. 22. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See de Saint-Phalle, Thibaut. "U.S. Productivity and 
Comoetitiveness in International Trade". Hashington, D.C., 
Georgetmm University Center for Strategic International Studies, 
c. 1980. 
7 U.S. Congress General Accounting Office. Report of Foreign CorruDt 
Practices Act on U.S. Business, AF1ID - 81-34. Hashington, GAO, 
Harch 4th, 1981. 
8 Law. John. Arab Investors: 11110 They Are, IJhat They :Buy, and !\1here. 
He1" York, Chase \}or1d Information Center, 1980, pp. {)S-[lLf • 
9 Ihid. 
- 171 -
10 J·fiddle Fast Economic Survey, Vol. 22, September, 24th, 1979, p. 1. 
11 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, lfultinational 
Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on }fultinational Corporations. 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1974, pt. 4, p.86. Hereafter referred to as ~1NC Subcommittee 
Hearings. 
12 }1N'C Subcommittee Hearings, pt. 4, p. 88. 
13 Ibid. 
14 "Saudi Arabia : Bullish on America", Middle Fast Research and 
Information Project (~mRID) Reports, No. 26, March 1974, p. 6. 
15 u.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on 
lfultinational Corporations and lfudted States Foreign Policy, 93rd 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1975, pp. 134-140. Hereafter referred to as }1NC 
Committee Report. 
16 Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
17 "Saudi f--rabia", a special report by l\fiddle Fast Economic Digest 
(HEED), August 1978 and see George Lenczowski, Hiddle East Oil in a 
Revolutionary Age (Hashington: American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1976). 
18 An-Nahar, Arab Report 8..'ld Hemo, April 14th, 1980 and "Aramco Share" 
Quarterly Economic Revie\v of Saudi Arabia, 3rd Otr., 1979. 
19 Financial Times (London) April 23rd, 1979, a special section on 
Saudi Arabia. 
- 172 -
20 vllii1e most references refer to Aramco as the oil industry in Saudi 
Arabia, it should be noted that there are two other operators ••• 
the Getty Oil Company and the Arabian Oil Company. The former is an 
American company while the latter is a Japanese concessionaire. 
Together, the t~.,o account for about 2% of Saudi annual production 
while Aramco accounts for the remaining 98%. 
21 "Yamani Statements", Saudi Economic Survey, Vol. XIII, No. 637 
(October 24th, 1979), p. 3. 
22 The first development plan was the period 1970-75 for the sum of $41 
billion, the second for 1975-80 was for $142 billion and the third 
in 1980-85 for $237 billion. SAMA Annual Reports and nw 
International Financial Statistics. 
23 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Middle East and 
Africa, June 9th, 1980, p. 3. 
24 Oriana Fa1laci, "A Shiek Who Hates to Gamble", New York Times 
~mgazine, September 14th, 1975, p. 28. 
25 See New York Times, September 16th, 1980, p. 1, Sept~~ber 17th, 
1980, p. 1, September 1Rth, 1980, p. 1. 
26 H. Naull, Oil and Influence : The Oil Heapon Examined (London: The 
International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1975) pp. 29-30. 
27 Outlook for \,lorld Oil into the 21st Century, Petroleum Research 
Foundation prepared for the Electric POIver Research Institute, J>1ay 
1978, pp. 6-15. 
28 It Saudis Draft Goals for the Time when Oil Runs Low", Christian 
Science r:ionitor, April 2nd, 1981, p. 11. 
- 173 -
III 
A Interest Related to the Arab-Israeli Conflict, and 
B Interest Related to the Western Alliance 
1 Because of its status as guardian of Islam, the Saudi Government 
cannot afford to be seen by Arabs (or Muslims) to be abandoning 
the objective of restoring the third holiest shrine in Islam to 
Arab sovereignty. 
2 See U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
Subcommittee on Europe and the l-tiddle East. Review of recent 
developments in the 'Hiddle East, 1979. Hearing, 96th Cong., 1st. 
Sess., July 26th, 1979. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1979, p. 77. 
3 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East. Activities of the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers in Saudi Arabia. Hearing, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 
June 25th, 1979, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1979, pp. 56-57. 
4 Hiddle East Economic Digest, Vol. 24th, January, 18th, 1980: 37. 
5 New York Times, February 6th, 1980. 
6 Riyadh radio, Nay 27th, 1980. 
7 Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Fahd, in an interviel'i in Le Honde called 
on the United States to recognize the rights of Palestinians and 
establish direct contacts Ivith the PLO. Fahd descrihed the 
Ep,yptian-Israeli peace treaty as "an invitation to war rather than 
peace" because it pushee! the region toward greater violence and 
radicalism. See Le Honde, Paris, Hay 14th, 1979. Also, see 
- 174 -
Al-Hajalh, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Hay 1979, pp.2-5. 
8 National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski on February 4th, 1980, 
described the Gulf region as "the third central strategic zone" of 
importance to the United States, along with Europe and the Far East. 
See New York Times, February 6th, 1980. 
9 Washington Post, June 30th, 1977. 
10 Hashington Pos t, October 30th, 1977. 
11 Washington Star, February 10th, 1980. 
12 1vashington Star, Barch 13th, 1980. 
13 'vashington Post, l'farch 2nd, 1981. 
14 Ivashington Post, }1arch 4th, 1981. 
- 175 -
CHAPTER THREE 
SAUDI ARABIA AND THE SOVIET UNION 
I Introduction 
II Influence of the Soviet Union in the ~fidd1e East 
III Soviet Union relations with Saudi Arabia: 
A 1901 - 1940 
B 1940 - 1960 
C 1960 - 1970 
D 1970 - 1980 
E 1980 - 1987 
IV Conclusion 
V Footnotes 
- 176 -
I Introduction 
The Biddle East has long been important as the object of great 
power aspirations, both for strategic and economic reasons. Its 
position astride the main lines of air and sea communication linlting 
the Atlantic and European nations with East Africa, the Indian sub-
continent, South East Asia, the Far Fast and Australasia led great 
powers to regard control over the region as vital to their 
interests. This outlook was reinforced as huge reserves of 
petroleum were discovered and began to be exploited. In addition, 
the l'liddle East, particularly its northern and eastern section, was 
valued as a buffer to prevent the expansion of Russia, both Tsarist 
and Soviet. The various Russian governments, naturally, have 
regarded the region in a different light, as an obstruction in a 
traditional area of expansion and in desired north-south paths of 
communication to the Indian Ocean, and as the locale for Hestern 
'I' b 1 nu 1 tary ases. 
The Arabian Peninsula (especially its peripheral areas) attracted 
the attention of the great powers for the same reasons. Aden \\1as a 
vital link in the communications and commercial chain of the British 
Empire, a bunkering station ,vhich com~nded the southern anproach to 
the Suez Canal. British shins policed the Arabian Gulf to ensure 
the safety of this alternative approach to India. It ,·;ras the fear 
of a challenge to its naval dominance in the Gulf and Indian Ocean 
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by French, Russian or German acquisition of bases or refuelling 
facilities which prompted Britain to conclude treaties with the 
local Sheikhs of the Gulf principalities (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and 
the Seven Trucial States) and Nuscat expressly forbidding such a 
possibility; the treaties eventually became the basis of a permanent 
British presence in the Gulf, as the principalities became virtual 
protectorates. 2 
The interest of Russian governments in the Arabian Peninsula was 
generally spasmodic until recently; attention was more often 
focussed on Iran and Turkey, the countries adjacent to Russia. 
Nevertheless, both before and after the Revolution, governments of 
Russia made attempts to establish some kind of presence in the 
region. Tsarist Russia's aspirations in the Peninsula were 
centred on the Gulf and in fact on Persia more than on the 
principalities. However, at the end of the nineteenth century, 
Russian activity in the principalities at each end of the Gulf Ivas 
the cause of much British consternation. 3 
Tne Revolution wrought great changes in Russian foreign policy, not 
least in the leadership's outlook and the ability of the country to 
undertake active policies. If anything, the former changes 
intensified Soviet Russia I s interest in the Peninsula, and l'-!oscow 
had some success in establishing ties with the independent countries 
in the region. However, during the first three and a half decades 
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of its existence, preoccupation with the internal situation and with 
other, more important, areas of the world, and its weakness vis-a-
vis its "imperialist" enemies, prevented the Soviet Union from 
seriously challenging Britain's hegemony in the Peninsula. 
Since the Second Horld War the changes in the global situation have 
been immense. ~~o of the most important of these have been the 
movement of colonial and dependent countries to independence and the 
attendant decline in the influence and prestige of the Hest in those 
areas. Another has been the emergence of the Soviet Union as a 
super-power willing and able to try to take advantage of that 
situation. Once Hoscow had made the decision to approach the newly 
independent states, the }tiddle East, because of its proximity to the 
USSR and the continued weakening western presence there which the 
Soviets felt to confine and threaten them, was an obvious target. 
Since the mid-1950's the development of events in the area has made 
the policy regarding the ~riddle Fast one of the more important 
I 
aspects of Soviet foreign policy.4 
The Arabian Peninsula was included in Soviet "['fiddle East policy not 
simply because of geography; it also aroused interest on its mm. 
There was the traditional Russian interest in the Gulf, and the fact 
that Yemen and Saudi Arabia were t'(vO of the first states ,('lith which 
the Soviet Union had established relations. 5 There ,vas the fact 
that the larp;est state in Arabia was also (nominal) spiritual 
-- ---- ---c----------
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homeland of a large number of Soviet citizens. But, above all, 
there were many of the last British dependencies on the periphery of 
the peninsula. These were supplying the West with much-needed oil, 
probably at a lower cost than would Sovereign States with control 
over their o,Yn oil; they were also providing it with military bases, 
strategically significant on a regional, or wider, basis. More 
recently, the situation inside the Peninsula countries has been 
changing and will probably continue to change, especially with 
Bri tain wi thdrawing its military presence. The Arabian Peninsula 
appears to present the USSR with a good chance to expand its 
influence and presence; clearly it is a region to which Moscow has 
been justified strategically and ideologically, in paying close 
attention. 6 
Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union have had an extremely limited 
contact over the years. The only exception was during the period 
1Q26-38. Since that time dinlomatic relations have not existed. 
Ilistorians attribute this situation to the attitude of the Soviets 
towards Islam, and the fact there has been no civil war inside Saudi 
Arabia that the Soviets could take advantage of. 
The Soviets have continually referred to Saudi Arabia as a servant 
of American imperialism. Saudi commentarv on the Soviet Union has 
been generally negative since the Saudis see the USSR and communism 
as being a threat to lIoslem principles and the conservative 
7 
monarchy. 
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tfuen the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and continued to exercise 
military strength on the continent, particularly in Yemen and Oman, 
Saudi Arabia had little interest in reinstating diplomatic 
relations, even though such relations have been established with 
other Gulf States, including Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman 
and Bahrain. 
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II Influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle Fast 
A Following the Bolshevik Revolution. 
The Bolshevik Revolution added new dimensions to traditional Russian 
aims in the ~tiddle East and Arabia; the desires to expand into 
Persia, and to weaken England by threatening its position in India 
were reinforced by the vision of world-wide socialist revolution, in 
which even the colonies and backward countries of Asia, Mrica, and 
Latin America would have a part to play.8 The latter idea was one 
of Lenin's most perspicacious adaptations of ~~rx's theories. For 
while ~rx and Engels recognized the revolution potential of 
nationalism in the baclQWard European countries for example, Poland 
and Ireland, in weakening the strong capitalist nations, they 
scarcely considered the possibility of revolution in the colonies; 
they assumed that the proletariat would triumph in the advanced 
industrial countries, and then \·muld take over the colonies 
temporarily and lead them to independence as ~viftly as possible. 9 
Before 1916, the nationality question in Lenin's theory applied (as 
it had in Marx's) more to the minorities in Russia and Eastern 
Europe than to the colonies. In 1916, hmvever, Lenin wrote 
Imperialism : The Highest Stage of CaDi talism in ,qhich he widened 
significantly the geographical focus of ~·1arxist thinking ahout 
revolution to emhrace not only the advanced industrial nations, but 
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the serni-industrial countries and the non-industrial colonies as 
well.10 The emphasis on the importance of the colonies to 
capitalism, and the implication that the revolution might begin (but 
could not be consummated) in the east rather than in the industrial 
Hest, represented a fundamental revision of Narx's theories. It was 
a revision which was to exert a lasting influence over the foreign 
policy of the Soviet Union and to be of great significance to its 
international position in the 1950's; the possibility of weakening 
capitalism by encouraging the colonies to struggle for independence, 
in combination with Lenin's thinking on the national question (and 
his belief in tactical flexibility) led him to advocate that the 
proletariat of the metropolitan countries (and later of Bolshevik 
Russia) should ally themselves temporarily with even the middle and 
upper-class independence movements in the colonies. 11 
The question of the possibility (and desirability) of co-operation 
with Eastern national movements, and the degree of such co-
operation, remained open; both Soviet theory and policy until 1955 
vacillated betlveen collaboration with and opposition to nationalist 
movements in the East "which were not led by comrmmists. The issue 
did not arise immediately after the revolution, for the Bolsheviks 
were preoccupied with internal problems and with the prospect of 
revolution in Europe, on \'7hich they believed the success of the 
revolutionary movement to depend. nevertheless, Lenin realized that 
---~~----------
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the Soviet Union's weak international situation made it advisable to 
utilize all possible chances to weaken and distract the imperialist 
12 
enemy. Therefore, an attempt was made early in December 1917 to 
enlist the support of all }fuslims in the Soviet Union and the Near 
East and to incite them to revolt: 
Muslims of Russia ••• , henceforth your faith 
and your customs, your national and cul tural 
institutions are proclaimed to be free and 
inviolable. Order your national life freely 
and unrestrictedly. It is your right 
[~fuslims of the Near East], it is not from 
Russia and her revolutionary government that 
your enslavement is to be expected, but from 
the European imperialist robbers ••• Overthrow 
the despoilers and enslavers of your countries. 
Do not allow them to despoil your hearths and 
homes any longer! You yourselves must arrange 
your lives in your own 'way. That is your right, 
f d '" hd 13 or your es t1ny 1S 1n your mm an s ••••••. 
The Bolsheviks' attention was prinCipally directed westward. 
However, the "Eastern branch" of the ideology continued to develop. 
In November 1918 Stalin "7rote several articles calling attention to 
spreading revolutionary unrest in the Fast; in "Don't forget the 
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East" he declared that complete victory over imperialism would be 
impossible until the latter was deprived of its "most reliable 
rear", and inexhaustible reserve", the colonies and semi-colonies .14 
By 1918 Soviet committees and organizations had been established 
for the purpose of educating the government of other nations on the 
values and benefits of a socialistic system.1S The ~fuslim 
Commissariat was created within the Commissariat of Nationalities!6 
The principal task of the Commissariat was to ensure Socialist 
education of the people of the East, and to deliver the people from 
oppression, and instilling in the workers and the peasants, a 
liberating spirit of revolution. Delegates to the ~fuslims 
Commissariat called for the people to rise up against international 
imperialism and declared their intention for revolution. 17 
The next month the Central Bureau of the t1uslim Organization of the 
Russian Communist Party announced it would or~anize a DeDartI'1ent of 
International propaganda to spread the ideas of communism quickly in 
the East and to dra,\T together all peoples of the East .IR 
'i:ithin a short time, the Soviet Union recognized that a small number 
of communists could not have a sufficient impact to overthrow 
imperialist regimes. From the time of the Third Com~unist 
International, a ne,v policy V.'aS initiated '\Thich sought to secure the 
temporary collaboration of the nationalist bourgeoisie with 
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revolutionary communists. At the end of 1919 the call for the 
overthrow of the established order was replaced with a more 
practical approach. Speaking to the Second All-Round Russian 
Congress of Communist Organizations of the people of the East (that 
is, of ~fuslim communists) in December 1919, Lenin reiterated that 
although "final victory can be won only by the proletariat of all 
the advanced countries ••• they will not be victorious without the 
aid of the toiling masses of all the oppressed colonial peoples 
" 19 Lenin restated several of his pre-revolutionary themes as . .. . 
well: his listeners would have to adapt the "true Corrnnunist 
doctrine ••• intended for the Communist of the more advanced 
countries" to peculiar conditions in which the bulk of the 
population were peasants and in which the struggle would be against 
not capitalism, but medieval survivals; and they would have to base 
themselves on "that bourgeois nationalism which is awakening ••• 
20 
amoung those people [of the East]". It was this thinldng which 
,oms subsequently to enable the Soviet Union to co-operate with the 
bourgeois regimes of King Husayn of Hejaz and later with Ibn Saud 
and Imam Yahya of Yemen. 
Soviet attention gradually turned to the East, \\There revolutionary 
ferment in several countries, including Persia, Turkey and 
Afghanistan, seemed to offer ne'\\' opportunities. The theme of co-
operation between the peasants and the nationalist hourgeoisie 
"(.,ras developed in July 1 Q20 at the Second Congress of t'1e Communist 
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International, where Lenin called on workers and peasants to 
collaborate with the revolutionary bourgeois movements in the 
colonies and backward countries, and even to align unconditionally 
21 
even if the movement was in an embryonic stage. This speech and 
similar views expressed by Lenin has been described as the 
theoretical foundation for a practical drive to win the East. 22 
The theses on the National and Colonial Question also declared that 
"it is the duty of the class-conscious Communist Proletariat of all 
countries to be ••• particularly attentive to national feelings ••• 
in countries and peoples that have been long enslaved ••• ". Despite 
these statements, the approval of "bourgeois-nationalist movements" 
was so conditional (if taken literally) as to make it almost 
meaningless; for pan-Islamic and other pan-Asiatic movements were 
excluded from the favoured category, and bourgeois movements were 
included only if they "would not oppose us in our efforts to educate 
and organize the peasantry and the mass of exploited people in 
1 · th 1· .. " 23 genera ln e revo utlonary splrlt • 
Additional moves 'vere made to enlist the support of the colonized 
peoples in August 1920 'ivhen the Executive Comrnittee called upon the 
peasants and workers of the East, including Syria, Arabia, and 
:nesopotamia, to attend a Congress in Baku. The invitation stressed: 
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If you organize yourselves, if you arm 
yourselves, if you unite with the Red Army of 
Russian workers and peasants will be able to defy 
the British, French and American capitalists. 
You will be able to get rid of them. You \\7J.ll 
liberate yourselves from your oppressors by 
allying yourselves iv1.th the other workers' 
republics in the world. Then the wealth of your 
country will really belong to you. In your own 
interests and in the interests of workers 
throughout the world, the products of labour will 
be exchanged equitably and we shall aid each 
other. 24 
The passing of a resolution calling for the establishment of 
peasants' and workers' Soviet governments showed that hope had not 
been abandoned completely, but the high point of the ConB;ress \.;ras 
zinoviev's proclamation, to the tumultuous acclaim of his audience, 
of a holy war against British imperialism. Nothing could he more 
indicative, however, of the movement of Soviet policy a\\Tay from 
encouragement of revolutionary movements in the Eastern Countries. 25 
The "holy war" i.;ras to be directed by the newly created permanent 
Council of Propaganda and Action as an auxiliary of the Third 
International. This Council Has subdivided into three sections, the 
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first of which assumed responsibility of Turkey, Arabia, Syria, 
Egypt, Armenia, Georgia, Persia, Azerbaijan and Dagestan. 26 
The tactical flexibility ,vas well illustrated by Soviet policy 
toward Arabia in the 1920's although not holding much hope in the 
Arab countries in the immediate post-Revolutionary period. 27 The 
Congress held its session from September 8th, 1920. The absence of 
Arab sympathy for the objectives of the Congress is underlined by 
the fact that of the 1,891 delegates attending, only three were 
Arabs, and none of them signed the final communique. In this 
connection, it has been remarked that the impact of the Bolshevik 
Revolution was smaller in the Arab World than elsewhere in the East, 
due primarily to the prevailing French and British influence in the 
. 28 
reg10n. 
The speakers representing the Russian Communist Party were Zinoviev 
and Pavlovich. These communist dignitaries exhorted the delegates 
to declare a holy war against the British and French capitalists and 
to join with Soviet Russia in a common struggle. Thus, it is 
apparent that the Russian Communists controlled the entire procedure 
of the Congress and were its main speakers, while the non-Russian 
representatives not only kept in the back-ground but very likely 
failed to understand ,vhat their illustrious leaders "Tere so 
?Q 
vehemently trying to convey to them. ~,' Heantime, in see1dng to 
explain the reasons for Turkey's beine dr3l-rrl into the Communist 
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International, Enver Pasha, who claimed to represent the Turks, 
spoke about "the similarity of our ideas". It appeared, indeed, 
that Enver claimed even a greater responsibility than that of a 
Turkish delegate. "Comrades", he said, borrowing extensively from 
his mm imagination, "I wish to declare that the union of the 
revolutionary organizations of Horocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Tripolitania, Egypt, Arabia and Hindustan, which has sent me here as 
its representative, is in complete agreement with you".30 Moreover, 
the participants at the Congress displayed a marked ignorance of 
conditions in the Middle East. 
The shift in Soviet policy after the Baku Congress, toward the East 
in the direction of co-operation with existing bourgeois nationalist 
movements and governments, regardless of their repressive policies 
toward native conullunities, ,vas exemplified in the Near East by the 
signature of treaties with the governments of Afghanistan and Persia 
in 1921, and by the development of friendly relations with Kemalist 
Turkey. Although the Soviet leaders were motivated by a desire to 
encourage governments such as these to break with the west, they 
wished to do this as far as possible ,vith gradual and unobtrusive 
methods which would not jeopardize the grmving Soviet economic and 
diplomatic relations with the caritalists.31 
The Third Horld Congress of the Comrnu.."1ist International, \'7hich met 
in Hoscow on June 22nd, 1921, took cognizance of the fact that a ne,-] 
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situation had arisen through the failure of immediate revolution in 
the Hest. Even though the revolutionary situation looked negative 
in the l~est, they did not corne to the conclusion that the East might 
ff ' , 'b'l" 32 o er more prOTIllS1ng POSS1 1 1t1es. 
After other Eastern delegates had spoken, contributing nothing new, 
Zinoviev introduced a guest speaker, }mkhul Bey, fraternal delegate 
from the Committee of Revolutionary ~fuslirns. The Revolutionary 
}mslirns were an organization of nationalists from various Islamic 
countries, who sought to lead the different liberation movements 
into a cornmon strategic path, and who entertained friendly relations 
,vith the Comintern. Hakhul Bey painted a glowing picture of the 
revolutionary dynamism of the Nuslirns. He pointed to the fact that 
positive developments were taking place in Turkey, in Morocco (where 
a revolutionary committee tried to start an insurrection) in Tripoli 
(where the rebels were said to have killed 35,000 Italians, and to 
have seized 70,000 rifles), in Egypt (,vhere occasional terrorism 
occurred), in Albania, Persia, India, and Java. The speaker 
furthermore mentioned the Amir Ibn Saud of Arabia and the Imam Yahya 
of Yer;1en as outstanding anti-imperialist fighters for their 
opposition to Britain's allies, a reference to King Husayn in the 
Hejaz and the Idrisi ub 'Asir. 33 
In the course of the year 1 Q21-1922, the process ",Thich the Third 
Congress had characterized as "stabilization of capitalism" 
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continued. i~re and more, the revolution seemed to be on the 
defensive. ~educed to its national bastion, the Soviet State, 
communism became increasingly identified with that bastion. The 
Soviet State thus continued to gain an ever greater ascendancy over 
the International. At the sa~e time as the revolution became 
embodied in one particular leader country, the peripheral action of 
communism also continued to express itself in national forms. 
Soviet Russia continued her policy of establishing relations based 
on friendly collaboration with the governments of the East, and 
especially with those which had a national character and sought to 
combat the colonizing influence of \~estern powers. 34 In 1922, it 
became apparent to Soviet Russia that the establishment of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat was a distant prospect in the West; 
rather anti-communism and conservatism in Europe were increasing. A 
different approach was taken with a moderate attitude toward the 
West. This enabled the Soviets to direct their attention more 
effectively towards the people of the East.35 
At the end of 1922, when the Fourth Congress of the Communist 
International met, it was obvious that the discussion of the 
national and colonial question was going to play an important role. 
The Congress seemed to weaken Soviet chances of good relations when 
it re-affirmed the importance of the East in the weakening of 
imperialism, and undertook to support "every national revolutionary 
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movement against imperialisn". Nevertheless, while ,'larning 
00mmunists that alliances \vith the bourgeoisie must be only 
temporary and partial and that the struggle for com~lnist 
leadership of the national liberation movement and for the 
fulfilment of the demands of the poor classes must not be 
foresworn,36 in fact the Congress expanded the category of social 
groups ~vith ,<lhom, in certain circumstances, transitory alliances 
were acceptahle, to include the "feudal aristocracy" and the pan-
I 1 . 37 s anuc movement. 
In Harch 1923 Lenin wrote essays on the importance of the East: 
••• The outcome of the struggle as a whole can be foreseen 
only because we know that in the long run capitalism is 
educating and training the vast majority of the population 
of the globe in the struggle. In the last analysis, the 
outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that 
Russia, India, China. etc., account for the overwhelming 
majority of the population of the globe. And it is 
precisely this majority that, during the past few years, has 
been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with 
extraordinary rapidity, so that in this respect there cannot 
be the slightest shadow of doubt what the final outcome of the 
world struggle will be. In this sense, the complete victory 
of Socialism is fully and absolutely assured. 38 
-------~----------
- 193 -
In 1924, Stalin defined those to whom Communist support could be 
given. This of course did not mean that the proletariat must 
support every national movement, everylvhere and aliolays, in every 
single, concrete instance. The point ivas that support must be given 
to those national movements which tended to \veaken imperialism and 
bring about the overthrow of imperialism, and not to strengthen and 
preserve it. Cases occur when the national movement in certain 
oppressed countries comes into conflict with the interests of the 
development of the proletarian movement. In such cases, of course, 
support is entirely out of the question. The rights of nations are 
not an isolated and self-contained question, but part of the general 
question of the proletarian revolution, a part which is subordinate 
to the whole and which must be dealt with from the point of vieiv 6f 
the whole. 39 
The unquestionably revolutionary character of the overwhelming 
majority of national movements is as relative and specific as the 
possible reactionary character of certain national movements. The 
revolutionary character of a national movement in the conditions of 
imperialist oppression does not necessarily pre-suppose the 
existence of proletarian elements in the movement, the existence of 
a revolutionary or a republican programme of the movement, the 
existence of a democratic basis for the movement. The struggle 
which the Amir of Afghanistan is waging for the independence of his 
country is objectively a revolutionary struggle, despite the 
- -- -------:-----------
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monarchist views of the Amir and his entourage, for it ,oleakens, and 
undermines imperialism, where the struggle is \olaged by "desperate" 
, d'" 1'" l' . d ' 1 . 40 aemocrats an SOCla lSts , revo utlonarles an repUD lcans. 
It seems queer that the cold, far-off Soviet Union should be 
interested in Arabia and yet she is - because the capital of Arabia 
is an outpost from 'olhich British imperialist policy can be observed, 
because Hoscow wishes the .Arabs to see a friend and moral supporter 
in the Soviet Union, and because the Bolsheviks, despite their 
atheistic policies, cannot wholly ignore the spiritual bond that 
connects their millions of Moslem citizens with the holy places of 
Islam. The Soviet Union is one of the greater Hohammedan countries. 
This was an acknowledgement that co-operation with non-Socialist and 
even monarchical systems was desirable. ~fuen King Husayn declared 
himself Caliph in Narch 6th, 1924, he sent a telegram to Chicherin 
announcing the fact, and on August 6th, 1924, normal diplomatic 
relations were established, Comrade Khekimou was sent to Jedda (the 
capital of the Hejaz) as agent and Consul of the U.S.S.R., and Amir 
Lotfalla arrived in Noscow as Hinister of the Hejaz.41 
Upon the collapse of the Hashemite regime in the Hejaz, the Soviet 
Union quickly recognized Ibn Saud's government and soon afterwards 
concluded a Treaty of Commerce and Friendship with Imam Yahya of 
Yemen, who was regarded as being anti-imperialist.42 
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B It is a mistake to assume that Russian-Saudi relations started off 
in the 1920's and that the initiative was taken hy Sharif Husayn in 
the Hejaz, before that country was annexed by Ibn Saud to his 
Y,ingdom. 
Historical events shmv that :ung Abdul-Aziz had contacts with the 
Russian Consul in Bushehr (Iran) and Basrah (Iraq) at the end of the 
19th century, while the AI-Saud family were refugees in Kmvait, 
because Ibn Rashid had driven them out of Najd and taken over that 
area. During this phase the Russians (not yet Bolshevik or Soviet) 
were a major power like Britain, striving to extend their influence 
and interests in the region. They too ,,,ere attempting to 
communicate ,vith Abdul-Rahman Ibn Saud and his son Abdul-Aziz, 
through the Consul in Bushehr and Basrah. The Russians ,,,ere 
offering guns and funds with other aid to strengthen Ibn Saud's 
forces which he was preparing to attack Najd. 43 
Sheikh Nubarak, ruler of Kuwait, dissuaded father and son from 
accepting the Russian offer, and instead encouraged them to turn 
towards British sources of generosity. Britain had already warned 
Nubarak not to keep up diplomatic relations with the Russian Consul 
in Bushehr. So Abdul-Rahman Ibn Saud directed his messages to the 
British Consul in Bushehr, requesting British protection for the Al-
Saud dynasty, who were hoping to return and occupy Najd. Before Ibn 
Saud captured Riyadh in January 1902, ~rubarak had tried to contact 
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the R.ussians in 1901, but Britain warned hiP.1 against that P.1ove for 
fear of intensifying great pm'7er rivalries. >'leam.;rhile Sir IT. 
O'eonor, the British Ambassador in Turkey had sent a telegrao to 
the Foreign Office on 12th tfay 1901, the gist of which was that the 
Kill.;raiti ruler was plotting \vith the Russian Consul General in 
Baghdad through Abbas Alyof. Britain ,vanted the Kuwaiti ruler to 
put an immediate end to Abbas' plans. Othen.;rise the Russian profile 
Ivould become too prominent in the future. On the same day the 
British Political Agent in Bushehr sent a telegram to the Foreign 
Office, in which he said he had received a message from a 
responsible Briton called Winslow on 12th :t-lay to the effect that 
}fubarak was plotting with the Russian Consul in Baghdad. Once more 
~fubarak received a warning from the British, because he had not 
grasped the international implications of the conspiracy for the 
struggle between the imperial powers to maintain influence. From 
that time Hubarak kept informing his British allies of all the 
contacts and correspondence between him and the Russians. The 
Russian Consul had thanked him in a note for his hospitality on his 
visit to Kuwait and asking him to convey greetings to Ibn Saud.44 
The Consul's message, dated 16th Harch 1902, came after Ibn Saud's 
capture of Riyadh. In t·1arch 1903 Abdul-Aziz came to KillVait to greet 
}fubarak and urge him to persuade the British to extend their 
protection to Ibn Saud. However, Britain refused that request. In 
KillVait the Russian Consul visited Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud offering aid, 
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but Abdul-Aziz turned the offer down, since he wanted no help other 
than British. The Secret Service Agent in Kmyait mentioned in a 
letter to Campbell dated 8th Narch 1903 that the Russian Consul was 
accompanied by a naval Captain and two Russian Officers as ~vell as a 
French Naval Officer, a Captain, ivith two Officers. Their ships had 
arrived on the Kuwaiti coast on 6th Harch 1903. They had breakfast 
,,,ith :"ilharak and then Droceeded to meet Ahdul-Aziz Ibn Saud, 
d ' h ' h h' 45 spen lng two ours Wlt lID. 
Next day the Russian Consul and ten of his sailors along with the 
French Captain and ten of his sailors visited Sheikh JI'fubarak. The 
Consul offered him rifles. Then they visited Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud 
and offered him a mortar gun; they spent two hours together and when 
the time came to depart, they asked Abdul-Aziz to join them that 
they might show him the two ships; but Ibn Saud excused himself on 
the grounds of weariness, and sent his brother instead. This showed 
his reluctance to align himself with Russia for fear of losing the 
confidence of the British. 46 
After 1902 relations betT.veen Russia and the Saudis came to an end, 
when Saudi-British relations became stronger. At the same time the 
Saudis made secret treaties with Turkey; that was in 1914. In that 
year Ibn Saud signed the first of his treaties with Britain. 
Russian attempts to contact Ibn Saud were retarded. All the while 
the Saudis were informing the British of these attempts. Thus, 
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Russian competition collapsed in the face of British funding and the 
assistance they gave to Ibn Saud. 47 
Official relations between the Soviet Republics and Arabia were 
first established in 1924 with King Husayn of the Hejaz. After 
mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations,48 
on 6th August 1924, Comrade ~Carim Khakimov arrived in Jedda (the 
capital of the Hejaz) as the 'Agent et Consul General de l'USSR, 
Pre's de S M' t Ha h' 't Le R ' d' Ar b' , 49 a aJes e c lffi1 e. .01 a la • 
Comrade Khakimov was accompanied by a first Secretary Tuimetov, a 
Tatar from Caucasus, formerly a clerk in a cotton factory who spoke 
Russian, Turkish, and Persian. He was a conmrunist and much trusted 
by Khakimov. Second Secretary Naum Markovitch Belkin, a Russian 
Jew, employed pre-war as an engineer on the Baghdad railway spoke 
Russian, German and French. Excluded from the inner councils of 
Khakimov and Tuimetov was the Interpreter, Ibrahim Amirkhanov, of 
Russian Tatar origin. Educated partly at American College, Beirut, 
he spoke English, Arabic, Russian and Turkish. 50 Three ladies and 
three small children also accompanied them. Hhen they arrived 
without suitable clothing and nowhere to live, King Husayn 
instructed 
'd 51 reSl ence. 
that they be temporarily housed in the Kaimmakam's 
The Kairnmakam of Jedda later directed them to the 
Director of the Custom House, where they lived miserably in four 
rooms while they hunted for a house. 52 
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Comrade Khakimov, a ~fuslim Tatar from Ufa, and an agitator spoke 
Russian, Tur~sh, Persian, Arabic and French. Previously he had 
Horked with the Soviet Hissions in Tehran and lJeshed. 53 Being a 
i-fuslim, ~Chakimov had one advantage over his foreign colleagues; he 
could go to Uecca. He went there in a car provided by the King soon 
after his arrival. The mission seemed to have plenty of money, and 
two cars and a launch were said to be on the way for their use. 54 
Shortly after Khakimov reached Jedda, Ibn Saud began his campaign 
into the Hejaz and the policies to be adopted towards Husayn and Ibn 
Saud became a matter for debate in Hoscow. Ibn Saud's campaign led 
to the abdication and flight of King Husayn and the establishment of 
55 . Ibn Saud's power over the Hejaz. After the fall of Mecca to Ibn 
Saud, Chicherin, in a report to the Central Executive Relations on 
October 18th, 1924, observed: 
The opening of diplomatic relations between the USSR and 
the Hejaz, which plays such an important role in the 
movement for the creation of a united greater Arabia, 
occurred just before the blow to that movement delivered by 
the attack of the primitive tribes of 1;\[ahabites on the Hejaz, 
led by that opponent of Arabism, Ibn Saud. We hope that the 
Hejaz will come through all dangers satisfactorily. 56 
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In contrast, ten cl.ays earlier, the r;omintern had observed that 'Ibn 
Saud ,,,as becoming the chief of a great national movement' and 
suggested that 3. victory 'ivould stir the lfuslims to revolutionary 
action as far as India, especially against British imoerialism. 57 
The Soviet Hission in Jedda observed a strict neutrality in the 
conflict bet'iveen Ibn Saud and the Hachemites, deviating on only one 
occasion from this policy.58 This occurred when Khakimov tried to 
enlist Ibn Saud into the Soviet Union's scheme for a great 
revolution of the East against the "Imperialist" and "Colonising" 
powers especially England. Ibn Saud temporized, and was threatened 
vaguely that the Hachemites \vould receive help. 59 During the Najd-
Hejaz war, the Soviet government were inactive but Khakimov sent 
prodigiously long cypher telegrams to his government and twice sent 
Naum Belkin to Rome \Vith despatches. 60 The Soviet government's view 
of Ibn Saud also evolved on the same lines as that of the Comintern. 
The Soviet leaders had come to regard Ibn Saud in a more favourable 
light. In an article in Novy Vostok in 1925, his Ikwan (brothers) 
policy was considered an "extraordinarily interesting political-
social program", and the Hahabi campaign was said to be a "major 
blow to England's policy of creating an Arab vassal state".61 
Ibn Saud, by asserting his control over both the Hejaz and Nejd, had 
become the standard bearer of a national Arab conception. 62 The 
Soviets decided to support Ibn Saud against the Hachemites. They 
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te.,'11porarily lost an opportunity of strengthening their position in 
the Hejaz, King Husayn felt himself betrayed by the British, and he 
invited Bolshevi'(s to Jedda to spread anti-British propaganda. 63 
On the capture of Jedda on 22nd nec~mber, 1925, Ibn Saud addressed a 
letter to Xhakimov, the Soviet Consul, thanking the Soviets for 
h . 1 . . h . l' h lT~ h' 64 Th tlelr neutra lty ln 18 strugg e agalTIst t e ,laC emltes. ,e 
Soviet l'fission stayed in Jedda during the siege. 65 Until the end of 
1925 'a large part' of the Comintern continued to support Ibn Saud's 
movement in the belief that it was through the agency of the Wahabis 
that the British and French could be expelled from the ~tiddle East. 
Similarly, Imam Yahya of the Yemen received praise from the 
Comintern as a revolutionary opposed not only to the pro-British 
Idrisi in 'Asia but also to the British in the Aden protectorate. 66 
However, by the end of the year, after Ibn Saud had been in contact 
with the British, and Imam Yahya's reliance on ~russolini had 
increased, the Comintern abandoned the pretence that its 'anti-
. . l' h' . 1 l' . 67 lIDperla 1st eroes were genulne y revo utlonarles. 
In 1926 the Soviet government accorded Ibn Saud its fullest support. 
~1hen in February Ibn Saud declared himself King of the Hejaz and 
Sultan of Najd, the Soviets were the first to recognize the new 
tit1e. 68 
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The Comintern "7elcomed Abdul-Aziz' since they regarded him and Imarn 
Yahya as independent Arab leaders opposed to Eritish influence, 
whereas the Hashemite family, \yho the British had installed as 
monarchs in Transjordan and Iraq, were dependent for their position 
on ':L'l1perialism'. After Abdul-Aziz ~yas successful in uni ting the 
Arab tribes in 1925 and claimed the title of TZing in January 1925, 
the TJSSR hecame the first state to recognize the government of Ibn 
Saud, by according him diplomatic recognition on 16th Pebruary, 
1926. In response to the recognition, ¥ing Ibn Saud permitted the 
S . t '!i. . J dd . 69 OV1e L' SSlon 1n e a to rema1n. 
On 16th February, 1926, Comrade Khakimov, the Agent and Consul 
General of the USSR forwarded a letter to the new King, which 
stated: 
"By authorization from my government, and from the principles 
of people's right to determine their own dynasties along with 
the full respect to the will of the Saudi people to choose 
you as a King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Najd and its 
territories. Accordingly, the government of the Soviet Union 
considers itself in a natural diplomatic status with your 
70 government". 
The King responded in a letter dated 19th February, 1926, which 
stated: 
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He have the honour to receive your letter of 3 Shapan, 1344 
(16th february, 1926), l~o. 22, informed of the recognition 
by the government of the USSR of the new rule in the Hejaz, 
and the choice of Hejaz people for me to be King of the 
Hejaz and Sultan of Najd and its territories. Ny government 
expresses its thanks to your government and announces its 
full determination to establish diplomatic relations with 
the government of the Soviet Union as they apply to any 
friendly nation. Let the relations between our two 
governments be on a mutual respect grounds aimed at 
defending the full independence of the Holy Places and all 
other international traditions recognized by all nations".71 
Ibn Saud thus responded with a warm letter of thanks but the British 
Consul in Jedda observed that Ibn Saud had tied his hands by this 
ready acceptance of Soviet recognition of his kingship over the 
Hejaz. The King's declared policy of the brotherhood of the world's 
Huslims would, however, be seriously compromised if he refused 
representation in the Holy Places to millions of Soviet Muslims. 72 
This letter was followed by a response from Comrade Khakimov dated 
April 2nd, 1926, which read: 
"Your Hajesty: 
l'fy govern.'11ent received 1'7ith pleasure the letter of 
correspondence between your Najesty and the representative 
of the Soviet Union (Comrade T(t1akimov) which took place 
on February 16-18th, 1926, and resulted in establishing 
diplomatic relations between our two governments. 
He are confident about the success of your important 
duties in external and internal policy which ultimately 
will lead to total benefits the Arab people. 
My government will be very pleased if your ~1ajesty will 
accept the humble gifts which are considered as a 
memorial for establishing diplomatic relations between 
our countries. He are also confident that your care for 
our representative in Hecca will facilitate his duty 
toward mutual benefits for both countries. The friendly 
relations that we establish between our two countries 
will increase in the future for the benefit of the Arab 
people and people of the Soviet Union". 73 
On 2nd July, 1926, the Soviet Union's support of Ibn Saud at the 
Hecca Congress contributed to his overcoming opposition to his 
sovereignty of the Holy Places. 74 The Bolsheviks allowed the Chief 
Ecclesiastical Directorate of the Hohammedan Hosque in.Russia with 
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headquarters in Ufa to send a strong delegation to the tfecca 
Congress, and thus contributed appreciably to the reinforcement of 
Ibn Saud's position in the ~'Ioslem world. Though relatively of minor 
importance, I.'loscm,r seeks in this and other ways to remind the Arabs 
f h · f l' •• • l' t 75 o t, e eX1stence 0 a D1g a...."lt1-1mper1a 1S pm.,er. 
This support and the Soviet TInion's early recognition of Ibn Saud as 
King of Hejaz led him to regard the Soviets ,.,ith particular favour. 
It became a cause of concern to the British and Dutch governments 
who feared the effect of unbridled Soviet propaganda on their 
nationals participating in the hejj. The Soviet Consulate staff in 
Jedda had limited consular functions since the Soviets had arrived 
for the pilgrimage since the 1917 Revolution, thus freeing it to 
devote its efforts to propaganda. The Soviets themselves admitted 
that Hejazis were 'ignorant and ill-fitted to assimilate the 
advanced Soviet ideas', but that the hejj offered an 'excellent 
opportunity' to contact same of the most influential persons of the 
Islamic world and to spread socialist ideas among them. Soviet 
ideology would thus reach 'the minds of people who in their own 
76 
country would be almost unapproachable'. 
Despite these protestations the Hejazis were unresponsive to their 
propaganda. In Hecca Khakimov was watched too closely to indulge 
freely in propaganda, but he lost no opportunity of speaking against 
the British government and preaching the mission of the 
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Soviet Vnion to liberate the East. 77 
The Soviet Agency gave a big festival on the occasion of the Soviet 
National Day. Practically all the Hejazi government officials were 
present. 
Khakimov was unexpectedly heard boasting that Ibn Saud and his 
peoole were Bolshevi:<:s. On 30th January, 1926, the late Egyptian 
Consul described Khakimov as a very capable and cunning man \vho had 
succeeded in winning over a certain Kasim Zainal, a wealthy merchant 
of Persian origin, influential and in high favour with Ibn Saud. 
Khakimov also succeeded in convincing the people of Jedda that the 
Soviet government was their best friend. He was in full confidence 
of Ibn Saud and the Soviet Agency Staff was very popular and 
loved. 78 
Further opportunities for the Soviet Agency to spread propaganda 
occurred during the Hecca Congress when members of the Soviet 
delegation readily opened their house to any guests who presented 
themselves. 79 On 1st January, 1926, Khakimov paid a visit to Hecca 
and it was reported from a reliable source that his object \Vas to 
organize Bolshevik propaganda amongst the pilgrims en route from 
Jedda to ~~cca and that with the pilgrims from the Soviet Union, a 
number of special agitators were expected. 80 It was also suspected 
that the Soviet Consulate in Jedda was behind extremist articles in 
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the Sgyptian and Sudanese press. Communist outbreaks in the Dutch 
d 1 m East In ies were a-LSO attributed to the same source • 
.Amin Bey Tewfiq the Egyptian Consul said that, in his opinion, the 
whole Soviet organization in the Hejaz constituted a real danger to 
those pow'ers whose nationals w'ere easily infected by the Bolshevik 
virus. From such an ideal distributing centre Bolshevik propaganda 
could be scattered through the Islamic world. He also thought that 
the Soviet agents would have an easy task to their corruption of 
Hejaz officials, more especially of the Syrians in the 
administration. These Syrians i-lere adventurers and would be easily 
amenable to corruption. 82 A Soviet-protected person, Sheikh 
Abdullah ~rusa al-Buk-ari, was suspected, in collaboration with 
Khakimov, of spreading Communist ideology among Indian pilgrims.83 
Lord Birkenhead said that it was desirable to ta~e all possible 
steps to minimise the utilisation of the Hejaz pilgrimage as a means 
for the dissemination of Bolshevik propaganda, and to prevent Ibn 
Saud himself (if there was any risk of this) from falling under the 
influence of the Soviet government. 84 The Dutch Consul in Jedda i-laS 
reported to be in possession of information that Khakimov had 
indulged in violent propaganda, partly against the Netherlands 
b . 1 . B" 85 government ut maln y agalnst rltaln. 
The Um-el-Kura of the 15 contained the following official 
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notification: 
"The ne\Vspaper 'AI-Ahram' published in its number of 28th 
November, 1926, an article taken from the 'Journal des 
Debats' entitled 'Javanese Communists and the Dutch 
Legation in Egypt'. It said that the Dutch Legation 
over a year ago '>rrote a report, since proved to be untrue, 
to the effect that the members of the Bolshevik Agency 
in Jedda are working to spread the spirit of Communism 
among ~bslem pilgrims and are distributing revolutionary 
literature among them. 
As such news is untrue and as the Hejaz government is 
satisfied that no such (Bolshevik) activities exist in 
all the Hejaz, the Hejaz government irrote to the Dutch 
government through the Dutch Consul in Jedda requesting 
that enquiries be made into the sources of this false 
rurnour. 
The reply of the Dutch Consul has now been received, after 
proper investigation. He denies the whole matter, and 
states that neither the Dutch Legation in Egypt nor any 
member of its staff has made a report in that sense. The 
news, therefore, is quite false".86 
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Prom the point of view of general British interests, it is evident 
that some importance must be attached to the presence in the Hejaz 
of an active Soviet Hission. The advantages of Jlfecca and the Hejaz 
generally as a headquarters for anti-European agitation in the Near 
and Far East need hardly be dwelt upon. Not only did ~!oslems from 
allover the ~vorld come to the Hejaz for the pilgrimage, but they 
also settled for religious study at Hecca and Hedina during periods 
varying from six months to several years. Among these pilgr~~ and 
students there must have been many who, by their contemplative and 
theorising natures, afforded excellent material for the inflammatory 
half-truths of the propagandist. In Hecca malcontents from Morocco 
could meet refugees from Syria, and agitators from India could 
compare grievances with their sympathisers from Java and Sumatra. 
It ought to have been easy for Soviet agents in Hecca to get into 
touch with Huslim peoples from allover the world. 8? 
The atmosphere of the Hejaz may differ from that of ordinary 
countries. The air did not blow freely there. There were no free 
newspapers, no easy means of communication with the outer world; the 
Hejaz ~vas an enclosed space in which prejudice and misconception 
would spring up rapidly. Religion and the jealous conservation of 
religious exclusiveness accentuated the difference between the Hejaz 
and the rest of the world. 
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The Soviet Foreign Department considered the Hejaz as a promising 
post from \"hich to encourage a cleavage bet~veen East and ~·Jest, but 
it would have been a bad plan for Khakimov to plunge into active 
propaganda immediately the Soviet ~'fission was established. The 
present ruler of the country was friendly rather than antagonistic 
to the great colonial powers, and found that his business ,vas very 
f'lUch ,nth them. On Great Britain, Holland and France depended to 
some extent the strrvival and the prosperity of the Rejaz. Ibn Saud 
could not afford to view I"ith indifference any tampering with India, 
or Javanese or Moroccon pilgrims while in Raj. The Soviets knew 
this, and realised that their cue, at the beginning, was to avoid 
arousing suspicion. Their best plan was to impress upon the people 
and authorities of the Hejaz that they represented their country in 
the ordinary Consular (or diplomatic) way, that they ate, drank, 
joked and grew weary as do other Moslem portions of the Soviet Union 
to supply them with considerable work in the future. The idea of 
10,000 possible Soviet pilgrims from Central Asia was music enough 
. H' 88 1n eJaz ears. 
A letter from Khakimov, intercepted in Alexandria, referred to his 
(Khakimov's) activities directed toward the creation of Communist 
organization in the Middle East. 89 The Egyptian Consul suggested 
that it should without delay consider co-operating with Ibn Saud to 
check the Bolshevik infiltration, the dangers of which to all Muslim 
countries under our aegis, especially to the Sudan and ,Egypt. 
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Obviously it was doubtless not to his interest that Bolshevism 
should find a centre of propaganda in the Hejaz. From a remad\: let 
drop by Amin Bey Te~vfiq it would seem that some Hejaz officials at 
any rate were apprehensive lest P..olshevik propaganda in the Hejaz 
might induce the foreign governments concerned to discourage their 
subjects from making the pilgr:L11age. It seems, anyhow, possible 
that Ibn Saud and his govenlment might co-operate to circumscribe 
Bolshevik activities in the Hejaz. 90 
The widespread circulation of communist propaganda in Hejaz and in 
the other parts of the ~lidd1e Fast provoked the British authorities 
to suggest that Ibn Saud be urged to check Soviet influence in the 
Hejaz. In November 1925 from Cairo, Lord Uoyd advocated that Ibn 
Saud be persuaded to sever his relations with Soviet Russia.91 
Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, was convinced that the 
severance of relations between Ibn Saud and the Soviet Union was 
desirable, but the Foreign Office left it to the discretion of the 
British Consul in Jedda as to whether to approach Ibn Saud on the 
subject of Soviet subversion among pilgrims in the Hejaz. 92 
From Jedda, Consul Jordan was warned that although the British 
government had no right to request Ibn Saud to curb Soviet 
activities, the King could be informed very confidentially of what 
the Soviets were doing. Hith regard to Soviet propaganda in Egypt, 
the Foreign Office observed that it was the responsibility of the 
- 212 -
Egyptian authorities, and not Ibn Saud to curtail Soviet activity 
h r' ' 93 among t,e I',gyptlans. 
TI1e Soviets prepared a more serious attempt to acquire influence 
among the pilgrims when it Has annotl.'1ced that food supplies would be 
dispatched to Jedda for 'gratuitous distribution' among pilgrims. 
'A mission of propagandists' l'lOulct also arrive 'for ~york among the 
'1 ' ,94 Pl grlffis • Van der Neulen, the Dutch Consul in Jedda warned Ibn 
Saud that if ~1ecca was permitted, to become a centre of anti-Dutch 
activities the Dutch government would be obliged to change its 
pilgrim policy. In reply, Ibn Saud stressed that Necca must be a 
Holy City, not a centre of political activities. 95 
On 10th Hay, 1927, another letter was sent to Ibn Saud by Comrade 
Kalenine, the Soviet President, which stated: 
"Your Hajesty, 
After receiving your interesting letter which was handed 
by your son, Prince Faisal, during his visit. I share 
,nth you the true feelings of pleasure in establishing 
friendship ties between the Soviet Union and the Arab 
people. I hope I will have a chance in the future to 
greet your son in the Soviet Union, to whom I ,n11 be able 
to express the friendship and sincere feeling tow'ard the 
fulfilment of the Arab people's desire for a course of 
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national unity and social progress that has been achieved 
by people of the Soviet Union. 
Your ~.f.ajesty, please accept my best wishes and my 
1 ,,96 sa utes • 
Trade between the two countries began. Ships sailed from Odessa 
bringing Sovie t goods to Jedda. The merchandise, however, ~vas 
dumped in the market at extremely low prices and the merchants 
1 · d 97 comp alne • 
Haji Abdull, the Kaimmakam of Jedda, appeared to have heard of a 
paragraph in the "Times" to the effect that a Soviet ship "Tomp" was 
bringing pilgrims, flour and sugar to Jedda, and that it was hoped 
to establish a regular commercial service between Odessa and Hejaz. 
Haji Abdullah reminded Acting Vice-Consul Jakins that last year a 
Soviet vessel had called at the height of the pilgrimage season 
when, apart from a little natural curiosity, she had attracted no 
great attention. The flour she had brought had been easily 
absorbed. The Kaimmakam went on to say, however, that the question 
of establishing a regular service was a very different proposition, 
and if, as was rumoured, the Soviets intended to under sell the 
current market price, the Jedda merchants would sustain heavy losses 
on the stocks in hand and would be compelled to place future orders 
in the Soviet Union instead of India. 
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A Soviet agency had Jeen touting the market for buyers, freely 
offering flour and sugar at ;+:1 a ton less than the current price, 
and adding that he was prepared to undercut the marl<et at any price. 
As soon as this news reached the Kaimmakam's ears he acted quickly. 
Calling together the chief merchants of the tm·m, he drew up a 
memorial for their signature and sent it off to Hecca, begging for 
protection. As a result a meeting was arranged at Bahra, on the 
~fecca road, at which the Prince Feisal, the Acting Assistant Viceroy 
and the Director for Foreign Affairs met for discussion with the 
q8 Kaimmakam and another representative Jedda merchant.- As a 
consequence of the meeting the Director of Foreign Affairs burst 
into Jedda on the morning of the arrival of the Soviet ship "Tomp" 
on 11th November, 1927, to inform the Consuls concerned that the 
plan, of which there had been vague rumours in the tmYl1, of levying 
some sort of discriminatory tax on Soviet goods, which would bring 
their prices up to market level, had been abandoned, and it had been 
decided to impose a boycott on the Soviet goods. 
The Italian and Egyptian Agencies, who had followed the course of 
events with considerable anxiety, readily agreed to the proposal and 
immediately had their merchants warned. The 12th November, 1927, 
therefore, heralded a series of skirmishes between the Kaimmakam and 
the Bolsheviks, who, in the face of such opposition, were straining 
every nerve to prevent their venture ending in failure and passed in 
their interminable squabbles with lightermen, custom and municipal 
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officials, all of Hhom bad been instructed to place every 
conceivable obstacle in the '.Yay of the new trades. 
On 13th November, 1927, six Soviets had arrived by the vessel to 
take over the direction of Soviet commercial interests in the 
H . 99 teJaz. The Italian Agent \Vas immediately up in arms. Obviously, 
if the Soviets had brought their own commercial personnel they could 
themselves sell the wares. He therefore asked H. G. Jakins to join 
him in an official protest. Permission had been refused, he said, 
to certain Italians who had wished to establish themselves in Jedda, 
and in view of the grave political interests involved he was not 
going to stand by and meekly see the country thrown open to the 
Bolsheviks. Dr. Cesano, the Italian Agent reported to the 
Kaimmakam that the six new Soviets had no Hejazi visas on their 
passports. The opportunity which now presented itself was too good 
for liaji Abdullah to miss, and he issued an order that the 
Bolsheviks were to return to their ship at once. At this, the 
unfortunate individuals not unnaturally took refuge in the Soviet 
Agency, and when, later in the day, two ventured into the street, 
they were promptly seized by the police and clapped into goal. 
In the face of this affront the Bolshevik representative set off for 
Hecca to see Prince Faisal, threatening that if he received no 
satisfaction he ';vould go to Riyadh and see the King himself. Hhile 
the ship was being unloaded and buyers again being sOllght in vain it 
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was decided that t,vo of the six, one a doctor and the other a 
Consular secretary, should be allowed to remain. The other four 
must return from ,vhere they came. Consequently, when the "Tomp" 
steamed out of Jedda harbour on the 16th ~ovember the staff of the 
proposed Soviet comrnercial bureau went with her .100 
The attitude of the Hejaz' government towards the Bolshevil<s is 
interesting. It was generally admitted that in internal politics 
the government had little to fear from the Bolsheviks. It was 
highly unlikely that the Soviet government would waste time 
upsetting this primitive monarchy while the Necca Pilgrimage gave 
them unique opportunities for easy propaganda in the East. Their 
interests were best served by a stable government in the Hejaz to 
guarantee a regular influx of pilgrims. It is, therefore, difficult 
to believe that the Hejaz government took drastic action to oppose 
the consolidation of Soviet interests through nervousness of its own 
immunity from attack. The Minister for Foreign Affairs talked to 
Vice-Consul Jakins very largely of what the government, as 
represented by himself, did, and went so far as to say that if the 
Bolsheviks had not given themselves up he would have sent in to 
their agency and had them brought out. ~ihen the Bolsheviks 
representative saw Prince Faisal at Hecca he was infonned that the 
government had no knowledge of the "Tomp", and it is clear that the 
King in Riyadh was not consulted. Indeed, it would not be 
surprising if the ship sailed before the King was aware of its 
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arrival. 
All the evidence, in fact, points to the ~aimmaka~ as the hero of 
the piece. It must be remembered that not only was he the leading 
h · . h b h 1 h b' t h t 101 autlorlty ln t e tmm, ut e was a so t. e 19ges merc an_. 
The "?olshevik representative apologised to the Hejaz' government for 
the technical breach of the regulations regarding entry of 
foreigners into the Hejaz. This, in itself, '\vas a significant 
indication of the attitude which the Soviet government was likely to 
adopt. Kaimmakam imagined that he had frightened the Bolsheviks 
away for good, but he had probably under-rated their persistence. A 
single rebuff would not cause the Bolsheviks to abandon their scheme 
for a regular commercial service e."{tending down the eastern coast of 
the Red Sea as far as Aden. Next time they would be better 
prepared, and it remained to be seen what effective measures could 
102 be taken to oppose them. 
Khakimov sent a letter to Yousf Yasin, Acting }linister of Foreign 
Affairs of Hejaz upon Ibn Saud's assumption of the title of King of 
Najd dated 15th April, 1927, No. 162. 
I have the honour to inform your Excellency that my 
government has instructed me to advise you that it 
has taken notice of the Sultanate of Najd into a 
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kingdom under the name "Kingdom of :'Jajd and 
Annexed Territories" and regarding the 
proclamation of His Hajesty the King of Rejaz, 
Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud, as King under the name 
"Kingdom of Najd. and L'\nnexed. Territories". 
In this connection my government sends its 
h · hI· u· \1· 103 1,'S est congratu atlons to '1lS • ,a]esty • 
This did not decrease Ibn Saud's growing distrust of Soviet 
intentions. Instead he moved closer to Britain with whom he 
concluded the Treaty of Jedda in }fuy 1927. In the second article of 
the treaty each party undertook to use "all means" to prevent its 
territories from being used as a base for 'unlawful activities 
directed against peace and tranquillity in the territories of the 
other party'. Ibn Saud had thus undertaken to limit the activities 
of the Russian Consulate. 104 
Hany foreign pmvers were actively occupied in the Hejaz in ousting 
British trade and securing Hejaz's market, the most active among 
these powers were the Soviets. lOS In January 1928, Ibn Saud raised 
h . f S . . . fl . Ar b' 106 H 1 t e questlon 0 OVlet econOffilC ln uence 1n ala. e a so 
raised the question of the danger of Bolshevik' propaganda in the 
Hejaz in his letter to Lord Lloyd. Ibn Saud was prepared to control 
Bolshevik trade activities and combat Bolshevik propaganda in his 
dominions in return for assistance from his Majesty's government. 
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There seemed little reason to doubt the ability of Ibn Saud to 
control the "?olshevik activities in his dominions, should he find it 
in his interest to do so. The question was what His Hajesty's 
GoverTh~ent could properly offer him.107 
Ibn Saud fully realised that the Hejaz might easily be made a centre 
of anti -British propaganda by Soviet agents "Tho might see1-: to instil 
h · 'd ' h' d f '1 ' 108 H h d 11 t elr leas lnto t.e ffi1n s 0 pl grL~s. . e ~a at a costs to 
prevent the dissemination of Bolshevik propaganda in the Hejaz 
because of the fear that pilgrims may be contaminated. It might 
appear at first glance that this danger was one to cause alarm to 
the governments of India, the Dutch East Indies, ~~laya and Egypt 
rather than to Ibn Saud himself. The suspicion, however, that 
pilgrims were imbibing in the Hejaz the poison of Corrmrunistic 
doctrines would be quite sufficient to justify the governments 
affected in withdrawi.ng from the pilgrimage their special 
sanction and support. The Soviet representative did not hide his 
disappointment at the meagre results obtained by his agency during 
their four years stay in the Hejaz. The open attempts to influence 
Ibn Saud in i.mich Khakimov appears to have indulged in his first 
appointment here met with definite snubs. The Soviets' latest 
endeavour to gain favour and influence by the introduction and 
distribution of cheap food-stuffs had met with an equally decided 
109 
check. 
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It ,vas more difficult than might appear to "get at" vi1p,rims. ii'rom 
the moment of their arrival at Jeclda they passed, according to their 
nationality, ~mder the control of j\fu.tawifs or their agents and no 
person of other nationality might attach hin1self to any party. Any 
attempts by an unauthorised person to visit these parties of 
pilgrilns ,-[ould be ilThllediately detected in i1ecca, i"here, owing to the 
concentration of all pilgrims in houses in the proximity of the 
Nosque, close surveillance was easily effected. no 
Faud Hamza the Hejaz Foreign Minister ad~tted that it was to the 
interests both of His Hajesty's government and the Hejaz that the 
Soviet activity in the Hejaz be carefully watched. Hamza assured 
}~. Stonehewer-Bird that there was nothing to fear on that score. 
The Soviet government had, however, evolved a more insidious scheme 
for gaining favour with the people and pilgrims in the Hejaz and 
undermining British interests, namely, by sending to the Hejaz 
consignments of produce, sugar, flour, etc., for sale at much lower 
rates than those prevailing in the market for similar Indian 
cowmodities. The King had so far placed every obstacle in the way 
of lli~loading and selling of Soviet goods in the Hejaz. The latest 
instance w'as that of the Soviet ship "Kommunist", which had arrived 
four days earlier in Jedda with a considerable cargo. She had 
sailed ,,,ithout being permitted to tmload a single bale. The King 
was acting, in his own view, against the commercial interests of the 
country in prohibiting the import of cheap commodities;, he was also 
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layin0; himself ODen to criticism hy the pilgrims ~vho Here asked to 
Day hi.8;her ~)rices for Inc1ian nrorhlC2. His sole ohject in pursuing 
this policy Has his desir2 to do nothing \.Jhich mi9;ht in any way harm 
British interests. At the same tiT'le he could not reconcile it to 
his conscience that by so actin~ 11e rqas crmsing material loss to his 
111 people. 
Stonehewer-Bird replied that, while he felt justified in saying that 
His Llajesty's Government would fully appreciate the mark of His 
i-1ajesty's loyalty and friendship, he ventured to make two 
observations: one, that the attempt of the Soviet TJnion to oust 
British Indian trade would meet with strong opposition from the 
leading merchants, most of whom had been for years in business 
relations with India, and neither could nor would lightly transfer 
their allegiance; secondly, the Soviet Union could not afford 
indefinitely to supply goods at less than their economic price; 
these shipments of cheap goods ivere, as he himself realised merely 
propaganda whereby the Soviet Union hoped to gain a footing. ll2 
Again the Soviet attempt to distribute free food and dispose of 
sugar and flour at low prices aroused the opposition not only of the 
Indian merchants but, also from the governor of Jedda who himself 
h d ' t t b' , t 113 a 1ffipor an US1ness 1n erests. In 1928 the King embargoed all 
Soviet goods, and the Soviets "("ere unable to persuade him to sign a 
trade agreement. As the King sought to limit contacts ~ith the 
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USS1, ,Soviet interest in the Saudis soon ,vaned. Contacts were 
. . l1Lf lnfreC1uent 1mtll 1032. 
l{halzimov's departure thus very probably marlzed the end of the first 
stage in the existence of the Soviet Agency at ,Jedda. From all 
appearances, that stage had been mainly a passive one. If the 
agency Has to alva1cen to a 1110re militant neH life, signs of tl-Je 
change might be expected tmvards the end of the that year .115 
On 28th Hay, 1932, a delegation from the Kingdom of Hejaz and Najd 
and its dependencies arrived in Moscow. It was headed by Prince 
Faysal, son of King Ibn Saud and ~linister of Foreign Affairs and 
Viceroy of the Hejaz. With him were Faud-by Humza, Assistant 
Hinister for Foreign Affairs; Najor Khelid Al-eiyubi, Prince 
Faysal's adjutant; and Said Shagir Assemen, Secretary to the 
delegation. The delegation was met at the Polish frontier by the 
Chief of the First FBstern Division of the Commissariat for Foreign 
Affairs, Pastukhov; the referent of the Division, Polishov; and the 
former Hinister to Hejaz, Comrade Khakimov.116 
On 29th May, 1932, Izvestiya, in it's No. 147, in a leading article, 
described the historical rise of the Kingdom, including a statement 
that after having used the Arabs against Turkey, England had not 
kept its promise in the treaty of 1915 to King Husayn to create an 
independent Kingdom of Arabia under him, but divided the country up 
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i-lith France, leaving Yerrlen as the only indeDendent portion. "nut", 
says Izvestiya, "the mighty influence of the October Revolution in 
Russia also had an effect on the Arabian East". The Arabian people 
undertook to create a national state by it mID efforts and King 
Husayn was driven out of the Hejaz and a ne,.; state arose, consisting 
of the Hejaz, Najd and the territories attached to the '1ITajd. "The 
Soviet Union Has the first, and i·rithout any reservations, to 
recognize the independence of the new state and established nOr.TIal 
diplomatic relations with it". The Soviet paper stated that the 
fact of the existence of a large independent national state on the 
Arabian Peninsula undoubtedly had great international importance and 
quoted approvingly the statement of the Rome monthly Oltremare to 
the fact that Arabia Ivas no longer a Turkish province but was now 
divided into a number of states born of new nationalism developing 
there, that Arabia ~vas a centre of international communication 
uniting three continents, and that it had a growing trade 
. 117 
:Lmportance. 
On its arrival in Hoscow the delegation was met by Acting Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs, lZrestinski; the Assistant Commissar, Karakhon; 
member of the Collegium, Stomoniskov; Assistant Commissar for 
Nilitary and Naval Affairs, Kamenov; other military and Hoscow 
officials, together with a military escort and the Persian 
118 Ambassador. The delegation was received and entertained by 
Kalenin, President of the Central Executive Committee, and other 
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usual social amenities were extended to it. The delegation visited 
the1ed Ar01Y ':rouse and a horse ShOH, the October Camn, the rlilitary 
Aviation Academy, the AnO automobile factory in Noscol\T before 
proceeding to Leningrad for 3rd and LIth June. After returning to 
1l0SCOlv the delegation left for Odessa and Istanbul. The Chief of 
the Protocol Section of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was to 
, d I t to the latt:-r cl'tv.1l9 accompany tne e ega es ~_ 
A speech was delivered by Kalenin, the Soviet President, on 29th May 
1932, to honour the delegation. His comments were as follows: 
"Your Highness: 
It is my pleasure to have you here in the Soviet Union. 
You represent a friendly nation, and I salute the King 
through you. Through the past years the relations 
between our two nations has been very friendly and true. 
Hithout a doubt your visit is one happy side of our 
relations. I greet you in the capital of the Soviet 
Union as you represent one of the Arab peoples that has 
acquired full independence by the virtues of the King's 
bravery and leadership during Horld War I. The 
independence of the State is an important condition to 
the cultural and economics of the Soviet people and the 
government is looking very closely and seriously to the 
successful development of your government policy which 
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3ims at defendin~ the independence of t~e Arab nation 
and to ac1:1ieve a hi<?,h level of economic aDd cultural 
\<lelfare. I am confident that friendship betc"een our two 
nations r'2sponds directly to the interest and benefit of 
our people. Your visit to the Soviet Union will increase 
the strength of our friendship. 
I urge you to carry my best wishes of good health and 
prosperity to King Abdul l~ziz and I greet you warmly as 
a representative of a friendly nation and a leader of 
its Foreign Affairs. I truly wish the continuation of 
progress and prosperity to your people and to our 
friendly relations every strength and support".120 
As a result of Prince Faysal's visit, the Soviet l~ion offered to 
forgive a debt of 30,000 pounds sterling that the government had 
never paid, ironically, for the import of petroleum products. 
Moscow also offered a loan of one million pounds if the King would 
lift the trade embargo and sign both a commercial trade and a treaty 
of friendship. The fung later ended the trade embargo but did not 
. ttl 121 Slgn any rea y or accept a oan. 
On 3rd June, 1932, Pravda reported that Leningrad industry would 
take part in the permanent exhibitions of Soviet export goods being 
organized in Hejaz by the All-tJnion Chamber of Commerce. 122 The 
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l[osCOlv Daily Fe,vs weekly edition of 5th June, 1932, contained an 
article on the visit of the delegation to the Fejaz.123 
Saudi-Soviet relations then became fairly inactive. The Soviets saw 
that Ibn Saud ,vmud not take active measures to challenge the 
British position in Arabia but was co-operating with London instead. 
Indeed, the Soviets themselves soul;ht to co-operate ~vith the British 
as the power of FU tler' s Germany grew stronger. ~,7hether it was to 
improve relations with London or for some other reason, in 1938 the 
Soviets withdrew their diplomatic mission from Saudi Arabia as well 
as from Yemen, Turkey, Afghanistan, and persia.124 
April 1937 witnessed a brief revival of Soviet interest in Saudi 
affairs. The new doctor, M. Stepukov who arrived in Jedda to re-
open the Soviet dispensary, knew only Russian when he arrived. He 
informed His Majesty's Hinister soon after his arrival that he was 
swamped with patients sometimes as many as eighty in a day, but in 
November he said that his daily attendance was twenty to thirty 
(this was at a time when the British Indian doctor attached to His 
~·tajesty' s Legation ,vas seeing some tlVO hundred patients a day) .125 
The members of the Soviet Legation frequented local houses 
assiduously, and it was remarked that they learnt colloquial Arabic 
quickly. Ali Fattahov a new Soviet Secretary who replaced Khakimov, 
was popular and loved by the Hejaz' people.126 His wife, a Turkish-
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speaking ~'oslem, SDent several months during the summer staying ioJith 
the Turkish wife of Prince Faysal. 127 
The Saudi j\iinister in T....ondon, Hafiz ~!ahba, informed the Foreign 
Office that if Ibn Saud could not get a SPlall air mission from His 
f"Tajesty's \,overnment he might apply to the Soviet Union, the 'Cing 
realised the advantages that would result if he ohtained assistance 
fror:l some country like Holland or a Scandinavian country, which had 
no political interest in the r-fiddle East, but a Soviet Hission would 
cost much less. It was thought at first that the T(ing had "Hhite" 
Russians in mind, but Hafiz Hahba asserted that it was a Soviet 
}lission that was in question, and that an offer had been made by the 
Soviet Embassy in Paris \vhen Prince Saud was there. It seems, 
hOlVever, that Wahba was under a misapprehension. Fuad Bey assured 
His Hajesty's Hinister that there was no question of accepting a 
Soviet Mission and that Hahba rrru.st have been mistaken. 128 
In 1938 members of the Soviet Legation contacted numerous government 
offices in Jedda when the opportunity was taken to spread 
propaganda. The ~tinistry of Foreign Affairs responded by 
instructing all foreign missions to communicate with the Hinistry 
alone. Apart from this brief flurry of activity, the Soviet 
TJegation staff occupied itself with translating propaganda leaflets 
, A b' 12q mto ra 1C. . 
These uere to be among t}1e last acts of the Soviets in the F~ejaz for 
in 'lay 1939 the ,~oviet governfllent announced the closure of its 
lfissions in both Saudi Arabia and the Yemen as a 'gesture of 
disapproval' at the Anglo-Italian Agreement concluded earlier that 
year. 130 The true reason for the closure of the ~.fission remained 
'obscure' but the Soviet Union's general policy was 'to reduce 
f . , 131 orelgTI contacts • 
Dr. Stepukov had settled down in Jedda, l'laS living with a white 
Russian engineer named Na'<, who was employed in the Saudi Air Force. 
The doctor had applied for a license for practising in Jedda, the 
Health Department had agreed to grant his application, so that he 
could become an additional foreign doctor in Jedda. He appears to 
have been well-esteemed as a doctor, though his value to Arabs was 
diminished by the fact that he hardly spoke a word of Arabic, or 
132 ' 
any language except Russian. 
A great many current stories were concerning the circumstances of 
his refusal to leave with the rest of the ~lission. One story says 
that he told the Charge d'Affaires, Ali Fattohov, that he was quite 
sure he would be killed when he got back to the Soviet Uhion, so it 
would save a good deal of trouble if Fattohov would oblige him by 
killing him on the spot. Another story says that before leaving 
Jedda for the second and last time, Fattohov obtained from the 
government a certificate shOlving that he had tried his ,best to 
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8ersuade the doctor to come, ,rrthout success; hut the r.Ciamma~(am 
denied this story. }fr. Trott thought that Dr. Stepu1.zov woulcl 
eventually receive Saudi nationality. The vJ.ammakarrt also 
e....'Cpressed great concern for the fate of Fattohov, who, he said, was 
not a Russian at all but a Turk, and a good Voslem.133 
According to one writer, those members of the Soviet ~fission who 
returned to Hoscow from Saudi Arabia were put to death by order from 
Stalin on account of the failure of the Soviet !~ssion in Arabia. 134 
In Saudi Arabia the Soviets had gained from "the slight propaganda 
value of their doctor, they have never had any pilgrims. The 
Legation has long been little more than a translation bureau from 
135 Arab newspapers'. 
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B From the enn of Uorld Har II lmtil Stalin's death in 1953, fe'y 
references are available as to any contact betHeen the tTIlO nations. 
During the fifties and early sixties the Soviet Union ,.;ras feeling 
its ,-vay in the politics of the .Arabian Gulf. Its attitudes and 
comments were frequently contradictory. Soviet 'iiITiters could not 
make UD their minds \yhether the United States and Britain ,.;rere 
hitter rivals there, or whether they were working hand in glove. 
i(m·;ait remained virtually a colony in their eyes, until independence 
in 1961. The same was true of Bahrain and the United Arab Thlirates 
,vhich ,vere still under British protection until their independence 
in 1971. In 1953, a Soviet writer gave full support to Iran's 
claim to Bahrain, stating that union with Iran was what the people 
wanted. In later years, such backing was no longer given. 136 
The militant and unsympathetic propaganda line and the passive 
policy which the USSR conducted toward the Arab East until Stalin 
died was reflected in attitudes and policy regarding the Arabian 
Peninsula countries. 137 The Soviet Union made no attempt to develop 
closer ties with Saudi Arabia, but adopted a "wait and see" 
position. However, in 1956, a new line of propaganda began for the 
purpose of re-shaping the thinking of the Arab Horld mainly to\vard 
the Hest. 138 The Bol'shaya Sovetskya Entsiklopedia regarding Saudi 
Arabia Wahhabi dogma argued that it had originally had some 
progressive ingredients such as the unification of the tribes 
against Turkish rule. However, it condemned its transformation into 
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a reactionary ideology guarding a colonial feudal regime and 
directed against the national-liberation struggle in Arabia, against 
d d d o °d ,,139 a vance emocratlc 1 eas • 
The Soviets were not in favour of the Saudis allowing the TJnited 
States to build and operate an air base in Dhahran, "the only base 
from which American hombers can reach the industrial centres of the 
Sovie t Union. Ihn Saud \.73S accused to selling out to the Arnericans. 
Surprisingly, even this f'lost serious charge ,vas not followed by 
direct bitter attacks; Soviet propagandists preferred, then as 
later, to depict Saudi Arabia and its ruler as victims of Hestern 
imperialism. An important aspect of this picture was a vitriolic 
campaign against Western oil companies operating in the area. These 
companies (and especially Aramco) were often described as ruling 
their concession areas like a state within a state, and were 
regularly reported to be plundering the Middle FEst, reaping 
gigantic profits mainly because of their inhuman exploitation "of 
140 the native workers, and beggarly wages" • 
The Soviet coverage of the Arabian Peninsula in the late 1940's and 
early 1950' s such as it ,vas, dealt mainly with the activities of the 
oil companies and with the competition of Britain and the United 
States for control of new sources of oil. Saudi Arabia received 
some individual attention.141 The Soviet Union's attitude toward 
Saudi ~~abia reflected Stalin's toward Third World Nations in 
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general. Toe relation betHeen Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union 
\lOuld not chan,:re until a neW' leader \'78S appointed. 
The death of Stalin brought a fundamental change in Soviet policy 
toward the ~tiddle East. Although the Soviets had begun to take the 
side of the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict as early as 1954, 
'ihen Halenkov was still Premier, the real change in Soviet Dolicy 
did not emerge until :Zhrushchev ousted Halenkov from the 
premiership in February 1955. Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev lias not 
afflicted with a two-camp view of the world. Instead, he saw the 
world as being divided into three main zones or blocs - the Soviet 
bloc, the capitalist bloc, and the Third Horld, which he hoped to 
win over to communism through political support and large doses of 
economic and military aid.142 By 1954, how'ever, the Soviets had 
becol'le some~vhat more optimistic about the Arabian Peninsula. 
Undoubtedly the main factor in this change of mood was the more 
flexible way of looking at the underdeveloped world and its 
nationalism which developed in 110SCQlv in 1952 and 1953; this allow'ed 
policy-makers to rediscover some past ideas regarding the value of 
nationalist and even traditionalist regimes to the realization of 
the Soviet \Yish to deny the i-tiddle East to the Hest. Events in the 
Peninsula in the early 1950's were regarded in retrospect as 
encouraging. 143 
The Soviets were pleased by King Saud's rejection of U.S. military 
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aid in ~ebruary 1 C)'54 a.nd hy his refusal in 19')5 to join the 
~';estern-sponsoren Security Pact that was to become the Central 
Treaty Organization (CENTO). Follmving the momentous Czech-Egyptian 
arms deal - the first major arms agreement between the Socialist 
bloc and a Third ~~orld State - the Soviets were hopeful that they 
could sell arms to the Saudis also. In 1952 Saudi forces occupied 
the Burami Oasis on the basis that it had been under Saudi rule in 
the nineteenth century. It i.Jas hoped oil would be found there, as 
this oasis was near Oman and Abu Dhabi where other oil had been 
f d 144 0l.ID • 
In October 1955 British, Omani, and Abu Dhabi forces re-took the 
oasis and pushed the Saudis out. Both Prince Faysal and Soviet 
officials were cited in the western press as claiming that Saudi 
Arabia was considering resuming diplomatic ties with HOSCOlv and 
buying Soviet arms, but the Saudi government offiCially denied both 
stories. The Soviets did, however, express support for the Saudi' 
posi tion in the Burami Oasis dispute. The Soviets were also hopeful 
about the prospects for friendship with Riyadh, since King Saud then 
seemed T,villing to follow Nasser I s lead by signing a security pact 
with Egypt and Syria in October 1955 (which was joined by Yemen the 
following year).145 Hoscow refused to abandon hope for King Saud, 
his trip to Hashington ,vas barely reported. On 22nd February, 1957, 
Le Monde issued a report, neither confirmed nor denied, that the 
Fxemlin had invited King Saud to visit the Soviet Union. 146 
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In its efforts to inn over the LTear and the Tfiddle r:ast, the Soviet 
Union in 19511 Jlade no pretence 0 f relying on i t.s mm resources, 
h h 1 " I 'I' 'I I 147 Dur' h i~ et. er po 1 tlca , 'TIl. 1 tary, econoffilc, or cu tura • lng t .ese 
years, the Soviets \~ere optimistic about creating a friendly 
relationship ~vith Saudi Arabia, especially since they wanted to 
\~eaken the Dri tish position in Aden. The hope was dimmed when King 
Saud ljroke relations ivith \jasser. Saudi ,Arahia turneo closer to the 
United States and accepted American aid. In 1957 King Saud renewed 
the U.S. lease on Dhahran air base which produced a demonstration in 
Riyadh, and the Soviets became more critical. 148 At the end of 
August, an article in New Times stated: 
Using financial and other pressures, United States imperialism 
has been working to sever Saudi Arabia from other Arab States 
and convert her into an instrument of aggressive policy. So 
far that goal has not been fully achieved ••••••••••••••••• 149 
In 1958 Soviet hopes for Saudi Arabia had dimmed, Soviet \·rriters 
came to the conclusion that Saudi Arabia had joined the imperialist 
camp and changed from praising Hahhabism as a progressive, anti-
British movement to condemning it as an instrument of the 
'rul h ISO reactlonary ers to oppress t e masses. 
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C Until the 1960's, the Soviet media maintained an ambivalent attitude 
towards Saudi Arabia. On the one hand the cOtmtry was described as 
a symbol of 'reaction, baclavardness, feudalism, tribalism, serving 
imperialism', but at the same time the Soviets described the Saudi 
rJlers as 'victims of colonialism', exploited by the imDerialist oil 
monopolies and forced to serve them. lSI 
Soviet thoughts about Saudi "Arabia were markedly friendlier in 1961 
and the first nine months of 1962, despite King Saud's resumption of 
pmver in December 1960. The Saudis decided in Narch 1961 that 
America would not be allowed to renew the lease on Dhahran air 
152 base. The Yezhegodnik Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii praised 
the Saudi government for its continued policy of neutrality, its 
non-participation in aggressive blocs and particularly its increased 
co-operation with other Arab States; the latter Ivas a reference to 
the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Syrian Arab 
Republic and to the Saudi actions at the oil conferences in 1961 at 
which its delegate called for revision of unequal agreements and, 
incidentaly, "disproved the statement of imaginary 'dangers' of the 
export of Soviet oil for the Arab countries". HOSCQly was also 
encouraged by Saudi actions at the United Nations during 1961. The 
Saudi permanent representative at the United Nations, Ahmed 
Shukairy, made several strong attacks on the British for their 
activities in Oman. In addition, he "exposed the hypocrisy of the 
Hestern powers' indignation over the resumption of nuclear testing 
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hy the USS~ at the same time as they supported French tests in the 
Sahara", and praised the Soviet nnion for introducing a resolution 
in the General AsseQbly calling for an end to all colonial rule by 
the end of 1962, and, according to an Egyptian newspaper, had 
'.[:: 1 l' 'h f' 1 h H' d "J' 153 ll1J..oma ta .cs IVlti \Jromy~o at tl e unlte L·.atlons. 
By September 1962 the Soviet TJnion and Sandi l\ra1)ia Tvere taking 
t d ' 1 ' l' 154 steps to res ore lp omatlc re atlons. In that month the Hayor 
of Riyadh was touring the Centra~ Asian Republics. ~ .. rore important, 
the Saudi Ambassador to the United Nations, Ahmad Shukairy (who 
later became the first head of the PLO), went to Hoscow and ,vas 
warmly received by Khrushchev. These \07ere the first publicly 
acknowledged visits to the USSR by Saudi officials since Faysal went 
there in 1932.155 Soviet ~Tews reported that he "e.xpressed gratitude 
to the Soviet government and N. Khrushchev for their constant 
support for the Arab peoples in their struggle for national 
liberation", while Tass quoted him as saying that Saudi Arabia hoped 
for Soviet aid in building her heavy industry. Furthermore, the 
Daily Telegraph reported, a "high official of the Arab League" had 
revealed that Saudi Arabia had asked the Soviets to equip its army 
with modern ~07eapons, but because King Saud would not allow Soviet 
technicians and advisers into the country to maintain the weapons 
and train the army, Moscow had refused the request.156 
Over the ne.xt few years the Soviets looked for new opportunities to 
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increase ties bet'veen the two nations. The revolution in North 
Ye~en in 10G~ closed all possibilities of a ~eaningful relationship 
he tween the t,·;ro countries for some time to come. King Saud's 
decision to sUDply [;loney and arms to the Imam's forces, and the 
Saudi invasion and clashes \vith the R.epublican army provoked a 
violent outburst in the Soviet press and journals on the nature and 
ancestry of the Saudi tUngdom. A. Stupak declared: 
Discontent with the despotic regime in Saudi Arabia is 
growing every dliy. The Saudi royal family regards the 
country as its private domain and the State revenues as 
its purse. All matters are decided by the King ••••••• 
Slavery still exists. Progressive ideas are considered 
as a crime against the State, and persons suspected of 
liberalism and opposition to the King are regarded as 
dangerous criminals .157 
Despite its stated policy, the USSR attempted to improve its 
relations with Saudi Arabia on the occasion of Faysal's Coronation 
in 1964. (An Izvestia correspondent, reporting on Faysal's desire 
to develop good relations with the Soviet Union, also mentioned 
'positive measures' in the direction of social and economic reforms 
taken by the Saudi regime). This attempt was doomed to failure, not 
only because of Faysal's hostility to communism, but also because 
both countries were involved on different sides in the Yemen war. 
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The ~oviets also tried, unsuccessfully, to distinguish between their 
activity in Yemen and their relations ~,;rith the other countries of 
the Peninsula hy presenting their Yemeni involvement as a function 
of their relations T·7ith Egypt and the struggle against P,ritish 
iI!1Derialism in Aden. r'men they realised that their efforts were to 
no avail, the Soviets rene'wed their attacks on Saudi Arabia, ,'lith 
'?aysal becominr>; the symbol of 'l\rah reaction' in the service of 
. . l' 150 1mper1a 1S1TI. 
In July 1964 the Saudi government claimed to have uncovered a 
"Communist" network in the Eastern Province which had been plotting 
to disrupt the oil industry. The Saudis are given to hysterical 
outbursts about communists, but on this occasion G,eir claims were 
all but confirmed by an appeal from the FtrLSA in Pravda for all 
freedom-loving countries to apply pressure to the Saudi government 
to stop the arrests.159 
At one point there seemed to be a thaw in Saudi-Soviet relations. 
After Brezhnev and Kosygin ousted Khrushchev in October 1964 and 
Faysal deposed his brother King Saud the following month, the 
Soviets sent Faysal their congratulations, and the new King allowed 
a Soviet journalist to enter the Kingdom - the first to do so since 
the 1930's. Faysal told him that Saudi Arabia had no quarrel with 
the Soviet Union or prejudice against Russians, and that there were 
" btl" t' . b' 1 tIl' 160 Th S . no 0 s ac es 0 lffiprov1ng 1- a era re at10ns. e oV1ets 
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lauded the oe,'7 Tung, as they did the improvement of Saudi -Egyptian 
relations that took place as the result of efforts to bring ahout 
a cease-fire and a political settlement in Yemen. The Yemeni peace 
efforts failed, however, leading to renewed Saudi-Egyptian polemics, 
and since ~1oscml sided ,vith Cairo, the USSR a.T1d Saudi .Arabia once 
again became hostile toward each other. 161 
The proposal for a union of Huslim nations, or Islamic pact, 
mentioned by King Faysal in December 1965, when he was visiting Iran 
was the target of continuous Soviet attacks. Hoscow regarded it as 
an attempt to renew or continue earlier imperialist projects - "the 
so called Greater Syria plan, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Fertile 
Crescent Federation, the Baghdad pact, and others". The pact was to 
include - in addition to "feudal, medieval, reactionary and fanatic" 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya, Jordan, ~brocco, Kuwait and others.162 
Also, the USSR accused the sponsors of the Islamic Alliance to use 
it primarily on the home front against the national liberation 
movements, but at the same time it would undoubtedly strengthen· the 
't' f th' '1' 't' 163 Al k K . d ' POS1 10n 0 e 1ffiper1a 1st POS1 10ns. e seyosyg1n ur1ng 
his visit to the United Arab Republic in Hay 1966 added his 
condemnation of the Islamic pact to President Nasser's: 
Kosygin was careful to add that we respect the religious 
feelings of believers. But in this case religion is being 
used to mask a malevolent cause, directed against the 
It;1J. interests of the people.' . 
In 1966 and the first half of 1967 many Soviet reports on Saudi 
Arabia dealt Ivith t,VO developments. One was the outbreak of 
activity by underground organizations in Saudi Arabia, the other 
\-las the growth of co-operation betlveen Saudi Arabia and the \';est 
( . lIn' .) d f" .l' h" h P . 1 1(:5 part1cu ar y Dr1ta1TI ,an 0 oaU([l am 1t10ns on t e .en1nsu a. 
The increasingly critical Soviet attitude to the Saudi regime did 
not prevent the development on a minor scale of Soviet-Saudi trade. 
The value of imports from the Soviet Union grew from 600,000 rubles 
in 1964 to over three million in 1965 and then dropped to two and a 
half million in 1966; the main increases were in cement and sugar 
(of which in 1965 the Soviet Union was the second largest supplier). 
In December 1966 Izvestia reported that the Soviet auto exports 
organization had concluded an agreement with a Saudi company for the 
sale of 500 cars and trucks.166 
Riyadh viewed Soviet foreign policy toward the Middle East as 
designed not to bring about a solution favourable to the Arabs but 
to enhance the influence of the Soviet Union over the Middle East 
instead. King Faysal was particularly critical of the USSR; in his 
view, although Moscow said it helped the Arabs, it was Soviet 
military assistance to the Jews that allowed Israel to survive in 
1948. He also blamed the Soviet Union for the Arab defeat in June 
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19f.)7; he accused the Soviets of falsely infor'1ing ?Jasser that the 
Israelis ~vould not attack. ln7 :Uyadh also criticized the United 
States arms sales to Israel but accused the Soviets of providing 
Israel with soldiers by allowing large-scale emigration of Soviet 
Jews in the 1970's.168 
The Soviet attitude tmvards Saudi Arabia changed someHhat after the 
June 1967 SL"'C Day Har, ,.,hen the Saudis joined the short-lived oil 
hoycott and the attacks on Britain and the United States in the 
United Nations for their complicity in the Israeli aggression. 
However, Saudi Arabia undertook to provide financial support to 
Egypt, Syria and Jordan which had suffered in the war and to re-
build their armies from the ashes of the 1967 war. At that time, 
the Soviets again tried to re-establish diplomatic relations ,nth 
Saudi Arabia, but to no avail. Even if certain aspects of Saudi 
foreign policy served Soviet aims, in general, it was against the 
Soviet Union's interest, and so the Soviets preferred not to react 
directly. Although, for the most part, the Soviet media ignored 
them, there were from time to tL~e Soviet outbursts against Saudi 
Arabia and its policy.169 Occasionally the Soviets attempted to 
point out the advantage to the Saudi government of the establish~nt 
of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The USSR accused the 
imperialists, especially the united States, of having interest in 
relations not being established.170 
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In i\pril 1968 the Saudi government signed an agreement \vith 
Rwnania for Petronin (the national oil company) to exchange nine 
million tons of crude oil for n.umanian equipment. This was Saudi 
Arabia's first venture into the international oil marketing field, 
and Saudi Arabia ~vas apparently not happy 1,lith the equipment. In 
t~ovember 1969 it was annolmced that oil firms in Saudi .t\rabia had 
ordered several Soviet self-propelled drilling rigs. 17l Soviet 
comments on Saudi Arabia internal affairs have been few but 
critical; they have generally revolved around two themes. The 
first is the continuing prominence in the economy of foreign 
companies, particularly .~amco. The second general theme has been 
the social and political situation in Saudi Arabia. Bodyanskiy 
and Lazarev conceded that King Faysal had made genuine efforts to 
bring about certain social changes (such as the prohibition of 
slavery and the expansion of the education system).172 
The Soviets gave some support to the Marxist rebels in Oman in 1970. 
The Saudis decided to help Sultan Qabus who overthrew his oppressive 
father in 1970. In the late 1960's and 1970's, the Saudis and the 
Soviets were in a struggle for influence over the states Oman, 
Aden, and Yemen, that bordered directly on the Kingdom.173 
The Soviet Union's position was made more difficult by the change in 
American policy in the region after 1970. The United States began 
to take a more active role in Arabian and Gulf politics. and tried to 
--------------
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encourage its friends to follow suit. To aid their local allies in 
withstanding the pressure of the USSR and its Arab friends in the 
.~abian Gulf region, the United States increased its aid and 
attempted to solve, or at least alleviate, conflicts among them. It 
also encouraged the countries concerned to join forces to resist the 
. . d 1 f h' . f ' 174 suoverSlon an attac.c\:s o. tl.e progresslve orces. 
Nost gratifying to the Saudis in 1972 was the fact that Sadat :nade 
the decision to expel the Soviet military presence from Egypt with 
encouragement from King Faysal. The series of developments in the 
Arab world seemed to initiate a new trend toward moderation, away 
from the Soviet Union. Some thought it reflected the growing 
financial clout of the conservative Arab oil producers, especially, 
Saudi Arabia. Expectations were being raised that a new era of 
Saudi leadership of the Arab world was beginning and that this would 
have a clear impact on Soviet influence in the area. Only Iraq and 
South Yemen seemed to be locked into the Soviet Orbit, beyond the 
lure of Saudi financial inducements. The Soviets continued to try 
to keep relations with Saudi Arabia open at every opportunity.175 
In the very next issue of New Times Volsky, another key Soviet 
commentator on Middle East affairs, ~varned against Saudi Arabia's 
increasingly important role in the Arab world: 
iihat lies behind the activation of Saudi foreign 
policy? And ':'lhat is this thing called the 
"phenomenon of Saudi Arabia", ,,,hich the Hestern 
press is so zealously touting? •••••• 
The Saudi monarchy .... is bent on becoming the 
bulwark of reaction throughout the Arab world 
generally. Year after year it spends dozens 
even hundreds of millions of dollars on what it 
calls "Arab policy", the aim of which is to 
thwart social and economic reforms in other Arab 
states and subvert their co-operation with the 
socialist countries. Saudi "dollar diplomacy" 
is out to rally the Arab nations not for struggle 
against imperialism and Israeli aggression, for 
stronger national independence and social and 
economic advancement, but on purely religious 
foundations. Riyadh endlessly thumps the drum of 
the "jihad" or "holy war" that King Faysal has 
declared against "Communism-Zionism", that 
fantastic invention of present day obscuratists. 
And, as if to discredit Faysal even further, Volsky added: 
There is no doubt that Saudi oil could effectively 
influence Israel's American patrons. But here is what 
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'Zing Faysal said in an interview with Cairo weekly 
Al-tJussawar: "It is useless to talk about the use 
of oil as a tool against the United States. It is 
dangerous even to think of it". Sheikh Ahmed 
Yamani, the Royal 7finister for Oil and Nineral 
Health, explaining the King's viewpoint, says: "It 
is our opinion that the best way for the Arabs to 
use their oil is as a basis for closer co-operation 
with the Hest, especially the United States. l ?6 
The Soviets had good grounds for attacking Saudi Arabia on this 
point, because in late September Yamani had come to the United 
States and, in a speech to the ~fiddle East Institute in Hashington, 
stated that Saudi Arabia would raise production from 6 to 20 
million barrels of oil per day by 1980 to satisfy the increasing 
U.S. oil needs in return for assured entry into the lJ.S. market. l ?7 
l·fuatever the USSR policy in the region, the Soviets could not ignore 
Saudi Arabia's central position in international oil exports, nor 
its enormous financial power and position of leadership in the Arab 
~vorld. Yet, Saudi Arabia's patriarchal "pre-capitalist" regime co-
operated with the united States against attempts to establish a 
foothold in the Gulf and against the USSR's 'progressive' allies in 
the area. Notwithstanding, the Soviet attitude toward Saudi Arabia 
ra~ined open-minded. Despite occasional outbursts against Saudi 
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J\rabia's strong anti-Soviet policy, the Soviet Dedia still tried to 
convince Riyadh that relations with the Soviet Union could [Jrove 
beneficial. Once again, this demonstrated that in spite of 
familiarity with the .Arabs, Soviet thin~dng remained removed from 
actuality and could not shake off the theories and pre-conceptions 
of the past. 
Saudi .~abia equates atheism and communism with the very Devil, and 
considers the USSR as a threat to the foundations of the Huslim 
States. Evidently, as long as the existing regime remains in power 
in Saudi Arabia, it is well-nigh impossible for the USSR to come to 
understanding with it. But the Soviets believe that attitudes might 
change and in any case they do not wish to risk confrontation with 
the Saudis beyond their minor verbal attacks and indirect, limited 
aid to subversive elements in the Arabian Peninsula. In most cases 
these attacks too, were prompted by Saudi provocation concerning 
178 local developments. 
The Soviets assume, moreover, the existence of a conflict of 
interests between oil-producing countries, Saudi Arabia in 
particular and Hestern oil-consuming countries, headed by the United 
States. They believe that their military power near this area and 
political and verbal support they have given to OPEC aggravates 
tension and, sooner or later, it will reach the point of explosion. 
Then, according to Soviet reasoning, countries like Sa~di Arabia 
Ivill have no choice but to rely on the USSR for help. Their 
attitude to Riyadh oscillates therefore, between preaching to the 
Saudis, trying to persuade then that their interests lie with the 
USSR and emotional outbursts occasioned by Saudi activities, Ivhich 
incense the Soviets. According to the Soviets, Saudi Arabia's 
absence of relations with the Soviet lJnion was 'incompatible with 
the interest of hoth Deoples of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab 
Countries'. Despite Saudi Arabia's anti-communist and anti-Soviet 
campaign in the Arab world and attempts to undermine the 
friendship between the Arab countries and the Soviet Union, its best 
interests would lie in 'settling and maintaining relations with the 
Soviet Union. 179 
Soviet commentary on Saudi Arabia generally reached the following 
conclusions: (1) 'imperialism' is responsible for the bad relations 
between Saudi Arabia and the USSR; (2) Saudi Arabia's 'reactionary' 
rulers are 'willing servants of imperialism' and its allies. The 
tone of Soviet approaches to Saudi Arabia again became friendly 
during and after the October 1973 war, when King Faysal supported 
the use of the Arab oil weapon against any country friendly to 
Israel, especially the United States. 
A message of congratulations ~ent in 1973 by King Faysal to the 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet N. Podgorny, on the occasion of the 
anniversary of the Great October Revolution, led to much speculation 
regarding its meanins and intentions.l~O Completely taken 11y 
surprise, in iloscow this messa1;e aroused hopes and ,Sreat 
. 18·1 lnterest. RThmours circulated concerning the possihi1ity of an 
Lr:1prOVemen t in re1a tions be bveen l·loscow and "Riyadh. Al-LTahar 
quoted contacts bet,·,een Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union taking 
place aimed to establish diplomatic relations hetween the t,VO 
countries. And also, Al-T'Tahar claimed that King Ji'aysal had 
182 
accented an invitation to visit Hoscow but this did not occur. 
It is to be assumed that these rumours may have originated in Riyadh 
to provide leverage against the United States. Alternatively, they 
might also have been a Soviet attempt to test Saudi reaction to such 
a possibility or to smV' dissent between Saudi Arabia and the United 
States. 
That situation did not last for long. Saudi Arabia was strongly in 
favour of ending the Arab oil embargo against the U.S., and exerted 
pressure on Egypt to move closer to the tJnited States, and tried 
(unsuccessfully) to make Syria turn away from the Soviet Union. By 
April 1974 the Soviet media had restrned its attacks on Saudi Arabia. 
A peace and progress broadcast in Arabic (4th April 1974) denounced 
King Faysa1 for equating Communism and Zionism, described Saudi 
Arabia as a country "where feudalism is in complete pOlver" and ,vhere 
"Arab reaction" wants to strengthen still more its relations with 
American Co10nia1ism".183 
~:in~ Paysal, a V'2r:y conservative voslem, ,vas strongly anti-
communist ':lhere it exists. He smv r::ommunism and 7;ionisf'1 as heing 
united in a conspiracy a~ainst the Arabs and vie~ved t:1e TJSSR and 
Israel as close allies, no matter what they said puhlicly.134 
The assassination of King Faysal on 25th Barch 1975 shook the \Vorld 
and highlighted the importance of this under-developed c01.mtry to 
th I " d 1" 185 e wor Q s economy an po ltlCS. The assassination received 
extensive Soviet coverage. Soviet commentators were careful, 
hmvever, not to appear to be presenting their own positions. They 
attributed their remarks to quotations from the "Hestern press", the 
Arab press or ~vhat was being said in Riyadh. This enabled them to 
change their positions as developments required. The questions the 
Soviets asked : Who stood behind the assassination? lfuat were their 
motives? Hho would benefit from it? The answers to all these 
questions were usually: The tJ.S.A. and the American oil companies. 
The Soviets viewed the assassination as a Saudi-American plot to 
bring to po\Ver someone more amenable to their wishes. For their 
part, although relieved to be rid of their worst Biddle East enemy, 
the Soviets feared that his successor would be even ,vorse.186 
King Faysal had little faith in Soviet protestations of friendly 
intentions, and he insisted that the USSR was li~~ed to Israel and 
that both opposed Arabs. He remained hostile toward the Soviets and 
to communism until his death. Khalid, his brother, assumed the 
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throne, and the security situation in the Peninsula greatly 
improved. ~!OSCo"," and :qiyadh did not cease to he critical of each 
other, hut there Here some more friendly statements, as when Crmm 
Prince "?ahd said that Riyadh wanted good relations 1.;rith hoth East 
and fTest ami that Saudi Arahia might "settle" its relations with the 
USSR. The Soviets welcomed all suc1:1 statements but \.;rere annoyed by 
the Saudi desire to have friendship without "emhassies". Ho;vever, 
as ~roscm.;r and Riyadh continued to compete for influence in both 
South Yemen and the Horn of Africa, this mood of friendliness did 
1 137 not ast. 
After King Faysal, it seemed as if Saudi Arabia would continue as 
before. But the Saudi leadership has put less emphasis on the 
"Communist-Zionist conspiracy" (though this notion does continue to 
appear), but it emphasizes that Israeli and Soviet foreign policies 
have a similar goal to keep the Arab States ~.;reak.188 Although 
conservative and isolationist, Saudi Arabia became different from 
the Gulf States in many ways. It was more aware of the outside 
world and had more ties with Hestern countries. Not only did it try 
to establish its importance in inter-Arab and Islamic arenas, but it 
also hoped to playa role in the Hestern world, of which it felt 
itself becoming more a part. The Soviets watched developments 
carefully in Saudi Arabia. It seemed as if they knew more about the 
country than before, but if one can judge from what they wrote or 
said, they did not always understand what they saw concerning Saudi 
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notivation and aiDS. Some sectors of the Soviet academic community, 
especially orientalists of Saudi Arabia, but with fe-';'7 exceptions, 
they had little influence over the Soviet decision-making 
189 process. 
The Soviets compared the situation in Saudi Arabia to those in 
TJzbe1dstan and A.zerhaijan hefore the Soviet revolution, or in 
Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie, or other similar historical 
situations. These led the Soviets to draw conclusions regarding the 
outcome of the situation in Saudi Arabia, but they forgot or ignored 
the fact that things were quite different in Saudi Arabia.190 
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j) Saudi Arabia I s attituc.e tm.mrd the Soviet Union - indeed, tOT·mrd th2 
international system as a whole - has traditionally heen determined 
hy three factors : its strong desire to perpetuate a highly 
conservative traditional system of s,;overnment and society, its firm 
int~rest in maintaining the political status quo in general and in 
the Biddle East in particular in the face of radical forces bent on 
disrupting order and stability, and finally its self image as 
guarding the Islamic Spirit and Community against hostile political, 
social and economic forces. 
It is against the background of these three factors that one must 
judge the Saudi perception of the Soviet Union. First, as a force 
striving to overthrow conservative regimes of the Saudi kind and 
revolutionize their social system; secondly, as a super pow·er 
interested in altering the status quo and actively supporting local 
radical forces instigating upheavals and tensions throughout the 
region, as a power representing an alien, hostile, atheist ideology, 
and communism that constitutes a real threat to the traditional 
Horld of Islam, its values, beliefs and norms. 
It seems that the Saudis, whose world view· is moulded by an 
uncompromising religious ideology, cannot see the conflict with 
communism in any other terms than those of good and evil. They, to 
be sure, do not have much liking for Hestern materialistic 
, 'I' t' 191 Th 'E I h t' C1V1 1za 10n. e Jast, owever, represen s communlsm, 
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atheism, radicalism and social upheaval and is regarded, therefore, 
as a far more dangerous enemy than the forces and ideas of the 
Hest. Thus, the elimination - or at least the containment - of 
Soviet influence has become a cornerstone of the Saudis peninsular 
d ' 1 I' 192 an reglona po lCy. 
Tt'1e Saudi perception of the Soviet Union has been widely expressed 
in the Saudi media. The themes emphasised by the media, the 
terminology used and the genuine sense of danger conveyed are 
exemplified by the follO'iving editorial which appeared in the Saudi 
paper 'Ukaz' in early January 1979: 
The Soviet Union is persistent in creating tension, 
generating class struggle and sowing sedition in all 
areas in order to achieve its expansionist and 
aggressive ambitions. International communism is 
pursuing its basic objectives aimed at assailing the 
unity of the peoples, destroying their economic 
resources, spreading moral decay and combatting 
heavenly ideologies in order to ensure the realization 
of their ulterior motives of domination and rule. 
Communism is against peaceful instincts and against all 
religions and beliefs. And since communism poses a 
real danger to all mankind, confronting its conspiracies 
and exposing its false slogans and misleading allegations 
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Dust he the duty of all t~ose who believe in one God. 
All communist moves reveal the truth about the 
communist DIan to incite disturbances :md encourage 
rebellion and chaos, so that in such a state of confusion, 
the Comrmmists can take over power. The Arab and Islamic 
nations must, therefore, be alvare of the comr.mnist ulan 
to destroy the ~fuslim man and erase all human values. 193 
Moscow radio broadcast in 1975 welcomed Prince Fahd's comments 
regarding the possibility of improving relations with the Soviet 
Union. 194 Another Soviet broadcast said: 
The imperialists made substantial efforts to hinder the 
normal development of Soviet-Saudi relations ••• which 
were ruptured through no fault of the Soviet union ••••• 
The imperialists are persistently scaring the Saudi 
ruling quarters with the fictitious communist danger 
Far-sighted politicians in a number of Arab states have 
recently, and with increasing persistence, called for a 
settlement of Saudi Arabia's relations with the Soviet 
U . 195 nlon. 
However, in April 1978, a commentary by V. Kudryavtsev stated that 
the billions of dollars l07hich Saudi Arabia owned offered it the 
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0pDortunity to take giant strides along the path of economic and 
cultural development and t~at something was indeed being done in 
that respect. 
However, the political superstructure is adapting to the 
changing economy at a snail's pace. Surviving feudal 
foundations and the unlimited pOW8r of the royal family, 
the fear of decisive steps in the sphere of education, 
\vhich might in the opinion of the ruling clan lead to a 
radicalization of the populations opinions - all this 
is fraught with troubles for Riyadh within the country. 
Kudryavtsev is Deputy Head of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity 
.with Asian and African Countries, an organization ,vhich serves as a 
link between the Soviets and 'national liberation movements' , 
supporting those factions in Third '~orld countries acting against 
regimes with whom the Soviets would like officially to appear as 
being friendly, or at least not against them.196 He predicted that 
the longer the existing regime remained in power, the more radical 
would be the one which succeeded it: 
As history confirms, the more a country's development is 
held back by political restrictions and the later a 
country embarks on the path of progressive development, 
the more strong, profound and painful are the social and 
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class cataclysms. That is 1:,lhy the Saudi }'.rabian 
government is devoting great attention to strengthening 
the internal political situation. 
According to a Soviet comment in mid-1978: 
The oil ,veal th and the immense currency reserves have 
impelled the Saudi rulers to modernize their kingdom 
technically. However, the medieval structures and 
autocratic rule and the entire anachronistic social 
and political mode of life have been preserved 
practically intact.197 
Soviet media gave considerable publicity in November 1978 to 
greetings from Prince Fahd to Brezhnev on the occasion of the Soviet 
National holiday. Hopeful that relations would eventually be 
established, the Soviets tried to hasten the process by having their 
media refer as little as possible to Saudi Arabia, avoiding all 
tt k S d ' Ar b' I • l' d 1 d h' 198 Th' a aCLS on au 1 ala reglme, po lcyan ea ers lp. lS 
sense of encirclement was further compounded by the 1978 revolution 
in Afghanistan, an Islamic country, which brought a pro-Soviet 
regime to power in Kabul. In an interview with a prominent 
American journalist at the end of 1978, the Saudi Crown Prince and 
First Deputy Prime Minister, Fahd, offered some insight into the 
Saudi perception of the new political realities created in the 
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region. Standi:1g hy a :naD, Crmm Prince Fahd placed his right hand 
on Pa!dstan and solemnly s~yept it across Afghanistan and Iran to the 
Arahian Gulf. His left hand traced a path through Ethiopia and 
across the Red Sea to South Yenen and the tip of Arabia. 'That is 
~'7hat \\1e call the Soviet and Communist pincer movement', he said 'and 
. f I ' r' d h 1 ,199 1 ran goes, tnen \.10 . e p us • 
In December 1978 AI-Nahar reported that the USSR made attempts to 
contact Riyadh through the office of Arafat the Chairman of the PLO. 
According to that, Leonid Brezhnev had conveyed a message to Prince 
Fahd, expressing satisfaction at the establishment of contacts with 
Riyadh and hoping that they continued and established diplomatic 
relations. The Brezhnev message explained the Soviet position on· 
the Arabian Gulf and the Horn of Africa, denying any offensive 
d ' . S d' A_ b' 200 eSlgns agalnst au J. _"U.a J.a. 
In April 1979, the Soviet airline Aeroflot resumed direct flights 
from Hoscmv to San' a, the capital of North Yemen, flying over Saudi 
air space. 201 The most dramatic act of rebellion against the Saudi 
monarchy was the seizure of the Grand Hosque at Hecca in November 
1979 by a group of religious zealots. The Soviets portrayed the 
rebels as "gunmen" and "religious fanatics" as well as generally 
supporting the Saudi government's efforts to defeat them, even 
though Soviet commentary was sympathetic to the Shias demonstrating 
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in the Eastern Province at the same time. Tne Saudis also rienied 
that the Soviets had played any role in the seizure. An important 
reason why the Soviets may have supported Riyadh on this matter is 
that ~IOSCOW did not want to provoke hostility in the Islamic world 
"by saying anything favourable about the rebels. 202 
As the Soviets watched the mounting tensions between Hashington and 
Riyadh, they apparently sensed an opportunity to make overtures of 
their o~~ to the Saudis. In a major article in Literaturnava Gazeta 
by Igor' Belyayev, one of the leading Soviet experts on the Niddle 
East, stated that Saudi Arabia and the USSR "had never fought each 
other" and had never had "any insoluble conflict". Instead of 
continuing the earlier Soviet practice of labelling the kingdom 
"reactionary", "feudalist", the "Kingdom of Darkness", the article 
portrayed the country in sympathetic terms and stressed common 
positions, such as the rejection of the Camp David Accords. 203 
Although he adopted a conCiliatory tone in the context of lJ.S. 
support of Camp David and its "inaction" in the face of Khomeini's 
threatening regime, Prince Fahd continued to talk about "ideological 
differences" with the Soviet Union and stated that "the question of 
di I t . It' . " 204 p oma lC re a lons lS •••••• premature. 
However, the Saudi disappointment with U.S. policy toward the Middle 
East, Igor' Belyayev hoped Saudi-Soviet relations \vould improve. 
The Saudi Foreign Ninister, Sa'ud Faysal, expressed his appreciation 
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for Soviet support to the Arabs. Several £,lore friendly statements 
I{ere issued from nosc:)',{ throughout 1979, and again Prince Faha 
~1 • d h t b d uld . h' . 205 prealcte. t a am assa ors ivO C)e exc, angeC! at SOf.1e pOlnt. The 
Soviet Narodny Eank sought to open a branch in Jedda and a Soviet 
trade mission was said to be ahout to visit Saudi i\rabia for talks 
?nh 
on mutual trade. _I" Contacts between Saudi Arabia and the Soviet 
Union iV'ere reported to have been maintained throuq;h .t\rafat, the 
Chairman of the PLO, and Cro~m Prince Fahd was even said to have met 
Soviet officials while visiting Hoscow in ~fay 1979. It thus became 
clear the Riyadh did not rule out improved relations with tfoscow in 
various fields, short of diplomatic relations.207 
The Saudi-Soviet rapprochement reached its peak in October 1979. In 
an interview with a Lebanese paper, the Saudi Defence Hinister, 
Prince Sultan, made the following statement: 
He are aware of the Soviet attempts to improve relations 
... vith us. He have noted that the Soviet media do not 
attack Saudi Arabia as they used to do in the past. 
Though iye do not have diplomatic relations iyith the 
Soviet Union, ive have mutual relations in several other 
fields. We do not oppose the establishment of diplomatic 
relations provided the Soviets will understand that our 
position emanates from the principles and values of 
Islam. lve do not wish to see foreigners (i.e. foreign 
- 2!SO -
diplof.lats) in our country who preach heresy. If and rvhen 
t~e causes for our concern are removed, there will be no 
f 'b f di 1 l' b 208 reason or tne a sence 0 'p omatic re atlons ,etween us. 
Toe Saudis feared the Soviet military threat, the revolutionary 
ethos of its doctrine, and the radicalism of is regional allies, but 
they couched their distrust in terms of inherent opposition betlveen 
spiritual Islam and atheist, materialist Comrrnmism. 209 Hhile still 
indicating that Islarn and Communism were irreconcilable Prince Fahd 
asserted tha t the USSR could not be ignored as 'a world superpower' • 
Indeed, toward the end of December 1979 there were reports 
indicating that Saudi Arabia was about to establish diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet union. But at this particular juncture, 
the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, throwing the Saudi leadership 
. t eli 210 ln 0 sarray. 
The Saudis capitalized on this action to defend their position. They 
emphasised the strategic-political dangers of the Soviet move as 
well as the threat against ~10slem peoples as a whole. Saudi 
Petroleum Ninister Yamani ,-larned that the main motive of the Soviets 
is the oil fields, because of the declining Soviet oil production 
which would force the Soviet union to need oil in the future. In 
the same spirit Foreign Minister Sa'ud Faysal suggested that the 
Soviet presence so close to the Straits of Hormuz was merely a step 
in the direction of the oil fields. Z11 
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;'fost Saudi statel11ents carried stron~ Islaf'lic overtones, claiming 
that "the hour of confrontation between Islam and Communism has 
b . 1 t 1" d th t "h t" h t" h d b h 1. d212 ,agun V10 en y, an a t, e a nelst t. rea . a, to e c eCK .e .• 
Consequently the Saudi newspaper Al-l3ilad called on 1st January, 
1930, for a meeting of heads of states to lay dmm a common 
strategy on "the Soviet threat ••• [Hhich] is ,?ointed directly at 
the Islamic faib". The Saudi ,c;overnment played a leading role in 
convenil1g the Islamic Conference in Islamabad (Pakistan) in late 
January. In his speech to the Conference Sa'ud Faysal described 
the Soviet action as a "flagrant challenge to the Islamic world, a 
gross disregard for Hoslems and Islam". The Conference ended by 
supporting the Saudi position. It condemned "Soviet military 
aggression against the Afghan people", called for "immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops", and urged the 
Soviets to "refrain from acts of oppression and tyranny against the 
Afghan people and their struggling sons". The Conference suspended 
Afghanistan's membership in the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, discouraged recognition of, and recommended severing 
diplomatic relations ~Yith, "the illegal regime in Afghanistan" , 
affirming "solidarity with the .t\£ghan people in their just struggle 
to safeguard their faith, national independence and territorial 
integrity".213 Stating its "complete solidarity with the Islamic 
countries neighbouring Afghanistan", the Conference called for the 
collection of "contributions from member states, organizations, and 
individuals" in support of the rebels, and for "non-participation in 
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the nlyr.lpic r;a~1es heing held in ifoscmv in Jul v 1980. 214 
In cases lilce these, Saudi nolicy-rnakers attempted to reconcile the 
T~ngdom's immediate strategic interests and its inherent Islamic 
heliefs. Consistency among the different comnonents of the Saudi 
1 ,· . . . f h ., 1 ., 215 wor (1 V1e,v 1S 1mportant to re1TI. orce t e reg1me s eg1t1macy. 
The opportlmity for creatin2; relations hetiveen the tlVQ countries ~vas 
further danmed >;'Jhen the Soviets entered Afghanistan. At times, 
various Saudi leaders had indicated a desire to have friendly 
relations with the Soviets. However, most agreed that such a 
relationship was not possible as long as the Soviets were in 
Afghanistan. The Saudis also would want the Soviets to reduce their 
military presence in both South Yemen and Ethiopia, and end all 
hostile propaganda against the Kingdom, and Soviet Huslims must be 
allowed greater freedom to practice their religion. The Saudis do 
not ~~ect the Soviets to meet these conditions, and as a result, 
there is little possibility of improving the relationship between 
the two nations at the present time. 216 
~vice in January 1980, interviews with Prince Fahd were published, 
and when he spoke of the USSR he emphasized the importance of 
recognizing the reality of Soviet power. "I would like to tell you 
that we have recently observed a positive development in the Soviet 
Union's policy. It began through its information media with the 
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expression of SOflle views indicating that it hehaves as though it 
understands us ••. ()n our part rve hegan nealing ~vith it even 
indirectly in a reasonable ~vay". Fahd Tvent on to say that economic 
and trade relations ,vere good and that "in a short time "\ve ~vill 
reac..It the desired level". Asl{ed ahont diplomatic relations, 1i'ahd 
said that public opinion must first he prepared. "Ho~vever, ,ve are 
t ' t th" "II 1 1 h "t t" ,,217 sure na 1S ':Vl. ta,(e D ace at t, e anpropr1a e 1me . 
A few weeks later Fahd again talked about the Soviet lJnion, this 
time with a somewhat different nuance. "He do not compete ~vith the 
Soviet Union in any way. Nobody can use us as a tool. In the 
circumstances we cannot but admit that the Soviet Union is a major 
power and that we want no problems with it. A frequent error is to 
highlight Saudi Arabia as the only state that can resist the Soviet 
Union and fight it everywhere. This is a mistake, and ,ve do not 
want to be nominated to a rank we cannot obtain".218 
How'ever, in the absence of any force capable of standing up to the 
Soviet challenge and with the consolidation of the Soviet presence 
in Afghanistan, the Saudis evidently realized that it was risky to 
antagonize Moscow. In the light of the American reaction to these 
events, the Saudis apparently concluded that no effective regional 
security, in which they could safely take part, ,vas in the offing 
and decided to appease Moscmv and remove their anti -Soviet label as 
the only means for minimizing the Soviet danger vis-a-vis the 
T(ingc1oEl. (;onser;uently, t~ey not only toned do~m their criticism of 
the Soviet Union and sought to avoid references to the iavasion, but 
they also reverted to conciliatory statements showing Saudi goodwill 
toward the Soviets. Reflecting this Saudi approach, Foreign 
Lrinister Sa'ud stated that an end to the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan would remove 'any inhibition' Saudi Arabia might have 
'about evolving and developing good relations wtth the Soviet 
Union' .219 
In devising a new attitude toward the USSR, the Saudis were more 
keenly aware than ever of the fact that they 'Ilere essentially trying 
to reconcile two mutually exclusive systems: Communism and Islam. 
Hence they sought to provide their nelfT policy Tn th some ideological 
legitimacy. vfuereas in the past they had constantly emphasized 
that Communism and the USSR were inherently atheist and expansionist 
and, by definition, enemies of Islam and Saudi Arabia, Saudi leaders 
now started to differentiate between Communism and the USSR. While 
still maintaining that communism was totally irreconcilable with 
Islam, they proposed, however, that the USSR be regarded as a global 
power and, as such, be treated on the basis of pragmatic 
considerations. 220 
The trend towards joining the Arab radicals led some in Saudi Arabia 
to consider going a step further and establishing relations with the 
Soviet Union. The Soviets had always expressed such a wish and, as 
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a first stage, were reacly to accent official economic ties, ~.Jith a 
permanent trade mission in riyadh, together ~vith a branch of the 
Soviet trade bank. The Saudis preferred not to permit this. 
A senior Soviet COlmnentator and !fiddle East specialist, ,rriting in 
the Hoscow Literaturnava Gazeta in late 1979, called for the 
estahlisruTlent of relations be tween the USSR and Saum _.trabia, he 
said, inter alia: 
The Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia have never been at war 
with each other and they have never had any implacable 
conflicts. The social system of the Soviet Union and 
Saudi Arabia are indeed different but surely this cannot 
be grounds for mutual enmity ... 
In its relations with all countries the Soviet Union 
consistently adheres to the principle of non-interference 
in other states' internal affairs ••• After all, the 
question of whether Saudi Arabia's subjects are acting 
correctly in adhering to Hahhabi postulates is never 
raised in the Soviet Union. That is their internal 
ff . 221 a alr. 
Saudi Arabia's Foreign Hinister, Prince Sa'ud was asked whether he 
had read the article and 'if there are objections to establishing 
diplomatic relations, would you object to the establishment of 
- 26i1 -
cOTllmercinl relations'? iris reDly was : 'fJe have no objection to 
trade transactions with any of the ",orld's countries. He have 
econof'lic dealings \"ith many countries in ,.;rhich ~.,e have no ciiplomatic 
representation'. As to 'the establishment of Soviet cowmercial 
agencies', Saud reDlied that these were usually established 'to 
facilitate existing trade and not the other way around' • 
Asked if he had replied to the message that the PLO Chairman Arafat 
had brought him from Soviet leaders, and 'what the objections [were] 
to the establishment of diplomatic relations with them', Sa'ud 
ignored the first part of the question and said: 
There were relations between us and the Soviets in the 
past, but they were the ones who stopped these relations. 
We wish to assert that the non-existence of diplomatic 
relations does not mean that we do not recognize the 
USSR or the importance of the role it plays in 
international politics. On the contrary, we have more 
than once expressed our gratitude for the positive stand 
it adopted toward Arab causes. 
Reacting to this interview', Hoscow radio in Arabic cited the 
Washington Post comment which 'pointed to the possibility of the 
restoration of diplomatic relations betw'een Saudi Arabia and the 
Soviet Union'. The broadcast ignored references to trade relations. 
- 1(;7 -
It saici that 'the statement is a recognition of the ISreat role the 
Soviet Union plays in renderinz assistance and support to the Arab 
'"I 'F) 
countries.""'':''~ 
II.. Sovyetskaya Rossiva article dealt at lenlSth Hith the matter of 
diplomatic relations: 
••• Reports have appeared in the press about the possihle activation 
of Soviet-Saudi relations Saudi Arabia was the first Arab 
country with which the Soviet {Jnion established diplomatic relations 
On the eve of the Second ~Jorld 'Har, Soviet representatives 
working in Saudi "~abia left for the USSR and since then there have 
been no diplomatic missions either in Hoscow or in Riyadh, despite 
the Soviet Union's 'vishes. 
Some people in Saudi Arabia mention the incompatihility of Islam 
and Communist ideology as the main obstacle to the activation of 
Soviet-Saudi relations. But it is appropriate to note that the 
Soviet Union has good relations T,yith many Nonarchist and Huslim 
countries which cherish the ideas of Islam as closely as the Saudis. 
Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Hinister Prince Fahd said: 
He are a~yare of the important role that the Soviet Union 
plays in international politics and we are anxious to 
ensure that this role supports the Arabs' just causes. 
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I do uot believe that the absence of diplomatic relations 
between the countries must nec2ssarily be interpreted as 
a sisn of hostility. As far as the re-establishment of 
diplomatic relations, this is an issue which should be 
settled in accordance \.;ith events ~.,hich contribute to a 
decision tJeing reached. 
Yevgenii Primakov, Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, 
USSR Academy of Sciences, told a Beirut journal: 'personally at 
present I see no insurmountable obstacles to the development of 
normal Soviet-Saudi relations. 
The indirect Soviet-Saudi dialogue continued, with the Soviet side 
trying to show restraint, ignoring Saudi attacks and accusations, in 
an attempt to persuade them to change their position and establish 
di 1 . l' 223 p omat1c re at10ns. 
The Soviet response to the Riyadh policy toward Moscow came in the 
first of 1981. In the Literaturnaya Gazeta Yevgenii H. Primakov, 
Central Committee Nember and c.fiddle FAst specialist, mentioned with 
concern that the United States was encouraging the condemnation of 
Soviet policy Afghanistan as a way of trying to weaken Saudi 
relations with the USSR. Izvestiya picked up the same theme of the 
U.S. "policy of disorientation" aimed at influencing "certain 
representatives of the Saudi ruling circles, who have been talking 
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increasingly frequently about the 'Soviet threat' \·!hici:1 alle?,edly 
e:<dsts for their COlll1try". In fact, the article asserted, it is the 
United States that threatens to seize Saudi oil and that keeps 
. h' h' h 224 tens10ns 19 1n t e area. 
However, top Saudi leaders have had occasional meetings with the 
Soviet diplomats. \'hen aslced about the Soviet (;oa1 in the tfiddle 
East, one Saudi official said: "The answ'er is simple our oil 
At this moment, we do not e..xpecCan invasion, but we do expect the 
Soviets to use their power to manoeuvre themselves into a position 
to make arrangements for a guaranteed oil supply". How the Saudis 
react to these anticipated Soviet pressures for accommodation will 
be in large measure a ftmction of their relationship I'lith and 
confidence in the United State. 225 
TI1e fluctuations in the Saudi attitude toward the USSR in the 1970-
80 period tended to illustrate Saudi dilemmas in shaping a coherent 
foreign policy in rapidly changing circumstances in the region. For 
the first time in this century, the Saudis had to face, as of the 
second half of the 1Q70's, a concrete Soviet threat to the security 
of the Kingdom and the stability of the regime. Condemning the 
Soviet Union and Communism on pure ideological grotmds, as the Saudi 
leadership had done in the past, could not serve any more as a basis 
for Saudi attitudes toward the USSR. The Saudis were, thus, forced 
to decide whether to continue their public opposition and criticism 
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of the Soviet Union or to ::leopt a ne\-7 ::lDproach, \vhich ~vould not 
antagonize ~roscow and would remove the extreme anti-Soviet label 
attached to Riyadh. It seemed that the Saudi Derception of the 
USA as '(yeak, impotent and lacking in determination in face of 
Soviet advances \\Tas the rr\ajor factor in Riyadh's opting for the 
latter course of action. In their nursuit of a more accommodating 
line toward !'~oscow, hOT\Tever, Comrnmism did not seem to have DOsed 
an insuperable imnediment for the Saudi leaders. Proceeding on the 
basics of pragmatic considerations, they managed to draw a line 
between Communism as an ideology~, totally rejected and the USSR as a 
superpo~\Ter, which mus t be reckoned ~Yi th for the sake of Saudi 
security and interests. The distance bet'iyeen this pragmatic 
response to the Soviet threat and the establishment of diplomatic· 
relations between Saudi Arabia and the USSR still seemed to be 
. t bl 226 1nsurmoun a e. 
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E The Soviet Union continued to request the re-establishment of 
diplomatic relations \vith Saudi Arabia. The press reported that the 
Soviets ,yere asking Arab parties to mediate "\.nth Riyadh in this 
respect, saying that secret talks were under way between rc1osco~v and 
Riyadh, either directly or through Kuwait, the PDRY, Syria and the 
??7 PLO.--
Saudi Foreign Hinister, Sa'ud Faysal, said that an on-going dialogue 
did e.ust bet~veen Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union and that Saudi 
and Soviet diplomats were having meetings allover the world. 228 
Washington diplomatic sources report that the Soviet Union and Saudi 
Arabia, which have not enjoyed diplomatic relations since before 
World Far II, have been meeting secretly in Kuwait. The leader of 
the Soviet delegation in South Yemen recently told his hosts that 
negotiations were underway for a resumption of formal ties between 
the Saudis and Hoscow. But sources familiar with Saudi diplomatic 
circles dismiss that notion as "nonsense". They say the talks are 
no more than a prudent way of the Saudis privately to sound out the 
Soviet position on such questions as the Iran-Iraq war, oil exports 
and Moscow's general policies in the Arabian Gulf. 229 
From 1981 to the present, the USSR and Saudi Arabia have issued 
generally negative commentary about each other. Occasionally, the 
Saudis have commented favourably on Soviet aid to the Arabs against 
Israel. 230 The Soviets were extremely happy when Crown Prince 
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Abdallah, a harsh critic of U.S. foreign policy on the Palestinian 
question, told a Time-sponsored delegation of businessmen and 
editors visiting Saudi Arabia in 1981, that the most dangerous 
threat to the Hiddle East was not the USSR, as the Reagan 
Administration had argued, but the United States. He explained: "I 
say this because of your total alliance with Israel, which makes the 
mass of our people take it for granted that AITBricans are anti-Arab, 
and makes it convenient for the Arab people to look to the Soviet 
Union as a friend, since they feel they have been abandoned by the 
Americans,,~3l 
In an interview with the Beirut daily Al-Safir, given before the 
Afghanistan debacle, Prince Fahd hinted that diplomatic relations 
~Yith Moscow were on the cards. And the relations will be 
accomplished at the right time. However, in an interview ~Yith Al-
Hawadith just after ~bscow's move, Fahd advised the U.S. to show 
greater consideration in its dealings with Riyadh. "We are not 
obliged to be friendly with the U.S. Many other possible doors are 
open to us whether on the military, technological or economic levels 
- all the countries of ~vestern Europe which have the capacity for 
industrialisation, armament and technology".232 
A change has been detected in U.S. Middle East policy after Reagan 
became President, perhaps because Washington has seen the gravity of 
the threat posed by the Soviet southward thrust into the Arabian 
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Gulf to cut off the T,Test I s oil supply. The change is seen in 
increased military aid to some of the Nidrile East countries and the 
sellin?, of sophisticated military equioment to them, as well as in 
U.S. declarations about reinforcing its military presence in the 
Gulf and the Jltiddle F..ast. 
Egypt and Saudi Arabian welcome the u.s. hard line to~vards Soviet 
expansion and are for more military aid and arms supplied them. 
However, the Gulf States are against any foreign military bases in 
the area. They hold that the preservation of Gulf security is the 
duty of the literal states of the area, and they call for the 
strengthening of national defence capabilities and great unity. 
Prince Fahd pointed out that "the region is threatened by the 
Soviet Union and Israel". But "the Gulf States do not need anyone 
to participate in the defence of the region since the Gulf States 
are capable of defending themselves if they can obtain the 
233 
necessary arms". 
Riya&1 opposed Brezhnev's Arabian Gulf peace proposals. In a speech 
before the Indian parliament in December 1980, Brezhnev proposed 
that the Soviet Union, the United States, China, Japan, other 
Western powers, and any interested states should agree on a five-
point set for mutual obligations: (1) not to establish foreign 
military bases in the area of the Arabian Gulf and adjacent islands, 
or to deploy nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction there; 
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(2) not to use or threaten the use of force against the countries of 
the Arabian Gulf area, and not to interfere in their internal 
affairs; (3) to respect the non-aligned status chosen by Arabian 
Gulf states and not to dra~'7 them into military groupings with the 
participation of nuclear powers; (4) to respect the sovereign right 
of the states of the region to their.natural resources; (5) not to 
raise any obstacles or threats to normal trade exchange and the use 
of sea lanes linking the states of the region yrith other countries 
of the world. 234 In short, the Saudis have not dropped their 
opposition to Soviet foreign policy in these areas in order to seek 
co-operation with Moscow in others such as the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and the Iran-Iraq war. 235 
When Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981, the 
Soviets claimed that the American-flown AHACS based in Saudi Arabia 
did nothing to stop the Israelis from flying over Saudi territory to 
get to and from Iraq. Soviet commentators have even claimed that 
the United States would take advantage of the Iran-Iraq war to move 
its forces into the region and then invade Saudi Arabia.236 
However, in July 1981 the Soviet press reported that 'in recent 
months Huslim leaders from the Soviet Union have visited ••• Saudi 
Arabia' and noted that 'negotiations are currently underway for 
sending Muslims from the USSR to schools in Saudi Arabia': 237 , The 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan seems an obstacle to the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
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It w'Ould appear more probable that the Saudis w·ould establish 
political relations with China ,yitb whom it shares 'a common vieW" 
f h S · hr ,238 o t e OVlet teat • 
In early August 1981, Prince Fahd, heir apparent and Deputy Prime 
tlinister (since 13th June 1982, King of Saudi Arabia) put fODvard a 
set of principles, designed to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
which were similar to the Soviet proposals on the same subject. 239 
The proposals made no mention of peace with Israel, nor of direct 
negotiations with it or official recognition of its existence. They 
did say that all states in the region should be able to live in 
peace, but made no direct mention of Israel. 
The proposals called for Israel's withdrawal from all territories 
occupied by Israel in the 1967 war including Arab Jerusalem, and 
that a Palestinian State should be established with Jerusalem as its 
capital. It was further stipulated that Palestinian refugees should 
have a right to return to their home after Israel's withdrawal from 
the I·Test Bank and Gaza Strip. There was provision for a 
transitional period under United Nations auspices, meaning that 
there would be no direct negotiations with Israel, which would 
transfer the territories to the United Nations, which in turn would 
hand them over to the FLO. 
Fahd's plan Iyas similar to Soviet proposals for a resolution of the 
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Arab-Israeli conflict, hut what mattered to the Soviets ~"ras not a 
solution or non-solution of the conflict, but rather that their 
participation should be ensured in any negotiations on the matter, 
and that they should have a meaningful role in any implementation 
of the outcome of the talks. The Soviets feared a situation \"rhere 
the Fahd plan would be accepted by most of the ,~ab States and 
Hestern Europe - perhaps even the USA - and that they '..7ould all sit 
down and talk about it without inviting the USSR. It could even 
lead to a PLO-USA dialogue and an end to PLO dependence on the 
USSR. The Soviets suspected that Prince Fahd's aim was to being 
about a split between them and the Arabs, and feared that 
acceptance of his proposals would act against their position in the 
240 Arab World. 
On 27th October, 1981, Brezhnev had assailed the Saudi proposal by 
innuendo, declaring that it was an effort to "satisfy the appetite 
of imperialism". But seeing the dissatisfaction and censure of the 
Arab countries, the Soviet leader suddenly changed his attitude 
towards the proposal and quietly notified the Chairman of the PLO, 
Yasser Arafat, that the Soviet Union considered the Saudi proposal 
a basis for the peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem. 
Why has the Soviet Union changed its attitude? To seek hegemonism 
in this important region. The Soviet Union has been reconciled to 
its exclusion from the Middle East peace process and has always 
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desired to return to the area. HOI" that the Soviet Union has given 
its "support" to the Saudi 'proposal', its objective is very clear, 
it is attempting to take advantage of the weak point in U.S. ~[iddle 
East policy and undermine U. S. influence in the area. Thus, the 
Soviet Union can 'i"in politica1 kudos. Its goal is still to take 
?41 part again in the ~'!iddle Fas t peace taD::s. ~ 
The subject of Soviet-Saudi relations came up when PLO Chairman, 
Arafat, visited }bscow on 30th October, 1981, to be received by 
Brezhnev who specifically mentioned Soviet participation when he 
spoke of the proposal for an international conference. On Arafat's 
return he reported the substance of this talk to Prince Fahd in 
Riyadh. The latter was said to have responded by agreeing that the 
Soviet Union should have a part in the efforts to solve the Arab-
Israeli conflict.242 
On 5th November, 1981, the Saudi Foreign Hinister announced his 
nation's intention to seek a United Nations resolution endorsing the 
Saudi peace plan. Passage of the resolution would be followed by an 
International Conference on the future of the Middle East, under the 
auspices of the U.N. Security Council. Hhat does that mean? To 
engage the Security Council means one thing, and that is to re-
engage the Soviet Union. And Soviet re-engagement is precisely what 
the Saudis have in mind. 1..Jhen asked recently if his proposal would 
lead to negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Saudi Foreign 
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~linister had this to say: 
of course with the Soviet Union. It is part of the 
Security Council. 
So much for the claim that Saudi Aiabia stands against Soviet 
influence. Now, the Saudis are inviting the Soviets into the Niddle 
East. 243 
After Syria's poor performance against Israel during the summer of 
1982, the militant approach proved unworkable. The Soviets 
responded favourably to the modified Fahd proposal, since calling 
for U.N. Security Council guarantees would make approval by the USSR 
necessary. 
The Saudi view has been and continues to be that the United States 
is more important than the USSR in bringing peace to the Hiddle 
East, since the U.S. has influence with Israel while the USSR does 
not. But the Saudis have also reached the conclusion that it is 
necessary to have some degree of Soviet support for any Biddle East 
peace plan to work, since Moscow might be able to influence the 
radical Arab States to accept it as well. The Soviets, naturally, 
welcome the efforts of a conservative Arab State closely allied to 
the United States to bring the USSR into the Middle East peace 
process when American foreign policy has sought to exclude Moscow 
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In December 1982 an Arab delegation ~"hich included the Saudi Arabian 
Foreign Hinister Sa 'ud Faysal, visited both ~Ioscow and Beijing as 
part of a plan to brief the five permanent members of the United 
National Security Council on the League's eight-point plan for a 
~liddle East settlement. The inclusion of the Saudi Hinister had led 
to speculation that Saudi Arahia might he on the point of 
establishing diplomatic relations "'ith one or both of the twn 
communist countries. The delegation met with Andropov, Tikhonov, 
and Gromyko, and on 3rd December Sa'ud and Gromyko had another 
meeting. But soon after this visit the Saudi Information rtinister 
ruled out any possibility of ties with Hoscow. 
Although excellent relations exist between Riyadh and Taipei, the 
Saudi English language daily Arab News signalled out Beijing's 
attitude toward the Arabs for special praise: 
Hhen the Arab Summit delegation, led by King Hussein, 
decided to go to the People's Republic of China, they 
knew that they were going to a friendly country for a 
genuinely sympathetic hearing. China has never wavered 
from its principled approach to the ~liddle East question 
and the plight of the Palestinian people ••• This 
Chinese policy has been clear and steady. The 
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Palestinians must have a homeland, Israel must withdrm'7 
from the occupied lands of the Arab ••• It has also 
condemned the unstinted support that the United States 
extends to Israel and warned the Arabs against 
excessive trust in Soviet intentions. 245 
Hith regard to Saudi-Soviet relations, the Al-Manama Gulf Hirror 
cautioned: 
Observers should be warned about reading too much into 
the visit by Prince Sa'ud ••• to Moscow. As a vital 
member of the Arab League's team, the Saudis had to be 
present. Therefore the conclusion that Saudi _~abia is 
on the point of resuming some form of diplomatic link 
with the Soviet Union is premature ••• Although Saudi 
government officials have been quoted as praising the 
attitude of the Soviets toward the Palestinian problem, 
this cannot be judged as a change of heart towards Moscow. 
It is merely the wise acceptance of fact. There is still 
the matter of Afghanistan to be resolved. 246 
Both Noscow and Riyadh, then, have a common interest in seeing that 
Iran does not defeat Iraq. Some observers have claimed that this 
common interest has led to Saudi-Soviet co-operation in supplying 
arms to Iraq even before 1982 when Moscow appeared to be tilting 
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toward Iraq. According to l;Jilliam Quandt, "early in 19tH the 
Saudis allowed Iraq to take delivery of 100 East European tanks at 
Saudi ~.ed Sea ports. This soon became a regular practice, with East 
European and Soviet ships calling at the small port of Oadima north 
of Jedda to lmload shipments of arms for Iraq. Aryeh Yodfat claimed 
that Soviet aircraft had begun to land in Badanah, in north-east 
Saudi Arabia, carrying supplies to Iraq. Such claims were denied by 
Saudi government officials. Given Saudi sensitivity over any kind 
of Soviet presence and the fact that Soviet arms were openly 
delivered to the Jordanian Red Sea port of Aquaba for transfer to 
Iraq, these accounts are remarkable. Yet even if the Saudis did 
allow the Soviets to directly deliver weapons or if Arab suppliers 
acting as intermediaries brought Soviet weapons into the Kingdom for 
re-transfer to Iraq, Soviet-Saudi co-operation to save Iraq would 
seem to have certain natural limits, since their interests regarding 
Iraq are not the same. 
Saudi Arabia would like to see Iraq throw out the Iranians but would 
not like to see Iraq become strongly allied to the USSR or allow in 
a Soviet military presence in order to do it. Similarly, Moscow 
would not like to see Iraq become closely liruced with either the 
West or the conservative Arab States at the expense of its ties to 
the USSR. In the extreme case, Saudi Arabia would regard its own 
security as seriously threatened if the Soviets intervened 
militarily to save Iraq, and the USSR would be extremely unhappy to 
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see "lestern military intervention of the same purpose. Thus, ~vhile 
neither Hoscow nor R.iyadh wishes to see Iraq defeated by Iran, the 
Soviets Ylould like to retain or preferably increase their influence 
in Baghdad whereas the Saudis would like Soviet influence there to 
decline or end. Saudi and Soviet interests with regard to Iraq are 
b . 11 t . t . . 247 . aSlca y compe 1 lve, not co-operatlve. 
Ceremonial greetings were exchanged between the Soviets and the 
Saudis on their national holidays and anniversaries. A Soviet 
broadcast on the occasion of Saudi Arabia's National Day (23rd 
September, the anniversary of the founding of the Kingdom in 1928) 
said that the Soviet Union was ready to build relations with Saudi 
Arabia. 248 In exchanges of festive greetings between Brezhnev and 
King Khalid they wished each other 'prosperity and success' .249 
Saudi Arabia's declared aim was to fight communism and diminish the 
Soviet role in the region. It succeeded in isolating PDRY, turning 
Egypt, Somalia and the YAR away from the Soviet Union, and 
preventing the establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
Soviet Union and some of the Gulf states. This was done primarily 
by providing financial aid. According to a Soviet commentator: 
Saudi Arabia's finances reactionary forces not only in Arab 
countries but also in Africa, Asia and Western Europe. 
~,1oroccon forces ••• were transported in 1977 to the war 
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against the rebels in '0aire at Saudi Arabia's expense. 
Recently Riyadh gave major financial aid to Zaire 
encouraged the Somalia regime's departure from a 
progressive course and its aggression against 
revolutionary Ethiopia ••• Honey flows from Saudi 
Arabia to anti-communist parties and organizations in 
Hestem Europe ••• Saudi Arabia, when granting credits, 
strives to dictate a certain political course ••• 
it allocates resources, sometimes quite considerable 
resources, to countries that have suffered from Israeli 
aggression, and to a number of Palestinian organizations. 
At the same time, Riyadh welcomes strikes both against 
the revolutionary wing of the PLO and against progressive 
forces in Arab countries. Also, the Saudis spent billions 
. 250 
of dollars on Egypt's return to a conservative path. 
The revolutionary nationalism of the 1950's and 1960's gave way to 
the political pragmatism of the 1970's and 1980's: revolutionary 
leaders were replaced by more pragmatic ones, or simply by men who 
had moderated their views as time went on. Thus, while it was 
Egypt's Nasser with his fiery brand of revolutionary anti-western 
oratory who dominated the Arab political theatre in the early 
period, the principal actors in the 1970's and in the 1980's were 
pro-~.Jestern, status-quo leaders such as King Faysal and King Fahd 
of Saudi Arabia. 251 
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As the move away from nationalist, revolutionary politics gathered 
momentum, and as the conservative, pro-Y'les t leaders, hitherto on the 
defensive, emerged to play central roles in the international 
relations of the region, the influence of the Soviet Union began to 
wane. Indeed, the conservative states, at whose helm stood Saudi 
Arabia, ~vent on the offensive to try to exclude the Soviet Union 
from the area. This ~vas clearly spelled out in a statement made by 
Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd in 1974 : 'I intend to get the 
Russian Communists out of Somalia. My policy will be to help the 
moderate forces in South Yemen. I will help the Sudan resist 
Communist subversion'. And the Prince was true to his word. By the 
1980's, Saudi aid to the Sultanate of Oman, a country which had been 
fighting Communist insurgents for long periods, amounted to over 
$3,000 million. Saudi aid'ivas also instrumental in persuading North 
Yemen to expel considerable numbers of Soviet advisers and reduce 
her reliance on the USSR. Similar tactics were used successfully 
with Somalia, and the Saudis publicly handed a cheque for $25 
million to the Afghan rebels at the Islamabad Islamic Conference in 
May 1980. The Riyadh government has also extended financial support 
to the Eritrean insurrection against the r~rxist Ethiopian 
regime. 252 Indeed, Saudi aid has gone to distant countries such as 
South Korea, Taiwan and Zaire simply because of their government's 
anti-Communism policies. 
A condition of Soviet-Saudi competition developed in the region, 
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'vith the Soviet side often finding itself the loser. AI though 
generally attac~dng Saudi Arabia's policy, tl-te Soviet r:ledia would, 
from time to time, point out the error of the Saudis' not having 
di 1 ' 1 t' , h h S ' U' 253 Th d h h P omatlc re a lons Tfflt: tle OVlet nlon. eyargue t at t e 
USSR 'was anxious to have ties with Riyadh and that the differences 
in regimes need not be an obstacle. Soviet commentators cited the 
axample of Kuwait which, in spite of having a conservative regime, 
had diplomatic and trade ties with the USSR. 25ft 
Riyadh continues to be concerned about the Soviet military presence 
in Aden. The Saudis also oppose Soviet-backed Ethiopia's attempt to 
conquer the Moslem insurgents in Eritrea. In 1982 the Saudis hosted 
a meeting at Jedda of the three main Eritrean guerrilla 
organizations, at which they agreed to co-operate; Eritrean leaders 
continue to thank the Saudis for their support. Riyadh has 
continued to express support for and give aid to Afghan guerrillas 
the Soviets are trying to conquer.255 
In the first half of 1983, Soviet commentary about Saudi Arabia 
became very hostile indeed, with Tass accusing Riyadh of using 
torture against its internal opponents. l~at really seemed to annoy 
Moscow, however, was that the Saudis were using Afghanistan as an 
"excuse" for not establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR. 
The Saudis, however, appear serious in regarding Afghanistan as an 
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obstacle to friendly relations with i'·foscow. At times, various Saudi 
leaders have again indicated that friendship with the USSR was 
possible. 256 Hhen Crmm Prince Abdallah said in Harch 1983 that he 
favoured establishing diplomatic ties with ~'losCOlv "at the right 
tL'Tle", and when Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Prince Bandar invited 
Soviet' Ambassador Dobrynin to dinner as well as later telling the 
press that the Arabs would turn to "Hoscow, Paris, and London", for 
Iveapons if they could not buy them from Hashington. Crown Prince 
Abdallah later said that Riyadh had no intention of establishing 
relations with the USSR or Socialist bloc, and the Saudi Press 
Agency said that Prince Bandar was "misquoted". 257 
Once more the Saudi officials have made it clear that the Soviet 
Union must meet four conditions before Riyadh will improve relations 
with Moscow: (1) Soviet forces must be withdrawn from Afghanistan; 
(2) the USSR and its allies must reduce their military presence in 
South Yemen and Ethiopia; (3) the USSR must end all hostile 
propaganda agains t the Kingdom; and (4) Sovie t Moslems mus t be 
allowed greater freedom to practice their religion. The Saudis do 
not realistically expect the Soviets to meet these conditions and as 
a result do not foresee Saudi-Soviet relations improving any time 
soon. 
These four Saudi conditions, as well as the history of Soviet 
efforts to establish ties to P~yadh, show that the primary obstacle 
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to friendly relations betHeen the t"70 nations is Soviet foreign 
policy in the region surrounding Saudi Arabia. Hhile it wants good 
relations with Riyadh, Hoscow has never regarded this goal as 
important enough to warrant not supporting governments or radical 
. . hb' . d S d' . 258 groups In nelg ourlng countrles oppose to .. au l lnterests. 
Since Hor1d r.Jar II, Saudi Arabia has not exchanged ambassadors with 
259 the USSR or with any other Communist country. The Saudis believe 
that the most effective deterrent to direct Soviet military 
intervention in the region is a sound global balance of power. If 
the prospect of nuclear war does not deter the Soviets, a few 
American divisions near the Arabian Gulf were unlikely to do so. 
Lesser contingencies can best be dealt with on an ad hoc basis and 
by building Saudi military power. 260 
Even the absence of diplomatic relations with Riyadh has not 
prevented a spectacular increase in Saudi-Soviet trade during the 
past two years, and Saudi Arabia is now, together with Iraq, one of 
the two leading suppliers of oil to the USSR. According to the 
latest monthly statistics review of Soviet foreign trade, overall 
trade with Saudi Arabia in the firs t quarter of 1984 was worth 155.9 
million roubles ($198 million) as compared with 37.3 million roubles 
($47.2 million) in the first quarter of 1983. Hhen Soviet 
petroleum purchases are discounted, the increase in trade is even 
more remarkable: its value in the first quarter of 1984 was 93.6 
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million roubles (S118.3 million), while in the first quarter of 1983 
it was worth just 2.1 million roubles ($2.7 million), consisting 
1 f C • S d' A b' 261 on yo oov1et exports to .au lra lao 
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Conclusion 
A year after the Russian departure, Ibn Saud came to regard the Soviet 
Union as the menace both to Arabia and Britain and requested that these 
vie~vs be transmitted to the British government. He affirmed that the 
Soviets had proved themselves to be no friends of the allies after their 
alliance with Nazi Germany. It was his belief that the Soviet lJnion 
would try to get at the Arabian Peninsula, which was separated from 
Russia by only Turkey and Iraq. Of these countries, Turkey had failed to 
declare itself prepared to stand in the way of any Russian aggression. 
If war broke out, the Arab States, and British interests therein would be 
threatened. Ibn Saud therefore hoped that Britain would strengthen the 
Arab States not only arming them, but also by assisting them to 'compose 
their differences'. He 1vent on to assert that the Arab States would be 
able to resist 'the Soviet threat' to their independence more effectively 
'if they were in some way associated under the aegis of His Majesty's 
government, than if each ~vas fighting alone' .262 
Suspicion has continued to mark Saudi Arabia's attitude towards the 
Soviet Union to the present time. However, there was little, if any, 
contact between the Soviet Union and the governments of the Peninsula 
after the departure of the Russians in 1938 until the 1950's when Soviet 
writers came to value the 'nationalist and even traditionalist regimes as 
a means of denying Arabia to the ~-lest'. Slowly the Soviet Union began 
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to adopt more flexible attitudes as strikes and demonstrations which 
occurred along the Hestern Coast of the Arabian Gulf 'seemed to indicate 
to the Soviets the class and political consciousness of the Arabian 
ki 1 ,263 wor. ng c ass • 
The first hesitant move toward the restoration of relations occurred in 
1954 when Soviet citizens ~yere permitted to participate in the pilgrimage 
to Mecca. In their turn, the Arab States believed that the Ivestern 
powers were preparing to increase their influence in the Arab world and 
to 'organise the area into an anti-Soviet defence organization' which 
would necessarily divert them from their real enemy, Israel. 264 
The Soviet Union entered the ~tiddle East and Arabian Peninsula at the 
invitation of the Arab governments at a time when its ideological and 
national interests coincided with the Arabs' interests: to rid the 
t-tiddle East of every form of Ivestern influence and rule. The Soviets had 
traditionally been regarded with friendly eyes by knowledgeable Arabs as 
the enemy of their enemies: Turkey, Persia, Britain. Since 1955 the 
Soviet Union has built up influential positions in the Middle East; 
however, the strength of these positions has been largely derived from 
Moscow's support of Arab causes, against Israel, and (in the Peninsula 
especially) against Britain, and against the oil companies. Now the 
British are leaving, the oil producers are forcing the companies to 
increase their payments, and in the foreseeable future the concessions 
will expire. If, perchance, a satisfactory solution to the Arab-Israeli 
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conflict were to be found, the common interests would have largely 
disappeared and the Soviet positions would be undermined. This is not to 
say that the Soviets would lose all of their influence; residual 
friendship and gratitude toward the USSR, stemming from the help it has 
rendered over the past 15 years, would assure the Soviets of a warm 
welcome in most Arab States (especially if the assistance was continued). 
However, the Soviet presence would once again be dependent on invitation, 
on the Arab governments' judgement that good relations with the TJSSR 
would be in their interests. The Arabs have not struggled against 
Hestern tutelage in order to come under Soviet influence; they wish to be 
able to initiate free and equal relations with any countries they chose, 
and to impose their own limits on great-power politics directed them. 
The history of Soviet relations with the Arabian Peninsula countries 
indicates that Moscow would not jeopardize existing relations in order to 
halt this process by some kind of active intervention. The policy of 
caution and flexibility in response to events will almost certainly be 
continued. 265 
The Saudis can and do trade with the Soviet Union, and diplomatic 
exchanges and meetings occur regularly. Horeover, in Saudi -Soviet 
relations, as elsewhere in the Middle East, the very issue of whether or 
not there are diplomatic relations is unduly charged, as if the mere 
exchange of envoys would presage a major diplomatic shift. But as an 
indication of diplomatic position, and as a practical facilitator of 
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~ . TJ' 266 contact, such a move obviously f)enefits the .,ovlet nlon. 
The USSR and Saudi Arabia have supported Iraq in its war with Iran, and 
both of t~em do not want to see Iran defeat Iraq. They have been on the 
same side of the ~~ab-Israeli conflict for a relatively long time. 
frescow and Riyadh both supported the Arab side and opposed the Israelis 
during the 1956, 1967, and 1973 lfiddle East wars and during the 1982 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Both have called for Israel to withdraw 
from all Arab territory occupied since June 1967 and for the creation of 
a Palestinian State. 267 In addition to their both opposing Israel, the 
USSR and Saudi Arabia are not friends with the People's Republic of China 
either. Yet Riyadh's refusal to establish diplomatic ties with Peking is 
of little comfort to Moscow, since the Saudis have not established 
relations \yith any other Communist state either. 268 
The reason for Moscow's failure to achieve an improvement in relations 
with the "moderate" States lay in its miscalculation of several factors; 
one being the genuine antipathy felt in traditional Islamic States to 
Communism, an antipathy multiplied the-fold by the events in Afghanistan. 
This antipathy stems not only from these States' ideological objections 
to Communism, but also from fear of its subversive potential within their 
O\YD States. They are therefore unlikely to enter into any close 
relations with the USSR or its regional allies which might destabilize 
the internal basis of their own regime. Secondly, Moscow underestimated 
the dependence of the elites in these countries on Western values, 
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:';estern lifestyles and traditional economic links with Europe and the 
United States. Such is the strength of these links that countries like 
Jordan, Saudi Jirabia, Oman and the Gulf Sheikhdoms ~.;ould continue to 
favour the '.Jest almost irrespective of what kind of policy the United 
States chose to pursue towards Israel. Relations may deteriorate between 
these States and \17ashington, and they may choose to drm7 closer to 
European countries as a result, yet the establishing of ties with Hoscm.; 
is not seen as the logical alternative that it was in the 1950's. A 
tactical alliance might have been possible on the single issue of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict before the Iranian revolution and the invasion of 
Afghanistan, but following these events, at least in the short term, any 
leader who moved too close to the Soviet Union risked being accused of 
flaunting Islamic principles. 269 
Soviet foreign policy toward Saudi Arabia so far can only be judged a 
failure. Moscow's attempts to be friendly with Riyadh have not resulted 
in diplomatic relations since Stalin withdrew his mission from Jedda in 
1938. Nor have the Soviets been able to bring about a shift in Saudi 
foreign policy from close relations with the United States to neutrality 
between the superpowers; ~loscow has been unable to exploit potential 
differences between Washington and Riyadh over foreign policy issues such 
as the ~1idd1e Fast and oil. Nor have the Soviets succeeded in promoting 
revolution or a coup that would bring to power a government more friendly 
to the USSR, since Saudi opposition groups have proved weak. The Soviets 
can only hope that somehow either the government's view of the USSR or 
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the prospects of the regimes opponents Ivill change and thus provide them 
with an opportunity to gain some measure of influence in the country. 
HoV! might this occur? One change that would benefit the Soviets would be 
a new King, with different foreign policy views than his predecessors, 
who would want to have ties ~vith Noscow. That the Soviets have warmly 
greeted eve~, new Saudi King and promoted an improvement in Saudi-Soviet 
relations indicates that they have hoped for this. Though disappointed 
in the past, they could succeed in the future. Crown Prince Abdallah's 
positive statements about the USSR may be a sign that as King he would 
permit better Saudi-Soviet relations. However, Fahd made similar 
statements as Crown Prince (and even as King), but relations have not 
improved. In addition, a new King and probably the senior members of the 
royal family would have to be willing to overlook all the many foreign 
policy differences that have hitherto divided Moscow and Riyadh, 
including Afghanistan, South Yemen and the Horn of Africa. 
Another change that the Soviets hope for is a coup or revolution 
overthrowing the monarchy. Moscow can be expected to immediately 
recognize and offer support to any new Saudi government, just as it did 
with the Yemeni republicans even though the USSR enjoyed good relations 
with the Imamate. The Soviets would prefer a Marxist government to come 
to power but would ~velcome any government, particularly if it were anti-
American and willing to become friends with the USSR. 
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The ~eakness of the opposition and the strength of the central government 
in Saudi Arabia, however, make either a coup or a revolution seem 
unlikely in the near future. As long as revenues from oil exports allow 
the govern~ent to provide the populace with a high standard of living, 
discontent over economic issues is not likely to spark opposition to the 
government. Since known Saudi oil reserves are estimated to last until 
2050 at current rates of production, economic decline and the political 
d · . h' . h d . . t 270 1srupt1on t 1S m1g t cause 0 not seem lmmlnen • 
\\bat this means for the USSR is that while it would like to improve 
relations with the present government or promote revolution in the 
Kingdom, it must wait for some kind of change to take place within Saudi 
Arabia for either of these two policies to succeed. If the past is a 
guide to the future, however, such a change will not arise soon. 
One of the basic components of Saudi foreign policy orientation is non-
alignment. Saudi Arabia is a founder-member of the non-aligned movement, 
and has participated in five of the seven summit conferences (1961-1983), 
yet Saudi Arabia has no diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc; all 
its relations are with the West. The Soviet Union was, however, one of 
the very first countries to recognise Abdal Al-ziz Ibn Saud's new 
authority and to establish diplomatic relations in the 1920's. Moreover, 
the Soviet bloc has been in the forefront in supporting the Arab cause, 
whether against the old colonial empires or against Israel since 1954. 
Did not these countries (with the exception of Rumania) break off 
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diplomatic relations Ivith Israel following its initiation of the 1967 
Six-Day Har?271 
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I Introduction 
The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iraq has been one of 
conflict and disagreement. However, through the years, leaders of 
both countries have made many attempts at reaching an agreement that 
would let them live together as neighbours in the Niddle East. The 
struggle has been stimulated by differences in political and 
religious ideology, as well as tribal and border disputes. _Another 
factor that must be considered is the fact that throughout history 
most tribal groups have the desire to isolate themselves from 
outside influences, and consider their territory as belonging to 
them, with their own government, tribal customs, and traditions 
being inflexible creating conflict between factions. In spite of 
these factors, the two nations have much in common and are in some 
ways interdependent. Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam, 
contains the two holy Cities, Hecca, and Medina. Iraq, as an 
Islamic nation, has close links ~·]ith these cities since followers of 
Islam make annual pilgrimages. They also have in common a mutual 
interest in OPEC, and the stability of oil prices and production, as 
both nations are heavily dependent upon oil as a major contributor 
to the gross national product. It is against this background that 
we now examine the Saudi-Iraqi relationship. 
The following is the history of the relationship of these two 
nations, and their strum-;les to maintain a peaceful relationship. 
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II Brief Historical Perspective on Iraq 
The geography of Iraq is distinguished by the number and identity of 
adjacent countries. Iraq is bounded by six countries : in the north 
by Turkey, in the east by Iran, in the south by Kuwait, in the 
south~yest by Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and in northwest by Syria. 
This maximizes Iraq's national security problems, particularly in 
the light of population structures and resource availability in the 
area. Bordered by desert in the south and a multitude of passes in 
the north, Iraq is virtually without defence against invasion. The 
area of Iraq is estimated at 172,000 square mile.1 
In terms of access to the sea, Iraq is the most geographically 
disadvantaged Arabian Gulf State because it has a short coastline at 
the head of the Gulf flanked by Iran and Kuwait. This limited 
access to the Gulf waters is to Iraq's disadvantage both in economic 
terms resulting in less fishing and continental shelf zones and in 
strategic terms linrlting Iraq's naval capability. 
The Iraqi population \.Jas estimated in 1 q77 to be 14 million2 making 
it the second largest population among the Gulf states, next to Iran 
with L~O nrlllion. About 25% of the people are Sunni Nuslims 
concentrated in the upper Euphrates region. The Sunnis have 
traditionally been the political elite bot~ under Ottoman and 
Tlritish rule. The rest of t1,e popu1ation is shi' ites Noslems, a fe,v 
i~ 
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Christians and there is also a small proportion of Je'ioTish 
residents. 3 
From 1638-1918, Iraq was under the direct rule of the Ottoman Empire 
legislative power with the Turkish Sultan. Before 1839, the only 
source of law in the Ottoman Empire was the Islamic law. Islam 
served as the constitutional legislative, and administrative law. 
After Vlorld War I and the collapse of the Turks, Iraq became a 
British mandated territory. Upon its formal independence in 1922, 
Iraq signed a Treaty of Alliance with Britain. This treaty 
recognized the elected ruler of Iraq as the King. Although Britain 
had always formally acknowledged Iraq's national sovereignty, the 
legal status of Iraq was until 1932 itA" class mandate. 
Between 1914 and 1921, during direct British administration, limited 
change was made in the commercial, civil and maritime codes which 
had been established by the Turks. 1\11 these codes remained in 
force until the national administration 'i'laS established in 1922-32. 
From the 1930' s fODvards, Iraq began to develop its own national 
legal system and in doing so \Vas much influenced by the Egyptian 
legal system. l'lany Iraqi lml students "lOuld go to Egypt to study 
law, particularly for higher degrees and research. }'lany more would 
consult Egyptian legal literature in Iraq both for academic and 
4 professional purposes. 
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Although the British mandate officially ended in 1932 when Iraq was 
admitted to the League of Nations as an independent country, the 
British connection continued in the form of a Treaty of Alliance. 
This gave the British the use of two Iraqi air bases and precedence 
in providing military training, economic assistance, and "advise". 
Hhen this treaty expired in 1955, Iraq became a member of a new" 
defence agreement, the Baghdad Pact, which included Turkey and later 
Iran, Pakistan, and Britain. The United States was a member in all 
but name. The Pact ensured continued Hestern support of the 
. 5 
reglme. 
The revolution of 4th July, 1958, headed by Brigadier Abdul Karim 
Kassem eliminated the monarch, and began the new history of an Iraqi 
republic. 6 
Today Iraq is dominated by the Socialist Arab Ba'ath party.7 Iraqi 
foreign policy is based on four basic pillars : Iraqi nationalism, 
pan-American, Ba'ath party political and economic ideology, and the 
vie'vs of Saddam Hussain. However, the domestic environment has 
great influence on Iraqi foreign policy.8 
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II I 'Jhe Saudi Arabia-Irag Boundary 
Delimitation of Saudi Arabia's boundary with Iraq was one of the 
issues confronting the Saudi government during the period of the 
1920's and 1930's. Settlement was exacerbated by a host of 
questions involving Bedouin tribes in the disputed areas; the most 
important factors determining both relations between the two 
countries and settlement of their boundary related to the tribes' 
migratory patterns, grazing rights, and extradition of offenders. 
The British government's role in these complex issues was important. 
Central to understanding the difficulties of the boundary issue is 
that the boundary area, between the northern extremity of Saudi 
Arabia and the southwestern parts of the Euphrates, for centuries 
had been economically necessary to the Najdi tribes in their 
migration toward the Euphrates in search for water and grazing 
lands. One of the best descriptions of this matter is provided by 
George Lenczowski : 
Since time immemorial tribesmen have wandered in the 
wastes of the Peninsula in search of water and grazing 
grounds. Claims to ownership were usually limited to a 
coastal town, an oasis, or a water 'veIl. The desert in 
between could be likened to a high sea, to which no one 
could justify laying exclusive clains of control. 9 
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For the first time in the history of the Arabian Peninsula the 
status quo was challenged by the concept of the territorial state -
a concept having as its premise the notion that state-hood depends 
on the existence of boundaries. Hhile this concept \V'8S familiar to 
Saudi, Iraqi, and British authorities, it was unknown to the tribes. 
The problem was aggravated in 1921 when a large group from the 
Shammar tribe, who paid tribute to Ibn Rashid, migrated to Iraq and 
began raiding Saudi territories in an attempt to challenge Ibn 
Saud's authority in Hail province. The result was heavy losses 
among the tribes on the Saudi side, and retaliation. Raids and 
counter raids rendered the area unstable and began a chapter of 
unfriendly relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq.l0 
The British government, fearing that the situation might escalate to 
a '.;Tar, called for a conference at Mohammarah in Nay, 1922. Its 
purpose was to settle the differences between Najd and Iraq. 
On 5th Nay, 1922, in the presence of Sir Percy Cox, the Treaty of 
Hohanunarah was signed hy delegates from Najd and !raq. Article I of 
t'1e agreement stipulated that Shammar of Najd apoertained to Najd 
"Thile Amarat, Dhafir and Huntafiq 1Jelonged to Iraq. The boundary 
het\veen the two coul'1tries was to be based on the location of 
pastures and "Tells used by the said trihes. It was further decided 
that a party of delegates from both sides should meet in P,aghdad 
under the presidency of a Rritish official to ,vork out the details 
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of this boundary. Article II ensured the safety of pilgrims and 
Article III provided for normal commercial intercourse between the 
two countries. Articles IV and V dealt with freedom of travel and 
grazing fees while Article VI declared that if there should occur a 
breach of relations beD?een Najd, Iraq and Great Britain, the treaty 
would become null and void. Pending the decision of the projected 
meeting in Baghdad, the Ibn Saud's Ikhwan forces were pledged not to 
k I 0 °be 11 attac raq1 tr1 s. 
Even though representatives of the governments agreed, the treaty 
required ratification by Ibn Saud and King Faisal I of Iraq. Ibn 
Saud rejected the sections of the treaty assigning certain tribes to 
Iraq, arguing that the Saudi representatives had gone beyond their 
authority and that the Saudi natural northern boundary could extend 
to areas bordering the Euphrates. 12 
It appears that Ibn Saud's rejection of the "Mohammarah Treaty was 
based on important considerations. By 1922, Ibn Saud's territory 
was surrounded by three hostile rulers : Abdullah in Trans jordan , 
Faisal I in Iraq, and their father Sharif Hussain in the l-fijaz. 
Hostility to Ibn Saud was a result of the clashes bet,veen Hussain 
and Ibn Saud during 1919-1920 over Khormad and Turbah and the 
strug8le for power in the Arabian Peninsula. The ~!ohallmarah Treaty 
did not provide a guarantee tha t these three rulers ,vould not 
combine against Ibn Saud. Such a guarantee could only come from 
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Britain, a mandatory power over Jordan and Iraq. But Ibn Saud was 
unable to secure such a commitment from the British.13 King Faisal 
of Iraq also refused to return leaders of the Shammar tribes who had 
entered Iraq and who constituted a challenge to Ibn Saud's authority 
in Hail province. This act of King Faisal was calculated. The 
Shammar tribes had joined the Iraqi Anazah tribe and formed a tribal 
alliance against Ibn Saud. This alliance could be used by Faisal as 
a source of instability in northern Saudi Arabia if Ibn Saud had any 
intentions of military force against Faisal's father in the Hijaz or 
his brother Abdullah in Trans jordan. The return of the Shammar 
tribe was for Ibn Saud politically and militarily important, but 
strategically unwise for Faisal. The Mohammarah Conference and the 
resulting treaty failed. The boundary and tribal problems remained 
unsettled. Raiding and counter raiding across the boundary 
continued. 
In Decemher, 1922, developments in Iraq led the British government 
and Iraq to arrange a new conference with Saudi Arabia. On 1st 
October the Turkish forces penetrated into the Hosul district in 
Iraq. Anti-gover~~ent agitation through the Kurdish districts to 
the northeast threatened to destroy the country, and gave increased 
local unrest. 14 King Faisal of Iraq found himself in difficulties, 
faced not only with challenges and agitation inside his territory 
but ~'7ith instability at both the northern borders "\>lith Turkey and 
the southern horders ,<lith Saudi Arabia. Contacts har! to he 
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established with Ibn Saud. ~1essages were sent to Ibn Saud, 
expressing Faisal's intention of ending the instability and 
confusion on the boundary area as well as the need for fixing the 
Iraq boundary.lS Sir Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner in 
Iraq, dispatched a message to Ibn Saud expressing the importance of 
a conference with the aim of reaching settlement of the boundary 
between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. 
The Uqair Conference was held on 21st November, 1922, on the coast 
of the Arabian Gulf, and the parties were convinced that as long as 
the boundary remained undefined, tribal raids would continue and 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq would deteriorate. Two 
difficult ideas had to be reconciled : the concept of a territorial 
state with defined boundaries and a nationality-determined 
population, on the one hand, and that of uncontrolled, nomadic, and 
undefined tribal communities on the other. Finally, on 2nd 
December, 1922, settlement \Vas reached and the TJqair protocols, 
which \V·ere appended to the Nohammarah Treaty, were signed. These 
protocols fixed the Saudi Arabia-Iraq boundary of approximately 426 
miles. According to the TJqair protocols the two governments agreed 
that there would be free movement of Saudi tribes to watering and 
grazing places on the Iraqi side of the boundary, provided they were 
nearer than those within the Saudi boundary (Article II). The 
parties agreed (Article III) that there would he no fortification or 
troop concentration by their party at wells or Ivaterin[; places. A 
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diamond-shaped zone at the southeast extremity of the boundary was 
declared a neutral zone and common territory (Article I). The Saudi 
Arabia-Iraq boundary traverses desert throughout its length. 16 
Creation of a neutral zone appeared, at the time, to he the only 
arrangement that could prove successful. The area was rich with 
water wells, which were, of course, vital to the Saudi and Iraqi 
tribes of the area. Any other solution that failed to recognize the 
tribes' needs and their unfamiliarity with boundary lines separating 
an extended desert area or the idea of a boundary treaty involving 
international obligations would have unsuccessful. 
Even though the Uqair protocols fixed the boundary between the two 
countries and settled the problems of watering and grazing rights, 
the issues of extradition and the prevention of raids remained 
unresolved. Resolution of these remaining issues involved larger 
political-tribal nroblems. The Shammar trihal leaners, .. 7nO had 
taken refuge in Iraq in 1921, were ahusing their asylum hy raiding 
Ibn Saud's territories. 17 This constant strain in relations hetween 
the two countries I,Tas one of the major agenda items discussed at the 
Kuwait Conference in 1923 sponsored by the British government. lS 
Saudi representatives urged the Iraqi government to prevent the 
tribe froD using the country as a 1)ase against Saudi territories. 
If the Iraqi government was unable to prevent these raids, the 
Sau~is insisted, the trihe anri its leaders must l)e expelled. The 
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Iraqi delegation refused to consider such a demand.19 The 
conference was interrupted and re-convened for a total of ten 
sessions between December, 1923, and April, 1924, without resolving 
the issue of extradition upon which the stability of the two 
countries' boundary seemed to depend. 
After the breakup of negotiations at the Kuwait Conference, 
instability along the boundary continued, but efforts toward 
stability and peace persisted, and in January, 1925, Ibn Saud sent a 
message to the British Resident in the Gulf area, Lt. Colonel F. B. 
Brideau, expressing his desire to persevere in negotiations : 
I am still prepared to conclude special agreement with 
the Iraq Government or His Britannic Majesty's 
Government in their capacity as ~fandatory Government 
for the purpose of establishing safety on the frontiers 
of the two countries, Najd and Iraq, and for the 
stemming up of raids hy the tribes of t,\TO countries. 20 
On 11th October, 1925, Ibn Saud and Sir Gilbert Clayton, the Britist 
representative, convened yet another meeting, the Dahrah Conference 
in the Hijaz. In the ne80tiations leading up to the conclusion of 
21 the Bahrah agreement, Ihn Saud pressed for agreement on 
extradi tion of offenders. Hithout such an agreement, Ihn Saud 
argued, houndary disputes \'Jould plague the tr,·70 countries. 
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Disagreement over what constituted criminality postponed agreement 
on extradition, but a compromise was reached. Article IX gave the 
two governments the power to exact guarantees from a tribe under the 
other contracting party's jurisdiction, if this tribe had migrated 
to one party's territory. Jl1igration must not be for raids into the 
territory in which it had resided. If such aggression occurred, 
punishment and sanctions (provided in Articles I through VII), would 
be strictly applied. The parties agreed to negotiate an extradition 
agreement within a period not exceeding one year from the date of 
signing the Bahrah Agreement. 
The Bahrah Agreement marked considerable progress tow'ard friendly 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, but within ten months of 
signing the Agreement and, ironically, as soon as positive results 
became apparent, the Iraqi government established several police 
posts near the Saudi Arabia-Iraq boundary, Ivhich gave rise to a new 
series of heavy and sudden raids into Saudi and Iraqi territories. 
Toe Iraqi government's apparent objective was supervision of tribal 
activities along its borders as "7ell as establishment of a deterrent 
force against what the Bahrah Agreement termed "tribal aggression". 
In Article III of the Uqair Protocols the Iraqi government agreed 
that there would be no "fortification or troop concentration" along 
the boundary. The Saudi trihes in the area, headed by Faisal Al-
~yaish, did not differentiate between fortifications or troop 
concentrations and estabHshJTIent of police posts. Despite King Ibn 
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orders22 to his tribes not to engage in raiding, Faisal Al-Dwaish 
led a tribe in heavy raids across the Iraqi boundary against the 
police posts and other tribes near the area. The attacks resulted 
in retaliation by the Iraqi tribes inside Saudi territories. 
Fear that instability along the Saudi Arabia-Iraqi boundary could, 
in addition to jeopardizing stability in Iraq, spillover into 
Kuwait and disturb the status qu023 determined the British 
government to bring to an end these perpetual raids, and British 
planes in 1930 took dramatic action, bombing both the tribes and 
Faisal Al-Dwaish's followers. 24 Removal of Al-Dwaish in 1930 from 
Iraq created a quiet situation on the border between Saudi Arabia 
25 
and Iraq. 
Between 1931 and 1939 a series of agreements took place between 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq over migration, nationality of tribes, 
boundary regulations, and ad~nistration of the neutral zone. They 
still have a bearing on the boundary hetween the countries. Ho 
boundary disputes have heen reported since the 1930's. 
Toe next move came on 18th April, 1975, when the governments entered 
into negotiations with the intent of agreement on the status of the 
neutral zone. Tnis materialized on 2nd July, 1975, when the 
governments concluded an agree.l1ent according to 'ivhich the diamond-
shaped zone would be divided between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, by a 
- 335 -
simple line through the middle. Both countries have annexed their 
respective shares. They clarified, for example, the status of a 
640-Km border stretch delineated under the 1922 Al-Mohammarah Treaty 
and that of a demilitarized "neutral zone" (separate from the Saudi-
Kmvaiti neutral zone) of 4,000 Km2 set under the 1922 Uqair 
Protocols. 26 
Conclusion of this agreement and its timing were based on the 
conviction that the status of the neutral zone, agreed upon in the 
Uqair Protocols and based on the necessity of grazing and watering 
rights, had lost its utility by 1975. Discovery of oil in Saudi 
Arabia in 1938 and the revenue from large-scale production had an 
immediate and massive effect on the country, particularly on the 
Saudi tribes. 27 The discovery, with its potential for 
revolutionizing the economic base of the country, rendered obsolete 
the issues of tribal grazing and watering rights. During the early 
years of oil development in Saudi Arahia, thousands of P€douin 
tribesmen, attracted by high wages, a regular income, and the 
unprecedented chance for a non-nomadic, settled life, worked as 
unsldlled workers in the oil fields. 28 The cmnulative effect of 
these benefits was reluctance to return to their traditional life. 
Since 19L~O the Saudi government has adopted an active land 
settlement policy, encouragement of tribes to form agricultural 
communities. Agriculturists ,Jere provided with land, seed, and 
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money. Old wells and irrigation systems were repaired, and new 
irrigation projects constructed. In 1949 the government proclaimed 
readiness to make grants of State land to any citizen who undertook 
to cultivate it. 29 By 1975 the government introduced inducements to 
agricultural activities. 30 Although not all tribes have become 
either agriculturalists or labourers in the extractive oil industry, 
large numbers have been attracted to the cities. The final boundary 
agreement of 1975, dividing the Saudi Arabia-Iraq neutral zone, has 
been affected by the wealth from oil and the new economic situation. 
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IV The Saudi Arabia-Iraq Relations - 1920's-1980's 
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq have generally not been 
friendly from the time of the establishment of the Iraqi 
government. 31 Until 1958, relations bet~<leen the two countries were 
dominated by the historic feuds between the AI-Saud and rmshemite 
dynasties. While the Arabian Peninsula was politically and 
territorially divided among rulers with uncertain allegiances, the 
antagonism of Abul Aziz Ibn Saud in Najd towards the pro-Ottoman 
Sharif Hussain in the Hijaz created a confrontational atmosphere. 
The Al-Sauds claimed that their authority over the Arabian Peninsula 
was based on the doctrine of tawhid (absolute oneness of God) whose 
main objectives was to restore Islam to its original purity.33 The 
AI-Saud dynasty's concern was considerably reinforced following 
Sharif Hussain's self-proclamation as the "King of the Arabs".34 
Ibn Saud's efforts to unify Arabia led to the armed conflict with 
the Hashemites in t,jay, 1919. 35 The Hashemites were defeated, but 
their political setback created unique opportunities. That setback 
was a result of the Franco-British Sykes-Picot Agreement, which re-
drew the map of the LeVCL."1 t and removed Hussain's son, Faisal, from 
the throne in Damascus. As a compensation, the British offered him 
the Iraqi throne on 23rd Au~st, 1921. 36 
On 11th narch, lQ22, Ibn Saud's Ikh'·.ran forces attac'<ed Iraqi 
- 338 -
tribesman at Abu Ghar slaughtering many of them and stealing their 
camels and their livestock. 37 The feeling of Iraqi public opinion 
was agitation. The Iraqi nationalist's consulted the clergy to 
discuss the situation, which led to an agreement to hold a 
38 
conference. The Najaf clergy held a number of meetings discussing 
the Ibn Saud's Ikhwan forces aggression, and then decided it was 
necessary to have a general conference with the clergy participating 
along with the leaders of the tribes and the nationalists. 39 On 
12th April, a general meeting was held in the Court of Iman Hussain 
Ibn Ali, and all the delegates participated in the meeting.40 
Hohammad Ja'afar Abu Al-Tamen addressed the public describing the 
massacre committed by Ibn Saud' s Ikh~van forces against Iraqi tribes 
in Abu Ghar and Sammuwa. 41 The delegates signed two documents, the 
first 'vas presented to King Faisal I and the second to the clergy. 
These documents stated that due to the fact that Ibn Saud's Ikhwan 
forces had done uncivilized acts, killing, stealing, and vandalism 
against Iraqi !''foslems, they had decided to S1.lPDort the tribes and 
fight Ibn Saudi's IJ~wan forces, and ask Iraqi authorities to aid 
the suffering people and compensate the victims according to the 
42 
observed laws. The conference was seen as the only "my to stop 
the aggression from Ibn Saud's Ikhwan forces. 43 
The British Foreign Ninistry sent a protesting telegram to Ibn Saud 
by its resident representative in Bahrain, Ibn Saud replied to that 
tele~rarn declaring his urgent intentio!l and his determination to 
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punish the offenders and prevent any offensive in the future. 44 
The Iraqi Council of Ministers suggested that the British Colonial 
Office should use economic sanctions against Ibn Saud, and force him 
. h h k d h ' , 45 to punlS t e attac ers an compensate t e Vlct1IDS. Instead, Sir 
Gilbert Clayton the High Commissioner for Iraq suggested that flares 
should be dropped from the air on the tribal regions telling the 
Bedouins to stay 400 miles away from the Iraqi border. 46 
Between 1923 and 1926, Ibn Saud's Ikhwan forces continued to expand 
their territorial hold in the north by gaining the support of Iraq 
tribes whose allegiances shifted with their migratory patterns.47 
In time, tribal mobility not only upset Najdi and Iraqi territorial 
domains, but also disturbed the orderly collection of taxes. 48 
Increasingly, such economic factors exacerbated the personal 
hostility between King Faisal I and Ibn Saud who agreed, however, 
through a series of British sponsored agreements, to settle their 
h d d ' 4q or\.. er lsputes. . 
Relations between 1'iajd and Iraq did not imDrove until after Faisal 
Al-Th.Jaish had he en surrounded. He surrendered to the British 
authorities in Iraq on 9th January, 1930. He had been placed on 
hoard a British warship in the Arabian Gulf. How"ever, the British 
authorities handed him over to Ihn Saud, "'ho promised to treat him 
, I 50 numane y. 
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On 22nd February, 1930, Sir Francis Humphrys, the High Commissioner 
for Iraq,51 invited Ibn Saud and King Faisal I on board the British 
warship Lupin in the Arabian Gulf. The two Kings held a meeting for 
the first time face to face. 
Soon they discovered that they had underestimated and misunderstood 
each other, and that they were united by a common love-love of 
Arabia. The two monarchs agreed to open diplomatic relations 
between their countries for the first time. 52 
On 12th April, 1931, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri Said with Taha 
al-Hashimi, brother of Yasin Pasha, visited Saudi Arabia. The 
result was a Treaty of Bon VOisin-age, friendship, and extradition 
signed between Saudi Arabia and Iraq on 5th April, 1931. 53 The 
visit was returned in 1932 by Prince Faisal, the second surviving 
son of Ibn Saud. The visits helped the improvement of the relations 
between the tlVO countries. 54 
Clearly, economic necessities had prompted Ihn Saud to accept a 
diplomatic settlement 'ilith King Faisal 1. But in the Bijaz, Ibn 
Saud's efforts to control the Arabian Peninsula continued to clash 
,vith Sharif Hussain's rival claim to the custodianship of the Holy 
Cities of l'Jecca and l'ladinah. Pith the support of the Ikh'iJan, Ibn 
Saud defeated Hussain and in 1932, united the tribes of the 
Peninsula to create the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. His sharp 
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disagreements with the Hashemite dynasty were to abate, however, as 
Iraq's King Faisal I strengthened his ties with London. The London-
Baghdad relationship was viewed in Riyadh with suspicion and 
ambivalence. Yet, the British-Iraqi rapprochement notwithstanding, 
Riyadh would pursue contradictory policies for several decades as 
its internal political structures experienced significant changes. 
Its foreign policy would largely be influenced by what Iraq would do 
and it may be safe to assert that the impact of the Hashemite-Al-
Saud rift hampered the political development of both Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia. 55 
However, on 10th January, 1935, the Iraqi Prime Hinister Ali Al-
Ayobi contacted the Saudi Ambassador Sheikh Hafex Hahbah in London, 
and expressed to him his wish to signal a "Brotherhood Treaty" 
bet'veen his country and Saudi Arabia, on one condition, that Yemen 
could join them later. 56 On 25th 11arch, 1935, "',Jahbah visited 
Baghdad to discuss the principles of the treaty ,vith the Iraqi 
officials. 57 On 2nd April, 1936, an official announcement was 
issued in Baghdad declaring that an Arab and Islamic friendship 
treaty had been signed bet\.;reen Saudi Arabia and Iraq.58 The reasons 
the treaty was signed was in accordance with Islamic ties and 
national unity, the necessity of co-operation between them to 
discuss the affairs ,oJ'hich are in the interest of the States, and to 
consider a peaceful settlement and solutions for any conflict or 
d · t h t t' v ....:l t1-. t t 5Q lSpU es e ,'Teen nem. Lemen .101neo 'Ie rea y. 
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~Vhen the revolution in Palestine increased in 1936, Ibn Saud made 
some efforts to unite the Arab States. He telegraphed his 
representative in Baghdad to inform the Iraqi Prime Hinister about 
his opinion regarding the situation, and the necessity of helping 
P 1 . . . t" 60 I-T h h d . . a estlne ln lts curren sltuatl0n. 1.oW'ever, Til en t e eC1S10n 
was made to divide Palestine, Saudi Arabia rejected it along with 
Iraq. The rejection had not been taken in accordance with the Arab 
brotherhood treaty prinCiples, but to the facts of the Saudi 
objections to any major role for the Hashemites in Syria (Sham 
States). Saudi Arabia wanted also to know the Iraqi position and to 
stop unity between Jordan and the remaining Arab section of 
Palestine. Ibn Saud was very satisfied ~vhen the Iraqi Prime 
Minister Hikmat Sulieman and his cabinet was replaced by Jameel 
~mdfai, and his cabinet. The satisfaction could be deduced from Ibn 
Saud's statement to the Iraqi minister Thabet Abal Noor in Benah 
during the pilgrimage season when Ibn Saud said, "The Iraqis are our 
brothers and cousins", and swore by God that he ~·lOuld respect the 
61 treaty. 
Despite the treaty between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, no success had 
been achieved on the field of co-operation between the two countries 
with regard to Arab affairs. Jameel Hadfai complained about Ibn 
Saudi's changing policies, and accused him of being a British 
62 
agent. 
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The relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq had never been fully 
compatible. Since the 1930's, all the Iraqi ministries tried to 
improve the Iraqi-Saudi relations. All these efforts have been 
unsuccessful because neither state could agree on foreign affair 
issues. The Saudi position can be explained by its continuous 
objection to the defence projects that were suggested by Iraq to 
63 defend the Arab States. 
However, Riyadh watched carefully the event in Iraq. 64 ~.)hen the 
Rashid Ali' revolution took place in 1941, and the Iraqi-British 
relations deteriorated,65 Ibn Saud sent a letter to Rashid Ali 
protesting that he did not consult him in the disputes ~Yith 
Britain. 66 Ibn Saud considered that the consultation between Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq in foreign affairs issues was very necessary 
according to the 1931 treaty between the Iraqi and the British 
armies, Riyadh became very alarmed that the war would be extended to 
its territories as a result of increasing German influence in 
I S7 raq. 
On 15th Hay, 1941, Baghdad sent an official delegation to lliyadh, 
headed by Naji Swaidi68 to solicit utilization of an Arab and 
Islamic friendship treaty signed between the t,vo states on 2nd 
April, 1936. However, Rashid Ali contacted Asaad Faqech, the 
authorized minister of Saudi i\rabia in Baehdad, and asked him to 
inform Ibn Saud that t:1e Iraqi army was in need of his help to block 
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the Jordanian-Iraqi highway, to prevent the British army from 
attacking the Iraqi army in various fronts. So Ibn Saud replied 
that Baghdad did not consult him when they disputed with the 
British, and when they had an agreement with Germany. 69 
However, Ibn Saud met Naji Swaidi, and he complained as usual 
because the Iraqi government did not consult him on many occasions. 
Ibn Saud refused to co-operate with Iraq against Britain, and he 
literally took (Article IX) from the 1936 treaty between his country 
Iraq.70 Thus, Riyadh foreign policy did not co-operate with Baghdad 
foreign policy. And Ibn Saud refused to support Rashid Ali' 
revolution. 
On Britain's exhortation, King Faisal revived the Old Fertile 
Crescent Project in the spring of 1943, which proposed to group 
Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and Transjordan as a political entity 
bound to Iraq within the framework of an Arab League. 71 Riyadh 
feared potential Iraqi expansion in the Arabian Peninsula when 
backed by such a regional organization. It found an ally in Egypt, 
equally alarmed at the establishment of a Baghdad-Damascus axis. In 
a move aimed at th'ivarting Hussain, Cairo proposed in July 1944 that 
an association open to all Arab states be constituted. 72 This 
endeavour was supported by Saudi Arabia primarily because it lL'llited 
the rising influence of the Iraqis, and in time an independent 
League of Arab States (LAS) came into being. The creation of the 
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Arab League, however, did not prevent the two dynasties in Iraq and 
Jordan from forming a pro-Hestern block, which prompted Cairo to 
engineer a collective security pact with Riyadh, Damascus, Beirut 
and Aden. 73 
However, relations between Riyadh and Baghdad were very tense. Ibn 
Saud feared that the Hashemites would rise up and revenge themselves 
for unfriendly relations since thirty years ago. In addition, 
Baghdad was oofriendly due to the Burairni issue. These reasons were 
the cause of deteriorating relations between the two states. 74 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt remained united in their opposition to 
Baghdad's alliance throughout most of the 1950's. Nasser 
successfully persuaded King Saud to oppose any pact concluded under 
the aegis of the Kingdom's principal ally, namely the United 
States. 75 Nevertheless, King Saud's contradictory policies placed 
Saudi Arabia in a precarious position in the Arab ,vor1d. On the one 
hand, his anti-communist stance bound him to Hashington and, on the 
other, his opposition to the ruling Hashemite dynasty in Baghdad 
compelled him to become Nasser's ally. The catalyst to Riyadh's 
reservations toward Baghdad was the 1956 Suez war when, ironically, 
both monarchies adopted similar positions at the November 1956 
Beirut Conference, rejecting an Egyptian proposal to break 
di 1 . 1 t" . h Fr dB" 76 p omatlc re a lons Wlt .t ance an rltaln. For the first time, 
Riyadh and Baghdad shared a similar policy. That policy '·78S 
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primarily adopted because both regimes feared the consequences of 
permanent closure of the Suez Canal ••. their major oil route. 
Despite the recovery of Riyadh-Baghdad relations in 1956, Saudi 
Arabia did not join the Baghdad Pact. However, the increase of 
Nasser's influence in the Arab world encouraged closer relations 
between Riyadh and Baghdad. 77 
On 20th September, 1956, King Faisal II visited Saudi Arabia for the 
first time. Faisal held a meeting with King Saud in Dammam. The 
Ki d t . l' b h . t' 78 two ngs agree 0 lmprove re atl0ns etween t elr coun rles. 
Hhile King Saud was on a state visit to the United States on 1st 
January, 1957, Iraq's Crown Prince Abdul Ilah happened to be in 
~.Jashington at the same time. Saud met the Crown Prince, and the two 
agreed to bury the hatchet and co-operate in meeting the real danger 
to their realms and thrones, ",hich lay in the revolutionary ideology 
promoted by Nasser. Although both the Saudi and Iraqi governments 
had previously engaged in double-talk and double-dealing with each 
other, the meeting betw"een these two men at that particular place 
and under the particular circumstances prevailing at the time 
established at least a presu~ption of earnestness to be tested by 
their respective future behaviour. The record of that behaviour was 
, th th . +"' • 1 79 to ShOi-7 at e meetlng was 0"_ suostantla consequence •. 
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However, after the phoney crisis over Syria's Communist-inspired 
threat to its neighbours subsided, l<ing Saud resumed and intensified 
his rapprochement with Iraq.80 Shifting alliance in the Arab world 
made expedient a change in the former animosity between the ruling 
Saud family and the Hashemite dynasties of Iraq and Jordan. A 
growing suspicion of Egypt by Saudi leaders prompted King Saud to 
visit Iraq for the first time on 11th tfay, 1957, at the conclusion 
of the visit the Saudi and Iraqi Kings issued a joint statement 
d ' '.' l' d" 81 con ernnlng communlsm, 1ffiperla lsm, an Z10nlSm. 
Despite Saudi Arabia's apparent rapprochement with Iraq, Riyadh 
remained suspicious of Baghdad's regional ambitions. The most 
significant change in Saudi relations with Iraq, however, came in 
1958 with the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy and the establishment 
of a radical, military regime headed by Brigadier r~neral Abdul 
Karim Kassem. 82 The Iraqi revolution produced tensions between Iraq 
and Saudi ,"Irabia that endured through the 1960' s and into the 
1970's. The Saudi leadership felt insecure because of the Y~ngdom's 
strategic position bordering on revolutionary Iraq which was 
supported and armed by the Soviet Union and \vhich considered Saudi 
Arabia as a base for "imperialist" penetrations in the region. 83 
From Riyach'1's perspective, the Nasserist-inspired military coup in 
Baghdad placed Iraq and Egypt in an anti-Hestern camD. Saudi Arabia 
triec! to COlL.Tlter this develop~ent by forr,ing closer ties with the 
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United States. It supported the Eisenhower Doctrine while Iraq 
revolutionaries supported national liberation movements in the Arab 
world aiming at the overthrow of conservative monarchies. 84 
Iraq's increasing rapprochement with Hoscow and pro-Soviet forces 
disturbed the Saudi leaders. For example, Iraq provided political, 
military, and financial assistance to the anti-Saudi Narxist-Lennist 
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) 
. Oma 85 ln n. The Iraqi's were actively involved in the political 
interactions of the Gulf region. 
The crisis over Kuwait developed rapidly. On 25th June, 1961, Abdul 
Y~rirn I{assern declared that Kuwait was part of the Republic of 
86 Iraq. This declaration held improving relations with Saudi 
Arabia. Riyadh support of Kuwait, characterised by King Saud's 
assurance to the Shiekh of Kuwait that "Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are 
one country, what effects TZmiTait effects Saudi Arabia", inevitably 
l ' 't d th f d 1 ' I 'C d' l' R7 lrnl e e prospects or eve oplng raql-oau 1 re atlons. 
Consequently, when Y~ng Faisal ascended to the Saudi throne, he 
outlined a ne,\7 conservative approach for nuslim cmmtries to follm,7: 
fight all ideologies \07hich are inconsistent ,vith "Islam". Paisal' s 
principal targets Ivere Iraq and Eeyot, as relations with the latter 
soured. Hhen on 17th July, 1 %8, the Da' a th party came to pm,;rer in 
88 Baghdad, Iraq's already close ties ,'7ith !1oscm'l improved 
dramatically. Yet, Saudi i'lrabia' s real disquiet 'vith Iraq \.;ould not 
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reach alarming proportions until the signing, in 1972, of the 
Soviet-Iraq Treaty of Friendship and co-operation. 89 This event, 
more than any other, determined Riyadh's policy in the region for 
the next decade. 
Yet, despite its concern with the Soviet-Iraq relationship, Saudi 
Arabia's opposition to Israel converged with Baghdad's. For 
example, Riyadh agreed to Baghdad's call to stop all oil exports 
during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. 90 Hi thin a few months, however, 
the two countries' positions diverged as Saudi Arabia opted for a 
lifting of the embargo. The same divergence of approach betv7een 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq surfaced again during the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
war. Instead of joining OPEC's oil embargo decision, Iraq argued 
the OPEC states should sever their diplomatic relations with the 
United States which was providing military assistance to Israel and 
withdraw their deposits from American banks. 91 Horeover, Iraq 
called on Saudi Arabia and all other Arab states to nationalize all 
AlJerican interests in the area. Although Riyadh may have privately 
sympathized Hith these arguments, it refused to cut its ties with 
!'lashington or to nationalize U.S. interest in the Kingdom. Instead, 
Saudi Arabia and OPEC opted for the gradual implementation of a co-
ordinated oil production reduction and a selective embargo. On 18th 
Octoher, 1970, ~iyadh initiated the application of these measures 
~ut Iraq deemed them insufficient. Rather, Eag"'1dad chose to 
nationalize any rer:lainin[,; "U·~stem" interests in the Basra Petroleum 
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Company, including American and Dutch interests as well as those 
belonging to Calouste Gulbenkian.92 These actions notwithstanding, 
Iraq refused to participate in the 1973 oil embargo. Saudi and 
Iraqi positions became irreconcilable after the 1973 war. Riyadh, 
supported by Egypt and Syria, favoured negotiations with Israel 
through the United States acting as an intermediary, whereas Baghdad 
rejected any form of negotiations with Israel. 
However, the Saudis found themselves to be impotent in their efforts 
to effect a reorientation in Iraqi policies and attitudes, primarily 
because Iraq was an oil-rich state in its own right and possessed 
substantial military resource and could withstand traditional Saudi 
"financial" and diplomatic pressure. An improvement in relations 
between Saudi Arabia and Iraq began in the mid-1970's and was 
dependent less upon Saudi initiatives than upon changes in the 
attitudes of the Iraqi leaders. 93 
After the Iran-Iraq border dispute over the Shatt aI-Arab was 
settled in 1975,94 however, relations between Baghdad and P~yadh 
also began to improve. Apparently, during the OPEC Algiers meeting, 
Saddam Hussain invited Crown Prince Fahd to visit Iraq.95 
Subsequently, Saudi Arabia and Iraq signed an agreement to resolve 
their own border dispute and rebuild "the 1, 2Rn fill! road between 
Najaf (Iraq) and Madinah (Saudi pxabia) to provide Iraqi and Iranian 
pilgrims \vith a direct route to l'jakkah". 96 In June 1975, Prince 
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Fahd visited Baghdad to discuss Arabian Gulf security questions with 
President Ahmrnad Hassan al-Bakr and Vice President Saddam Hussain 
Al-Takrti and, according to press reports, "the visit resulted in 
the settlement of Iraq's conflict with Kuwait over sovereignty of 
the two islands of Bubiyan and Harbah. 97 Later developments, 
however, revealed in 1985 that the conflict over the islands might 
not have been settled. But clearly, bilateral relations between 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq seemed to improve. 
An agreement demarcating the joint boundary of the Iraqi-Saudi 
neutral zone was concluded in July 1975; subsequently, the Iraqi 
regime terminated its propaganda campaign against the Saudi 
monarchy. Reciprocating these Iraqi actions, Saudi Arabia has been 
instrumental as a mediator in helping to resolve the tensions 
between Iraq and its neighbours, Iran and syria. 98 In 1977, Riyadh 
and Baghdad announced that they had concluded an economic, technical 
1 d 
. qq 
anc tra e co-operatlon agreement.-· 
There is thus little doubt that the gradual normalization of Iraq-
Saudi relations during 197R occurred as a result of fundamental 
modifications in Iraqi attitudes primarily brought about by 
indigenous factors. Pm.;rer struggles within the Ba' ath party 
leadersl1ip, disquiet in the armed forces, and the increasing 
alienation of the large Shi'ia community froD the SUThji ruling elite 
(giv~m a draT1atic boost in January 10,79 by the Iranian revolution) 
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seem to have convinced the Iraqi leaders that the pursuit of radical 
and revolutionary policies in the Arabian Peninsula \vould ultimately 
affect their already turbulent domestic situation. lOO Saudi Defence 
}linister Prince Sultan paid an official visit to Iraq in April 1978, 
and, after talks ,vith President aI-Baler and Vice President Hussain, 
he declared that there were "no points of disagreement on any topics 
discussed". The Iraqis confided that agreement had been reached "to 
remedy problems of common concern". Immediately after this visit 
Saudi Arabia despatched Planning Hinister Hisham Nazer to Teheran, 
reportedly to convey to the Shah the willingness of Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia to establish with Iran "a form of co-operation in the field 
of defence and security to meet any future developments in the 
region". Similarly in June 1978, the Iraqi Information llinister 
confirmed that Iraq, Iran and Saudi Llttabia were co-operating to 
f d 'I 101 sa eguar 01 routes. 
However, a diplomatic rapprochement also came as a result of the 
convergence of t1vO developments in the region in 1978-79, the 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and the Iranian Revolution. Co-
operation between the t,vo ideological opposites in the Arah world 
had first been manifested during the Daghdad Conference I in 1978. 
Their parallel interests were further emphasized during the Tunis 
Su~mit in November, when the Iraqis refrained from pressing Piyadh 
to Dut more "teeth" in the :P,3ghdad anti-Sadat resolutions. Iraq's 
restraint at Tunis preserved a measure of harmony in the already 
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102 
,·7eakened front. During the Baghdad Conference II in 1979, Saudi 
Arabia abandoned its traditional softer policy tOlvard the peace 
process and joined Iraq in condemning Sadat's Egypt and imposing 
d · 1 . d . t' C' 103 lp omatlc an econOmlC sanc lons on alro. 
The Iranian Revolution also spurred better relations between Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq. The conservative Saudi and republican Ea'athists 
feared the revolution's rising influence among their subjects, 
whether Shias or Sunnis. Furthermore, the other conservative Gulf 
states perceived Iran's internal turmoil as a destabilizing factor 
in regional security matters. Immediately after the fall of the 
Shah in January 1979, Iraqi Interior Minister Izzat Ibrahim, an 
influential member of the Ba'ath Party's Command and Iraq's 
Revolutionary Command Council, spent seven days in Saudi Arabia 
discussing Gulf security. On 5th February, 1979, Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq concluded an internal security co-operation agreement, which 
also covered border security.104 On 17th July, 1979, Saddam Hussain 
assumed the presidency when Al-Bakr, on grounds of ill health, 
handed in his resignation. 105 At that time Saddam was seeking 
allies to help him confront domestic opposition groups including the 
Iraqi Communist Party which was violently purged. Saddam also 
wished to consolidate the state's authority over Iraq's Shia 
subjects which represented the majority of the population. 106 For 
its part, Saudi Arabia shared with Iran the fear that Iran's anti-
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\Testern militancy ,muld reach the conservative monarchies through 
the local 8hia populations and \Vas especially concerned with the 
Eastern Province ~.;rhere Saudi Shias work in the oil fields. 
Iraq ,vas also galvanised into action by the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan on 27th December, 1979, resulting in a considerable 
strengthening of a nascent trend in their Arab relations - one of 
tacit, if not acknowledged, Riyadh-Baghdad co-operation. In fact, 
the parallel responses of Saudi ~~abia and Iraq to the Soviet 
invasion marked an important step toward the subsequent development 
of a full Riyadh-Baghdad alignment during the summer and fall of 
1980.107 The Iraqi condemnation of the Soviets was elaborated 
during the first week of January 1980 in a series of articles in 
the authoritative Al-Thawra newspaper.108 
Riyadh and Baghdad positions were not yet as harmonious as they 
would be later in the year. In particular, these nations differed 
both on the importance of the Islamic aspect of the Afghanistan 
crisis and on the appropriate role of the great powers in the 
region. Thus, while the Iraqis pursued a course somewhat parallel 
to that of Saudi Arabia, their policies illustrated another older 
theme of inter-Arab relations; that of Iraq as the "odd man out" of 
Arab politics. That at this juncture was even farther apart from 
the other Arab "radicals" than it was from the "conservatives" was 
manifested in the varying responses to the Soviet invasion by the 
- 355 -
1 . f f df d ft' 109 ne~'7 y actlve _ront or stea astness an con ron atlon. On 1 flth 
January, 19r1O, Saudi Foreign ~ rinis ter Sa 'ud 'lisi ted Iraq 'Ivi thin the 
frame"<:vodc of co-ordination to discuss the Soviet intervention in 
,.p h' 110 iug anlstan. On 23rd January, the Iraqis formally announced that 
they \.;rould participate in the Islamabad (Pakistan) Conference on 
29 h J 1900111 . . f' . B hd dR' dh t, anuary, 0 . - -'motner Slgn 0 lncreaslng ag a -, lya . 
co-operation, and iillproving relations betl.;reen them. The Conference 
d d . 1 I . 1 S d' .. 112 en e \ut 1 raq supporUng t 1e ~au 1 posltlon. 
However, the most important development to emerge from the shifts in 
the Arab balance of power in 1978-1980, was the formation of an 
Iraqi-Saudi-Jordanian axis (see Appendix 1). Iraq played the key 
role in creating the neTil alignment, partly because Saddam Hussain 
had achieved good rapport with the ti.;rO monarchies at the Baghdad 
Conferences. 113 
The Iraqi-Saudi-Jordanian axis became an increasingly viable bloc in 
1980 and 1981. On 8th February, 1980, Saddam proposed a National 
Covenant (see Appendix 2), which was designed to suggest the 
principles upon which inter-Arab co-operation should be based. The 
ti.;rO most important guidelines in this document were a ban on the use 
of force in disputes between Arab states and a doctrine of 
neutralism which precluded commitments to either superpm.;rer. The 
covenant not only enhanced Saddam Hussain I s leadership role, but 
further ensured the hegemony of the Iraqi-Saudi-Jordanian axis.114 
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The extent of Eaghdad-Riyadh alignrilent on Arab issues came into full 
vie':} during the conference of Arab, foreign, economic, and finance 
ministers held in Jordan's capital, Amman, on 6-9th July, 1980. 115 
However, Riyadh and Amman stood solidly behind Baghdad's effort to 
prevent a linkage hetween short-term political issues and 10ng-teD:l 
economic-strategic ones, although Riya~~ in particular refrained 
from embracing t:1e anti-Syrian tenor of Iraq's statements. Iraqi 
Foreign ~'linister Sadon hammadi confirmed that Baghdad and Riyadh 
enjoyed solid and excellent relations. He also declared Iraq would 
not use the oil weapon unless all the Arab countries agreed to use 
it as well. Hammadi's declaration was a dramatic shift from Iraq's 
stand in the past, and brought the radical Ba'ath in Baghdad into 
line with the conservatives in Riyadh.116 
Against the backdrop of such developments, high level contacts 
between Riyadh and Baghdad culminated in the 6th August, 1980 visit 
by Saddam Hussain to Taif (Saudi Arabia). This "was the first time 
an Iraqi head of state had been to Saudi Arabia since the overthrow 
of the Iraqi monarchy on 14th July, 1958" .117 t,Jhat transpired 
beDveen King Khalid and President Saddam remains uncertain. The 
official communique announced that the two heads of state had 
reviewed the regional situation and discussed the implications of 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan for the security of the 
Arabian Gulf as well as the Israeli government's declaration 
proclaiming Jerusalem as Israel's eternal capital. lIS At the end of 
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their talks, Khalid and Saddam declared that both countries would 
sever economic and diplomatic relations with all states I-lhich 
recognised the Israeli proclamation. This joint Saudi-Iraq position 
on Jerusalem may have been Riyadh's warning to lJashington not to 
accept yet another Israeli orchestrated fait accomoli. A more 
plausible explanation for the Saudi acceptance of a strongly worded 
Iraqi initiated ultimatum may be found in Riyadh's desire to 
strengthen it ties with Baghdad at a tL~e when the Iranian regime 
was embarked on a crusade to export its revolution to Iraq and the 
conservative monarchies. Toward the Iranian threat, the Khalid-
Saddam negotiations enjoin[ed] "that peripheral differences should 
be discarded and ranks should be closed". Conceivably, King Khalid 
may have wished to foster relations between the world's largest oil 
exporter and the Arab world's greatest military power. 
From its perspective, Iraq attempted to capitalize on this newly-
found co-operation. Reportedly, in a ~3rch, 1980, declaration, 
Saddam Hussain had gone so far as to "pledge military assistance to 
Saudi Arabia" if Soviet troops invaded Saudi territory .119 Such 
exuberant statements drew mild responses from Riyadh which wished to 
rebuild its strained ties with Tehran. 
From some time the Iraqi approach to Riyadh has been couched in 
terms intended to attract the Arab nationalism of the younger, 
secular-educated members of the royal household and any government 
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tec~~ocrat3, with antagonizing the equilibrium of the ruling circle 
commanded by King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd. The result of the 
August negotiations was that in public the Saudi position was one of 
benevolent acquiescence to Iraqi plans. In private - though 
e..xpressed in public by the Saudi's acknowledged spokesman in the 
Gulf, the Qataris - the position was more active support covering a 
f h 120 range 0 Iraqi requests in the event of ':var '(vit Iran. 
Yet, when the Iraq-Iran ~yar broke out on 22nd September, 1980, and 
Iraq pressed its requests, no one in Riyadh or elsewhere in the Gulf 
could be sure which Ivay the Saudi leadership would spring, publicly 
or privately. Despite considerable coaxing from Baghdad, the Saudis 
remained anxious that an open conflict between the Arabs and Iran 
would provide new opportunities for the Soviet Union - in Iran, as 
it continued to deteriorate, and in Iraq, if it got tied down in a 
costly war, to guard against that contingency, Riyadh believed it 
essential to retain its "American option" - the possibility of an 
American intervention on the Saudis' behalf - whatever the other 
Arabs thought.12l 
So, Saudi Arabia had no choice but to express its total support of 
Iraq, believing perhaps that a rapid victory would end the 
perceived Iranian threat.122 Riyadh opened its port facilities to 
help Iraq receive military supplies, committed a portion of its oil 
~~orts to help make up for the Iraqi losses and interceded on 
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Baghdad's behalf ':vith European states for the sale of advanced 
\'7eaDons. On 16th April, 19R1, the Kuwaiti daily Al-P,ai AI-Am 
reported that the Arab Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the 1kU_ted 
Arab Emirates, Qatar and PBhrain) had committed themselves to 
providing Iraq \-lith SILl billion, of which s6 billion would originate 
, S d' Ar b' 123 ln au 1 ala. 
The first \'7eeks of the war witnessed a concerted Iraqi campaign to 
mobilize Arab support behind its thrust into Iran.124 Formally, 
this campaign was successful. Thus, Baghdad's propaganda machine 
also succeeded in winning the Arab world's support of Iraqi's 
struggle against the "racist Persian aggressors", through the years 
of the war. 
Because of the Iranian Revolution and the Gulf war, Iraq moved 
closer to Saudi Arabia and in doing so toned dolVTI its hitherto 
intransigent political rhetoric. In fact, Baghdad's newly found 
flexibility was notably apparent in its oil pricing policies. In 
1979, Iraq abandoned its hard line stance on pricing and aligned its 
policy with that of Saudi Arabia. This was a major victory for the 
kingdom. On the political front, Iraq came to support the King Fahd 
peace plan despite its previous rejection of U.N. Resolution 242. 
However, these changes in Iraqi-Saudi and Iraqi-Arab affairs must be 
evaluated with caution. Iraq's long-term ambitions in the Gulf 
region include the fulfilment of a long-sought leadership role. 
Undeniably, )"oib Ira,! and Iran are entangled in IVar, Riyadh is 
maldn!S a hid for that leadership position. Tfuether T3aghc1ad or 
Tehran \vould acquiescence in Riyadh I s rising influence in the area 
is subject to debate. Nevertheless, what Arab Gulf States cannot 
ignore is a potential Iraqi bid for leadership ;vithin the Arab 
regional organization. Clearly, such a development would 
substantially alter the conservative nature of the Arah Gulf States 
and threaten its quest for regional security and stability based on 
principles espoused by Arab Gulf States. 
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Conclusion 
Thus another area in which Saudi Arabia foreign policy has encountered 
problems has been in relations ':<lith Iraq. 
The reason for tense relations bet,veen Saudi Arabia and Iraq 'vas Ibn 
Saud's Ikhwan forces offences against the Iraqi horder. Desnite the fact 
that many agreements and treaties had been signed between the two 
c011.TJ.tries (1922-38), relations between them were tense and lmfriendly.125 
Since Abdul Karim Kassem's revolution in Iraq in 1985 - generally 
purveyed as an image of "radical, socialist and Soviet-oriented" Iraq 
posing a threat to the "conservative, pro-Western" Gulf States of the 
Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates and Oman), relations between Riyadh and Baghdad remained 
. b . 1 126 lnsu stantla • 
The Iraqis were actively involved in the political interactions of the 
Gulf region. In 1961, Saudi Arabia and Iraq were on the verge of anned 
conflict as Baghdad revived its territorial claim to Kuwait. The Kuwaiti 
affair worsened the relations between Riyadh and Baghdad. 
During the regime of the two Arefs (1963-68), little change occurred in 
relations with Saudi Arabia. This relationship remained tense and 
insubstantial. Although Saudi Arabia's opposition to Arab League 
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involvement in the Gulf Sheikhdoms, and its contributions to the British-
inspired TrJcial States Development Fund, created resentment in Baghdad, 
the major factor affecting Iraqi-Saudi relations Ivas not in the Gulf but 
in Yemen. Given the severity of the conflict in Yemen between the 
Egyptian-backed republican government and the Saudi-based royalist 
insurgents, it is hardly surprising that the Aref reg~~e's pursuit of a 
"unified political command" with Egypt limited the prospects for an 
, d 1 d' I ' I t' 127 lmprove ~au 1- raql re a lons. 
The government that emerged in July, 1968, led by Ahmmed }fussan Al-Bakr, 
Ivas "Ba' athist, radical, socialist, and backed by the Soviet Union". Al-
Bakr's regime was an anti-Saudi regime, called Saudi Arabia base to the 
imperialism in the region.128 Also, Baghdad called upon Saudi people to 
overthrow their King, and establish a socialist repub1ic.129 At that 
time the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq were the worst since 
King Ibn Saud met IZing Faisa1 I of Iraq on the British warship, ~5 Lupin 
on 22nd February, 1930. 
However, after the 1975 agreement between Iraq and Iran, little 
development occurred in Riyadh's relationship with Baghdad. On 17th 
July, 1979, Saddam Hussain took over from the ailing a1-Bakr • The new 
Iraqi regime started with an eagerness to Lmprove relations with Saudi 
Arabia, in the hope that co-operation between the two countries could 
ensure a specifically Arab role in the maintenance of the Arabian Gulf 
security.130 Riyadh ivas amdous not to find herself at odds ivith their 
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ne~vly assertive and potentially powerful neighbour, and began to work 
toto improve Saudi-Iraqi relations. 
On ideological grounds this seemed a strange match. The Ba'athists in 
Baghdad were secular socialists. They had long been identified in the 
Hest with extreme positions, had a reputation for violence, and had 
concluded a Treaty of Friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union. 
But by 1980 Iraq had somewhat tempered its position on the Arab-Israeli 
dispute, had edged away from Hoscmv's embrace by opposing Soviet actions 
in Afghanistan and in Ethiopia, and had broken its close ties with the 
Narxist-Lennist in South Yemen. 
The Saudis, perhaps se1f-servingly, took some credit for these 
developments, but what ever the reason the stage was set for an 
unprecedented degree of co-operation between Baghdad and Riyadh. Both 
regimes were worried about the Islamic revolution in Iran; both expressed 
concern about the superpower rivalry in the Arabian Gulf; both opposed 
the Camp David accords; and both had an immense stake in OPEC pricing 
decision.13l 
While the new relationship with Baghdad was hedged with qualifications 
and was probably not destined to last indefinitely, it did demonstrate 
that Saudi Arabia was prepared to co-operate with so called radical Arab 
regimes if that might reduce pressures in inter-Arab debates. For 
example, early in 1981 the Saudis allowed Iraq to take delivery of 100 
~ast European tan'(s at Saudi Red ,Sea ports. Tl1is soon DeC3Jl1e a re.~lar 
practice, "7ith East European and Soviet ships calling at th~ sf'lall port 
of Qadima, north of Jaddah, to tmload shipments of arms for Iraq. By 
fall 19~1 more ams were reaching Baghdad via Saudi Arabia th.an by any 
other route, at a time Hhen Iraq T,'lBS actively at T<7ar Ivith Iran, Saudi 
support was particularly important. 
Saudi leaders hoped that Baghdad would continue its policy of non-
alignment and that the Iraqis might curtail their disruptive actions in 
countries of special interest to Saudi .~abia, such as North Yemen and 
Oman. wnile harbouring few illusions about the ultimate compatibility of 
Iraqi and Saudi interest, the Kingdom's leadership was prepared for 
pragmatic accommodations with Baghdad. For example, within OPEC a joint 
stand by Saudi Arabia and Iraq on prices would be very hard to resist 
since together they account for well over one-third of OPEC's total 
productive capacity. Thus Riyadh has a strong incentive to discuss oil 
policy ,,,ith the Iraqis. One concrete example of co-operation on oil 
might be a pipeline from Basra in southern Iraq across Saudi Arabia to 
the Red Sea, a project that was seriously discussed in mid-1981.132 
\,]hatever the excellent relations between Riyadh and Baghdad in the 
1980's, still the two regimes did not trust each other. To illustrate 
the point, at a reception in Baghdad, Forces cornered a Saudi diplomat 
and asked him: if Saudi Arabia felt genuinely threatened, would you call 
Baghdad or Hashington first? He gave them by, way of reply, a long and 
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troubled stare that clearly said: \Tashington. Besides, if the Saudis 
wanted to team up ,-lith another Arab State, they Tvould most li1cely choose 
133 Egypt rather than Iraq. 
On 5 th Fehruary, 19131, the Creation of the Gulf Co-operation C01mcil 
(GCC) was announced by the foreign ministers of six Gulf Arab States 
(Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and 
Oman). They did not invite Iraq to be a member in the GeC. It is 
absolutely clear that Saudi Arabia and the rest of the C£C members did 
not trust the Baghdad regime, and they did not want Baghdad to be 
" 1 d' th" d " d f" 1"" 134 lnvo ve In elr omestlc an orelgn po lCles. 
Iraq, in short, despite its role as bastion of anti-monarchial sentiment 
and revolutionary Socialism in the Arabian Gulf, is far more isolated and 
weak, both militarily and politically, as a result of the war with Iran. 
Baghdad indeed joined Riyadh's conservative line and fall in the 
conservative Arab Gulf States orbit. Relations between Riyadh's regime 
and Baghdad's regime in the 1980's, the best relations between them since 
1920, although they did not trust each. Obviously, the Gulf war played 
an excellent role in good relations between Riyadh and Baghdad. 
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Apoendi."':: I 
.Arab Alignments since ['arch 1979 
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Libya Sudan Saudi Arabia 
Oman Jordan 
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Source: -Alan R • Taylor, 1he Arab Balance of Power, Syracuse, New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 1982, p. 124. 
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Appendix 2 
National Covenant Proposed by Iraq, Baghdad, 8th February, 1980. 
In the light of the current international situation and the possibilities of 
its future development and in the light of the dangerous possibilities that 
might ensue from this developme~t, threatening pan-}\rab soverei<~ty and 
security on the one hand, and world peace and security on the other; in 
response to the dictates of pan-Arab responsibility toward the Arah nation and 
its people, land, culture, civilization and heritage; and in accordance with 
the principles of the non-aligned movement, Iraq finds itself called upon to 
initiate the issuing of this declaration so that it can serve first as a 
charter to regulate relations among the Arab countries and second, as a pledge 
by the nation to neighbouring countries which proclaim their respect for and 
commitment to this charter. 
The declaration is based on the following principles; 
(1) The rejection of the presence or the facilitation of the presence of any 
foreign armies, bases or armed forces in the Arab homeland in any form, 
under any pretext and guise or for any reason, the isolation of any Arab 
regime which does not adhere to the principle, boycotting such an Arab 
regime politically and economically and resisting its policies by all 
available means. 
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(2) Ba..'"h'1ine an Arab state from resorting to ::trned force against any other 
Arab state and resolving any dispute that might arise among the Arab 
countries by peaceful ;neans and ,.nthin the context of the principles of 
joint pan-Arab action and the supreme Arab interests. 
(3) The application of the principle cited in Clause (2) above to the 
relations bet'iveen the Arab nation and its countries, nations and states 
neighbouring the ~Iab homeland. 
Of course, you know that the Zionist entity is not included because it is 
not considered a state. It is a freak entity occupying Arab land and is 
not included in these principles. 
It is not permissible to resort to armed force in disputes with these 
states, except in the case of self-defence and the defence of sovereignty 
against the threats which undermine the security and basic interests of 
the Arab countries. 
(4) The solidarity of all the Arab countries against any aggression, violation 
or state of actual war which any foreign side might undertake against the 
territorial integrity of any Arab country. These countries ,viII jointly 
repulse this aggression or violation and will thwart it by using all ways 
and means, including military action, collective political and economic 
boycott and any other methods dictated by necessity and pan-Arab 
interests. 
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(5) '1:'12 affirmation of the Arab countries comr1itment to international laws and 
norr.1S nertainin?; to the use of waters, airs-pace and zones by states which 
are not in a state of war ,nth any Arab country. 
(6) Keepin~ the Arab cOl.L.'l.tries away from the circle of international conflicts 
or Hars, &id commitment to total neutrality and non-aliwunent toward any 
party to the conflict or ,<Tar as long as these parties to the conflict or 
war have not violated Arab territorial integrity and the inalienable 
rights of the Arab countries, which are guaranteed by international laws 
and norms. The Arab countries will not allow their military forces to 
participate in part or whole in military conflicts and wars inside and 
outside the area on behalf of any foreign state or quarter. 
(7) The commitment of the Arab countries to establish developing and 
constructive economic relations among themselves in order to provide and 
strengthen a joint groundwork for a developed Arab economic edifice and 
Arab unity. The Arab countries Inll shun any behaviour which might harm 
these relations or impede their continuity and development, irrespective 
of the diversity of Arab regimes and the peripheral political differences 
among them, as long as the parties concerned are committed to the 
principles of this declaration. The Arab countries will adhere to the 
principles of pan-Arab economic integration. The Arab countries which are 
economically capable will pledge to offer all kinds of economic assistance 
to other Arab countries so as to prevent their possible dependence upon 
foreign forces, which might undermine their independence and pan-Arab will 
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U3) ;,:hile drawing up the principles of this declaration, Iraq affir::ls its 
readiness to be committed to this declaration before every Arab cOlmtry 
and before any party Hhich is committed to it. Iraq is ready to discuss 
this declaration ,lith the . .\.rab brot:1ers and to listen to their renarks in 
order to em1ance this declaration's effectiveness and to deepen its 
context. 
Iraq also affirms that this declaration does not constitllte a substitute 
to the P...rab League Charter, the joint defence treaty and the economic co-
operation among the members of the Arab League. Iraq considers this 
declaration as a strengthening of the Charter and Treaty commensurate with 
the current international circumstances, the dangers which threaten the 
Arab nation and the pan-Arab responsibilities which result from the 
current and future circumstances. 
Source: Ibid., pp. 153-155. 
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I Introduction 
Before South Yemeni independence, contact was quite close between 
the two regions. Hany thousands of South Ye.rnenis lived and worked 
in the Saudi Kingdom. In contrast with the largely unskilled North 
Yemeni labourers, the southerners were mostly educated clerks, 
accountants, or merchants, often of considerable substance - thus, 
members of the bourgeois class that was to become a casualty of the 
revolution in their homeland. Saudi relations with the protecting 
power had been clouded by several territorial disputes in which 
Britain championed the interests of the states with which it had 
special treaty arrangements. The Saudis and the British never 
reached a meeting of minds on the border between the Kingdom and the 
Aden Protectorate. While the British dealt officially with Riyadh 
on behalf of South Yemen, the Saudi ruling elite maintained cordial 
informal contact with many of the rulers, themselves aristocrats of 
traditional outlook. 
After independence in 1967, and when the National Liberation Front 
(~~) took power from the Front of the Liberation of Occupied South 
Yemen (FLOSY), Saudi Arabia became alarmed. To Riyadh, the NLF 
represented a communist party. The establishment of the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was viewed as the creation of a 
communist regime. The formation of a connnunist state in the Arabian 
Peninsula could not be tolerated by traditionalist Saudi Arabia. 
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P~yadh long abstained from entering into official relations with the 
inde~endent South Yemeni re~irne. However, the Saudi leaders tried 
very hard to overthrow the regime. 
The history of the relations between Saudi Arahia and the PDRY 
covers many turbllient years. The relations have been greatly 
affected by the Saudi role in countering communism and the influence 
of the Soviet TJnion in the area. In addition, the existing 
hostility between the two Yernens continues to pose a threat of war 
in the region which would place Saudi Arabia in a difficult 
position, bordering both nations. 
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II Brief Historical P..ac...'-cground of the PDRY 
The British government announced that its presence in Aden would be 
terminated on 30th November, 1967.1 The Soviet Union waited for 
such opportunity as might be presented by developments in Aden 
during the confusion usually associated with a newly independent 
state. In 1967, two groups emerged as claimants for power: the 
Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), strongly 
supported by Egypt, and the National Liberation Front (NLF), which 
was wary of Egyptian control. 2 King Faysal had always seen the NLF 
as dangerously communist, and he urged the British not to hand over 
power to them. Instead of fostering FLOSY, Britain, in opposition 
to President Nasser's ambitions in the Yemen and his close relations 
with the Soviet union, allowed power to the NLF, an umbrella 
organization for a motley mixture of Harxist-Leninist and l-1aoists. 3 
On 30th November, 1967, South Yemen was proclaimed an independent 
state and named the People's Republic of South Yemen (PRsy).4 The 
ruling regime that emerged after independence was strongly Marxist. 
It was divided, however, into a faction led by the new President, 
Qahtan al-Shaaby, who supported a relatively moderate course of 
action and efforts to maintain good relations with Aden's 
neighbours, and a much harder-line Marxist faction backed by Salem 
Rubaya Ali, Abdul Fatah Ismail, Ali Nasser ~fohannnad and Mohammad Ali 
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Haytham. In Harch 1968, the NLG split over these policy 
differences, and al-Shaaby emerged as the initial victor. 5 
These orientations in the PRS{'s leadership and the economic 
conditions of the new state gave the Soviet Union an opportunity.6 
Hilitary assistance, economic aid and Soviet advisers and 
"technicians" rushed into the PRsy. 7 Hoscow's assistance, important 
for fixing power internally, strengthened the PRSY's military 
capabilities vis-a-vis the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and enabled it 
to support the Dhofari rebellion which had been threatening Oman's 
stability since 1965. The Soviet union became the major outside 
supporter of the PRSY. The Saudi government considered the Soviet 
presence and influence near its southern boundary as a serious 
potential threat. 8 
The regime of the PRSY and especially the more radical elements of 
the ruling NLF, together with the Chinese, continued to support the 
rebellion in Dhofari. 9 Marxist-oriented, and dedicated to the 
overthrow of the 'feudal' regimes in the Arabian Peninsula, the NLF 
and "The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf" 
(PFLOAG) were loathed py Saudi Arabia. As British intentions to end 
their commitments in the Arabian Gulf were revealed in 1968, Riyadh 
became deeply concerned about the goals of PFLOAG and the NLF's 
socio-political revolutionary programme. 10 
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The PRSY has an estimated population of only 1.5 million. It ranks 
among the poorest countries of the Arabian Peninsula. However, 
because of its strategic position and proximity to the world's major 
oil sources, the PRSY is an important political force in the Arab 
world. Aden remains the most important city, as shipping, oil 
refining, and other large-scale economic operations have given the 
people a high standard of living. ~ltside the cities, the PRSY is 
sparsely populated, with a tribal social structure made up of 
Shafa 's Huslims. Host of the foreign labour and European interests 
11 have fled from the country. 
In foreign relations, the new regime unequivocally placed itself in 
the revolutionary Socialist camp and made determined efforts to 
develop its ties with Cotmnunist countries. Relations ~vith the West, 
on the other hand, deteriorated sharply. Not only was "world 
revolution" preached, but Aden, an important centre of revolutionary 
movements, intensified it subversion of 'reactionary' governments. 
It was voted to Marxist-Leninist ideology~2 
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III The Saudi Arabia-PDRY Boundary 
Saudi Arabian is bounded on the south by the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (PDRY) , lying along the Gulf of Aden and the 
Arabia Sea. Saudi Arabia's vast Rub al-Khali (empty quarter) desert 
roughly demarcates Saudi territory from Qatar in the east in an arc 
to Yemen (Aden) in the south. 13 The boundary between these two 
countries has never been defined. The difficulty can be attributed 
to two sets of factors. 
The first set stems from the conflicting interests of Saudi Arabia 
and Britain in the Arabian Gulf area before the final British 
withdrawal from Aden on 20th November, 1967.14 
The tense relations between Saudi Arabia and Britain over the Burami 
issue,15 debated for over forty years, prevented any discussion 
between the two governments concerning the Saudi-South Yemen 
boundary. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were 
severed during the Suez war of 1956. During the 1950's the British 
government was preoccupied with plans to form a Federation of South 
Arabia,16 to include the nine small states in South Arabia and the 
colony of Aden. A bo1llldary between Aden and Saudi Arabia did not 
appeal to the British authorities. More important, probably, was 
the Saudi government's reluctance to establish a final boundary with 
Aden when it was a British colony. To do so lvould have. meant 
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acceptance of colonialism in Aden at a time ~oJhen the Saudi 
government and all the Arab states were calling for an end to 
colonialism and independence of Arab territories under foreign 
rule. 17 A final boundary settlement was postponed until the 
eventual British ~oJithdra\oJal from Aden and the Gulf area. 
After the British withdrawal from Aden in 1967, new and even more 
complicated factors emerged, affecting the boundary question between 
Saudi Arabia and the new independent state of South Yemen. The 
Soviet Union's support of the PRSY immediately after the British 
withdrawal from Aden in 1967 marked the beginning of unfriendly 
relations between Saudi Arabia and its southern neighbour.1S 
Southern Yemen's border with Saudi Arabia has never been delimited. 
In November and December 1969 fighting occurred within the areas of 
Sharurah and Al-Wadeiah. South Yemen claimed that Saudi Arabia had 
annexed the areas with British consent before independence. The 
fighting lasted only a week. The press reported that aerial 
dogfights had taken place between Saudi aircraft supplied by Britain 
and South Yemeni' MiG's supplied by the Soviet Union. The fighting 
ended with re-occupation of the disputed areas by Saudi Arabia.19 
However, in late 1969 Saudi-PRSY relations worsened, reaching their 
highest level of conflict when clashes occurred at the Saudi border 
checkpoint al-Wadeiah. 20 
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In 1970, Saudi Arabia huilt 11p her troops near the border. The 
huild up, combined with major Saudi payments to some of the South 
Yemeni tribes, forced Aden's regime to reduce the fighting along its 
Saudi border to minor encounters betiY'een Saudi and Yemeni backed 
tribal factions. 21 
Finally, Riyadh turned its attention to the many South Yemenis who 
escaped after 1967 into Saudi Arabia. Hainly ax-Sultans and Sheikhs 
with their followers, members of the moderate South Arabian League 
(SAL), and tribes who opposed the NLF, these refugees served as a 
nucleus of the Army of National Salvation (SNS) which invaded 
Hadramout in the last months of 1971. However, despite initial 
success the attempt proved to be a complete failure as a result of 
dissension, lack of determination and leadership within the ANS. 
Thus, again in late 1977 clashes occurred at the Saudi border 
checkpoin t of Al-Wadeiah. 22 
In January and February 1978 there were several reports of border 
clashes between Saudi Arabia forces and the South Yemen forces, four 
Saudi planes were reported to have been shot down by South Yemen 
MiG's (one reason, perhaps, why the clashes did not develop into 
th ' .) 23 any 1ng more ser10US • 
The Soviet military daily Krasnaya Zvezde described a continuing 
threat to the PDRY. It claimed that Saudi Arabia was concentrating 
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forces near the PDRY border. PDRY Defence Hinister Ali Antar was 
quoted as saying that 'in the event of an attack ••• we shall turn 
to our friends'. Krasnaya Zvezde went on: 
As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is always 
prepared to act consistently on the side of people 
defending their right to independent self-determined 
development. The Soviet people decisively condemn 
the subversive activity and plots against Democratic 
Yemen ••• The Soviet people have given and will 
continue to give help and support to the PDRY to 
strengthen its national independence and implement 
. . . t f t" 24 progresslve SOCl0-eCOn0rn1C rans orma lons. 
However, in 1982, PDRY' Hinister of Interior flew to Riyadh to 
discuss demarcating the PDRY-Saudi Arabian border; although no 
agreement was reached, both sides announced the talks had been 
"useful" and the way seemed to be open for further normalization.2S 
The only Saudi boundary still undefined is that with the PDRY, whose 
political orientation is in sharp contrast to that of Saudi Arabia. 
The divergence of the two political systems has thus far precluded 
any settlement of a corrnnon boundary. 
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IV Saudi Arabia-PDRY Relations 
Tne most sensitive area of Saudi Arabia relations with states in the 
Arabian Peninsula was its relationship with the People's Republic of 
South Yemen (PRSY) w'hich was a potential threat to Saudi Arabia. 
For the whole of 1968 the Aden regime regarded Saudi Arabia as their 
most dangerous enemy. From the very beginning of the PRSY King 
Faysal regarded the NLF, who had ousted his federal friends, as a 
menace which he worked to overthrow, and refused to recognise the 
Communist regime in Aden. 26 In February 1968, he assisted the 
attempt by the Sharif of Bayhan to regain his country, and he 
supported other attacks during that summer. His agents were also. 
active in the Hadhramout, which some people believed that he aimed 
to annex - if he could have established an oil terminal at MUkalla, 
he would have been able to avoid depending on the Straits of HOrrnuz. 
The Aden government hit back as best it could, and in November 
Qahtan al-Shaaby, the President of the PRSY called on the Saudi 
people to oust their King. Qahtan successors later claimed that 
Riyadh had spent $600 million on support for their enemies. 
Refugees from the PRSY were paid to be in readiness for an armed 
return; Saudi funds financed a newspaper in Jeddah and a radio 
station in Najran which attempted to stir up unrest with claims that 
Islam was in danger. 27 
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In 1969 two sets of events precipitated a further deterioration in 
relations between Saudi Arabia and the PRSY; first, the abortive 
coup attempts of June and September by Saudi nationalist elements 
~vithin the armed forces which the Saudi leadership believed stemmed 
from the increasing radicalization of politics on the Arabian 
Peninsula; and second, the occurrence of sporadic attacks by the 
PRSY forces on Saudi outposts along their common frontier during the 
28 
autumn. In response to these developments, Saudi Arabia permitted 
dissident tribal leaders from Hadhramout to resume using its 
territory as a base for operations against the Aden government. As 
in 1967, the evident purpose of this move was to create some sort of 
buffer state between Saudi Arabia and the PRsy.29 
The Aden government began to turn progressively more radical. Al-
Shaaby was severely criticized by the militants under the Secretary-
r~neral of the National Front. 30 At the first Congress in Zinjibar 
in early ~mrch 1968, an aspiring leader named Abdul Fatah Ismail 
framed the Zinjibar Resolutions for leading the country to 
Marxism. 31 In June 1969, al-Shaaby, the leader of the moderate, 
pan-Arab-oriented faction of the National Front which curbed the 
extremists, was overthrown and replaced by Salem Rubaya Ali, a 
militant but also an arch rival of Ismail. 32 As a reflection of 
this further shift to the left, on 30th November 1979, the country's 
name was changed to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRy).33 
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I-Tow'ever, Saudi Arabia developed a new policy towards the PDRY (' re-
Arabization' ), hoping that moderation ~vould effect the removal of 
the Soviets and the rise of a less extremist PDRY leadership. 
Ifowever, despite the PDRY's readiness to receive aid from anyone 
ready to provide it, and to pursue both Harxist and Arab nationalist 
policies, it did not appear likely that even Salem Rubaya Ali would 
leave the path of the Socialist revolution and turn to 'bourgeois' 
Arab nationalism. PDRY co-operation with other Arab countries could 
however continue mainly for as long as pan-Arab activity ~.,as 
directed against Israel or the West was hence in the PDRY's 
interest. 34 
President Anwer Sadat of Egypt succeeded in convincing Riyadh of the 
importance of strengthening solidarity with the PDRY, binding it 
more strongly to other Arab countries than to the USSR by providing 
financial aid. 35 Although the economic aid of Saudi Arabia and its 
allies and the development of closer diplomatic relations with them 
did not however cause a noticeable change in the PDRY's relations 
with the Soviet Union. 
Faysal's diplomatic skill and unobtrusive firmness immensely 
increased Saudi Arabia's prestige and influence. Without a trace of 
flamboyance he had become an international star personality. Among 
the Arabs his tendency was always toward moderation and conciliation 
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rather than confrontation. \lith the exception of quasi-Harxist 
DeIl10cratic Yemen, which he allvays refused to recognize, he 
maintained relations with other Arab regimes of which he certainly 
di d 36 sapprove • 
The Saudi leadership for some time has considered its southern 
border to be strategically vulnerable and it has been apprehensive 
over the intentions of the Harxist regime of the PDRY. A major 
Riyadh concern is the prospect of a possible merger of the two 
Yemens. Such an occurrence - in Saudi eyes - would present a 
formidable threat to the Kingdom, particularly as the more dynamic 
and better organized Marxist leadership of the PDRY would be likely 
to emerge as the dominant political authority, drawing upon a 
combined population of a million. 37 Riyadh acted swiftly and 
strongly to quash moves toward unity in 1972 and 1979. Riyadh found 
willing allies in these efforts among the northern tribal Shaykhs 
who see, in the National Front's destruction of tribal autonomy in 
the PDRY and commitment to strong party government in a united 
state, a threat to their privileged position in the Yemen Arab 
Republic polity. Unity plans between the Yemens will continue to be 
opposed by Saudi Arabia and by powerful tribal Shaykhs in the YAR. 
Riyadh's interest in keeping the Yemens divided is clear~8 
After the 1972 agreement on union between the Yemens, the hostility 
between Riyadh and Aden continued unabated. A month after the 
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signature, Prime Hinister of the PDRY Ali Nasser r'!ohammad alleged 
that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Britain, and the United 
States were linked in "a reactionary neo-colonialist plan" to seize 
the F.adhramout. In t1arch 1973 he sent ministers around the Arab 
world to accuse "Riyadh reaction" of ,-lorking against union between 
the Yemens. 39 
Saudi Arabia continued to finance the armed refugees from the PDRY 
and its radio put out unremitting attacks on atheistic communism and 
such practices as the appointment of a woman as a judge or, as Aden 
put it, "symbolic figures agentry announced from the agenthood in 
Riyadh their hostility to the Revolution and the uniting of Yemeni 
people" .40 
The pragmatic President Salem Rubaya Ali made strong efforts to lead 
his country out of its isolation in the Arabian Peninsula by 
improving relations with Arab countries. He also tried to end his 
country's complete dependence upon the Soviet Union.4l During the 
Rabat Arab Summit with Faysal, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates joined Km-lait in giving economic aid to the PDY (although 
indirectly) .42 Upon Rubaya Ali's return he said "with regard to 
Saudi Arabia all I want is an end to the sabotage operations against 
my country, an end to the supply of weapons to the mercenaries, the 
liquidation of mercenary camps and halt the hostile campaign. He 
categorically refuse to be an aggressive state. There is not a 
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single shred of evidence that vie committed an aggression against 
Saudi Arabia but iye have much evidence that some Saudi officials 
have supplied and supported our enemies". This indication that the 
King himself might not have been to blame for the past and the end 
of the call for his overthrow was indeed an olive branch. A fe,y 
days later President Abrhim al-Hamdi of the YAR came to Aden and 
tried to help along the reconciliation bet'iyeen Aden and Riyadh. 43 
The control,of the country was divided between the state apparatus 
of power, run by Rubaya Ali, and the party apparatus, run by Abdul 
Fath Ismail.44 As the PDRY's economic situation worsened, Rubaya 
Ali increasingly found himself in a position in which he could 
survive only with outside Arab economic aid and in which Saudi 
Arabia was the only Arab nation willing to provide the scale of 
assistance he required. It was clear, however, that such Saudi 
assistance would continue only if the PDRY ended its support of the 
Dhofar rebels and broke with the USSR. 
Riyadh did not make things easy for Rubaya Ali. The Saudi's were 
slow in providing the financial aid they promised, and they used 
their growing financial power to take a number of steps that 
isolated the PDRY from the rest of the Arab world. Rubaya Ali thus 
tended to lose strength between 1973 and 1975, and when the PDRY's 
State Security apparatus was organized into a Ministry of Sate 
Security in 1974, and new Homeland Defence Laws were passed, Abdul 
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Fath Ismail seems to have been able to purge some of Rubaya Ali's 
45 key support. 
Ismail also benefited from the fact that he long had the status of 
an orthodox Narxist-Lenirtist 'in. th very close ties to the Soviet 
Union. Rubaya Ali was aligned with the People's Republic of China 
and was a more theoretical and gradualist Narxist in the Arab 
nationalist mode. As long as Saudi Arabia refused to provide major 
aid, the PDRY's only real source of military and economic assistance 
was the Soviet Union. This situation invariably favoured Ismail and 
it allowed him to strengthen his ties to Yemen's Soviet, East 
German, and Cuban advisers and to obtain their aid for his People's 
Hilitia. Although the PDRY signed friendship agreements IYith the· 
PRC in November 1974 and the USSR in December 1975, this sequence of 
events was misleading. The PRC was to all intents and purpose on 
its way out, and the USSR was on its way in.46 
Riyadh came to recognize this fact in 1975, and the defeat of the 
Dhofar rebels enabled Rubaya Ali to meet the Saudi demand that a 
cease-fire take place between the PDRY and Oman. Indeed Riyadh and 
Aden would have welcomed the IYithdrawal of the Iranian troops that 
Sultan Qabus needed against the rebels. Riyadh now appeared to be 
ready to change its policy from paying people to attack the PDRY to 
o °t b h 47 payIng 1 s government to eave. 
As a result the assassination in ~·rarch 1075 of Saudi Arabia I s Ving 
~aysal, a ~itter opDonent of co~unism and leftist radicalism in any 
for:n, Saudi Arabia has been ahle to pursue a more conciliatory 
policy tm<lard the sem-communist regime in the PDRY. The ohjective, 
~vhich so far had only limited success, has heen to "lean the PDPY 
away from the Soviet Union. Also, King Kahlid and Crm·m Prince Fahd 
believed there i.Jas a chance of Iv-eaning the pnRY al07ay from tbe 
f . l' .. C>hb 4<3 omentlng revo utlon among lts nel&" ours. 
Li 1975 a secret meeting had taken place in Cairo between Saudi 
Foreign Minister Saud and PDRY Foreign Ninister Huti. 49 In July 
from the same year there were unconfirmed reports from Riyadh that a 
meeting would soon take place between Saudi and PDRY representative 
as a result of mediation by Iraq.50 
In 1975 Salem Rubaya Ali set down a series of conditions under which 
he ,v-ould be prepared to normalize relations with Riyadh. These were 
subsequently formalized at the National Front Sixth Congress in 
March 1975, which accepted the principle of normalization with Saudi 
Arabia provided "it respect our sovereignty and our national 
independence, that it not interfere in the internal affairs of our 
country, that is stop its repeated attacks upon us, that it 
terminate the mercenary camps on the borders and that it stop the 
propaganda campaigns". 51 
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On 25th February the PDRY Foreign Hinister i'futi went secretly to 
Riyadh and the deal ~.,as done. On 10th Harcrl 1976, Saudi Arabia and 
the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen agreed to establish 
diplomatic relations for the first time since the PDRY's 
independence in 1967. 52 It was reported that Riyadh had given the 
PDRY $1 billion worth of aid to bolster its economy. It also 
pledged to pay the salaries of the PDRY Army and police for five 
years and support its economy, developing the much under-used oil 
refinery in Aden which had been vacated by the British Petroleum 
Company. 53 The two radio stations, long used to violent polemics, 
broadcast a joint statement that "proceeding from a spirit of 
Islamic and Arab fraternity ... (the two countries) desired to 
create an atmosphere of nrutual understanding" and would have good 
relationships. Both spoke of Zionist aggression, colonialist 
activities, and "religious, historical and cultural ties and a 
cormnon destiny". In April 1976 the Saudi Airline opened an office 
in Aden and flights from Jeddah were resumed. 54 
In July 1976 !<1uti was received publicly in Riyadh by King Khalid and 
Crown Prince Fahd "in a cordial and fraternal atmosphere". However, 
Riyadh offered the PDRY $100 million as the first series of loans 
that would free the PDRY from dependence on the USSR. 55 
For a year Riyadh seemed to regard the PDRY as being "on probation" 
and events moved slowly. In April 1976 there were reports that the 
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PDRY expected to receive up to $400 million in Saudi aid over five 
years, almost double the total planned PDRY investment for that 
period. 56 In the fall of 1976 Rubaya Ali sent a warm message to 
King Khalid, and in his National Day speech praised support for the 
PDRY from "fraternal States headed by Saudi Arabia. In Hay, 
hO\vever, it was reported that the Soviet Union had offered expanded 
aid to the PDRY. Clearly, Riyadh \Vas providing her aid slowly, and 
the PDRY was trying to play Riyadh against Noscow. 57 
In Harch 1977 Fidel Castro visited the PDRY, and Riyadh was alarmed 
about the visit. 58 In the same month Saudi Foreign ~unister Saud 
went to the PDRY to investigate Castro's visit. He was apparently 
reassured, expressed courteous admiration for the achievements of 
the regime and 'in a spirit of love and brotherhood', agreed to a 
great extension of bilateral relations. 59 
In April 1977 the first Saudi Ambassador to the PDRY presented his 
credentials, over one year after the agreement to establish 
diplomatic relations between the two countries. 60 In }Iay an 
agreement was signed bet!;veen the PDRY and Saudi Arabia by which the 
latter would supply the Aden refinery with one million tons of crude 
oil annually.61 Vast projects, including an 800 mile pipeline from 
the oil fields of Dhahran across the Rub al-Khali (empty quarter) to 
Mukalla and a railway linking Aden with Jeddah and Riyadh were 
discussed in a heady atmosphere, and in a more practical vein, a 
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loan of $20 million for rural electrification was made. This \Vas 
followed a felv days later by another $14 million for a housing 
scheme and a guarantee to cover the purchase of Boeing 707's for the 
~d· ,.: 1° 62 
.Hi .. en luX lne. 
On 29th July 1977, Salem Rubaya Ali, President of the PDRY, made an 
official visit to Saudi Arabia, the first ever by a PDRY Head of 
State. Heralding a period of closer relations, Saudi Arabia 
extended financial assistance to improve the PDRY's deteriorating 
63 
economy. 
The honeymoon be tween Saudi Arabia and the PDRY was soon over. On 
12th October 1977, the radical Abdul Fath Ismail, Rubaya's rival, 
denied that the PDRY would seek reconciliation with Oman,64 and in 
the middle of the same month Prime Ninister Ali Nasser Hoharrnnad 
attacked Oman and Iran and there were reports of border clashes on 
the PDRY-Qnan border. That brought Saudi Foreign Hinister to Aden 
for talks with Rubaya Ali over the Oman situation. The PDRY 
continued its support of PELOF and close ties with the Soviet Union. 
Riyadh felt that the PDRY had failed to keep faith, particularly 
over Oman; the offer of loans was abruptly withdrawn. Saudi Arabia 
continued to sponsor the PDRY counter-revolutionaries along the 
border and anti-unity forces in the YAR. Relations between the two 
thus deteriorated, and on 14th November 1977, Saudi Arabia recalled 
its ambassador from Aden. 65 PDRY's radio accused Riyadh of 
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complicity in the murder of AbrhiIn al-Hamdi, President of the YAR, 
Ttlhile Riyadh's radio denounced the godlessness of a reg:Lme which 
permitted "naked women in places of debauchery like cinemas" and 
even women standing as candidates in elections. 
Relations between Saudi Arabia and the PDRY further declined in the 
first quarter of 1978 as a consequence of the PDRY's vocal and 
material support for the USSR policy in the Horn of Africa. In 
February 1978 a serious frontier clash occurred between Saudi Arabia 
and the PDRY forces in which the PDRY's MiG's were said to have shot 
down four Saudi Lightnings. This was subsequently denied by Saudi 
officials.66 
Salem Rubaya Ali tried, through the mediation of Kuwait, to improve 
relations between his country and Riyadh, but this failed. On 15th 
April 1978, he sent his Interior ~linister, Saleh Qassem, to Riyadh 
for a discussion of the border situation, and for negotiations to 
improve the relations. 67 The political backdrop to these 
negotiatiOns, however, remained their broad dichotomy of interests 
in the Horn of Africa. This divergence, in turn, served as a 
further reflection of the structural ideological nature of the 
conflict between Saudi Arabia and the PDRY (one rooted in their 
contending patterns of national order). Hopes that the April 
meeting might ameliorate their strained relations were dashed upon 
the assassination of pro-Riyadh YAR President Ahmed al~Ghashmi in 
6R Sanaa on 27th June 1978. ' 
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Al-Ghashrni was killed by a bomb carried to his office in the 
briefcase of a special envoy claiming to have been sent by Rubaya 
Ali. 69 On 25th June Rubaya Ali was "suspended" by the Central 
Committee of the PDRY's political organization while a commission 
was established to investigate his role in Al-Ghashmi's 
assassination. On 26th June fighting broke out in Aden between army 
units loyal to Rubaya and popular militia forces loyal to Abdul 
Fatah Ismail, ending in Rubaya' s surrender and his execution two 
days later on charges of Al-Ghashmi's death and of rebellion, being 
in league with reactionary forces abroad, and undermining the PDRY-
USSR relations. 70 It is more lL~ely that Rubaya's opponents, 
especially Ismail, hatched the plot to discredit his moderate policy 
toward the YAR and Saudi Arabia and his political position 
generally. 71 
In retaliation for Al-Ghashmi's bizarre death, Saudi Arabia took the 
unprecedented step of sponsoring sanctions against the Aden regime 
within the Arab League. There was a recognition, however, that the 
political and economic isolation of the PDRY would only increase its 
72 dependence on the USSR. 
On 29th June 1978, Abdul Fatah Ismail became the new President of 
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the PDRY and Ali Nasser Hohammad became the Prime Hinister. 73 Ismail 
\'laS a Shia Nuslim and Riyadh was well aware of this. Although a 
tfarxist, advocating a pro-Soviet policy, he was independent enough 
not to accept everything that came from Hoscow. He sa,v himself as 
"a better HarAist" than many Soviet leaders whom he considered as 
deviants (because of their Soviet interests) from the "true faith". 
He too ,vas in favour of maintaining relations with Saudi Arabia, at 
I 'd 'f" l' 74 B h' . h east ln or er to recelve lnanCla ass1stance. Jy t 1S t1IDe, t e 
PDRY, with i ts ~1arxis t Leadership, had assumed a position as a 
Soviet Satellite State. 75 The PDRY's foreign policies may appear 
relatively inconsequential to the rest of the world, but they are of 
major concern to the YAR and Saudi Arabia. 76 
Four months after Abdul Fatah Ismail became President, the PDRY and 
Saudi Arabia were brought together by a common hostility to the Camp 
David agreements. During the November 1978 Baghdad Summit 
(assembled to deal with Sadat's signing of the Camp David 
agreements), Ali Nasser, the PDRY's Prime Hinister, me t the Saudi 
Crown Prince Fahd. 77 It seemed by 15th December that the moderate 
line was having some affect in the PDRY's regime. The PDRY's radio 
reported that Ali Nasser had received a hand-,vritten message from 
"his brother" Crown Prince Fahd regarding bilateral relations 
between the "brotherly" countries. And at the end of the same month 
Fahd wrote to Ismail inviting him to visit Saudi Arabia. 78 
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The fighting between the two Yemens broke out on 23rd FebrJary 1979, 
lvhen Saudi Arabia was seeking to improve its relations liTith the 
PDRy. 79 .Nohammad Saley ['fliti, the PDRY Foreign Hinister, was then in 
Riyadh to discuss arrangement;s for a visit to Saudi Arabia by Abdul 
~~tah Ismail. At that time there was an unconfirmed report that 
Prince Sultan, the Hinister of Defence, was among groups in the 
Saudi government who were against improving relations with the 
PDRY's regime. These groups encouraged the YAR to stage border 
provocations in order to prevent rapprochement between Riyadh and 
81 Aden. In the fighting Riyadh as usual supported the Y.\R, even 
placed the nation's military forces on alert in case intervention 
became necessary, and announced its intention to withdraw its 1,200 
man contingent from the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) in Lebanon. In: 
early March 1979 reports circulated that Saudi Arabia had sought 
American support of a possible Saudi intervention on the side of the 
YAR. Riyadh had asked for permission, as required under American 
Law, to use American-built weapons in the action against the PDRy. 82 
It took considerable time for relations between Saudi Arabia and the 
PDRY to recover after Riyadh's hostility to the PDRY during the 
Yemen's fighting. On 2nd September 1979 Abdul Fatah Ismail met 
Saudi Prince Abdulh, the Second Deputy Premier and Commander of the 
National Guard in Libya; neither side even admitted the meeting. 
Nevertheless, at the end of the month, Ismail said that relations 
\vith Saudi Arabia were based on "mutual respect and non~interference 
in internal affairs"; furthermore, he stressed his "desire to 
establish good and normal relations with Saudi Arabia". At that 
tL~e the PDRY's economy deteriorated and he was seeking financial 
" f R" db 83 asslstance . rom lya • 
Abdul Fatah Ismail visited the USSR from 23rd to 26th October 1979, 
when a USSR-PDRY Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed by 
Leonid Brezhnev and Abdul Fatah Ismail. The treaty was to last 20 
84 years. 
On 31st Harch 1980, Riyadh' government renewed its attempts to 
improve relations with the PDRy. 85 In the same month Crown Prince 
Fahd and Prince Saud, the Foreign Minster, held meetings in Jeddah 
with Salem Salh Mohammad the PDRY Foreign Minster, to discuss 
bilateral relations and developments in the region. A press release 
stated that Saudi Arabia was "determined to continue rapprochement 
(with the PDRY) for the sake of Arab and Islamic causes". 86 PDRY's 
Foreign Minister returned with an invitation from Fahd to Ismail to 
visit Riyadh for summit talks. Ismail refused the invitation.87 
On 20th April 1980, President Abdul Fatah Ismail resigned from all 
his posts. "Ill health" was the official reason for his 
resignation. 8S The Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) Central Committee 
accepted the resignation. The Soviets had welcomed Ismail into 
exile in Moscow where he lived in a manner befitting a .retired head 
of a friendly COl.ll1try. On 21st April 1980, Ali l'Tasser j'Iohammad 
became the new President of the PDRY. According to his associates, 
he was convinced that the time had come to end the PDRY's isolation 
in the Arab ,.]orld, which had lasted more than a decade, and to seek 
foreign aid from its wealthy Arab neighbours for its languishing 
~gonomy while maintaining its ties ~.,ith the Soviet Union. 
Ali Nasser, described by one Western diplomat as "more flexible, 
more pragmatic and less doctrinaire" than Ismail, strongly supported 
closer relations with neighbours Saudi Arabia and the YAR which it 
was felt could be jeopardised by further moves towards the Soviet 
Union. gO He stated he wanted "normal, good-neighbourly relations" 
with Saudi Arabia, and that he would be happy to visit Saudi Arabia 
Of ° °t d 91 1. 1.nv1. e • 
On 28th June 1989, President Ali Nasser visited Saudi Arabia and was 
received by King Khalid, with whom he had "brotherly and frank" 
discussions. According to the Kuwait News Agency, he es tablished II a 
new basis for relations based on equality, mutual respect and non-
interference".92 Ali Nasser denied the existence of any Soviet 
bases in his country.93 And he tried to convince the King not to 
attach too much importance to the military equipment (surface-to-
surface missiles, MlG-23 aircraft and T-62 and T-72 tanks) obtained 
by Aden from the Soviet Union. King Khalid stressed the lack of 
wisdom of allowing foreign forces in the region. 94 Ali Nasser 
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seized the opportunity to parade his credentials as a good Huslim by 
going to visit Hecca.He denied, hOlvever, that he had been promised 
$200 million in economic aid. 95 
Ali Nasser participated in the Islamic Summit in Taif in January 
1981 despite opposition at home because of the certainty that the 
Summit ~vould condemn the continuing presence of Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan. After the Summit, Ali Nasser held a successful talk 
with King Khalid and his Crown Prince Fahd, which led to the 
improvements of the relations between the two countries. At that 
time relations between Saudi Arabia and the PDRY seemed better than 
they had been at practically any other time since the PDRY had 
become independent.96 
The agreement between the PDRY and Oman on 15th November 1982, left 
the PDRY in a state of comparative peace with its neighbours for the 
f ' t' "t '1 xi t 97 lrst 1ffie ln 1 s natlona e s ence. It occurred as the result 
of Riyadh' promises of major economic aid during a visit by Saudi 
Interior Hinister Naif to the PDRY, on 9th June 1982. 98 The timing 
of Naif's visit was particularly striking because Aden had announced 
on 3rd June that it was pulling out of the talks scheduled with Oman 
in Kuwait and because an Iranian representative visited Aden on 4th 
June as part of the regular meetings Iran was holding with members 
of the Stead Fastness Front. ~~ile it is impossible to do more than 
speculate, this timing implied that Saudi Arabia achieved peace by 
- 415 -
outbidding the competition, and interpretation that is confirmed by 
the timing of transfers of funds and aid from Abu Dhabi and 
Kmlai t .99 
The PDRY normalization with Oman also speeded up the 
rapprochementbetween Riyadh and Aden. In July 1983 Saudi }\rabia and 
the PDRY agreed to exchange ambassadors again for the first time 
since 1978. According to Ali Nasser, the object of such 
normalization was to build bridges of fraternity, peace, security 
and stability in the area in general and also to keep our area free 
of the imperialist bases that threaten the region's peop1es,.100 
President Ali Nasser, ousted during the civil war in the PDRY in 
January 1986, campaigned for moderate regional accommodation.101 He 
eventually restored diplomatic relations with Oman and even achieved 
a modicum of co-operative interaction with Saudi Arabia. He also 
favoured economic liberalisation and more financial assistance from 
the conservative Arab states and the Hest. 102 By the end of 
January, more than 12,000 people had been killed. 
Foreigners left the country, as the [Harxist tribes] warfare spread 
to the remotest regions of the country.103 
Although the civil war was a power struggle bet~veen rival political 
personalities, after January 1986, Haider Abu Bakr a1-Attas, the 
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former Prime Hinister under Ali "Nasser, was installed as Pn~sident, 
and Ali Selam Al-Bayd became Prime Hinister. Both Al-Attas and Al-
Bayd have shown themselves more committed to fundamental ~'larx:ist 
1 "" 104 po lCles. 
Salem Saleh Nohamrnad, Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Yemen Socialist Party, believed that Ali Nasser, the deposed 
President, could not make a military comeback. It ~vas suggested 
that the Soviet lJnion's displeasure with Ali Nasser's flirtation 
. h h r.T h f th ., 105 Th b . f but Wlt t e west, was t e cause 0 e uprlslng. e rle 
vicious war in the PDRY, illustrates how quickly events in this 
country can get out of control even though a major foreign power 
intervenes. Although Marxism has been in existence for the last 
nineteen years, tribal traditions extend back hundreds of years, and 
will always have a strong influence on the government, as well as 
the desire to remain part of the Arab nations.106 
From what we have seen, it is very difficult to speculate about the 
relation between the sudden change of leadership in the PDRY and 
Saudi Arabi. The general view, however, remains that the PDRY will 
continue to assert its destabilising pressures against its 
conservative Arab neighbours as soon as its own internal 
circumstances permit such indulgences. 
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V Conclusion 
The costs in purely practical terms of the PDRY regime's orientation 
are particularly obvious in its relations with its wealthy neighbour 
to the north, a potential source of massive economic aid. Ivith the 
sole exception of support for the Palestinian Arab cause there is no 
common denominator of the two countries foreign policy objectives 
and thus no readily apparent basis for the development of friendship 
and co-operation. 
Saudi Arabia has long posed particular foreign policy problems for 
the South Yemeni revolution. The Kingdom has always been opposed to 
the establishment or growth of revolutionary socialism on the 
Arabian Peninsula, recognizing the danger that any such trend poses 
for its own autocratic and oppressive socio-po1itica1 system. 
Consequently, it has always assumed the leading counter-
revolutionary role in the area, supporting the Royalists against the 
Republicans in the YAR, the South Arabian League against the NF in 
the PDRY, and the Sultanate against the PFLO in Oman. Fo11mring 
South Yemeni independence in 1967 (and even more so after the 
Corrective Step in 1969), Riyadh threw its weight behind emigre 
groups and hostile propaganda campaigns aimed against Aden. It has 
also actively campaigned against Yemeni unity, fearing that a united 
(and demographically larger) Yemen would pose a serious national 
security threat to the Kingdoo. The leaders of the PDRY have all-mys 
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recognized Saudi Arabia's generally opposing interests in the 
region; indeed, the Kingdom's socio-political system and strong ties 
with the United States rendered it the epitome of local reactionary 
client regimes of imperialism which the National Front so decried. 
Yet at the same time Saudi Arabia is too close, too big and too 
powerful to make direct confrontation easy.107 
~mny aspects of the PDRY's internal policies, such as the 
nationalization of private property and the public employment of 
women, are anathema to the Saudi regime as inconsistent with Islam, 
and the entrenched Soviet position in the PDRY is perceived as a 
menace to regional security and stability as well as to the life 
expectancy of the ruling dynasty. For their part, the PDRY regard 
the nature of the Saudi regime, and its close ties with the United 
States and other Hestern countries, with undisguised distaste.108 
Since independence it has generally been the President who has held 
sway over regular foreign policy-making, and as a result the 
international behaviour of the PDRY has always borne something of 
the personal stamp of the President of the day. Under Salem Rubaya 
Ali, for example, the PDRY proved ,vary of an over-tight Soviet 
embrace and gradually improved its relations with Saudi Arabia. 
This process slowed dovm with the Harxist Abdul Fatah Ismail while 
relations "with the Soviet Union improved to the point where a 
twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed ",ith 
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~loscmv in 1979, reportedly on Presidential initiative. Ismail Ivas 
more committed to a militant policy, and the relations with Saudi 
Arabia worsened. Ali Nasser, 'ivhile not lessening the ties with 
Hoscow, did pursue a moderate foreign policy beyond previous levels, 
overseeing rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, the YAR and Oman. 
However, during his years in pOlver the PDRY had the best relations 
with Saudi Arahia since independence. 
In the 1970's, P~yadh made quiet overtures to the PDRY offering 
financial aid if the government would moderate its militant foreign 
policies. Some progress was made, but when the PDRY continued to 
co-operate with the Soviet Cuban and East German military effort by 
Ethiopia against Somalia, Riyadh began re-thinldng her strategy. 
Recent Saudi policy has persevered in the effort to reduce tension 
among the Arabian Peninsula States and to work for co-ordinated 
policies and actions. lVhile the response from the PDRY has been 
minimal, the Saudis have not reverted to their former policy of 
active hostility and punitive actions, such as preventing bank 
transfers by South Yemeni workers in the Kingdom and refusing to 
supply crude oil to the Aden refinery. Thus there appears to be 
some possibility that the friction which is inevitable between the 
two countries can be kept within manageable bounds. 
The position therefore of the PDRY in the Arabian Peninsula and the 
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Arab TVorld at large could be likened to the position of Cuba in the 
Hestern hemisphere. 
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I Introduction 
Historical factors going back to the 1930's complicate the political 
and military relations e"dsting between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 
These factors include the bonds that unite the two countries, namely 
ethnicity, religion and language. Saudi Arabia and Egypt belong to 
the .Arab nation, share the Islamic faith and spealc the Arahic 
language. 
In addition, though they eventually developed very different 
political systems, they shared a common monarchical form of 
government at the beginning of the 1930's. 
In Saudi Arabia where the political system remains traditional, 
centralized, autocratic and small, the personal role of the ruler is 
much greater. But even here there are political pressures upon the 
King and ones that are more difficult to discern than those in 
Egypt. 
Nasser's revolution eliminated the monarchy in Egypt, and changed 
Egypt's political system completely. His revolution brought new 
ideologies to the Middle East that alarmed the "reactionaries" 
regimes especially the Saudi regime. 
In the final analysis all one can say is that the conflict between 
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the "revolutionary" forces under the leadership of Egypt and the 
"conservative" camp led by Saudi Arabia for Arab leadership did no 
more than attract the support of the two superpowers. And so the 
polarization of the core Arab J'tlddle East further became a permanent 
base for the Cold \-Tar. 
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II Brief Historical Background of Egypt 
Egypt is the home of one of the most ancient civilizations of 
mankind. The beginnings of this civilization are not our present 
concern; yet they have some relevance to the modern history of 
Egypt, and a brief glance at ancient origins may help in the 
understanding of recent developments. 1 
Situated at the meeting point of two continents, Asia and Africa, 
Egypt is a geographical phenomenon. Although the total surface of 
the modern state of Egypt is over 363,000 square miles, habitable 
and historical Egypt - the Nile valley and Delta - occupies but a 
narrow strip of land between vast deserts. Yet the valley of the 
Nile is one of the oldest meeting places of man, and the fertile 
ground upon which one of the first civilizations developed and 
flourished for over 4,000 years. To speak of the living Egypt, 
therefore, is to speak of the 15,000 square miles upon which 98% of 
Egyptians live, w'Ork, procreate and die - an area slightly less than 
5% of the total surface of geographical Egypt. Since then, Egypt's 
population has been growing with uniform, though alarming, speed, so 
that in 1979 nearly forty million Egyptians are squeezed into this 
historical valley of the Nile. It is estimated that at the end of 
this century over sixty million people will inhabi tit. 2 
During the first 3,000 years of known Egyptian history,. thirty 
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pharaonic dynasties followed one another, and Egyptian civilization 
and the colossal monuments which w'Orked its evolution became widely 
known. At length, disintegration and decay set in, and the Pharaohs 
of the last four dynasties occupied their thrones under Persian 
domination (525-332 BC). 
In 332 BC Alexander the Great conquered the country from the 
Persians. He founded a Greek Empire in Egypt and for the next 300 
years successive Ptolemaic kings, descended from his general Ptolemy 
Soter, held their Graeco-Egyptian courts in Ale.."(andria. Their rule 
ended with the deaths of Cleopatra and Hark Anthony in 30 BC, and 
Egypt became a province of the Roman Empire. \.Jhen the Roman Empire 
was divided between East and West 400 years later, Egypt became part 
of the East Roman (Byzantine) Empire. 3 
The importance of the Arab conquest of Egypt, led by Omar Ibn aI-As 
in 641 AD, ended the Byzantine domination and absorbed Egypt in the 
Umayyad Empire. Omar imposed upon a Christian Egypt a new faith, 
Islam, and a new language, Arabic. The natives relinquished Coptic 
and Greek in favour of Arabic, and abandoned Christianity for Islam. 
Theories regarding this massive shift in religion and language have 
preoccupied scholars of this period for a long time. There is 
strong evidence to support the argument that the native population 
was alienated by the Byzantine attempt to establish one monotheistic 
creed in the Empire at all costs, including persecution and torture 
of heterodox sects such as the Coptic najority of monophysites in 
Egypt. Some scholars cont'2nded that Ornar f s benevolent and tolerant 
ad.rrdnis tration, ~'lhich gave tax relief to the Egyptians, served as an 
added attraction of Islam. Regardless of the reasons for the mass 
acceptance of Islat.l by the Egyptians, after the seventeenth century 
Egypt gradually became part of the Islamic-Arab tradition and 
civilization, and eventually its very centre. 4 
Subsequently, after a period of semi-independence under the nominal 
rule of the Abbasids, Egypt became the centre of the Fatimite 
dynasty, \vhich founded Cairo. Towards the end of the eleventh 
century AD Egypt was conquered by Salah aI-Din al-Ayyubi, and it was 
ruled for the next 400 years by a series of military oligarchies 
known collectively as the Harnelukes. The period of Harneluke rule, 
which lasted until the Ottoman conquest in 1517, was notable both 
for military glory and for artistic achievement. Under the Harneluke 
rule most of the remaining architectural glories of Cairo were 
created. Under the Ottoman rule the HameltL"'<es \Vere reduced to the 
position of domestic tyrants who were, however, allowed to do much 
as they pleased in Egypt so long as they paid an annual tribute to 
Constantinople. Under the conditions of oppressive and inefficient 
government which prevailed, Egypt was reduced to the lowest depths 
of economic and cultural decay. 5 
In 1820-39, Hohammad Ali used Egypt as a springboard in his quest 
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for aggrandizement and the extension of his dominion at the expense 
of the Ottonan Empire, and to exclude European influence. The 
revolutionary leadership of the E~JPtian Free Officers in the 1950's 
sought, in the name of Arab Nationalism and Arab Socialism, to lend 
at least the Arab Islamic world to development and pO'iver and, in 
doing so, to exclude Hestern Europeans and fHnericans - some would 
argue outsiders in general - from exerting influence or control in 
the [·tiddle East. 6 
lfowever, the dilemmas faced by Egypt in asserting its political 
identity were considerable and were discussed by President Nasser in 
his brief apologia The Philosophy of the Revolution. He said that 
he saw Egypt as being at the centre of a group of circles - Arab, 
African and Nuslim. The search for a suitable policy touched upon 
issues in all three circles, but the essence of Egypt's policy lay 
in the first, the Arab, and in particular in Nasser's attempt to 
lead and influence the Arab world. Nasser's method was to champion 
the Arab nationalist cause and to encourage the other Arab states to 
strive for "independence" but with the aim of creating 
simultaneously an exclusively Egyptian zone of influence in the 
~Iiddle East. Hestern-inspired defence systems were rejected, and 
arms I{ere purchased from the Soviet bloc in order to show how 
independent Egypt's decisions had become. 7 
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III The Saudi Arabia - Egypt Relations (1920-1980) 
It has he en in Egyptian national state interest to maintain a 
balance in the Arab East against the rulers of Arabia. This policy 
too is not Nasserite innovation. As early as 1915-16, Egypt, before 
becoming an independent state and still under British protection, 
sought to undermine any potential pmver constellation arising in the 
Hejaz under the British-sponsored Sharif Hussein of Necca. This 
policy was camouflaged in the interstices of the ostensibly 
religious question of the Caliphate that arose at that time on the 
occasion of the Arab Revolt. The same religio-political issue under 
new conditions and between different protagonists became a point of 
difference and basis of conflict between Egypt and the ne~v master of 
Najd and the Hejaz, that is, Ibn Saud, in 1924-26.8 In this sense, 
Egyptians have again sought to undermine the potential extension of 
Saudi power over the Peninsula by infiltrating South Yemen as was 
the case in the North Yemen episode of the period 1962-67. Egypt 
therefore has been, and continues to be, a serious contender for 
Arab leadership and the control of regional Arab politics. 9 
The Wahhabi forces embroiled Ibn Saud in a dispute Y7ith the Egyptian 
government over a question of not more than ceremonial significance 
at the very first pilgrimage held after the conquest of the Hejaz; 
and when the controversy was referred to the theologians of Najd, 
they gave a ruling which substantially endorsed the attitude of the 
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troops and left Ibn Saud \Vit~ no alternative but to resign himself 
, , v d 1 'd l' , 10 to a rupture w1tn "~gypt an 01 e 11S t1me. 
However, Ibn Saud failed to dissuade his counsellors from provoking 
a quarrel with Egypt that ,vas to cause a ten-year breach between the 
tlVO countries. The quarrel arose after the convoy bringing the 
traditional Egyptian carpet covering for the Kaaba in Hecca had been 
seized by Hahhabi forces on the gr01mds that the covering w'as too 
gaudy; and try as he might, for a long time Ibn Saud could not 
persuade his advisers to make and amends to the outraged 
E ' 11 gypt1ans. 
Egypt objected to Ibn Saud's 1924 acquisition of the Hejaz and its 
holy cities of Necca and Medina. 12 An ambitious King Fouad of Egypt 
wished to establish Cairo as the capital of Islam and himself as 
Caliphate. His ambition, coupled with jealousy and traditional 
Egyptian hatred of the zealous Wahhabis, led to a break in 
relations between Riyadh and Cairo between 1929 and 1936.13 This 
break was triggered by Fouad's refusal to recognize the Saudi 
Arabian political agency which had been headquartered in Cairo since 
1950. 
The result of the Hejaz-Egyptian controversy over the Mahmal14 in 
1926, Than Saud decided to manufacture the Holy Carpet at Necca 
instead of obtaining it from Egypt as before. 15 However, Ibn Saud 
had been able to maintain his objection to the tranSDort of the 
~,rahmal from Jeddah to lfecca Ivith its guard and its band, and his 
acceptance of the despatch of the Nahmal as far as Jeddah can only 
be considered as a device to save the face of the Egyptian 
16 government to some ~~tent. 
The rise of Ibn Saud to pOlver in the Arabian Peninsula had involved 
a bitter struggle against the F~shimites, who subsequently 
established themselves as rulers in Transjordan (later Jordan) and 
Iraq and sought to extend their power throughout the Fertile 
Crescent. Ibn Saud therefore had an equal interest in opposing the 
designs of the Hashirnites, which made him the natural ally of 
Egypt.17 
In 1927, Ibn Saud wished to appoint an official representative in 
Egypt, but first ascertain the Great British government's opinion in 
this respect. However, Ibn Saud wanted his representative to be 
assisted and advised by Britain's representative in Egypt as in 
Damascus.18 Lord Lloyd, Britain's representative in Cairo saw no 
objection on other ground and said it is desirable that Ibn Saud' 
representative should look to us rather than elsewhere for advice. 19 
Sir loT. Tyrrell (Britain's Foreign Office Chief) wrote to Lord Lloyd 
to inform Ibn Saud that His Majesty's government had no objection to 
his appointing an official representative in Egypt, and that His 
'Majesty's High Commissioner in Cairo would accord his good office to 
his Highness's delegate. Hmvever, Ibn Saud mst obtain the consent 
20 
of the Egyptian government. Sir H. Tyrrell instructed Lord Lloyd 
that Ibn Saud's representative at Cairo would represent him 
primarily as Sultan of I'Tejd, in which capacity he has long been 
recognised by His Jfajesty's government, and only incidentally as de 
f th " TT' 21 acto au orlty ln fleJaz. 
In 1929, King Fouad refused to recognize Ibn Saud's authority in 
ffejaz and had exhausted his patience and prompted him to demand the 
closing of the Egyptian political agency which was located in 
Jeddah. Relations between the two countries were eventually resumed 
in 1936, when a new King, Faruq, assumed the Egyptian throne. 22 At 
that time, the Egyptian Guardianship Council approved the 
restoration of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. 23 
On 18th November 1936, Fouad Bey Harnza, Deputy Foreign Minister of 
Saudi Arabia, visited Egypt and met Nahas Pasha, the Egyptian Prime 
~finister. Harnza and Pasha had friendly negotiations and signed a 
treaty of nrutual understanding in which Egypt fully recognized Saudi 
Arabia's independence and sovereignty. Harnza returned to Jeddah 
from Egypt on 22nd November, and expressed great satisfaction at the 
r~~oval on the grounds of the friction which had hitherto been so 
harmful to Saudi-Egyptian relations.24 On the whole, the result of 
the negotiations between the Saudi Deputy ~finister and the Egyptian 
Prime }linister must be considered as an almost complete victory for 
- 1J.1J.7 -
Ibn Saud after being officially ignored by Egypt since his conquest 
of the Hejaz. 25 
Saudi Arabia began to improve relations with Egypt after 19%. 
There were sufficient grounds to drmy the two countries into close 
relations; the two ~Zings of Saudi Arabia and Egypt shared their 
hostility to the Hashimite rule in Iraq and Jordan. Also, Saudi 
Arabia ~yas much in need of Egyptians to staff its educational 
. .. d d .. t' 26 lnstltutlons an government a rnlnlstra lon. 
The improvement of the relations betw'een Saudi Arabia and Egypt can 
be traced to the way in which Ibn Saud responded to the Egyptian 
call for forming the Arab League. In fact, relations between the 
two countries from 1936 to 1943 could be described as good and 
steadily improving. On ZZnd March, 1945, the beginning of a 
friendship between Saudi Arabia and Egypt was evident, and the 
relationship was further cemented when the Egyptian Sovereign 
arrived at the Port of Yanbu in Saudi Arabia on 27th December, 
1945.27 
King Faruq's visit was a success, with Ibn Saud personally meeting 
and welCOming his visitor upon his arrival. Soon after, Ibn Saud 
accepted King Faruq's invitation to visit Egypt. That trip occurred 
on 10th January, 1946, and he received a tumultuous welcome from the 
Egyptians. By then, cordial relations between the two Kings had 
~een fir:nly established. Their talks included bilateral relations 
as ~vell as their relations \<lith Britain. Despite his differences 
,·;rith ~,ritain over the Burairni Oasis, Ibn Saud advised TZing Faruq to 
re-3c"h a settlement of the dispute over Pritish occupation of the 
o ~ 1 28 
.::-uez \"ana zone. One report has it that Ibn Saud watered his 
.. . '"h 1 d t' t TT' 1':' 29 V1S1t W1l-i a ,1an. some secre reta1ner a ,~lng .l'aruq. 
The tone of the Saudi monarch's visit and of overall Egyptian-Saudi 
relations at that time ivas described by the late President Sadat in 
the following words: 
••• indeed, the whole country prepared for it for 
a long time. The late King Ibn Saud was a noble 
and generous hero. He had proved quite hospitable 
during King Faruq' s visi t to Saudi Arabia and the 
latter wanted to return his hospitality. Above all, 
King Saud loved Egypt. The Saudi ruling family's 
love for Egypt is traditional, and each monarch is 
always careful to maintain good and close relations 
with Egypt. 30 
In 1949, Ibn Saud and King Faruq united against the emergence of a 
Syrian-Iraqi accord. As long as Adib al-Shishakli remained the 
dictator of Syria, the Arab balance of power was tilted in favour of 
the Saudi-Egyptian bloc. 31 
-- --------------
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~1e r·73r;;1 relations bet~·,een Saudi !1.ral)ia and ~gyot continued to 
develop until 23rd July, 1952, when the Free Officers ended 
monarchieal rule in Egypt. 32 Neither the internal military struggle 
which continued in Egypt tmtil Nasser assuned pO'wer in ~farch 195Lf, 
nor the death of rbn Saud on qth ~~overnber, 19112, affected the 
cordial relations bet~veen Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 
Upon Ibn Saud's death, his eldest son, Saud, ascended the Saudi 
throne. Although King Saud carefully watcl1ed Egypt's political 
struggle, Saudi Arabia remained neutral. 33 Hhen Nasser finally 
assumed control of Egypt in 1954, King Saud welcomed his leadership 
and prepared himself for continued close and fruitful relations with 
Egypt. 
Hmvever, King Saud started his reign on a note of continuity. He 
intended to follow his father's strategy of trying to check the 
Hashimites diplomatically through informal understandings (for 
example, ,.;rith Egypt and Syria) while building up a deterrent force 
. 34 for internal and external purposes. tTowever, the initial years of 
the succeeding monarch, King Saud, witnessed a paradoxical 
coincidence of interest bet'iveen the conservative Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and the revolutionary republic of Egypt, headed by Gamal Abd 
35 aI-Nasser. 
President Nasser came to Saudi Arabia for a state visit in 1954 for 
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, . . 36 toe flrst t1.1TIe. Y:ing Saud enbraced Nasser as a brother. fillen 
:Tasser I·lent to :fecca to do his 9ilgrimage and to request Saudi 
Arabia partnership in his crusade to unite the Arab world the new 
King responded to the new president warmly. 37 
King Saud found Nasser as engaging and inspiring as most other Arahs 
did. 38 Saud drank in the Egyptian's heady notions of Arah unity and 
power, and he w'as flattered that '!asser 1:"!ad turned to him and not to 
the hated Hashimites for help. TZing Saud equated ~Jasser' s struggle 
to eject the British from the Suez CaT1al zone \vith his own battle 
for Buraimi; and eagerly pledged Saudi support for the aggressive 
and independent Arab stance of Egypt's new regime. 39 
However, over the months that followed, the incongruous linkage 
between the Saudi monarchy and revolutionary Egypt took on solid 
form. In January 1955, King Saud invited an Egyptian military 
mission to help organize and train the Saudi army alongside the 
American Hission.40 
'ifhile the Baghdad Pact was still being discussed, King Saud made 
common cause with Egypt in trying to dissuade Iraq from going ahead 
with it. 41 In the process he espoused the themes of neutralism and 
Arab nationalism that Egypt was using in the joint struggle, even 
though these were highly charged concepts that could undermine Saudi 
rule domestically and endanger Saudi-American ties. 42 After Iraq 
---------------
sizned the alliance ui til 'I'u.dcey, 'ring Sau(t concluded a 8"t..ltuCll 
defence ';-Tith Egypt in October 1055, and co-oper'3.t2d '-7ith "Tasser in 
efforts to bolate Iraq &ld to prevent Syria and Jordan from joining 
, D - 43 tne Lace. Saudi Arabia and Egypt denounced the attempt to create 
the Pact by an old colonial power to maintain its dominance over the 
lf4 Arabs. 
Displaying the same I:luddled enthusiasT'l Nith which Tling Saud had 
taken up Aristotle Onassis's tanker scheme, Saudi seized on ~Tasser's 
ideas as a chance to prove the originality and independence of his 
new regime, and as a substitute for the philosophy of a specifically 
Arabian modernization that he could not work out for himself. 45 
However, King Saud could sense the trend that Nasser represented, 
but he appeared to have little idea of how to adapt and apply that 
trend to his Olin Saudi monarchy. Egyptian advisers arrived to set 
up the bureaucratic procedures of the King's new civil service and 
teachers to staff his new schools.46 
Once King Saud committed himself to following Egypt's line, he felt 
compelled to support actions by its leader that went far beyond the 
immediate issue of Iraq. Thus, when Nasser announced in September 
1955, the conclusion of an arms deal with the Soviet Union, which 
brought the Soviets into the Arab region for the first time,47 King 
Saud supported Nasser's purchases of Soviet arms. But then 
intelligence reports started to suggest that these arms were being 
-paid for, in part 3t least, ':Jy Saudi oil revenues from _Araraco. In 
October lCl55, TZing Saud went on to sign the military alliance ,vith 
~IoHever, King Saud I s flirtation with Nasser was aiming Saudi Arabi 
on an impossible course. Nasser courted the Saudi monarchy because 
he ,,;rished to get the benefit of its independent prestige and of its 
;noney. fut a fe,., evenings listening to Cairo radio made the 
ultimate objective of his "Arab Socialism" clear to anyone. 49 Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia were supposed to be friends, but somehow this did 
not prevent Egyptian broadcasters from seizing on the tales of Saudi 
extravagance and corruption that came their ~vay. 
In the Spring of 1956, King Saud visited Egypt to confer with 
50 Nasser. However, Nasser had a scheme to bring together Egypt, 
Syria and Saudi Arabia in a grand three-cornered union to dominate 
the ~1iddle East, 51 and King Saud reckoned he was better off inside 
such a grouping than excluded from it. The role Nasser envisaged 
for Saudi Arabia was paymaster to its two more radical partners. 
Nasser had an annoying habi t of calling the produce of the Arabian 
Gulf "Arab Oil", as though the wells of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
Sheikhoms were communal property for him to enjoy of right; and 
though King Saud would not go as far as union with Egypt and Syria, 
he did agree to finance a tripartite alliance and to stand by both 
Egypt and Syria in peace and in war. 52 
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In July 10S(), ~;asser nationalised the Suez Canal, ~vhich ':vas avo·,Tedly 
done in retaliation against the Unit2d States for withdrawing a 
1,1 . rl ~ ~ 53 promise to help Egypt hui ,~ a hig~ ._am at .>\b\·ran. However, 
Nasser's momentous sten threatened the possihility of ~'7ar with the 
l-Jest and certainly that 4m~ of Aramco' s oil shipments together Hith 
75% of Saudi sea supplies, '.vhich passed through' the canal, ,vould be 
.. d 54 cast 1n Jeopar y. 
Although support for Egypt throughout the Arab world all this time 
remained at its highest pitch and, on the surface, virtually 
unanimous, there were some who were hesitant or doubtful. One such 
was King Saud. He was offended because he had not been consulted 
over a major decision taken by someone \'7ho was supposed to be an 
ally - a decision which could well have involved his country in war. 
He, and all leading members of the royal family, felt neglected, and 
this prompted uneasy (but unspoken) suspicions that perhaps this 
neglect reflected their true stature on the international stage. 
They ,vanted reassurance. This is something that the royal family 
and Saudi Arabia are always seeking - to be kept informed, to be 
asked for advice, to be flattered. Thlt, alas, such reassurance is 
something which not all the money in the world can buy.55 
Nasser decided to go to Saudi Arabia on 23rd September 1956. The 
Saudis suggested that he and the King should meet at Dahran rather 
than Riyallih; the choice of the oil capital as the venue would have a 
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symbolic significance. \;asser ,.;elcomed the idea. For the Saudis 
the presence in the kingdom of Nasser, now the principal figure on 
the inten13tional stage, ~'lOuld enhance their prestige. At Nasser's 
suggestion they were to be joined by President Quwatli of Syria. 56 
Although the visit had not been announced in advance, Nasser was met 
by tumultuous popular demonstrations hailing him as the Saviour of 
the Arab world. It \'TaS emharrassing for Nasser because everyone 
knew that the people were there to cheer him, not their V-ing, so he 
made a point of grasping Saud's hand demonstratively. ~fhen Nasser 
arrived in Riyadh, as in Dahran, tens of thousands of spectators 
rushed through the police barriers, desperate to touch the godlike 
figure. The army had to force a passage for Nasser's car along the 
road into the capital, and whenever Nasser appeared in public in the 
course of his brief stay, pandemonium broke loose. 57 A keen 
observer inside King Saud's court reported that in the wake of the 
visit, the King's advisers reversed themselves and, instead of 
supporting the project of a Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi federation that 
Nasser had come to discuss, they determined to destroy him. 58 
In October and November 1956, British, French and Israeli attacked 
Egypt, in response to the nationalization of the Canal. 59 King Saud 
did his duty as a good Arab, he offered Saudi airstrips to Nasser's 
war planes, and he broke off diplomatic relations with Britain and 
France and declared an embargo on oil shipments to them. 60 But at 
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heart, King Saud T..Jas furious with ~Tasser. Saud had had to plead 
Hitb the EfSYPtian leaders for the safety of the pipeline \'7hich 
carried Saudi oil via Syria to the ~''ledi terranean. The closure of 
the Suez Canal and the oil boycott of Britain and France meant that 
the Saudi King had to suffer a 40~ drop in revenues at a time ,vhen 
he was heavily in debt and all this sacrifice ~vas for the greater 
glory of nasser, ~'lhose role as chanmion of the Arabs Has guaranteed 
for a decade by his Suez "victory" over the Israelis and Hestern 
61 powers. 
In January 1956, King Saud joined forces with Egypt in inciting, 
with Arab nationalist propaganda and Saudi gold, massive riots and 
rebellion in Jordan to compel its government to reverse its 
intention to join the Baghdad Pact and force it to break away from 
Britain. Saudi Arabia and Egypt had their way, keeping Jordan out 
of the Pact after causing the downfall of several governments within 
a few weeks and shaking King Hussein's throne. 62 
On 12th January, 1957, Saudi Arabia joined with Egypt and Syria in 
undertaking to pay Jordan £12.5 million annually for a least ten 
years to replace the British subsidy.63 But King Saud was already 
apprehensive about the rapid rise of radical revolutionary Arab 
nationalism led by Nasser and about the increasing Soviet influence 
in the Middle East. 64 But in 1957, during the disturbances in 
Jordan King Saud sent Saudi troops to buttress the power of King 
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rr . ~ d d' -'l • f'" '}T 65 :~,usseln. uau ,_lu It out 0 rlva~ry wltn ,·:asser. 
By t:-le ti.De the .suez Har \va3 over, ;J.ng Saudi and his advisers Ivere 
seriously reconsidering the alliance with Nasser's Egypt. On the 
one hand, the rrashimites threat, which had been the raison d' etre of 
the alliance, seemed to have abated; Iraq \Vas contained and Jordan 
,vas altogether destablized. On the other hand, Nasser had emerged 
as an increasin~ pODular Arab hero, and the association of the Saudi 
government i'7ith him appeared to give license and legitimacy of 
expressions of identification with him among the peoples of Saudi 
Arabia. Moreover, Nasser seemed to have embarked on an ever more 
extreme revolutionary course and to have developed the habit of 
taking drastic decisions without consulting his ostensible allies 
and without regard to the fact of his decisions on them. 66 
After he had wrested political victory from the jaws of military 
defeat in the Suez war, Nasser's appeal to the Arab masses became 
greater than ever, and all restraints on whatever new initiatives he 
67 
chose to take seemed to have collapsed. \fuat course he would 
choose next was not quite clear; but his increased co-operation with 
the Soviets, who had spoken of sending "volunteers" to Egypt and had 
offered to replenish its arsenal destroyed during the war, did not 
bode well. 68 
However, reconsideration of the situation led King Saud in 1957 to 
try to revitalize the A~rican connection as a security asset 
against Nasser, to reverse his relationship ~vith the Hashimite 
monarchs from one of hostility to one of co-operation for the same 
reasoll, and at the same time to handle his relations with Nasser so 
as not to incur his open hostility. For a \·7hile circumstances 
helped King Saud manage this seemingly impossible feat; hut as the 
year wore on, the pretence behind this diplomatic and strategic 
reversal wore off, and Saud and Nasser came to a mortal 
confrontation. 69 
On 30th January, 1957, King Saud began a state visit to the United 
70 States. The Americans invited Saud with the aim to building him 
up as a counterpoise to Nasser in the Arab world. King Saud 
~xplained that if he was to stand as the representative of an 
alternative policy to Nasser's neutralism, the United States must 
provide support in practical and visible terms to the Kingdom. 71 
However, King Saud promised in return to explain the Eisenhower 
Doctrine to the other Arab leaders. 72 
In fact, King Saud never endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine 
unequivocally. He seems to have believed somewhat naively that he 
could persuade Nasser, if not to accept the Doctrine, to remain 
neutral. On his way home Saud stopped in Egypt to brief Nasser 
about his American visit. But Nasser's opposition was relentless. 
He smv the Doctrine, like the Baghdad Pact, as an attempt to 
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perpetuate Hestern domination of the Arabs and dragoon them into 
hostility tmvard the Soviet Union. 73 
On 21st April, 1957, Saudi police uncovered a plot to assassinate 
King Saud. The Saudis accused the Egyptian military attache in 
74 Jeddah for the plot. Nasser dispatched to i:fecca an Egyptian 
religious leader ';-7ho swore dramatically that the Egyptian government 
and the military attache had known nothing about the plot. But King 
Saud was not impressed, and he decided to retaliate. 75 According to 
H. E. Hohammad Riad, Egypt's foreign minister in 1964 and later 
during 1967-1971, the "plot" in actuality W'3S a C.I.A. (Central 
Intelligence Agency) ruse designed to embitter relations between 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Mr. Riad subsequently charged that the 
C.I.A. planned the operation and passed details of the supposed plot 
through Syrian President Quwatli. He believed that, even then, the 
United States wanted to isolate Egypt from the Arab world in order 
to secure Israel's existence. 76 
However, the honeymoon which had existed between Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt came to an end. Political relations between the two countries 
rapidly deteriorated, and in 1957 Nasser launched a violent 
propaganda campaign against the House of Saud. To wit, Nasser began 
supporting an Arab "revolution" that was aimed at the overthrow of 
the "conservative" regimes in the Arab ~yorld and the creation of a 
single Arab nation. To further his goal, particularlY,vis-a-vis 
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Saudi Arabia, Nasser allowed radical and socialist groups such as 
the Arabian Peninsula People's Union (APPU), an anti -.':.audi movef'lent, 
77 to operate from E~JPt. 
On 15th Nay, 1957, King Saud paid a state visit to "Baghdad, the 
centre of pro-lJestern anti-Nasserism in the Arab world, and finally 
made peace with his former Hashimite enemies. 78 Nasser's response 
,-las to launch his immensely powerful propaganda machine against King 
Saud. Ahmd Said, Director of Cairo's Voice of the Arabs and 
possibly the best known figure in the Arab world after Nasser, 
poured out scornful invective. He had abundant material in Saud's 
personal extravagance and the arrogant misbehaviour of some of the 
Saudi princes and shayks. 79 
However, in August 1957, King Saud publicly offered to mediate 
between Syria and Turkey and called on all sides to avoid 
interference in Syria's affairs. tTasser was pleased by his position 
and showed his appreciation by sending to Saudi Arabia another batch 
of his obsolete fighter planes, thus giving renewed expression to 
the military alliance between the two countries.80 
On 1st February 1958, President Nasser and President Shukri al-
Qtnvatli of Syria jointly proclaimed the union of the two countries, 
"the throbbing heart of Arabism", which became knmm as the United 
Arab Republic (U.A.R.). Other Arab countries were invited to 
join. rn !~1e lJ .A. R. invited Saudi I\.r3hia to join, but 'Ung Saud 
0') 
as:':ed for more time to consider. 'J,'. It ~vas clear to Saud that his 
cOlL.'1try \·70uJ.cl lose its independence if it joined the U.A.R., ~vould 
he threatened by the U.A.R. if joined its rival, and Ivould be 
vulnerable and isolated if it did neither. Caught in that dilemma, 
King Saud turned to conspiracy in search for a solution and 
displayed the feverishness and simplemindedness of a desperate 
83 
man. 
King Saud dreamed up a plot of his own, a double pronged attempt to 
subvert Syria and Egypt at the same time, by bribing the Syrian 
intelligence chief, Abdul Hamid Sarraj, to sabotage the union 
between the two countries, and King Saud put £2 million into the 
84 
attempt. On 5th March, 1958, Sarraj revealed to a press 
conference that King Saud had bribed him to carry out a plot aimed 
at foiling the union and arrange for the assassination of President 
Nasser and President QUlyatli as well. However, Saudi Arabia 
formally denied the story.85 
\~ether this charge was true or not, the Arab world believed it, and 
~~sser seized on his chance to launch an all out propaganda assault. 
Every night Cairo Radio exhorted the Arabian people who had cheered 
him in Dahran and Riyadh to rise up against King Saud. 86 However, 
on 25th Narch 1958, King Saud was forced to relinquish his pow'er to 
his brother, Prince Faisal, after the Syrians revealed the alleged 
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plot by King Saud. Paisal was regarded at that time as less pro-
C! d R7 Uester:1 and more pro-Egyptian than Tling uau • 
Faisal spent the second half of 1957 in the United States undergoing 
t " 88 ~ ~ " " t h h h d t th t~vo opera lons. ,le returneQ Vla l:,gYP , ';'1 ere lea spen e 
entire month of January 1958, there, part of it ~vas Nasser's state 
quest. Faisal had several meetings with nasser; his Dublic 
statements, although careful and cautious as was his way, expressed 
support for Nasser's neutralist policies. He certainly conveyed to 
Nasser the impression that he believed Saudi Arabia could live 'with 
the union, and his first actions upon assuming power confirmed that 
impression and distanced himself from Saudi's policies.89 
On 15th August 1958, Faisal went to Cairo for three days discussions 
with Nasser. 90 By the end of the discussions Faisal had agreed to 
denounce the American and British military interventions in Lebanon 
and Jordan as "aggression". He had proclaimed his support for Arab 
nationalism and apparently indicated his \Yillingness to try to get 
Saudi Arabia to join the U.A.R. 91 
Faisal himself was too shrewd not to recognize the long-term dangers 
involved in a strategy that depended so completely on appeasing the 
principal potential opponent. He had subscribed to it at a time of 
stress, when no viable alternative appeared to exist, but he was 
bound to modify it as soon as an opportunity presenteditself. 92 
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Such an opportunity arose in April 1959, ,·,hen Nasser could not let 
_!\bd AI-Krim Qasim' s challenge go unanswered, ,\Then Iraqi jails were 
full of Nasserites, without a drastic 10s8 of prestige. The bitter 
struggle betvleen Nasser and the revolutionary leadership of Iraq 
finally settled into a hostile stalemate. The seemingly 
irresistible tide of Nasser's personal and ideological sway over the 
Arab ,'lOrld had been chec!ced hy ~aghdad' 8 new regime, supported by 
93 
NOSCQ1;Y. But to oppose Qasim effectively Nasser had to adjust his 
stand towards other parties, for which he paid a price. He had to 
mend his relations with the Saudi government in order to seek her 
co-operation in isolating Iraq - within the Arab League - for 
unsympathetic as the Saudi government ~ight be to a fire bank like 
Qasim, she had reason to relish the sight of Nasser in difficulty 
and could not be expected to go out of her way to help him fight 
his battles. 94 
Faisal took advantage of the situation to steer what he called in a 
declaration in October 1958, an "independent" Saudi policy based on 
"neutrality and Arab nationalism".95 The policy continued to keep 
the U.S.A. at arms length and paid obeisance to the prevailing dogma 
of Arab nationalism but regained some room for manoeuvre by 
capitalising on the hostility between Nasser and QaSim. 96 
In 1961, Syria withdrew from the united Arab Republic,97 dealing a 
severe blow to Nasser and his ambitions. Though the union 
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disintegrated before it could threaten Saudi Arabia. By 1962 the 
Har of words between Nasser and the "reactionary" camp reached 
venomous proportions. In January of that year the Egyptian 
newspaper AI Ahram accused King Saud, then convalescing in the 
United States, of plotting a religious, political, and economic 
98 
a t tack upon Egypt. Saudi Arabia's reliance upon the Americans 
became but another item in the propaganda war that continued at 
fever pitch. In April Faisal promised "a fight to the finish" 
against Nasser's propaganda, and in ~1ay Saudi Arabia rejected 
Egypt's Kiswah (Holy Carpet for the Kaaba) and turned back Egyptian 
pilgrims wishing to make the Hajj. In July Nasser charged King Saud 
with paying 25 mllion Saudi riyals to support a conspiracy against 
99 Egypt. 
However, since Syria withdrew from the U.A.R. Nasser began searching 
for a means to regain his lost prestige in the Arab world. lOa The 
North Yemen revolution in 1962 provided such an opportunity. Nasser 
immediately dispatched an expeditionary force into Yemen to help the 
republicans. His ultimate objective, however, was not just Yemen 
but the entire Arabian Peninsula; and Yemen was only a foothold. 10l 
On 1st October 1962, Nasser sent paratroopers and military equipment 
to Yemen, and Egyptian ships began landing at the newly finished 
port of Hodeida shipyard carrying tarn,s, arms, ammunition and staff 
officers.102 The Egyptian intervention in North Yemen .started with 
1 . 1 d 1 ~nn 1":' t' lcli 103 on y two alrp anes an a )out~, '''gyp lan so. ers. 
September 1062, Egyptian ne"lS[)2perS began castigatinf; TU.ng Saud and 
1 • h' b 'f' ..,. 104 ro' D d' "TI t,1reatenlng ,lm a out tne ~ate m'laltlne nlffi. I"alro.ca _10, . lle 
voice of the Arabs", too attacked TU.ng Saud and admonished hLll 
against extending any kind of assistance to the royalist headed by 
Prince Hasan, who had arrived in Yenen via Saudi Arahia fro:J1 New 
York., to fight the republicans. lOS 
In November 1962, the Egyptians dropped arms inside Saudi Arabia, 
hoping that the arms would be found by the anti-Saudi regime and 
used against them. The Saudis claimed that Nasser was planning to 
infiltrate Egyptian soldiers into Saudi Arabia disguised as pilgrims 
on their way to Hecca. But these were disorganized attempts; and 
when Abdulh al-Sallal, the Yemeni revolution leader broadcast 
appeals for a united "Republic of the Arabian Peninsula" the 
Nasserites forced him to stop using ~.,hat they considered too radical 
106 
a slogan. 
On 10th November 1962, a treaty of mutual defence was signed between 
Egypt and the ne'!;., republican regime in North Yemen. This treaty 
subsequently obliged Nasser to increase the number of his troops in 
Yemen to protect the ne~., republic .107 However, King Saud began 
arming the royalists in an attempt to stymie the Egyptian presence 
in Yemen. As a result of Saudi involvement in Yemen two Saudi 
pilots defected to Egypt with their planes, and Egyptian forces were 
subsequently increased in Yemen. IO? Egyptian intelligence, \'7hich 
atthe time Tms good on Saudi Arabia, essentially confirmed that the 
defection of the Saudi pilots had caused Kin;:s Saud to suffer a 
10Q 
nervous breakdown for fear of a plot. '-
?gypt and Saudi Arabia used the Jeddah ~iilitary Pact of 1956,110 to 
justify their intervention in Yemen in 1962. Article 'rIvo is the 
most significant one and states: 
The contracting states consider any armed aggression 
committed against any state thereof or against their 
forces as an aggression against them. Therefore, 
and in implementation of the legitimate individual 
and collective right for the defence of their entity, 
each of them is bound to hasten to the assistance of 
the state against whom aggression is committed and to 
adopt forthwith all measures and to use all measures 
at its disposal, including the use of its armed 
forces, in order to repel aggression and to restore 
. d III securlty an peace. 
In an attempt to interdict the flow of money and war material to the 
royalists, on 15th November 1962, Nasser ordered U.A.R. air strikes 
against the Saudi border towns of Najran and Jizan which were 
serving as points of supply for the Yemen royalists.112 Also, in 
January 1963 the U.A.R. planes bombed Saudi positions along the 
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1 d f · , . I' t ' 113 )or er area rom WhlCh roya lS S were operatlng. As a result of 
the U.A.R. attack on Abha in the spring of 1963, thirty six patients 
inside an Abha hospital were ldlled.114 These bombardments of Saudi 
territory added a neloJ' and dangerous element to the conflict. 
However, Saudi Arabia's forces were incapable of defending Saudi 
territory against the U.A.R. attacks during that time. 11S 
1 foreover , ?Tasser embraced the old Tl:gyptian belief in -r.:gynt' s 
centrality to the region around it and its supremacy and its urge to 
pursue its destiny in places such as the Sudan, Syria, and the 
Arabian Peninsula. Consequently, that kind of belief alanned Saudi 
Arabia's leaders, whose forefathers had been driven out of the 
Arabian Peninsula in the early 19th century by Mohammad Ali and his 
son Ibrahim. 116 The military attacks and media campaigns against 
Saudi Arabia continued throughout 1962 and early 1963. Against 
these developments, Saudi Arabia had no choice but to break off 
diplomatic relations I·nth Egypt in November 1962, and to prepare to 
defend its southern borders. II? 
However, the Egyptian intervention and the situation in Yemen in 
1962 and 1963 were viewed seriously and intolerable by the Kingdom. 
Saudi Arabia was left Ivith no alternative but to defend itself 
against Nasser and his attacks. Accordingly in 1963, in the face of 
the Egyptian assault, Faisal delivered three speeches in main Saudi 
cities, Riyadh, Dammam and Taif, for general mobilisation. For 
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exaople, ':1e made his attitude clear in a speech in Riyadh: 
"Our Country", he said, "is by nature a peaceful 
country, but it does not accept injustice". 
Egypt's rulers declared that they had sent their 
expeditions to fight in Yemen to threaten the 
very existence of this country, to conquer it 
and destroy it. lie were, therefore, driven into 
a position where we had no alternative but to 
defend ourselves. Every state and every country 
in the world is entitled to self-defence. He 
concluded by telling his audience: "You are 
responsible for everything in the country. The 
government is nothing but a representative 
expressing your will, your feelings and your 
wishes" .118 
Beyond question, the situation in Yemen had posed serious problems 
for Nasser. His decision to attack Saudi borders meant that for the 
first time in ten years as Egypt's President he w'Ould initiate 
offensive military action against an Arab state. He justified his 
break "tvith tradition on the grounds that he was helping the 
revolutionaries in Yemen. Nevertheless, Egypt's intervention in 
Yemen and its attacks on Saudi Arabian borders alarmed many Arab 
states, particularly Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In response, these 
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countries expressed their intention to prevent Nasser from e:'\.rpanding 
his authority throughout the region. The Syrians and the Jordanians 
interpreted Nasser's move into Yemen as the first step in taldng 
over Saudi Arabia. Further, they smT the threat to Saudi Arabia as 
presenting a threat to Syria and Jordan. 119 
Saudi's determination to ra~ove the Egyptians from Yemen intensified 
after Faisal finally took power from his brother Saud in November 
1964. lZing Faisal evolved a two-point strategy to deal with the 
Egyptian-Yemeni threats. First, he decided to avoid direct Saudi 
military intervention at all costs. Instead, he chose to fight the 
Egyptian and republicans by proxy, through providing all possible 
support to the royalists and to any tribes that could be bought. 
Faisal realized that the royalists could not defeat the Egyptian 
forces decisively and that his strategy could at best result in a 
long war of attrition, stalemate, and negotiations; but he also 
realized that he had no other choice. The Saudi armed forces, even 
with a Jordanian contribution, were no match for the Egyptians, and 
their loyalty \Vas questionable. 120 llere they to suffer a serious 
defeat, the consequences could be fatal. Horeover, intervention 
would give the Egyptians an excuse to extend the war to Saudi Arabia 
itself and thus encourage internal uprisings, while placing the 
regime in an unfavourable position to obtain assistance from 
friendly outside powers. Second, now that the Nasserite threat was 
so close to home, Faisal decided to drop all pretence of non-
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alignment and incur the liability of seeldng the help of the United 
States and Britain. Ironically, he had more success uith the 
latter, ",vith Hhich Saudi Arabia had broken diplomatic relations in 
1956, than ~"ith the United States, whose friendship had been taKen 
h 1 f d 121 ,~een ta,<:en _or grante • 
Indeed, the U .lI. R. attacks on the Saudi border tmms ':{ere iVor~dng 
against Nasser and undoubtedly in favour of Saudi Arabia in terms of 
ld .. 122 \Vor OplnlOn. However, Nasser's real motives from these attacks 
were to create a state of unrest within Saudi Arabia and to force 
Riyadh to stop its aid to the royalists. 123 
Nonetheless, Egyptians and Saudi involvement in North Yemen enlarged 
the conflict from a local struggle to regional dilemma. Instead of 
being restricted to a local struggle between royalists and 
republicans, the North Yemeni civil war thus became an international 
military and ideological conflict in which the Egyptian military 
effort on the republican side was approved by the radical socialist 
Arab regimes with the Soviet Union and China, while Saudi aid in 
funds and arms to the royalists was supported and approved by the 
Arab monarc~ies, Britain and the United States.124 
In fact, Nasser's intervention in North Yemen was a miscalculation, 
as he had anticipated an easy victory. Faced with strong resistance 
from the ex-Imam and his supporters, Nasser was obliged. to increase 
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t:te :1umber of his troops eV2ry day.125 
The First Saudi-Egyptian efforts to find a solution for the ':emeni 
crisis occurred in February 196L+ when two repr,3sentatives from Iraq 
d "l' . d' R' d' 120 an ~_gerla arrlve ln, lya n. TIlere, in a number of meetings 
"7ith Faisal, they offered to :rJ.ediat2 between Saudi }\rabia and Egypt. 
Faisal apnreciated their concer71 and accepted their role, as 'veIl as 
tje int'2nded arrival of .::l11 Egyptian delegation to discuss the Yemeni 
conflict. Consequently, in Harch 1964, a U.A.R. mission headed by 
Vice President Abdul-Hakim Arnir visited Riyadh and held talks Ivith 
F · I 127 alsa • The two sides agreed on Harch 3rd, 1964, to the 
. f di 1 . I" h . . 128 d restoratlon 0 p omatlc re atlons oetween t elr countrles, an 
the Egyptians conceded the principle that it was for the Yemenis to 
determine the future of their country, but Faisal nevertheless put 
off further negotiations to a meeting between himself and Nasser 
scheduled for t"l0 months later, in late April or early May.129 
In April 1964, Nasser paid his first visit to North Yemen130 in 
order to prepare a new Egyptian offensive. The aim of this campaign 
,vas not to finish the royalists, but to inflict a defeat on them 
that would strengthen Nasser's bargaining position at the Second 
l31 Arab Summit Conference, scheduled for September of that year. 
The second attempt between Saudi Arabia and Egypt to find a solution 
for the Yemeni conflict materialized during the Second Arab Summit 
• c:: b lOL / . /'11 .J' '" 132 In . Jeptef'1 er .. iH In. exanu.rla, L',gypt. Paisal met wit~ Nasser 
f" ' f'" • J • 1 v . ,. 133 TIl 1 d 
-,-or t:1'2 .1..lrS t tJJne to CllSCUSS t.le .i.emenl crlS1S. .Lc e t,vo ea ers 
decided to co-operate "to help the people of Yemen tm-mrds 
stahility, security and freedom".134 Specifically agreed on a 
seven-month cease-fire during ~"hich 1i:gyptian troops would withdraw 
gradually and Saudi Arabia \"ould halt its aid, and they pledged 
themselves to create a Yemeni coalition government that would 
include royalists as well as republicans but exclude both President 
135 Abdulh al-Sallal and Imam al-Badar • The significance of this 
agreement was that Egypt for the first time acl<nowledged the 
political existence of the royalists.136 
Under pressure from Nasser and Faisal, royalists and republicans met 
on 30th October 1964, at Erkw'it in the Sudan. There the sides 
agreed on a cease-fire would come into force on 5th November, and 
planned a National Congress in Haradh, Yemen, on 23rd November of 
that year to be attended by one hundred and sixty nine tribal, 
religious and military leaders to realize the agreement fully.137 
However, the National Congress did not meet as scheduled. Instead 
the cease-fire broke down and fighting resumed, with the Egyptian's 
bombing royalist positions in late November 1964, and the royalists 
resuming ground operations shortly thereafter. Given the opposition 
of Sa1lal and the Imam to the Alexandria agreement, it is not 
difficult to see why the cease-fire did not hold.138 
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The Eg'.1Ptian I s "ere paying a lnr,<se price for the Har in Yemen and it 
had :)ecome clear to them that their original ohjectives I"ere 
inaccessible. They had failed to crush the royalists; the Saudis 
l>7ere secure; and ,vith the increasing losses in the North Yemen war 
had becoMe very unpopular in Egypt itself, uhere it ,vas seen as a 
major cause of the economic difficulties the country faced in the 
, r1 l(V() I 139 ~_l. 0, s. And the royalist l'1ilitary succeSS2S in the Sll""'1ner of 
1965 were instrumental in convincing the Egyptians to search for nel-7 
ways to extricate themselves from North Yemen. As a consequence, on 
22nd August 1965, Nasser flew to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia and met 'ivith 
King Faisal in an attempt to reach a peace settlement on the Yemeni 
. . 140 
crlS1S. 
Nasser and Faisal agreed on another cease-fire date and signed the 
well-known Jeddah agreement on 24th August, 1965.141 However, the 
Jeddah agreement made plain a philosophical and fundamental 
disagreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Nasser insisted on the 
retention of the ~yords "Republic of Yemen", and Faisal held that the 
term must be eliminated in favour of the "State of Yemen". No one 
even seemed to consider what the Yemenis might think, except to 
assume that whatever Nasser and Faisal agreed upon would be 
acceptable to republicans and royalists. It was the Yemenis, 
however, who were the first to undercut the Jeddah agreement. 142 
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The ["farad Conference Has held on 23rd November 1965, in accordance 
T07ith the Jeddah agreement, and hoth Saudi and Egyptian 
143 
representatives attended the conference. But the conference was 
soon deadlocked over tIm issues. The Saudi representative and the 
royalists wanted the interim regime to be titled "the Islamic State 
of Yemen", as a means of postponing the issue of monarchy or 
repuhlic until the plehiscite, the w:gyntian representative and 
republicans insisted on maintaining the title "Republic". Nore 
than this, the Egyptians and the republicans were unwilling to 
concede the possibility that members of the deposed Imam's family 
should hold political office in any capacity, Ivhich again in Saudis 
d l ' t ' d f h' 144 an roya 1.S eyes was a pre-JU gement 0 t e 1.ssue. 
It could not be known for certain to what extent, if any, the 
Egyptians and Saudis were responsible for the intransigence of their 
Yemeni clients. It might be surmised that both Nasser and Faisal 
were only trying to buy a little time at Jeddah. Nasser, in order 
to avert a debate on Yemen at the ~~pending Summit meeting in 
Casablanca and to facilitate the resumption of American surplus -
food deliveries - Faisal, to avoid an Egyptian attack on his 
territory while he went shopping for stronger Western diplomatic and 
military support (he concluded a deal for $500 million worth of 
British and American air defence equipment just as the Haradh 
Conference was breaking down) .145 
In 0ecember 1065, the Haradh taH:s '(;Jere adjourned until 20th 
Ii'ebruary, but in fact they ~ever resumed. "']y ;'\arch, ~iasser lIas 
cieclaring that ~lis army was prepared to remain indefinitely in north 
Yemen, and rene'iving his threats to attac;<. royalist bases inside 
C' " • • 146 oauul terrltory. 
-q0\'7ever, ~Tasser fel textremely provoked by FaisEll' s caP1paiQJ1 on 
behalf of an "Islamic Pact", ",hich he began with successful visits 
to Iran in December 1965 and Jordan in January 1966, to enlist their 
rulers' support.147 Faisal delivered a speech in the Iranian Majlis 
(Parliament) denouncing Arab socialism, communism, and any alien 
ideology to "Islam" in the Biddle East. Although he did not mention 
148 Nasser by name, everyone knew that Nasser was his target. 
Faisal's visit to Iran angered Nasser because the Shah of Iran had 
been at odds with Nasser for several years.149 The Shah had 
criticized Nazzer's intervention in Yemen and had occasionally 
shipped arms and money to the royalists. Nasser saw in Faisal's 
project the "Islamic Pact", another attempt inspired by Britain and 
the United states,150 similar to the "Baghdad Pact", and to the 
"Eisenhower Doctrine", to organize an alliance against him and his 
policies, by the Saudi regime under the banner of the "Islamic 
Pact".151 The creation of the Pact refined the ideological conflict 
between the traditionalism and the modernity. 
In February 1966, Nasser made one of those dramatic speeches152 that 
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punctuated his career, in \'lhich he virtually tore up the "Jeddah 
agreement", derided [.'3.isal's "Islamic Pact" as a tool of 
iruperialism, and charged him with supporting a plot by the Egyptian 
Uuslim Brethren to overthrow the Egyptian government .153 By c .. rarch 
1966, Nasser introduced his so-called "long breath policy", which 
resulted in increasing his troops from fifteen thousand in October 
1962 to seventy thousand in December 1966.154 He declared his 
determination to stay in Yemen "even five more years" if necessary 
to protect the republican regime from the reactionaries, Faisal and 
the royalists. 155 
Faisal's response was to re-double his efforts along the already 
established lines. He continued to pursue his "Islamic Pact" 
project by travelling to Kuwait, Pakistan, Turkey, Libya, Norocco, 
Tunisia, Hali, Guinea and other places between April and September 
1966 in search of supporters.156 The purpose of Faisal in calling 
for such an "Islamic conference" was mainly to attack Arab socialism 
and the revolutionary regimes in Arab countries.1S7 
However, Faisal's challenge to Nasser was genuine and powerful as he 
was the acknowledged leader of anti-Nasser elements. But his 
diplomatic achievements were limited because, except for Iran and 
Jordan, the key states in his potential Islamic front - Pakistan, 
Turkey, and Sudan - declined to commit themselves to anti-Egyptian 
policy, and his proposal for a summit meeting of Hoslem Heads of 
Q 'Ci" l b' ",1St; ,~tat2 In ",aUOl lira la came to not,nnSj. 
To add to Faisal's discomfiture, the Egyptians ptilled off a minor 
dirylomatic coup on V3th "C'.ecemner 1966, by producing in Cairo none 
other than Fai.sal' s deposed l)rother Saud. T':le former king, 
castigated in his time by the Cairo press and radio as the 
inc3.rnation of ~enig'1ted reaction, had turned dmm an invitntion to 
come home to retire in Arabia and preferred to settle in t~le 
, 1 f h Ar b '1' 1 t' 159 caplta 0 tie a socla 1st revo u lone 
Nasser, busy in the Yemen left the Egyptian sky defenceless and open 
to the frequent raids by the Israeli Air Force. Riyadh radio 
endlessly hammered home the question : is it advisable to fight in 
the Y~~en whilst threats are coming from Israel? Therefore, Faisa1 
sent a message to Nasser at the end of 1966, 
"Dear Nasser, you must know that the enemy is 
lying in wait for us. Your policy, and that 
of your collaborators, is disastrous to our 
common ~velfare. You have allowed the atheist 
forces to establish themselves on Arab 
territory dear to all of us. Thus giving 
Israel justification to enter our countries. 
I have learned that the more the Soviets give 
you munitions, the more the .~ericans give to 
- 477 -
the Israelis. It could be asked if you are 
preparing Israel's defences for war ag3.inst 
your hrother countries? fly duty is to remnd 
you that I give my support to the disapprobation 
shmm to you by the Arab countries ~1ereafter" .160 
nasser's reply '-laS to order a ne~'7 offensive in the Yenen in T"ebruary 
1967, with its corollary, the systematic bombing of Saudi territory. 
But, aided by supplies from Faisal, the royalists repulsed the 
Egyptian a~editionary force, and pushed them back as far as the 
161 gates of Sanaa. 
On 24th March 1967, Nasser ordered another offensive on the 
1 · d . fill 162 roya lSts an lt was success • The Egyptian's regained 
territories lost to the royalists in February. They pulled off 
another diplomatic coup on 30th Harch, by producing the former King 
Saud, this time not in Cairo, but in Yemen. The Egyptians took the 
former king for a tour around the territories they had just regained 
from the royalists. The former King Saud held a press conference in 
Yemen, and he condemned his brother King Faisal's intervention in 
Yemen.163 
The massive defeat of the combined forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan 
on 6th June 1967, by Israel shifted the attention of Egyptian policy 
decision makers from Yemen. It was the prelude to a permanent 
.:1iseClga,a,ement of Sg;r::>tian forces from Yer1en. ~,TO loo3er l.]as ideology 
t~e ::11 iG1port3Clt factor in the conflict bet~'7een E,gypt and Saudi 
Arabia. The immediate need of Egypt ':vas the restoration of its amy 
and its shattered economy in the Hake of the defeat .164 
On 29th AU£$ust 1967, the Arab Swnmit took place in '(hartoum ~vith 
'Tasser and "<'aisal in attenc1&ice. On 30tlt ,:\ugust of t:lat year 
Nassera and Faisal met in Hohomed A. Hahgoub's house (President of 
the Sudan) to discuss the "Yemen Peace Plan".165 On that night 
166 Nasser and Faisal agreed on settling the Yemen problem. Not only 
was settling the Yemen problem agreed upon by the two leaders, but 
Saudi Arabia joined with Kuwait and Libya in providing Egypt, Syria 
and Jordan substantial annual financial support to help them recover 
167 from the Six Day ~'lar. 
It was very unfortunate, however, that the Yemeni Civil Har broke 
out on 26th September 1962 (the first anniversary of the break up of 
the union between Egypt and Syria), and that was a good opportunity 
to teach King Saud a lesson. He had financed the break up of the 
union and led the campaign agains t Egypt, ,,'hile his country had 
common borders with the Yemen. So when the Presidential Council met 
in Cairo to consider the Yemeni request for assistance, Anwar a1-
Sadat \Vas the first to support it. He convinced the Council of the 
necessity of supporting the Yemeni revolution, and they did so.168 
'!:he ;--'Tasserites oefend 'Jasser' s position by holding Sadat responsible 
for S~1Pts intervention in Yemen. 
~-101'7ever, ~Tasser' s r:ri.litary support for the republicans against the 
royalists in the Yemeni war should go dOlm in history as his 
greatest blunder, apart from the financial burdens which it imposed 
on the Egyptian c:!conomy, and the shedding of Arab hlood.169 
For the Royal House of Saud, as well as for Nasser, the Yemen 
conflict had become a matter of Sharaf - a type of honour highly 
important to the Arabs. Thus, neither Faisal nor Nasser wanted to 
make the first move towards a disengagement from the Yemen Civil 
War. Although Nasser was reportedly anxious to withdraw his troops 
from Yemen, he could not allow the Sallal government to fall after 
having committed his prestige to its continued existence. As for 
Faisal, he was convinced that Nasser's intervention in Yemen was 
aimed ultimately at the overthrow of the House of Saud. And he 
correctly surmised that Nasser's Yemen adventure had become a severe 
financial and military drain on the U.A.R., therefore, Faisal was 
disinclined to make any propitiatory moves which might extricate his 
chief Arab adversary from a quagmire. 
Fol101ving the 1967 war, Saudi foreign diplomacy was very much less 
active and King Faisal no longer attempted to take any strong lead 
in the Arab \vorld. He refused to agree to the holding of a further 
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Arao SUlTh'Tlit {eeting on tlle .'.?;rounds that this should a1;vai t the 
outcome of the :nission of Dr. r.u.T1nar Ja.rring, the TnT Special Envoy. 
17n ilis relations with Egypt were correct but cool. . 
HO"7ever, ;';asser declared in ~~arch 1969 a "war of attrition" against 
Israel designed to force it to renounce its 1967 conquests on his 
171 teITls. Tbe"7ar ;(Tent on 'lTltil !\ugust 1 fl70. Tie callerl upon the 
Soviets for further assistance to recover and ~<:eep going, and the 
latter responded positively and appeared to entrench themselves 
deeper and deeper in the country. By the first months of 1970, 
h h d S · d' . E 172 A t ere were some seventeen t ousan OVle t a Vlsers ln gypt. t 
the time, however, it looked to most observers, and certainly to 
Riyadh, as though the Soviets were well on their way toward turning 
Egypt into a dependent proxy if not a satellite. This apparent 
entrenchment, suggested to P~yadh a systematic Soviet encirclement 
and subduing of Saudi Arabia. 
The war of attrition against Israel ,vent a long way toward restoring 
Nasser's prestige and the credibility of the Arab nationalist cause 
that he led after the setbacks they suffered in the 1967 defeat. 173 
This became apparent when, in Hay 1969, military officers headed by 
Colonel Jaafer al-Nirneiri overthrew the conservative regime in the 
Sudan, proclaimed its adherence to Arab socialism, and moved the 
Sudan toward co-operation with Egypt and the Soviet Union.174 Four 
,nonths later, in September 1')6() , :mother Military coup, ':"leaded by 
Colonel i!ualTnar al-0acldafi, overthrew Libya's ;Zing Idris al-S.::mussi, 
oroclairning the ne,v regime' s ad.~erence to Arah nationalism, and 
offered to merge Lihya with Egypt. 175 niyad..~' S 3IL'<:iety in the face 
of this resurgence of revolutionary pan-Arabism and Arab-Socialism 
'..las particularly active because in the months bet\veen the Sudanese 
and Libyan coups TUyadh uncovered and suppressed similar coup 
attempts in the ~Cingdom, involving a large number of senior military 
officers and civilians, some with Egyptian intelligence 
. 176 
connectl0ns. 
Against that formidable combination of dangers there was not much 
that Faisal could do on his mm initiative. One of the things he 
tried was to revive his pet project from the early 19nO's of an 
"Islamic Pact" as a means to COl.IDter the resurgent Arab socialism 
and Arab radical trends.177 Taking advantage of an incident in 
which a mentally deranged Australian set fire to the .H Aqsa Hosque 
in Jerusalem, Faisal took the lead in arranging an Islamic Summit at 
Rabat, Morocco in September 1969 to consider a Muslim response. Ali 
Sabry led the Egyptian delegation because Nasser could not stomach 
sitting dOlm with Faisal and other reactionaries leaders .178 
From the first session onward, the summit polarized into the 
"traditional" and "progressive" camps, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
Turkey and some African countries in the former, and the rest, led 
- !;'H -
l)y !\%y"?t a:1d A19;:~ria, in the second. /\,1 ,\qsa ~losque itself, the 
oste:1sil)l~ r2ason for the sum:m.t, -;o!aS !larclly "1entione1. Put the 
su-nmit, \vith its squabbles, bitterness and divisions, did much to 
persuade Paisal t:1.at his idea of Arah dominance throughout "Is1a1'1" 
,>JaS not sound. This was the major outcome of the affair, laying the 
foundations for Saudi k~3bia's future role in inter-Arab politics 
and Ti'aisal's co-operation '<lith :Tasser ani );asser's successor .179 
In December 1969, Faisal paid a t~'70-day visit to Cairo. 180 1Jith 
friendship and amity such a nei" concept between Paisal and Nasser, 
it was inevitable that some old points of argument should remain, 
but the two leaders got on better than they had expected, and in 
effect decided to respect each other's point of view. A communique 
issued at the end of the meeting said they agreed on "the broad 
lines of Islamic and Arab solidarity for the confrontation i<7ith 
Israel". Hore practically, some old disputes beti<7een the two 
countries, such as settlement of claims by Saudi Arabia for property 
of its nationals seized in Egypt, were amicably agreed. The 
meeting, the first between Faisal and Nasser since the 1967 Khartoum 
Summit, marked the definitive rapprochement of the leaders of the 
Arab world. lEn 
Thus, at the December 1969 Arab Summit, again being held in Rabat, 
Nasser surprised Faisal, with whom he had ostensibly co-ordinated 
positions a few days before, by making an impassioned speech calling 
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UDon the Arabs to close ranks in their struggle against Israel, and 
concluded <.;rith a tacit oemand that Sauoi Arabia and other Arab oil 
producing countries confront the United States and the T·Test by using 
t:1eir oil as a potential \.;reapon. 
However, ~asser hLr:1self walked out of one session, not over any 
sin.<1le ;Joint, but oec2use he felt that the rliscussion ~'73S getting 
nowhere, a view which later proved absolutely accurate. The failure 
of the summit was due at least partially to Saudi Arahia I s refusal 
to increase its financial support for the Arab countries directly 
confronting Israel by the amollilt these countries desired. 
However,the encounter at the Rabat Summit showed that President 
Nasser had recovered much of his old punch and willingness and was 
prepared to strike surprise blows at Saudi Arabia were they could 
hurt most.182 
On 15th September 1970, King Hussein unleashed his Bedouins army 
against the Fedayeen (the PLO guerrillas) in Jordan. The fedayeen 
defended themselves, the battle raged for several days, but in vain. 
They had been taken too much by surprise, and could not hold out 
against the entire army. That massacre today goes under the name of 
Black September.183 
While the fighting was still going on, Nasser had called a rump Arab 
Summit in Cairo to deal with the crisis,184 and Faisaldiscovered 
that for onC2 :1i3 interest coincided ~-7ith t"1at of the Egyptian 
12ader. ?Tasser and Ti'aisal \vant2d the PLO disciplined and cut down 
to size ,'lithout appearing to sanction all of Hussein's actions, and 
hoth therefore pushed for a cease-fire and nediation ~Jithout 
pressim; Hussein too hard to cOrlply and ;;rrthout punishing him as 
h A b 1 ~ rl eli 185 ot. er ,lIa ea""ers ~vere ueman ng. 
• I 18~ On 2Gb. SeDtenber 10 70, President ~asser (heel of a he::.rt attacc. 
This event removed from the scene a formidable adversary and the 
foremost leader of pan-Arabism and Arab-Socialism.1R7 
Riyadh, always suspicious of Nasser, was pleased that his successor 
was Anwar al-Sada, one of the few top Egyptian officials whom the 
Saudis had cultivated over the years and in whom they had some 
confidence. IS8 Above all, they believed him to be much less pro-
Soviet than Nasser. Anwar al-Sadat, someone Riyadh preferred to 
Nasser, even though "Faisal held Sadat personally responsible for 
the Yemen Crisis" .189 
For Sadat, the ultimate constraint was the unavailability of 
resources to pursue an active Arab foreign policy and to compete 
with countries with immense financial resources such as Saud 
Arabia. 190 This view was reinforced in early 1970 by his desire to 
develop a broad Arab consensus against Israel in preparation for the 
war. Consequently, Egypt followed a policy of coexistence with 
oti1er Ara l) regilles, ~ri:larily those that had oil wealth and 
, d t k • 191 nappene" 0 ue conservatlve. Once again Egyptian goals began to 
coincide fairly closely ,·lith Saudi objectives, and the t'im states 
found themselves increasingly on the same side in inter-Arab 
. 192 disputes. 
In nove!11her 1970, shortly after !'Tasser's death, Faisal sent his 
brother-in-law, chief of Saudi intelligence, and confidant, Kamla 
Adham, on a confidential mission to explore the possibility of 
anunderstanding with new President Sadat. Among other things, Adham 
had stressed to Sadat Riyadh's concern over the extent of the Soviet 
presence and influence in Egypt and pointed out hmv that factor also 
caused the Americans to associate themselves with Israel much more 
strongly than they would liKe. Sadat replied that he needed the 
Soviets as long as he faced the probability of war with Israel.193 
Having sensed direct danger in 1970, and perceiving new 
opportunities after Nasser's death, Riyadh tried under King Faisal 
to use its influence to we&~en the Soviet influence in the ~tidd1e 
East. 194 PErly in 1971, Sadat put do'iVn a challenge from a pro-
Soviet faction headed by Ali Sabry, an act that further convinced 
Faisal that Sadat '\vas the best person to back in Egypt .195 
However, on 19th June 1971, Faisal began a week long visit to Egypt 
in which he accomplished at least t'ivO things : he secured Egypt's 
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endorsement of the Saudi-Iranian understanding on the Arabian Gulf, 
and he helped from the joint Saudi-Egyptian mission to mediate the 
remaining conflict amoung King Hussein and the PLO.196 
One story relates that President Richard Nixon urged Faisal in mid-
June 1972 to pressure Sadat to get rid of the Soviets as a 
precondition to an active U.S. role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.197 
However, Faisal's cultivation of the connection with Sadat was 
finally vindicated when on 8th July 1972, Sadat suddenly ordered the 
Soviet advisers and military personnel, by then numbering 21,000, to 
leave the country within ten days.198 Fortunately for the Saudis, 
just as they began the game of wooing Egypt towards centrist 
position, Saudi oil revenues were rapidly increasing. This made 
Saudi Arabia a much sought after friend in the Arab world. After 
Sadat ousted the Soviets from Egypt, Riyadh was delighted and was 
more than willing to help Egypt economically. 199 
President Sadat visited Riyadh in August 1973, to inform Faisal of 
the exact time of the Egyptian-Syrian attack against Israeli troops 
on 6th October 1973, and to enlist his support and co-operation. 
Faisal was the only person trusted by Sadat and asked about the 
attack on Israel. Faisal went along with Sadat' s decision, agreed 
to contribute $500 million to Egypt's war chest, and promised to 
weigh in by using the oil weapon~OO According to Mohammad Heikal, 
who reported that promise, Faisal added: "But give us· time, we do 
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not want to use oil as a weapon in a battle which goes on for two or 
three days and then stops. He want to see a battle which goes on 
for a long enough time for world opinion to be mobilized". 201 
On 6th October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched simultaneous surprise 
attacks, beginning what came to be known as the Yom Kippur War. 202 
On 20th October 1973, the Saudis declared an embargo on all oil 
shipments to the United States and the Netherlands.203 
The Arabs saw the war as a victory, and the Saudis took credit for 
having played an essential part in it. Henceforth they would not be 
allowed to remain on the sidelines and plead that the oil weapon was 
a two-edged sword that should never be wielded. 204 
After the October war the Riyadh-Cairo axis (based on a trade-off 
between Egyptian muscle and Saudi money) aimed to discourage any 
revolutionary ideology or "practices subversive of the status 
quo ... 20S 
The axis acquired military teeth through the official formation of 
the Arab military armaments organization (AMIO), founded in 1975 as 
a joint venture by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, 
and Qater. AMIO was endowed with lOOre than $1.4 billion in an 
effort to combine oil money with Egypt's skilled labour force. By 
1978 the groundwork was laid for the establishment of a basic Arab 
I . 
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defence industry located mainly in Egypt. 206 
If the 1973 war marked the high point of Saudi co-operation with 
Egypt that did not last for 10ng. 207 Sadat was soon moving on his 
way toward peace with Israel, leaving the Arab states. In the 
1970's economic factors played a crucial role in the determination 
of Egypt's foreign policy objectives. Sadat's decision to visit 
. Israel ~yas largely motivated by economic considerations, the 
reduction of defence expenditures (37% of the GNP in 1977), the 
encouragement of foreign private capital, and the need for more U.S. 
aid. Even before this step, Sadat' s Arab policy and his forging of 
a Cairo-Riyadh alliance had also been predicted on expected economic 
gains. 208 
On 19th November 1977, Anwar al-Sadat made his historic visit to 
Jerusalem and addressed the Israeli Knesset as a first step in an 
attempt to break the impasse that left the Arab-Israeli conflict 
unresolved for decades. 209 
Saudi Arabia viewed Sadat's initiative as doubly negative: for 
being harmful to the country's inter-Arab standing, and for calling 
into question the traditional Saudi attitude toward Israel. On the 
first count, Saudi pique was caused by Sadat' s failure to consult it 
in advance, and was heightened by his concealment during a visit to 
Riyadh on 2nd and 3rd November 1977, of the plan he had already 
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evolved. t1Jre seriously, on the second count, Sadat had upset the 
delicate balance in Saudi Arabia's policy on the conflict~10 For 
these reasons the basic Saudi attitude to Sadat's initiative was 
negative, a reaction reinforced by traditional Saudi hostility 
(coloured by concepts of Hahhabi Islam) towards Israel. 
A statement issued by the Royal Court as early as 18th November 1977 
(before Sadat's arrival in Jerusalem) asserted that because of 
"attitudes with uncertain results not in hannony with the general 
Arab situation ••• the Arab cause has at the present time passed 
through a different phase". 211 
However, the reactions of Arab states to the visit differed 
markedly. Morocco, Sudan, Somalia, and <Allan supported the move, 
Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, and the PLO condemned it 
in a meeting they held in Tripoli in December 1977. Sadat responded 
by severing diplomatic relations with the five Arab states. In the 
middle, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Arab Gulf states were neutral, 
giving Sadat the benefit of the doubt. Relations between Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt were not affected by the visit to Israel. 212 
Indeed, Saudi Arabia agreed to represent Egyptian interests in Iraq, 
Syria and South Yemen after the severing of diplomatic relations. 213 
An important indication of Saudi Arabia's and the Arab Gulf States' 
interest in the maintenance of Sadat' s regime was the fact that 
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financial aid to Egypt was neither suspended nor, as far as we know, 
cut back. Reports to the contrary were quickly denied by official 
quarters. Moreover, Saudi and Kuwaiti deposits in Egypt's Central 
Bank were not withdrawn as scheduled in order not to aggravate that 
country's balance of payment problems. The Gulf Organization for 
the Development of Egypt, established in 1976 by Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, continued to function 
as before. So did the Arab Military Industries Organization, formed 
in 1975 by Saudi Arabia, Qater, and the United Arab Emirates. 
Following a meeting of its Higher Committee in Abu Dhabi on 21st 
February 1978, the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, expressly 
ruled out the possibility that "Arab differences" could affect the 
Or . ., . it' 214 gan1Zat10n s act1v 1es. 
On 26th July 1978, Crown Prince Fahd and his Foreign Minister, 
Prince Saud, arrived in Alexandria for t~.,o days of talks with 
Sadat. 215 Fahd reported to the Cabinet that he had come back with 
"tangible facts", that Sadat would "close the Suez Canal to Tel 
Aviv" and "open it to the Arab Capitals", and he also added 
"adherence to not signing a separate peace with Israel".216 On 8th 
August 1978, Sadat announced that he would attend the Camp David 
Summit together with the Israeli Prime Minster, Saudi Arabia's 
effort collapsed.217 
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Despite Saudi Arabia's dispute with Egypt over its policy toward 
Israel, there was active co-operation between them concerning Soviet 
penetration into the Horn of Africa and Black Africa. Apparently, 
it was Riyadh that initiated and financed the Egyptian military aid 
to Somalia and Chad. Saudia Arabia and Egypt held close 
consultations on the future of Eritrea, on the events in Zaire, and 
on the strengthening of the Sudanese regime. Z18 They also worked 
together in considering the political repercussion of developments 
in South and North Yemen in June 1978. Saudi economic aid was not 
used as a lever against Egypt. Nor did political differences affect 
the situation of Egyptians working in Saudi Arabia who were 
estimated to number 500,000 in 1978. Egypt opened a special office 
in Riyadh to look after their interests. Sadat said on several 
occasions that Saudi Arabia had committed itself to financing 
Egypt's five-years military plan. A minor diplomatic incident was 
created when the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Butrus 
Ghali, made an ill-advised statement to the Assembly's Foreign 
Affairs Committee about the possibility of the transfer to Egypt of 
the F-IS's purchased by Saudi Arabia for the U.S. in the event of 
war with Israel. But an Egyptian communique promptly denied that 
Ghali had ever made such a pronouncement.Zl9 
Saudi Arabia's reaction to the Camp David accords was guarded at 
first. The Saudi's declared that "what has been reached at Camp 
David cannot be considered as a final acceptance fornrula for peace", 
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and specified that it "did not make absolutely clear Israel's 
intention to withdraw from all the Arab territories it occupies, 
including Jerusalem".220 They also attacked the accords for not 
giving the Palestinians the right to set up their own state and for 
ignoring the PLO. Yet the Saudis also maintained that they did not 
have the right to interfere with the efforts of any state to regain 
its territories whether through armed struggle or peaceful means, 
unless this clashed with higher Arab interests. The dilemma was 
that whereas the Saudis were strongly opposed to what Egypt had don 
to disrupt Arab solidarity, they were afraid to risk the fall of 
Sadat and the possible radicalization of Egypt if support were 
withdrawn. Thus, in the inJnediate post-camp David period, Saudi 
Arabia became the leader of a bloc of Arab countries which sought to 
prevent the isolation of Egypt. 221 
At the Baghdad Summit Conference (Baghdad I) on 2nd-5th November 
1978, (see Appendix 1), (Egypt had not been invited), Saudi Arabia 
and its allies initially indicated that they would not condemn or 
. 1 t E 222 ~so a egypt. But when Sadat refused to receive a delegation of 
high-ranking emissaries from the conference or to accept a $5 
billion annual grant offer, Saudi-Egyptian relations began to chill. 
The summit ended with an agreement that if Egypt concluded a 
separate peace plan, it would be expelled from the Arab League and a 
boycot t would be imposed on Egyptian companies doing business with 
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Israel. Later in the month, Sadat shunned a conciliatory message 
from Crown Prince Fahd because Saudi Arabia had adhered to the 
. 223 
sumnu t agreement. 
However, Egypt reacted with anger, and perhaps with a degree of 
surprise to Saudi Arabia's joining the anti-Egyptian, anti-American 
front during the Baghdad Summit, and its decision to form a 
coalition with such unlikely bedfellows as Syria, Libya, Iraq, and 
South Yemen. The Egyptian media accused Riyadh of complicity with 
the Bath regimes, the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact, by failing to 
back the Camp David accords. 224 The Saudis maintained that they had 
done their best to defend Egypt from the radical Arabs and would not 
cut off financial support "no matter what happens", they said "our 
relations with Egypt will remain the same". Nevertheless they made 
it clear that the extent of future aid would depend largely on the 
degree to which Sadat succeeded in linking the prospective treaty 
with Israel to an overall settlement.225 
The second Baghdad Conference on 27th March 1979, (see Appendix 2) 
was convened in the wake of the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli 
peace treaty, just as the first had been convened in reaction to the 
Camp David accords.226 HOwever, it was not a summit but a 
conference of ministers of foreign affairs and economy. Saudi 
Arabia's Foreign Minister Saud, agreed on the conference resolutions 
and the implementation. 
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The ambassador of Saudi Arabi left Cairo on 1st April 1979,227 Egypt 
responded on 7th April, by recalling its ambassador from Riyadh. 228 
This was followed by the formal breru<ing of diplomatic relations by 
Saudi Arabia on 23rd April 1979. 229 
Although Saudi Arabia hesitated to immediately cancel subsides 
already committed to Egypt, its intention to abide by the spirit of 
Baghdad II seemed assured when the Arabian Gulf Organization for 
Development in Egypt, supported by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and 
the United Arab Emirates, was disbanded on 26th April 1979. The aid 
from similar organizations was also discontinued, and on 24th May 
Saudi Def~nce Minister Sultan announced that the Cairo-based Arab 
arms industry was to liquidated. 230 
In response to Saudi Arabia's increasingly hard line, Sadat accused 
the Saudis on 1st May 1979, of paying other Arab states to sever 
diplomatic relations with Egypt. 231 He described the political 
system in Saudi Arabia as "wrong", and referred to the November 1979 
attack on the Mecca Mosque which did not take Egypt by surprise, 
since it had warned the Saudi government of such an eventuality.232 
Sadat implied that under its present leadership Saudi Arabia had 
forfeited its claim to Islamic leadership, a fact painfully 
illustrated by the failure to prevent the tragedy in Mecca. Sadat 
warned the Saudis of the Soviet danger, suggesting that the real aim 
of the Afghanistan invasion was the Gulf oil, and advised them not 
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to delude themselves into believing that by giving in to Soviet 
enticement they would escape that danger. He offered help not only 
against the "Soviet danger", but also against "Islamic 
revo1utionism", headed by Ayatollah Khomeini. 233 
In the final analysis, though, it would appear that both Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia were interested in finding middle-ground, allowing for 
some rapprochement. Meanwhile, mutual bitterness, disappointment, 
and misunderstanding dominated their relations. Egypt was bitter at 
the Saudi failure to realize that it was in its own interest to 
align itself with Egypt, while the Saudis kept trying to offer Egypt 
the end of the rope by which to abandon the Camp David process 
which Egypt persistently declined to accept. 234 
However, the Saudi ambassador returned to Cairo for some time in May 
1979, ostensibly for family reasons, but he held political talks 
with Egyptian officials. Reports of secret meetings between Saudi 
and Egyptian officials around that time were denied by both 
sides.235 
In early 1980, Cairo concentrated its efforts in pursuing three 
distinct objectives. Most important was the drive to win support of 
the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and the Arabian Gulf, with 
its primary interest in a reconciliation with Saudi Arabia, the most 
influential of the moderate Arab group both in the region and 
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in Washington. 236 Sadat apparently rated the chances of 
reconciliation highly. The Saudis, he argued, were not aware of the 
danger threatening them : "Saudi Arabia is the sleeping duck, that 
is to say, it is relaxed and its eyes are shut. This is a luxury 
which we cannot afford". Ready to "shoulder its national pan-Arab 
and Islamic responsibilities", Egypt offered "to give military 
facilities, or to offer military aid to Saudi Arabia or any Arab 
Gulf states should they be exposed to any foreign aggression". 
Likewise, Egypt supported the establishment of the Gulf Co-operation 
Council (GCC) : favoured the sale of American AWACS planes to Saudi 
Arabia (and denounced Israel's objection to the deal), and if there 
was any truth in the many reports to that effect held secret, high 
level contacts with the Saudis. The Saudi reaction, however, was 
extremely cautious, if not cool and Cairo was still awaiting an 
affirmative response to its overtures.237 
It is most instructive to listen to the Egyptian voices, because 
this country has provided the major leadership of recent years, both 
toward pan-Arabism under President Nasser and toward an independent 
peace with Israel, the Arabs have been and are unlikely to initiate 
either an effective peace or a war with Israel. 
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IV Conclusion 
The other serious contender for Arab leadership in the decade 1956-
67 seems to have been Saudi Arabia. Hore conservative, yet as 
autocratic in its domestic politics as Egypt, Saudi Arabi again like 
Egypt, has not had to face the same problem of political identity as 
the countries of the Fertile Crescent. One can hardly mention any 
notable Saudi contribution to the huge literature, folklore or 
mythology on Arab Nationalism or pan-Arabism. 23R 
Until 1958 the Saudis and Egyptians found it nrutually convenient to 
join forces to oppose and contain the ambitions of the Hashimites in 
the Fertile Crescent. This short-lived co-operation was affected 
usually over the question of who was to control, or dominate, Syria. 
It was, furthermore, a continuation of a convenient co-operation 
which earlier rulers of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Ibn Saud and Farouq 
had found beneficial to their respective countries. 239 
On the other hand, relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt were 
cordial, culminating in a Treaty of Friendship between the two 
countries in 1936. The initial years of the succeeding monarch, 
King Saud, witnessed a paradoxical coincidence of interest between 
the conservative Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the revolutionary 
republic of Egypt headed by Nasser. Nasser's bitter attacks on the 
Hashimite Kings of Iraq and Jordan in the wake of the Baghdad Pact 
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\~ere welcomed in Saudi Arabia, given her long-standing rivalry with 
the Hashimites, and between 1954 and 1957 she closely and loyally 
followed Egyptian policy, to the extent that one ~'Testern observer 
suggested that the Kingdom was "on the way to becoming Egypt's most 
240 
valuable colony". 
Indeed a mutual defence pact between the two countries was signed in 
October 1955, and this was later to expand into the Tripartite 
Jeddah Pack which included the Yemen. In January 1957 the Treaty of 
Arab Solidarity was signed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan 
for a period of ten years. During all the major controversies of 
this period - over the Baghdad Pact - the Czech arms deals, the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and the Suez crisis Saudi 
Arabia was firmly on the side of Egypt. 
However, at the beginning of 1957, Saudi policy began to shift. For 
a variety of reasons, King Saud was becoming wary of his pro-Nasser, 
anti-imperialist role, because it was leading to a potential 
conflict with the United States. In January 1957, he visited the 
U.S. and was successfully persuaded to re-assess his loyal adherence 
to Nasserist principles and policies. l~le no immediate clash 
occurred between them, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were beginning to 
drift apart. King Saud, increasingly conscious of the common 
interests binding him to other Arab monarchs, soon began to perceive 
Nasser and his radical policies as a threat to the Saudi monarchy. 
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It was becoming evident that Saudi understanding of Arab nationalism 
was markedly different from Egypt's. As one analyst observed: 
To the Saudis rulers, their Arabness was much a self-
evident fact that no theoretical elaboration was 
needed. Being of tribal stock, they thought of 
themselves as the real, ethnically-pure Arabs. '~ile 
they recognized the special ties among Arab countries, 
they attributed them as much to religion and 
proximity as to Arabism. They did not recognize any 
mystical links emanating from Arab nationalism. If 
uni ty was to be the goal, it should be based on 
"Islamic", rather than Arabism.241 
To deal with the threat from Nasser and his Arab-Socialism, the 
Saudis have resorted to a wide range of "tactics". Least effective 
were clumsy attempts to buy influence and politicians, including an 
abortive attempt by King Saud to finance an assassination attempt 
° t Pr °d u 242 aga1ns eS1 ent ~asser. 
Ideological and political polarization of the Middle East into the 
"conservative" camp led by Saudi Arabia and the "revolutionary" 
forces under the leadership of Egypt began with the succession of 
Syria from the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) in September 1961. 
Nasser therefore unleashed a bitter ideological and pol~tical 
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offensive against the backers of the Syrian separatists in the Arab 
world, particularly King Saud. Saudi Arabia immediately responded 
by intensifying her own campaign against Nasser's socialism, 
equating it with "atheistic communism" and describing Nasser as a 
"staunch communist who is still to communism as he was on the day he 
joined the secret communist organization in Cairo as a junior 
member" • 
King Saud also presented the "Islamic Charter" which, in criticizing 
"false nationalism based on atheistic doctrine", implied 
condemnation of Nasser's policies. The year 1962 witnessed a 
vehemently bitter interac~ion between Cairo and Riyadh during which 
radio propaganda was most effectively used. Saudi Arabia also used 
the "Holy Shrines of Mecca as instruments of her foreign policy". 243 
This polarization became complete in September 1962, with the 
eruption of the civil war in Yemen. Egypt immediately dispatched 
troops to help the republicans, where Saudi Arabia, viewing the war 
as the inevitable clash between the two ideological poles, 
uncompromisingly aided the royalist faction with money and 
equipment. She fel t that victory for Egypt in Yemen would 
constitute a direct ideological and strategic threat to her own 
poli tical order. After an Egyptian air-raid on the Saudi border, 
designed to neutralize the source of aid to the royalists, Faisal 
severed diplomatic relations with Egypt. 
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However, during that period, Saudi Arabia was reinforcing her 
position as the leader of anti-radical, conservative forces in the 
Middle Eas t • In 1965, Faisal called for an "Islamic Pact", and 
tried to use it against Nasser's pan-Arabism, Arab-socialism, and 
against any alien ideology to "Islam" in the ~fiddle East. But he 
absolutely failed because Nasser and his policies were very strong 
and the majority of the Arab masses loved Nasser and believed in 
h o 1° ° 244 1S po 1C1es. 
If using "Islam" was not the Saudi suit; economic aid proved to be a 
more persuasive instrument. Nasser's anti-Saudi crusade was blunted 
at the Khartoum Summit in August 1967 by generous offers of aid from 
Arab oil-producing countries, including Saudi Arabia, to the 
militarily and economic prostrate Egypt. 
By keeping channels open to the radical Arabs and by providing some 
aid, the Saudis hoped to be in a position to exert moderating 
influence and to exploit internal changes that might bring new 
leaders to the fore. This gamble seemed to payoff in 1970, a 
critical year in inter-Arab politics. On 28th September 1970, the 
Arab leader, Nasser, died of a heart attack and was succeeded by 
Anwar a1-Sadat, someone Riyadh preferred to Nasser, and also 
someone Riyadh can do business with. 245 
However, under Sadat Egypt had good relations with Saudi Arabia and 
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the October 'war plus the use of the oil weapon marked the highest 
point of Saudi relations with Egypt. 246 Although Saudi Arabia's 
importance began to emerge after the 1967 war, it was the 
quadrupling of the oil prices in 1973 and 1974 that brought Saudi 
Arabia to the forefront of Arab politics. 
Sadat embarked upon a diplomatic offensive in the Arab world which 
began in Riyadh before going on to Damascus and other Arab capitals. 
It was indicative of Saudi Arabia's burgeoning regional importance 
that, although President Assad of Syria had been Sadat's ally and 
"bother-in-blood" during and after the 1973 October war, the first 
Arab leader to hear the details of the Sadat-Kissinger talks was not 
the Syrian President but the late King Faisal. The same Egyptian 
strategy was pursued after the signing of the Sinai Accord in 
September 1975, when General Husni Mubarrak, the Egyptian Vice-
President, (the present President of Egypt), went to Riyadh to 
receive the all-important Saudi blessing. He delivered a detailed 
message from Sadat to King Khalid and then held a series of 
discussions with the King. Indeed, Egypt openly admitted that Saudi 
Arabia's approval of the agreement had been obtained before 
Kissinger embarked upon his mission. There is little doubt that the 
primacy of Saudi Arabia in Egyptian calculations and policies 
related in no small measure to the fact that between July 1974 and 
June 1975 she injected over $1,200 million into the Egyptian 
247 
economy. 
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HOI;.;ever, economic problems forced Sadat to seek a solution for the 
Arah-Israeli conflict. He took the initiative and made the historic 
visit to Jerusalem on 19th November 1977. Riyadh adoubted the 
policy of "wait and see" to the visit. But when Sadat signed the 
Camp David accords, Riyadh had no choice but to go along with the 
"Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation" (Jabhat al-Samud wa al-
Tasadi), and broke her diplomatic relations with Egypt on 23rd April 
1979. However, "privately Riyadh was against breaking diplomatic 
relations with Egypt and USing any kind of sanction against her". 
She did it because of lack of leadership. 
However, the breaking of diplomatic relations did not affect the 
thousands of Egyptian professionals and technical experts working in 
Saudi Arabia. In fact, it did not affect "anything", for example, 
if you watch Saudi television you felt that you are sitting in Egypt 
watching Egyptian television and not Saudi television. Indeed, 
Saudi Arabia needs Egypt and not vice-versa. 
The Arabic example says, Egypt Aum aI-Arab [Egypt is the mother of 
the ArabsJ. In short, it is very difficult to deny Egypt a role in 
the Arab world, even if Egypt herself opts for a more national 
policy of "disengagement" from the wider arena of Arab politics. 
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Appendix I 
Final Statement Issued By The 9th Arab Summit Conference, 
Baghdad on 5th November 1978 
The Arab Summit Conference issued a final statement at the conclusion of 
its meetings, which lasted for four days. The following is the text of 
the final statement: 
By the initiative of the Government of the Republic of Iraq and at the 
invitation of President Ahmd Hasan al-Bakr, the ninth Arab Summit 
Conference convened in Baghdad during 2nd-5th November 1978. 
In a high spirit of pan-Arab responsibility and joint concern about the 
unity of the Arab stand, the Conference studied confrontation of the 
dangers and challenges threatening the Arab nation, particularly after 
the Camp David agreements signed by the Egyptian Government and the 
effects of these agreements on the Arab struggle to face the Zionist 
aggression against the Arab nation. 
Proceeding from the principles in which the Arab nation believes, acting 
on the unity of Arab destiny and complying with the traditions of joint 
Arab action, the Arab Summit Conference has emphasized the following 
basic principles: 
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First The Palestinian question is a fateful Arab issue and is the 
essence of the conflict with the Zionist enemy. The sons of the Arab 
nations and all the Arab countries are concerned with it and are obliged 
to struggle for its sake and to offer all material and moral sacrifices 
for this cause. The struggle to regain Arab rights in Palestine and in 
the occupied Arab territory is a general Arab responsibility. All Arabs 
must share this responsibility, each in accord with his military, 
economic, political and other abilities. The conflict with the Zionist 
enemy exceeds the frame~~rk of the conflict of the countries whose 
territory was occupied in 1967, and it includes the whole Arab nation 
because of the military, political, economic and cultural danger the 
Zionist enemy constitutes against the entire Arab nation and its 
substantial and pan-Arab interests, civilization and destiny. This 
places on all the countries of the Arab nations the responsibility to 
share in this conflict with all the resources it possesses. 
Second All the Arab countries must offer all forms of support, 
backing and facilities to all forms of the struggle of the Palestinian 
resistance, supporting the PLO in its capacity as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied 
land, struggling for liberation and restoration of the national rights of 
its people, including their right to return to their homeland, to 
determine their future and to establish their independent state on their 
national soil. The Arab States pledge to preserve Palestinian national 
unity and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Palestinian 
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action. 
Third Commitment is reaffirmed to the resolutions of the Arab Summit 
Conferences, particularly the sixth and seventh Summit Conferences of 
Algiers and Rabat. 
Fourth In light of the above principles it is impermissible for any 
side to act unilaterally in solving the Palestinian question in 
particular and the Arab-Zionist conflict in general. 
Fifth No solution shall be accepted unless it is associated with a 
resolution by an Arab Summit Conference convened for this purpose. 
The Conference discussed the t\YO agreements signed by the Egyptian 
Government at Camp David and considered that they harm the Palestinian 
people's rights and the rights of the Arab nation in Palestine and the 
occupied Arab territory. The Conference considered that these agreements 
took place outside the framework of collective Arab responsibility and 
are opposed to the resolution of the Arab Summit Conference, particularly 
the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat Summit Conference, the Arab 
League Charter and the U.N. resolutions of the Palestinian question. The 
Conference considered that these agreements do not lead to the just peace 
that the Arab nation desires. Therefore, the Conference has decided not 
to approve of these two agreements and not to deal with their results. 
The Conference has also rejected all political, economic, legal and other 
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effects resulting from them. 
The Conference decided to calIon the Egyptian Government to go back on 
these agreements and not to sign any reconciliation treaty with the 
enemy. The Conference hopes that Egypt will return to the fold and join 
Arab action and not to act unilaterally in the affairs of the Arab-
Zionist conflict. In this respect the Conference adopted a number of 
resolutions to face the new stage and to safeguard the aims and interests 
of the Arab nation out of faith that with its material and moral 
resources the Arab nation is capable of confronting the difficult 
circumstances and all challenges, just as it has always been throughout 
history, because it is defending right, justice and its national 
existence. 
The Conference stressed the need to unify all the Arab efforts in order 
to remedy the strategic imbalance that has resulted from Egypt's 
withdrawal from the confrontation arena. The Conference decided that the 
countries that possess readiness and capability will co-ordinate 
participation with effective efforts. The Conference also stressed the 
need to adhere to the regulations of Arab boycott and to tighten 
application of its provisions. 
The Conference studied means to develop Arab information media beamed 
abroad for the benefit of the just Arab issue. The Conference decided to 
hold annual meetings for the Arab Summit Conference and decided that the 
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month of November each year will be the date for holding the Summit. 
After studying the Arab international situation, the Conference asserts 
the Arab nation's commitment to a just peace based on the comprehensive 
Israel withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, including 
Arab Jerusalem, the guaranteeing of the inalienable national rights of 
the Palestinian Arab people, including the right to establish their 
independent state on their national soil. 
The Conference decided to embark on large-scale international activity to 
explain the just rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. 
The Conference expressed its deep appreciation and gratitude for all the 
states that stood on the side of the Arab rights. 
The Conference expressed its appreciation to the Syrian Arab Republic and 
its heroic army, and to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and its heroic 
army, and expressed its pride in the struggle of the Palestinian people 
and its steadfastness inside and outside the occupied territories, under 
the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people. 
The Conference praised the "Charter for joint national action" signed by 
fraternal Syria and Iraq, and the Conference regarded the Charter as the 
great achievement on the way to Arab solidarity. The Conference also 
expressed its great appreciation for the initiative of the ~raq 
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Government illlder President Ahmd Hasan al-Bakr in calling for the 
convening of an Arab Summit Conference in Baghdad so as to unify Arab 
ranks and to organize Arab efforts to face the threats to which the Arab 
nation is currently exposed. The Conference expressed its thanks for 
President Al-Bakr's effects to make the Conference a success. 
The Conference took a number of resolutions and measures to face the next 
stage and to protect the aims and interests of the Arab nation. These 
resolutions stem from the conviction of the Conference that the Arab 
nation is able, through its material and moral capabilities and through 
its solidarity, to face all the difficult circumstances and all the 
challenges, as it always faced them through history, because it is 
defending justice and right and protecting its national existence. 
Source Alan R. Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, Syracuse, N.Y.: 
Syracuse University Press, 1982, pp. 147-149. 
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Appendix 2 
Resolutions Of The Arab League Council 
Following Heetings Of The Arab Foreign 
And Economy Ministers 
Baghdad, 31st March, 1979 
As the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt has ignored the Arab 
Summit Conferences' resolutions, especially those of the sixth and 
seventh Conferences held in Algiers and Rabat; as it has at the same time 
ignored the ninth Arab Summit Conference resolutions - especially the 
call made by the Arab kings, presidents and princes to avoid signing the 
peace treaty with the Zionist enemy - and signed the peace treaty on 26th 
March 1979; it has thus deviated from the Arab ranks and has chosen, in 
collusion with the United States, to stand by the side of the Zionist 
enemy in one trench; has behaved unilaterally in the Arab-Zionist 
struggle affairs; has violated the Arab nation's rights; has exposed the 
nation's destiny, its struggle and aims to dangers and challenges; has 
relinquished its pan-Arab duty of liberating the occupied Arab 
territories, particularly Jerusalem, and restoring the Palestinian Arab 
people's inalienable national rights, including their right to 
repatriation, self-determination and establishment of the independent 
Palestinian state on their national soil. 
I 
t· 
i 
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In order to safeguard Arab solidarity and the unity of ranks in defence 
of the Arab's fateful issue; in appreciation of the Egyptian people's 
struggle and sacrifices for Arab issues and the Palestinian issues in 
particular; in implementation of the resolutions adopted by the ninth 
Arab Summit Conference that convened in Baghdad during 2nd-5th November 
1978, and at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Iraq, 
the Arab League Council convened in Baghdad from 27th Harch 1979 to 31st 
Harch on the level of Arab foreign and economic ministers. 
In the light of the ninth Arab Summit Conference resolutions, the Council 
studied the latest developments pertaining to the Arab-Zionist conflict, 
especially after the signing of the Government of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt of the peace (as-sulh) agreement with the Zionist enemy on 26th 
Harch 1979. 
The Arab League Council, on the level of the Arab foreign ministers, has 
decided the following : 
1. A. To withdraw the ambassadors of the Arab States from Egypt 
immediately. 
B. To recommend the severance of political and diplomatic 
relations with the Egyptian Government. The Arab governments 
will adopt the necessary measures to apply this recommendation 
within a maximum period of one month from the date of issue of 
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this decision, in accordance with the constitutional measures in 
force in each country. 
2. To consider the suspension of the Egyptian Government's membership 
in the Arab League as operative from the date of the Egyptian 
Government's signing of the peace treaty with the Zionist enemy. 
This means depriving it of all rights resulting from this 
membership. 
3. A. To make the city of Tunis, capital of the Tunisian Republic, 
the temporary headquarters of the Arab League, its General 
Secretariat, the competent ministerial councils and the permanent 
technical committees, as of the date of the signing of the treaty 
between the Egyptian Government and the Zionist enemy. This shall 
be communicated to all international and regional organizations and 
bodies. They will be informed that dealings with the Arab League 
will be conducted with its secretariat in its now temporary 
headquarters. 
B. To appeal to the Tunisian Government to offer all possible aid 
in facilitating the settlement of the temporary Arab League 
headquarters and its officials. 
c. To form a committee comprising representative of Iraq, Syria, 
Tunisia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Algeria, in addition ,to 
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representative for the General Secretariat. The aim of this 
committee will be to implement this resolution's provisions and to 
seek the aid it requires from the member states. The committee will 
have all the authorization and responsibilities from the Arab League 
Council necessary to implement this resolution, including the 
protection of the Arab League's properties, deposits, documents and 
records. It is also entitled to take necessary measures against any 
action that may be taken by the Egyptian Government to hinder the 
transfer of the Arab League headquarters or harm the Arab League's 
rights and possessions. 
The Committee will have to accomplish its task of transfer to the 
temporary headquarters within two months from the date of this 
resolution. This period of time may be extended for another month 
if the Committee so decides. The Committee shall submit a report on 
its accomplishments to the first forthcoming meeting of the Arab 
League Council. 
D. A sum of $5 million shall be placed at the Committee's disposal 
to cover the transfer expenses. 
credit accounts of various funds. 
The sum shall be drawn from the 
The Committee has the right to 
spend more than that amount if required. .Expenditures for this 
purpose shall come under the supervision of the commi ttee or of 
those it authorizes. The expenses shall be paid by the member 
states, each according to the percentage of its ann~l contribution 
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the Arab League budget. 
E. To transfer the Arab League r~neral Secretariat officials who 
are employed at the time of the issuing of this resolution from the 
permanent headquarters to the temporary one during the period 
defined in paragraph 3C of the resolution. The Conunittee referred 
to in the above-mentioned paragraph 3 will have the responsibility 
of paying them financial compensation compatible until a permanent 
system is drafted for this purpose. 
If. The competent and specialized Arab organizations, bodies, 
establishments and federations named in the attached list, No. 1 
will take the necessary measures to suspend Egypt's membership. 
They will transfer their headquarters from Egypt to other Arab 
states on a temporary basis, similar to the action that shall be 
taken regarding the Council General Secretariat. The executive 
councils and boards of these bodies, organizations, establishments 
and federations shall meet immediately following the implementation 
of this decision within a period not to exceed the period specified 
in paragraph 3C above. 
5. To seek to suspend Egypt's membership in the non-aligned movement, 
the Islamic Conference Organization and OAU violating the 
resolutions of these organizations pertaining to the the Arab-
Zionist conflict. 
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6. To continue to co-operate with the fraternal Egyptian people and 
with Egyptian individuals, with the exception of those who co-
operate with the Zionist enemy directly or indirectly. 
7. The member-states shall inform all foreign countries of their 
stand on the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and will ask these countries 
not to support this treaty as it constitutes an aggression against 
the right of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation as well as a 
threat to world peace and security. 
8. To condemn the policy that the United States is practising regarding 
its role in concluding the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-
Israeli treaty. 
9. To consider the measures in this decision to be temporary and 
subject to cancellation by an Arab League Council decision as soon 
as the circumstances that justified their adoption are eliminated. 
10. Ihe Arab countries will pass legislation, decisions and measures 
necessary for the implementation of this resolution. 
TI1e Arab League Council, on the level of Arab foreign and economy 
ministers, has also decided the following : 
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1. To halt all bank loans, deposits, guarantees or facilities, as well 
as all financial or technical contributions and aid by Arab 
governments or their establishments to the Egyptian Government and 
its establishments as of the treaty signing date. 
2. To han the extension of economic aid by the Arab funds, banks and 
financial establishments within the framework of the Arab league and 
the joint Arab co-operation to the Egyptian Government and its 
establishments. 
3. The Arab governments and institutions shall refrain from purchasing 
the bonds, shares, postal orders and public credit loans that are 
issued by the Egyptian Government and its financial foundations. 
LI. Following the suspension of the Egyptian Government's membership in 
the Arab league, its membership will also be suspended from the 
institutions, funds and organizations deriving from the Arab League. 
The Egyptian Government and its institutions will cease to benefit 
from these organizations. The headquarters of those Arab I~ague 
departments residing in Egypt will be transferred to other Arab 
states temporarily. 
5. In vie~.;r of the fact that the ill-omened Egypt ian-Israeli treaty and 
its appendices have demonstrated Egypt's commitment to sell oil to 
Israel, the Arab states shall refrain from providing Egypt with oil 
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and its derivatives. 
6. Trade exchange with the Egyptian states and private establishments 
that deal with the Zionist enemy shall be prohibited. 
7. The economic boycott 
A. The Arab boycott laws, principles and provisions shall he 
applied to those companies, foundations and individuals of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt that deal directly or indirectly with the Zionist 
enemy. The boycott office shall be entrusted with the following up 
implementation of these tasks. 
D. The provisions of paragraph A shall include the intellectual. 
cultllral and artistic activities that involve dealing with the 
Zionist enemy or have connections with the enemy's institutions. 
c. TIle Arab states stress the importance of continued dealings 
with those private national Egyptian institutions that are 
confirmed not to be dealing with the Zionist enemy. Such 
institutions will be encouraged to work and maintain activities in 
the Arab countries within the framework of their fields of 
competence. 
D. 1he Arab countries stress the importance of car~ng for the 
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feelings of the Egyptian people's sons who are working or 
living in the Arab countries as well as looking after their 
interests and consolidating their pan-Arab affiliation with 
Arabism. 
E. To consolidate the role of the Arab boycott and to enhance 
its grip at this stage, in affirmation of Arab unanimity, the 
assistant secretary general for economic affairs will be 
temporarily entrusted with the task of directly supervising 
the major boycott office in Damascus. He will be granted the 
necessary pm-mrs to re-organize and back the said department 
and to submit proposals on developing the boycott in method, 
content and scope. lIe shall SUbmit a report in this regard 
to the first meeting of the Arab League Council. 
B. The United Nations will be asked to transfer its regional 
offices, which serve the Arab region, from the Arab Republic 
of Egypt to any other Arab capital. The Arab states will work 
collectively toward this end. 
9. The Arab League General Secretariat will be assigned the task of 
studying the joint Arab projects so as to take the necessary 
measures for protecting the Arab nation's interests in 
accordance with the aims of these resolutions. The General 
Secretariat shall submit its proposals to the Arab ~ague 
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Council in its first forthcoming meeting. 
10. The Zionist plot must be faced by drafting an Arab strategy 
for economic confrontation. This will lead to utilizing the 
Arabs' own strength and will emphasize the need for realizing 
Arab economic integration in all aspects. The strategy will 
strengthen joint Arab development and regional development 
within the pan-Arab outlook and ~Yill expand the establishment 
of joint Arab projects - projects that serve the aims of 
emancipating, developing and integrating the Arab economy -
and will promote the projects already in operation. TIle 
strategy will also develop the methods, systems and substances 
of the Arab boycott of Israel and will diversify and promote 
international relations with the developing countries. The 
Arab League General Secretariat shall rapidly submit studies 
relevant to the strategy of joint Arab economic action to the 
forthcoming session of the Arab F£onomic Council. This will be 
a prelude to the convention of a general Arab economic 
conference. 
11. The above-mentioned committee shall be assigned the task of 
supervising the implementation of these decisions and of 
submitting a follow-up report to the Arab League Council in its 
first forthcoming meeting. 
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12. The Arab states will issue the decisions and legislations 
pertaining to these decisions and will take the necessary 
measures to implement them. 
13. These measures taken by the Arab and economy ministers are 
considered minimal requirements to face the threat of the treaty. 
Individual governments can take whatever measures they deem 
necessary in addition to these measures. 
14. The Arab foreign and economy ministers calIon the Arab nation in 
all Arab countries to support the economic measures taken against 
the Zionist enemy and the Egyptian regime. 
Source Alan R. Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, pp. 149-153. 
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I Introduction 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen Arab Republic (YAR)* recognise Islam as the 
official religion. In addition, Saudi Arabia is responsible for 
safeguarding the two holiest cities of Islam, Mecca and ~1adinah. 
Since they are both Islamic states, Saudi Arabia and North Yemen 
recognize the shariah, or Islamic law, as the basis for their 
legal systems.1 
Similarities in domestic ideological orientation form the basis for 
a mutual understanding between the two countries. This is largely 
the result of a shared religion and the place it holds in the state, 
highly traditional societies, and conservative political systems. 2 
The paramount considerations in Saudi Arabia's view of North Yemen's 
political importance turn on geopolitics and manpower. North 
Yemen's geopolitical significance is derived in great part from its 
location, which commands the Strait of Bab al-Mandab. Freedom of 
navigation through this strait holds critical importance to Saudi 
Arabia primarily because this waterway is used extensively to 
transport oil from the Arabian Gulf to Europe. North Yemen's 
proximity to the Kingdom and to the other Gulf oil-producing states 
is another salient geopolitical factor. Further, North Yemeni 
* The YAH is also known as North Yemen 
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manpower represents a significant source of unskilled and semi-
skilled labour in Saudi Arabia in particular and the Gulf area in 
general. 3 Both geopolitical and manpower factors make North Yemen's 
political allegiance and friendship vital to the success of Saudi 
political goals, especially within the Arabian Peninsula. 
1his chapter reviews the history of the relations between Saudi 
Arabia and North Yemen over many turbulent years. 
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II Brief llistorical Background of the Yemen Arab Republic 
Yemen Arab Republic lies at the extreme south-western corner of 
Arabia. It has an estimated size of 74,000 square miles, comprising 
of t~vo well-defined climatic and topographical zones - the highlands 
inlanei, and the Tihama (the coastal strip along the Red Sea). Its 
frontiers march with Saudi Arabia in the north (Asir) and east 
(Najran). The western boundary is the Red Sea from a point opposite 
the Farasan Islands to Shaikh Said Peninsula, opposite Perim Island. 
In the south, Yemen is b0U11ded by the People's Democratic Republic 
of yemen.4 
In classical times Yemen, with the Hadhramaut, formed the south-
eastern part of Arabia Felix, which also included south Hejaz and 
the remainder of the PeninsUla south of Arabia Deserta. The best-
knmm of the southern-Arabian Kingdoms was Saba (or Sheba/Sabu). 5 
It had a recorded history from 950 to 115 BC, but no authentic 
evidence has yet been found of a "Queen of Sheba". The Sabeans 
earned great profits from the incense trade; but their prosperity 
slowly dwindled in competition with the Indian trade rOlltes through 
Iraq and Syria, and with the Roman exploitation of commercial 
navigation from the Gulf and the East through the Red Sea to Egypt 
6 and Europe. 
In the fourth century, Christian missionaries settl,ed in the 
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country. There was also a blend of Judaism after the fall of 
Jerusalem in AD 70. From the sixth to the second century Be Arabia 
Felix ~vas ruled by the Himayrite dynasty, from whom the modern Imams 
claim descent. Some rulers embraced Judaism, others were Christian. 
In AD 525 the Christian Ethiopians ofAxum invaded and overthrew the 
Himayrite Kingdom. Ethiopian rule was overthrown in AD 575 by an 
Iranian invasion. Within another one hundred years the country had 
submitted to Islam. Following the rise of Islrun in the south-
western periphery of the Arabian peninsula, the land known as Arabia 
, 7 
Felix, was mainly cut off from the mainstream of Arab development. 
1~e poverty and physical characteristics of the region were not 
conductive to development but rather were left to tribal groups who 
inhabited the area. The Ottomans extended their authority to Yemen 
in the second quarter of the sixteenth century. Their hold over the 
south, however, was precarious. When Yemen's Zaidia Imams gained 
independence at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the 
orthodox Shafti south was considered under their jurisdiction. The 
Ottomans paid little attention to the poverty-stricken southern 
borders of their country. 8 
At the opening of the nineteenth century, Yemen was entered into by 
the Hahhabis (the SuOOs). After the Egyptian victory of 1818, 
Ibrahim Pasha descended on the Tihama, which had been OVerrlll1 by the 
Hahhabi forces. The Wahhabis were expelled and the, Zaidi Imam was 
- 554 -
restored to authority in return for a subsidy to the Sultan in 
Constantinople who placed Egyptian garrisons in Hodeida and Moak, 
the main ports. The Egyptians withdrew in 1840, but Turkish 
9 suzerainty. 
After Horld Har I Imam Yahya emerged as an independent ruler, 
larp,ely by default, in as much as there was no power ready and 
~Yilling to assume imperial responsibilities in the area. No 
official proclamation of independence was ever issued in Sanaa, but 
Yahya quite obviously did not consider himself bound either by the 
}rudros armistice provisions or by the earlier British-Ottoman 
10 agreements regarding the boundaries in Arabia. 
Under the rule of the Zaidi Imams, Yemen was governed according to 
Zaidi politico-religious theory in so far as possible, creating 
probably the closest modern approximation of the theocracy. In 
theory, God rules the Zaidi state, in political terms, God is 
represented by the Quran, the Hadith, and the Zaidi interpretations 
of the significance and contents of these two basic sources. The 
Imam, as such, is merely God's temporal representative. Again, in 
theory, all judicial. executive, and legislative powers are vested 
in the Imam. In practice, of course, strict adherence to the theory 
~yas impossible and there inevitably grew up a complex set of 
arrangements designed to deal with the immediate problems of 
administering the po1itica1 entity known as Yemen.11 , 
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III The Saudi Arabia - Yemen Arab Republic Boundary 
'~en diplomacy fails to resolve an impasse between two parties, then 
resorting to force is likely, and a case in point is the dispute 
bet~veen Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Arab Republic over the 
delimitation of their boundary. Until 1926, Saudi Arabia had no 
boundaries with North Yemen; the Emirate of Asir, which serves as a 
buffer state, separated the tivO countries .12 As a result of the 
struggle between Saudi Arabia and North Yemen over the destiny of 
Asir and its final incorporation into Saudi Arabia in the 1930's, 
the boundary issue between the two countries became acute.130 
In 1925 and 1926, Asir was threatened by internal disorder and 
external expansionist ambitions. Internally, the hold of the Amirs 
of Asir, the Idrissis, began to weaken as early as 1923, the date of 
the death of the Amir Mohammed II al-Idrissi, founder of the 
dynasty. Struggles for power reduced the dynasty to disorder and 
instability.14 Externally, the threat to the dynasty came from the 
ambitions of the ruler of Yemen, Imam Yahya, who seized the 
opportunity of Asir's internal disorder to put his plans into 
operation. Between 1925 and 1926, Imam Yahyats forces captured some 
of Asir's cities along the coast and succeeded in occupying Jeizan, 
far into the interior. 
The Idrissi Amir Hasan was left with two options. ~e first was to 
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accept the reduction of his authority as a fait accompli, and, to 
avoid disaster, accept the role of nominal ruler of Asir under the 
authority of North Yemen. The second was to ally himself with a 
powerful neighbouring state that could limit or end Imam Yahya's 
15 
expansionist ambitions. 
Considering the circumstances, the second alternative appeared the 
more profitable. Amir }msan sent a delegation of his principal 
amirs to Saudi Arabia petitioning the Saudi government to expel Imam 
Yahya's forces from Asir. The Mecca agreement was signed on 21st 
16 October, 1926, by which Asir became a Saudi protectorate. 
After aSStmdIlg responsibility for conducting Asir's foreign affairs 
and defending it against external threats,17 Saudi Arabia hastily 
made its commitments to Asir widely known, informing Imam Yahya of 
these developments in Saudi-Asiri relations. To ensure that Imam 
Yahya ~vas aware of the new Saudi role and the new status of Asir t a 
Saudi delegation was sent to Sartaa, the capital of Yemen. Imam 
Yahya's insistence that Asir was a part of Yemen territories 
rendered these initial Saudi attempts without result. 18 Subsequent 
meetings between the two governments attempting to define the 
boundaries between Asir and Yemen lasted from 1926 to 1930, and 
finally succeeded. In 1931, Saudi Arabia waived its claim to a 
hilly territory in the southern part of Asir Imown as the Aaro 
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mountain, in favour of the Yemen. Imam Yahya abandoned all of his 
19 
so-called rights to the rest of Asir in favour of Saudi Arabia. 
The agreement was soon disturbed by developments in Asir, which was 
a ttrrning point in Saudi-Yemeni boundary relations. On 26th 
October, 1932, Amir Hassan al-Idrissi revolted against Saudi 
Arabia. 20 The revolt, together with the concentration of Yemeni 
troops in the neighbourhood, and Italy's manoeuvering and long-
standing ambitions in the Fasan Island, constituted a serious threat 
of Saudi Security.21 Saudi Arabia announced in 1932, that Asir had 
been annexed to the Saudi Kingdom, becoming part of its territory. 
The act of annexation made Saudi Arabia an immediate neighbour of 
North Yemen, and in June 1932, Ibn Saud sent a personal message to 
22 Imam Yahya proposing an urgent meeting to fix the boundary. Imam 
Yahya was unwilling to accept the annexation of Asir to Saudi Arabia 
as a fait accompli, and in spite of the conciliatory attitude 
implicit in the messages exchanged between the two governments Imam 
Yahya's forces advanced toward Najran, part of annexed Asir, a 
neutral zone between Saudi Arabia and North Yemen. In October 1932, 
a Saudi force proceeded to that area to put an end to Yemen's 
attempt to annex Najran. The first armed clash ended with the 
withdrawal of Yemen's forces from Najran, and boundary negotiations 
began between Saudi Arabia and the yemen. 23 
The Abha Conference was held on 2nd November, 1933, ,with the aim of 
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resolving certain outstanding problems and fixing the Saudi Arabia-
Yemen boundary. The issue of Asir was not raised, an indication of 
Yemen's acceptance of Saudi Arabia's incorporation of Asir. 
'111e question of sovereignty over Najran remained. The Yemeni 
delegation insisted Najran be annexed to the Yemen; the Saudi 
proposed that Najran be considered a neutral zone. 24 The 
Conference, after sixteen days, reached an impasse, nor was there 
any agreement or further negotiations. Force seemed to be the only 
alternative. In February 1934, Saudi Arabia sent an ultimatum to 
Imam Yahya to the effect that the Saudis would invade the Yemen 
unless a boundary agreement was concluded with in a given time,25 
which expired without response from Imam Yahya, who was stalling 
while he attempted to secure arms and munitions from the Italian 
government. 26 The Saudi government was aware of Imam Yahya's 
tactics and on 22nd March 1934, declared war on Yemen. 27 
As a result of a war lasting seven weeks, Hodaidah, the main port of 
Yemen, as well as the disputed area of Najran, fell under the 
control of Saudi forces. Control of Hodaidah was not part of a 
Saudi design to annex territories. The object was to use is as a 
pam1 in negotiations to secure Imam Yahya's recognition of Saudi 
Arahian sovereignty over Najran and a boundary agreement. 28 Another 
result of the war. which helped lead to a boundary agreement, was 
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the appearance of British, French, and Italian naval forces in the 
waters off Hodaidah. The powers had their interests in the region 
particularly in the Yemen. 29 If the Saudi-Yemeni war had escalated, 
it 'vould have provided an opportunity for the powers to achieve 
their objectives. 
External threats had an effect on both Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, 
30 
as well as other parties. They were moved to bring the war to a 
speedy conclusion and begin negotiation" which took place at Taif, 
Saudi Arabia, and resulted in an agreement on 20th May 1934. 31 The 
state of war was terminated (Article 1)., Najran was included in 
Saudia Arabia, and a boundary fixed (Article 4). The agreements 
fostered a new era of relations between the two countries. 
Saudi Arabia's boundary with the Yemen Arab Republic was the only 
one of its boundaries to be established by war. The use of force in 
this instance succeeded in promoting a final boundary agreement. 
Conflicts have since occurred between Saudi Arabia and Yemen Arab 
Republic, but not over the location of the already determined 
boundary. Rather, the botmdary was occasionally used as a pretext 
in order to achieve certain political and economic ends, at times 
coloured by ideological issues, which were unrelated to the 
boundary. 
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IV The Saudi Arabia - Yemen Arab Republic Relations (1920-1980) 
The relations bet~.;reen the two young governments, Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen, were totally friendly because there were no major disputes 
32 betrveen them. nut this situation did not last for long. 
The i~nediate cause of the conflict between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya 
was Asir, a small principality immediately north of Yemen on the Red 
Sea coast. Under the Ottoman Empire, it had been administered as a 
qa'immaqa-miyya within the Wilayat of Yemen, although it was in fact 
\ 
two separate areas governed by different families. The north 
portion was ruled by the Alids, formerly subject to the Wahhabi 
rulers of Najdj the southern portion was ruled by al-Sayyid Mohammad 
al-Idrissi of the Idrissi dynasty.33 
In April 1915, al-Idrissi signed an agreement with the British by 
which they recognized his independence, guaranteed him protection 
from attack (on his coastal cities), and provided him with a 
: 34 
subsidy as ~.;rell as armaments. At the end of Horld Har I, the 
British demonstrated their appreciation for the al-Idrissils 
attitude - he was the first Arab ruler to join the allies during the 
war - by turning over to him the towns and surroundirlg territories 
of al-llodaidah and al-Luhayya, which had been taken from the Empire, 
but ~.;rhich Imam Yahya believed to be a part of "Greater Yemen". This 
action quite naturallYt incensed Imam Yahya, who t~ereupon planned 
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to regain these territories. For over five years, the al-Idrissi 
was in possession of the coastal plain. known as the Tihama. 35 
Shortly after Horld Har I, the two rulers of Asir became involved in 
a dispute. 36 Shaykh Hassan Ibn Ali appealed to Ibn Saud for 
support, the latter, willing to accept the pretext for expanding his 
domains, sent his son Faisal in 1920 to annex these highland 
portions of Asir. The new arrangement was recognized by Hohammad 
al-Idrissi in a treaty drawn up in 1920. 37 
Upon the death of Mohammad a1-Idrissi, the rule passed to his eldest 
son, Sayyid Ali, then only eighteen years old, who proved to be a 
weak and ineffectual ruler. Soon after his accession, Imam Yahya 
took advantage of this weakness and the internal divisions in the 
al-Idrissi house to annex the entire Tihama area and its ports as 
far north as Maydi and also to threaten the cities of Jizan and 
sabya. 38 By this act he extended his area of the coastal lowland, 
and gained access to the Red Sea, and acquired control of the trade 
routes between the ports and Sanaa, the capital. 39 Sayyid Ali fled 
to Aden, and his uncle, Hassan Ibn Ali, proclaimed himself the new 
Imam and ruler; he appealed to Ibn Saud to support his claim, in 
accordance with the terms of the 1920 treaty.40 
However, Ibn Saud was only too happy to have another excuse to 
extend his own influence in the south western corner, of the 
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peninStlla, and his troops quickly occupied Sabya and Jizan. Sayyid 
Ali, however, had not given up his claim to the throne, a civil war 
ensued, with Imam Yahya now supporting Ali because of the former's 
fear that Ibn Saud was encroaching on territories he considered his 
mm. Ibn Saud's power carried the day, the Hassan al-Idrissi was 
established as the ruler of a truncated Asir. 41 
In so doing, he was forced to accept what amounted to a Saudi 
protectorate over his territories. Ibn Saud guaranteed him his 
throne, his then current frontiers, and full powers of internal 
administration (but not foreign policy); what remained of the al-
Idrissi's lands was to be annexed to Ibn Saud's domains upon 
Hassan's death. This agreement was formalized in the treaty of 
Hecca signed on 21st October 1926, between Ibn Saud and Hassan al-
Idrissi.42 
However, Imam Yahya was dissatisfied and unhappy because Asir was 
under the Saudi administration. lmam Yahya was looking forward to 
acquiring the whole of Asir in order to unite all parts of Yemen. 
Ibn Saud read through Imam Yahya's mind and thoughts; he then 
prepared a very skilful move to test the capabilities of Imam Yahya 
and to know his extent and intentions. 
A. To sign a common defence and security treaty, in 
order to protect the Arabian Peninsula. 
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B. To define the borders between the h10 countries. 
c. To organize their political relations according to 
43 international law. 
Of course Imam Yahya could not reject the proposal or refuse to 
enter into negotiations to achieve these objectives, although he was 
hesitant to enter the negotiations, in addition to his disbelief in 
the proposal. Then Ibn Saud realized that it was convenient to send 
a delegation to Sanaa for reaching an agreement or treaty.44 
The first Saudi delegation arrived in Sanaa on 20th May 192B. 
Negotiations started between both sides, without reaching any 
results because of the wide disagreement between them. However, Ibn 
Saud sent a second delegation to Sanaa on 10th June 1928, hoping 
that this delegation ~you1d be more successful than the previous one, 
but it did not accomplish anything either.45 
Saudi relations with North Yemen became somewhat strained as a 
result. Ibn Saud assured Imam Yahya that he had no intention of 
recovering the territories lost by the al-Idrissi before the date 
establishing his protectorate. This mollified Yahya to some degree. 
Nevertheless, the Imam believed that large portions of territory 
rightfully belonging to him were included in Asir. He sent out 
--- -----:----------
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troops occasionally to occupy small villages and valleys on the 
border between the two countries, causing Ibn Saud to distrust 
his intentions.46 
In order to strengthen his legal claim to Asir, Ibn Saud forced 
Hassan a1-Idrissi to sign a new treaty with him in October, 
1-l7 1930. The a1-Idrissi was left with nothing except the purely 
nominal title of sovereign, all of his prerogatives having been 
taken over by Ibn Saud. Hassan, as might be expected, began to 
plot revenge against Ibn Saud.48 
On 12th December 1930, Imam Yahya's troops advanced at the A1-Arou 
mmmtain and took some Saudi hostages, and they ordered all chiefs 
of the tribes to unite with Yemen. 49 Ibn Saud telegraphed Imam 
Yahya asking him to halt these actions. 
Negotiations by telegraph took place between the Saudi and Yemeni 
officials and ended with an agreement to hold a conference to be 
attend.ed by delegates from both sides. 50 'TIle Conference was held on 
12th Hay 1931, and ended without any agreement being reached. 51 
Imam Yahya telegraphed Ibn Saud asking him to give his personal 
judgement in a condition that would be acceptable by all parties. 
Ibn Saud replied that he would give up the a1-Arou mountain, and 
asked him to order his delegate to meet with the Saudi delegate to 
set up a draft agreement between their governments on 23rd December 
, 
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1931. 52 
Saudi-Yemeni relations improved to some extent after signing the 
agreement. Ibn Saud realized that it was possible to discuss a 
project of common defence treaty between the two governments "to co-
operate in order to strengthen the powers of Arab and Islam,,~3 
Before opening the negotiations between the Saudi and Yemeni 
governments, Hassan al-Idrissi co-operated with Abdullah, the 
IIashimite King of Transjordan (later Jordan), the historic enemy of 
Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya of Yemen, together they were to make a two-
prom~ed attack on the Hijaz from the north and south, driving out 
Ibn Saud. 54 During the summer of 1932. the attack from the north 
was begun under the leadership of Ibn Rafadeh, Chief of Billy tribe. 
The attack was repelled and the tribesmen driven back into 
Transjordan. Hassan al-Idrissi did not make his move until 
November. Hahhabi' reinforcements rushed into Asir, and Hassan was 
completely defeated, the Saudi troops occupied Sabya, and Hassan 
fleel to Yemen. 55 
f~wever, Ibn Saud sent a letter to Imam Yahya on 15th August 1933, 
he said : 
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"I am sure that you know about the abrasive 
conspiracy that had been agitated against 
Islam and the Arabs in the Saudi northern 
region around Agaba. Their only intention 
was to disturb peace within the country of 
God and to open the way to non-Hus1ims in 
order to achieve their vicious purposes 
from Islam and Hus1ims. 
I plead to you to respect the treaty that 
had been signed between our countries, and 
arrest all of the conspirators in your 
country".56 
Imam Yahya replied to Ibn Saud that he denied any involvement with 
Hassan a1-Idrissi and King Abdullah against his country.57 
However, the Imam intervened with Ibn Saud for Hassan a1-Idrissi, 
and a conference on the matter was held in Haydi in ~'Iarch 1933, Imam 
Yahya ordered his troops into Asir and the Oasis of Najran, the 
ownership of which was also disputed between Ibn Saud and Yemen. 58 
Imam Yahya was evidently not irlterested in any negotiated settlement 
at the time, for he arrested Ibn Saud's emissaries and held them as 
hostages. Hostilities between the t~yO sides began {:1bout the middle 
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of November 1933, the fighting was not, however, pursued with much 
vigour by either army at first, and it was interrupted frequently 
for further fruitless discussions. On 17th February 1934, 
representatives of Yemen and Saudi Arabia met in Abha. There the 
Saudis listed their conditions for peace. The Imam rejected them 
immediately and reiterated his claim to both the Oasis of Najran and 
A i 59 
l\S r. 
Ibn Saud finally decided that he had had enough of Yahya IS 
procrastination and expansionist aims. In April 1934, Ibn Saud sent 
Yahya an ultimatum to comply w'ith his demands, when the latter 
failed to answer, two Saudi columns led by Ibn Saud's sons, Saud and 
Faisal marched in. 60 Saud's army, starting from Najran and heading 
for Sanaa, made some progress before becoming bogged down in the 
mountains. Faisal's forces, however, moving along the coast, 
advanced rapidly after defeating Yahya's forces and reached the port 
of Hodeida, halfway down Yemen's Coast, within three ~veeks. 61 
By that time Yahya had sent appeals for help in every direction, 
some of which elicited prompt responses. The Italians, entrenched 
in Eritrea and Somalia since 1885 and fearing eventual Saudi control 
of Bah al-Mandeb, sent two destroyers to Hodeida and landed a 
company of marines. 62 Two days later the British sent their own 
naval units to balance the Italians and to try to keep Ibn Saud from 
becoming their neighbour at the Aden Protectorate. 63, 
- 567 -
Both powers demanded that Ibn Saud halt his forces and enter into 
negotiations, and Arab leaders chimed in with a call to end the 
fighting among Arabs and an offer to mediate the dispute. 64 Ibn 
Saud yielded and negotiations took place under the supervision of a 
cOI1ciliation commission composed of Egyptians and Syrians. 65 The 
resulting "Treaty of Muslim Friendship and Arab Fraternity" was 
concluded on 20th May 1934, between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, under 
the ~vatchful eye of a conciliation committee of representatives from 
other Arab States. 66 The treaty was called the Treaty of Taif. 
According to its terms, the disputed areas of Najran and Asir were 
to become fully incorporated sections of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, 
and Ibn Saud was to withdraw his forces from Yemen and payment was 
to be made to him of reparations of 100,000 sterling in gold. 67 
Although Ibn Saud's moderation was doubtless due in this instance to 
foreign pressure, Imam Yahya attributed it to the Ibn Saud's 
magnanimity and good will. In assuming this, he had the precedent 
of Ibn Saud's genuine disinterest and eminently fair decision 
concerning a minor border dispute to two years earlier. 68 
The tension which existed in Saudi-Yemeni relations subsided with 
the conclusion of the 1934 Treaty of Taif and set the stage for good 
future relations. 69 
In addition to the Treaty of Taif, several other fay tors contributed 
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to the development of good relations between the two countries 
during this period. First, although Imam Yahya had established a 
state designed to uphold traditional values, he was backed as its 
ruler by a nascent central government. He therefore had a good deal 
of incentive to settle his disputes with his neighbours in order to 
give him the freedom he needed to attend to internal matters of 
state. 70 Second, Ibn Saud had a good deal of incentive to settle 
his disputes as well. Having recently established the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, he was anxious to secure its borders and establish 
friendly relations with his neighbours. 71 As in the case of Imam 
Yahya, such freedom from outside concerns would enable the newly 
established ruler to devote himself to governing his people and 
attending to affairs of state. Third, from a practical standpoint, 
Imam Yahya had every tangible reason for wanting to maintain good 
reI a tions \vi th Saudi Arabia because he recognized Ibn Saud t s 
military superiority.72 
TIle lq34 war taught Imam Yahya to respect the strength of his 
northern neighbour, and made him a friend of Ibn Saud for life. The 
relations between Saudi Arabia and North Yemen were probably the 
best in the Arab Middle East. 73 
The improved relations between Saudi Arabia and North Yemen in the 
post-1934 period were strong enough to survive a number of potential 
political crises, including an unsuccessful attempt ,to assassinate 
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Ibn Saud himself. If there had been less trust between Ibn Saud and 
Imam Yahya, the fact that two of the would-be assassins were members 
of the Yemeni anny, might have resulted in the levelling of charges 
of government complicity before an investigation of the facts could 
take place. 74 
In lQ35, Ibn Saud and Crown Prince Saud were in Mecca for the Hajj 
(Pilgrimage). Both were perfonning the Tawaf, the ritual 
circumambulation of the Kaaba in the centre of the Holy Mosque in 
~~cca. Suddenly three youthful Yemeni fanatics, who had managed to 
push their way through the throng, leapt forward to attack Ibn Saud 
and his son Crown Prince Saud with daggers. nvO of the attackers 
were killed during the ensuing struggle with Ibn Saud's bodyguards, 
a third died of his injuries an hour later. Before the third 
attacker died, however, he admitted to Saudi authorities that he and 
his t~vo accomplices had intended to kill both Ibn Saud and the Crown 
prince. 75 
The investigation further disclosed that not only had there been no 
organized plot, but there had been no awareness of it of any kind on 
the part of the Imam's government, notwithstanding the fact that two 
of the at tackers were members of the Yemeni armed forces. Imam 
Yahya immediately disclaimed any involvement, and indeed was one of 
the first to send a message to Ibn Saud deploring the assassination 
attempt and expressing his thanks and relief that Iqn Saud and the 
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Crown Prince were safe. 76 
On 2nd April 1936, Yemen joined in a regional pact directed against 
Zionism in Palestine with Saudi Arabia and Iraq. This pact merits 
special note because it was unique in several respects : it was 
signed by the only states in the Arab world to have achieved their 
indepelldence at that time; it covered manifold aspects of relations 
among the three countries, including criminal laws, political and 
economic matters, territorial conflicts, religions and cuI tural 
matters and military co-operation; and it included a forward-looking 
provision which permitted any Arab state gaining its independence in 
the future to become a party to the pact. 77 
On 17th February 1948, Imam Yahya was assassinated outside Sanaa in 
a coup d' etat. Abdullah al-Hazir proclaimed himself the new Imam of 
78 the Yemen. He asked Ibn Saud to recognize him as the legitimate 
ruler of Yemen. In keeping with his policies, which ~V'ere aimed at 
stabilizing the Arabian Peninsula while repudiating violence and 
upholding agreements, Ibn Saud was horrified at the murder of a 
fellmV' monarch and the takeover and eschewed Abdullah al-Hazir' s 
request for recognition. Yahyats son Ahmad, with Saudi support, 
swept out of the northern mountains, deposed al-Hazir and sacked 
Sanaa. As a sign of appreciation for Ibn Saud's support, Imam Ahmed 
thereafter aligned himself politically with Saudi Arabia in foreign 
policy matters. 79 
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It should be noted that the 1948 coup in Yemen, the first to take 
place in the Arab world after the Second World '~ar, failed largely 
because of the revulsion caused by the murder of Yahya and the 
general sympathy with Ahmed. 
I~wever, Imam Ahmed continued to support the foreign policy 
initiatives of Saudi Arabia until Ibn Saud's death in 1953. 80 Unlike 
the 1948 coup d'etat, the 1955 coup attempt was largely a family 
affair. Rather than replace the Imamate system, the plotters sought 
to have Ahmed, the ruling Imam, step down in favour of his brother 
Abdullah. 81 Imam Ahmad's son Crown Prince Mohammad al-Badr, sent a 
delegation to Saudi Arabia requesting military assistance in his 
attempt to unseat Abdullah. King Saud quickly agreed to help al-
Dadr, but before the Saudi monarch was able to carry out his 
promise, Imam Ahmad himself had regained his throne. 82 . 
Saudi-Yemeni relations continued to improve during 1956 and 1957. 
Imam Ahmad travelled to Saudi Arabia in April 1956 for the first 
time, the first Yemeni Imam to visit the Saudi 'Kingdom, and be met 
by King Saud in Jeddah. 83 On the following day, they were joined by 
President Nasser of Egypt, and the three leaders then signed the 
Jeddah Mili tary Pact. 8'. Saudi Arabia and Yemen supported Arab 
causes, such as the Palestinian question, and condemned the 1956 
tripartite attack on Egypt. 8S 
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In 1956, Saudi Arabia's first ambassador to Yemen presented his 
credentials to Imam Ahmad. 86 Prior to that time, the two countries 
had conducted their relations through the exchange of ad hoc and 
temporary task/oriented missions on an issue-to-issue basis. 
Although the divergent interests of Yemen and Saudi Arabia led Imam 
Ahmad to pursue an independent foreign policy line, t11e cordial 
relations between the two countries continued as before. These 
divergent interests were exemplified by Yemen's joining the 1958 
union between Egypt and Syria, an action that Saudi Arabia did not 
support. 87 The Imam's new foreign policy direction, while not 
totally at odds with Saudi Arabia's, used previously untried 
channels to put an end to Yemen's isolationist stance and secure its 
interests in the world arena. In pursuit of these objectives, Imam 
Ahmad achieved a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and its allies, 
recognized the People's Republic of China and sought close ties ~Yith 
Nasser's Egypt. A8 Despite these moves, Saudi Arabia continued to 
co-ordinate itself politically with Yemen and to support the Imamate 
as the legitimate source of power in that country.89 
Imam Ahmad died in bed of natural causes on 19th September 1962. 
King Saud sent his brother Prince Fahd, then minister of education 
(the present King of Saudi Arabia), to head the Saudi delegation to 
North Yemen. This delegation, sent both to console the lfumid aI-Din 
family of Yemen and to congratulate the new Imam, Ahplad' s son 
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Nohatmnad a1-nadr, represented direct Saudi recognition of the 
legitimacy of Imamate rule in Yemen. It was also intended as a 
statement of Saudi Arabia's continuing commitment to its agreements 
with Yemen, particularly the 1934 Taif Treaty and the 1956 Jeddah 
H.i1itary Pact. 90 
The rule of Imam Hohammad al-Badr, lasted only eight days. On 26th 
Septemher 1962, revolutionary tanks in Sanaa opened fire on a1-
Badr's pa1ace. 91 The revolutionaries seized Radio Sanaa and 
proclaimed a republic. led by Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal, the 
insurp,ents began to systematically liquidate the ruling elements of 
92 the old regime, in particular the Sayyids. 
On 29th September 1962, the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) declared that 
it would respect the commitments and agreements which the defunct 
regime had concluded with other states, unless they were 
inconsistent with the country's independence and freedom. 93 
\*len the Yemeni revolution took place, Saudi Crown Prince Faisa1 was 
attending the Annual Meeting of the United Nations General 
94 Assemhly. . lVhen asked about the Yemeni "domestic affair" he said 
Saudi had nothing to do with it. 95 
Despite Saudi Arabia's initial neutrality vis-a-vis the revolution 
in North Yemen, the new repUblican regime in Sanaa, ,relying largely 
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on Egyptian military support, began to express hostile attitudes 
96 . 
towards Saudi Arabia. Instead of encouraging Saudi neutrality, 
let alone seeking its backing and support, Yemen Arab Republic 
President Abdullah al-Sallal launched a hostile campaign against 
Saudi Arabia. To wit, in October 1962, al-Sallal publicly announced 
his intention to extend a "republican form of government" to the 
entire Arabian Peninsula. 97 
Horeover, on 5th October 1962, Abd al-Rhman al"':Baydani, Deputy Prime 
Hinister of the YAR, called the Saudi Charge d'affaires in Sanaa and 
instructed him to leave the country.98 In the meantime, he ordered 
the closure of the Yerneni Legation in Saudi Arabia. In a speech on 
6th October 1962, al-Baydani clearly expressed his antagonistic 
attitude: 
\..j"e have taken all measures to move the battle to the 
Saudi territory and to Riyadh itself, if necessary. 
This is not for local consmption or propaganda. In 
the name of the government of the Yemen Arab Republic 
and in the name of the Yerneni people, I declare the 
acceptance of the Saudi challenge. He shall wait for 
it to begin. 99 
Prince Hassan, Imam Mohammad al-Hadr's uncle arrived in Jeddah on 
30th September 1962, from New York, and proclaimed himself as the , 
- 575 -
100 
new Imam of Yemen, and called for support. Saudi acceptance of 
his presence showed that he had their backing and this took the 
practical form of gifts of arms and money. By 8th october 1962, a 
royalist radio station was operating from Saudi territory and three 
days later came the first report of arms reaching royalist tribesmen 
through the Sharif of Bayhan who, according to al-Sa11al, received 
five million shillings from Riyadh for the purpose of fighting the 
101 new r.epublican regime. 
On 10th October 1962, Imam Hohammad al-Badr, who was believed dead 
by the republican regime in Sanaa, appeared and announced his plans 
to counter the republican regime in Sanaa and regain his throne. 
Cooflequently, Prince Hassan renounced his claim to the Imamate and 
joined his efforts with Imam al-Badr; who proceeded to the Yemeni-
Saudi border and sent a message to King Saud asking for more 
assistance.102 
However, on 27th November 1962, Faisal rejected President Kennedy's 
proposal to cease all assistance to the royalist forces. According 
to sources close to Faisal, the reason for this rejection were 
(1) that Saudi Arabia considered the Imam and his government the 
legal rulers of Yemen; (2) that a majority of the Yemeni people 
still supported the Imam and his government; and (3) that it was 
likely, indeed probable; that the Imam and his royalists would be 
able to defeat the republican forces before the end, of 1962.103 
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On 29th November 1962, President al-Sa1lal had publicly threatened 
to march his forces into Saudi Arabia as well as to recover Jizan, 
Najran and the province of Asir in the south western part of Saudi 
Arabia as it belonged to Yemen and should be returned to Yemen 
lOll proper. Also, al-Sa1lal asked a prominent Saudi Arabian refugee 
to form a government in exile. lOS 
106 Riyadh refused to recognize the republican regime in Sanaa. And 
Faisal dropped six ministers who had suggested that the al-Sallal 
regime should be recognized~107 However, on 20th December 1962, 
Radio Sanaa announced that the Yemeni republic possessed modern 
rockets with it intended to use against the royal palaces of Saudi 
Arabia, and indicated that Egyptian assurance of continued support 
had huoyed the confidence of the a1-Sa1lal regime.108 
The Saudi Arabian role in the Yemen conflict came as a result of the 
establishment of a republican regime in Sanaa and as a consequence 
of Egyptian intervention. l09 Saudi involvement was essentially 
110 defensive and conservative. The Saudi government adopted a 
three-pronged policy intended to ensure its security from the 
potentially dangerous events in North Yemen : to have the United 
States formally declare its support of Saudi integrity, to develop 
the capability of the Yerneni royalist forces so that the royalists 
,.,ould be able to keep both the United Arab Republic (UAR) and Yemen 
Arab Republic (YAR) forces engaged in Yemen and away, from Saudi 
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territory, and to remove the threat of YAR forces from the Arabian 
Peninsula. The interests of the royalists were consistently 
subordinated to the third objective. IiI 
It ,vas estimated that until March 1963, the royalists had 
received about $15 million in aid from Saudi Arabia.112 However, on 
2nd April 1965, ex-King Saud visited the Yemen himself, accompanied 
by the Egyptian Vice President Arner. He was welcomed by the YAR 
President al-Sallal, who greeted him as the legal King of Saudi 
Arabia. Saud replied that he recognized the Yemeni Republican 
Government on behalf of his subjects, and at a mass meeting on 24th 
April, he expressed hopes for a republican victory. Saudi, who 
presented $1 million to the republican government, said that he had 
left his country to avoid bloodshed, but that the continued presence 
of Rri tish and American mercenaries ivas forcing him to reconsider 
the situation.113 
Throughout the Yemen crisis, Saudi Arabia insisted on implementing 
the principle of "self determination" by the Yemeni people. When 
King Faisal ivas interviewed by Salim Habaji, the al-Hayat 
correspondent from Beirut, regarding the settlement for Yemen in 
November 1964, the following exchange occurred: 
f~baji : And what if you were asked to put forward 
a basis for a settlement? 
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Faisal : I would say exactly the same thing, namely, 
that the Yemeni people alone have the right to 
determine their destiny and choose the type of 
government and rulers they want.114 
Hhen Egypt withdrmv from North Yemen in 1967,115 Saudi Arabia lost 
interest in the Yemeni royalists. They had supported the royalists 
in opposition to the Egyptian presence and in opposition to the 
radicalism of the republican regime under a1-Sallal. Hhen, however, 
the Egyptian forces were wi thdrawn and a1-Sa11a1 was overthrown on 
5th November 1967, while on a visit to the Soviet Union, a new, 
moderate government emerged under the leadership of Quadi Abd al-
116 Ralunan al-Iryani. Unlike al-Sal1al, the new Yemeni leadership 
was \villing to accept the terms of the Khartoum agreement between 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The new YAR leadership also accepted, under 
the banner of "national reconciliation", the participation of some 
Yemeni royalists in the republican government.117 
Hope of ending the civil war 'vas destroyed on 10th January 1968, 
when the royalists launched an all out assault on Sanaa which nearly 
succeeded. The republicans rallied their forces with the assistance 
of the Soviet Union, which succeeded in lifting the siege, although 
the nmin Sanaa-Taez road remained cut off by the royalists. 118 King 
Faisal resumed aid to the royalists in a reaction to the 
intervention of the Soviet Union but he realised th~t to continue it 
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\vould accentuate the republican's dependence upon them. 119 However, 
Saudi support of the royalists in 1968 and 1969 was rather small in 
comparison with the days when Egypt had had its forces in North 
Yemen. 
On 13th February 1969, Saudi Arabia had worked to bring an end to 
the moderate al-Iryani government to restore the Imamate because it 
symbolized the new ideology-modernity, Arab unity, and social 
progress. However, when it became evident that the al-Iryani 
government had no formulated ideology Saudi objectives were 
120 
altered. On 25th November 1969, Saudi opposition to the republic 
was shelved in favour of sUstaining a w'eak republican government in 
Sanna. Such a policy aimed at fostering the historical animosity 
betHeen the tribes and the central government by carefully keeping 
the t\vo parties equal in strength. Saudi funds were made available 
to both the republican government and to the tribes. Each faction, 
therefore, became dependent upon Saudi money for its existence.121 
Ihe establishment of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY) was viewed by Saudi Arabia as the creation of a communist 
regime. The formation of a communist state in the Arabian 
Peninsula could not be tolerated by traditionalist Saudi Arabia.122 
It became imperative to the Saudi government to improve its 
relationship \vith the republican regime in Sanaa in order to develop 
unity of action in opposing the PDRY regime in the ~outh. The 
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Saudis feared that continual opposition to the republicans in Sanaa 
might influence the North Yemeni regime to move closer to the south 
in an attempt to form a unified front hostile to the Saudi 
government. 123 
Thus, in early 1970, King Faisal met with representatives of the 
Yemeni royalists and encouraged them to negotiate with the 
republican prime minister Mushin al-Iayni, to discuss a 
reconciliation government. 124 The "Islamic Conference" of foreign 
ministers which met in Jeddah during 23rd to 26th ~mrch 1970, and 
was attended by a Yemeni republican delegation led by the prime 
minister, provided the opportunity for such a meeting. 125 After the 
conference ended, both republican and royalist Yemeni factions began 
their negotiations with Saudi Arabia, which served as host as well 
as an observer. 
However, reconciliation depended upon the satisfactory resolution of 
two specific issues j namely, the future of Yemen and the role of the 
royal family. The republicans insisted on a Jumhuriya (republic), 
while the royalists pressed for the deSignation of Dawla (state). 
1he issue was resolved with the Saudi concurrence, when the Yemeni 
royalists accepted President Nasser's appeal to retain the name of 
the republic. The second issue was resolved when the Imam Nohammad 
al-Badr granted his permission to his royalists to make their own 
decisions. He also absolved them of their allegianc~ to him. Al-
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Badr then left Jeddah for exile in Britain.126 
In ~!ay 1970, agreement reached between the republicans and the 
royalists stressed the principle of national unity.127 According to 
the agreement t on 23rd May 1970, in the first Saudi aircraft to 
reach Sanaa since the 1962 revolution, there returned a large group 
of royalists headed by Ahmad al-Shami, who served as a foreign 
minister in the royalists' government in exile. lIe was made a 
member of the Republican Cotmcil, while some of his colleagues 
joined the Cabinet.128 
The Nay 1970 agreement was preceeded by Saudi recognition of the 
Yemeni repUblican regime on 8th April 1970, which demonstrated to 
both sides the Saudi position in favour of the reconciliation.129 
In July 1970, diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen 
Arab Republic were restored. 130 Thus, the reconciliation agreement 
reached by the republicans and royalists, and the Saudi recognition 
of the republican regime in Sanaa ended eight years (1962-1970) of 
131 bloody civil ~V'ar in North Yemen. 
Ilowever, Saudi involvement in North Yemen was an att~npt to 
reinstate the ancient regime by massive doses of financial and 
military assistance. As such, the Saudi role must be considered as 
intervention. It is true that the Saudi regime did not send 
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military personnel into Yemen, but it did allow the royalists to use 
its territory as a sanctuary. Saudi help to the royalists was 
undertaken not only to influence political and military events in 
Yemen, but also to give the royalists credence in international 
affairs. But when the royalists cause became less credible, the 
Saudi shelved their commitment to the royalists for the sake of 
political rapprochement with the republican regime in Sanaa.132 
During the Civil Har in North Yemen, Saudi policy had been conducted 
by Prince Sultan, minister of defence and aviation. Bypassing the 
Yemeni royalists, the Saudis frequently dealt directly with the 
Shaiks of the northern Yemeni tribes and paid them subsides. These 
operations continued after the Yemeni national reconciliation and 
the resumption of Saudi relations with the Sanaa government, Shaikh 
Abdullah al-Ahmar and other influential chiefs being recruited to 
the lists of Saudi clients. At the same time, the Saudi government 
extended a modest amount of budget support to the YAR. This dual 
Saudi leverage was applied to encourage conservative, if not 
reactionary, politics on the part of the Yemeni government, to 
thwart the efforts of President Abd aI-Rahman al-Iryani and other 
moderates to forge a national consensus by accommodation with 
leftist elements, and to prevent the relaxation of YAR opposition to 
the radical regime in South Yemen.133 
Having failed to overthrow the Harxist regime in th~ south, the 
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Saudi leaders had no choice but to bolster the regime in North Yemen 
against its southern neighbour. But the Saudis, fearing for their 
oml security, have been reluctant to make North Yemen too strong. A 
strong regime in Sanaa might also become too independent, something 
which is likely to be at odds with Saudi policies elsewhere in the 
peninSUla and beyond. Therefore, in order to keep North Yemen in 
line with Saudi Arabia's security requirement, the Saudi leaders 
combined their policy of strengthening the YAR regime with a policy 
of making it financially dependent on Riyadh. That course allowed 
then} to apply political and military pressure on Sanaa, thus 
interfering in Yemen affairs.134 
In ~July 1970, the Saudis made their first grant of $20 million and 
the tw-o countries exchanged ambassadors.135 Throughout 1971 and 
1972 King Faisal continued his policy of making Sanaa increasingly 
dependent upon Saudi financial aid. In March 1971 there was a large 
consignment of Inilitary equipment and school buses, in April a 
priIlting press and in October two aircraft, these were followed the 
next year by $1 million for hospital supplies and money to pay the 
salaries of 250 teachers. The tribal chiefs, without whose support 
the YAR could not survive, were given Saudi subsidies and there was 
a general belief that many of the leading ministers accepted bribes 
and that senior officers also received their shares.136 
In retlrrn, King Faisal demanded that a blind eye be, turned to his 
--~~~-----~-------
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building up on North Yemen soil an "Army of National Unity" from 
amongst the numerous refugees who had fled from the south, who were 
maintained in camps awaiting his signal to move across the 
f t · 137 ron ler. 
An important part of the Saudi design to ensure the safety of the 
Kingdom's southern border is the goal of supplanting a 10ng-
estahlished arms supply relationship between the YAR and the Soviet 
Union. 138 In 1972 a rift developed in YAR-Soviet relations because 
the Soviets dramatically increased quantitatively and upgraded 
qualitatively their arms supplies to South Yemen while reducing 
their military aid to North Yemen. 139 This provided the Saudis with 
an opportunity to prod Sanaa to switch to the West for arms. :Rut 
because the Saudis are never sure how strong they want the YAR to 
be, it took them three years to make up their minds, and it was 
prohably President Ibrahim al-Hamdi who forced their hands when he 
turned to the United States and France for an arms deal.140 
The failure of the Presidency Council led by the moderate Abd a1-
Rahman al-Iryani to cope with the country's political and economic 
difficulties led to a military coup in June 197'. headed by Colonel 
Ibrahim al-Hamdi.141 He seemed to be a strong, able, and popular 
man, capable of playing the roles of unifier of the YAR and balance 
of PDRy. 1I•2 After an initially disturbing start from the Saudi 
point of view, al-Barndi corrected course in November 1974 by 
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reconvening the Consultative Assembly, in which their client tribes 
had a dominant voice. 143 In January 1975 al-Hamdi went further in 
appeasing Saudi sensibilities by dropping Prime Hinister Nohasen al-
Aini, \'1ho, as signer of the 1972 unity agreement with PDRY, was 
strongly disliked by Riyadh. 144 In Al-Aini's place al-Hamdi 
145 
appointed Abd al-Aziz Abd aI-Ghani, a pro-Saudi government. 
Not surprisingly, President al-Hamdi's first trip abroad was to 
Saudi Arabia in July 1975, little more than three weeks after he 
assumed pow'er. The primacy of relations with the Saudis was further 
underlined ~'1ith Shaykh al-Ahmar led a delegation on an official 
visit to the Kingdom in August 1974. President al-Ilamdi visited 
Saudi Arabia three times in 1975, in part no doubt to reassure the 
Saudi leaders that his actions against their tribal clients were not 
a prelude to a radical re-structuring of Yemeni politics 146 and in 
part ot urge them to end their subsidies and other support to the 
tribalists and to fund the purchase of arms from the United States 
for the YAR armed forces .1l. 7 
In January 1975, al-Hamdi said YAR relations with Saudi Arabia were 
"at their zenith" and he won Saudi approval by setting up an office 
for Islamic Guidance with the brief of protecting the country 
against "imported ideologies which oppose Islamic teaching and 
traditions".148 On 28th May 1975, one of the dismissed officers, 
Lt. Colonel ~rujahed Abu Shawarib, tried to raise a ~ribal rebellion 
-------- --c----------
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in the northern areas but was put down. The Saudis were thus 
allow-ing al-Harndi to use his developing cormection with them to 
curtail the power of the tribes. 149 
In August 1975, Riyadh promised the YAR $100 million in budget 
support and $360 million in development aid. Al-Hamdi armounced 
that relations w'ith the Soviet Union were "frozen".150 He thus 
continued to use Riyadh support to weaken the tribes and to satisfy 
the nationalists in the YAR, and at the same time tried to balance 
his developing relationship with Saudi Arabia with the move to 
151 
appease PDRY and to keep an opening to Moscmv. 
In 1977 the Deputy Chairman of the Saudi development fund said that 
YAR "tops the most favoured countries 1ist,,152 and on 25th December 
1975, a joint commission for economic co-operation was established, 
due to meet every six months in the alternate capitals with senior 
ministers presiding over discussions of foreign policy, education, 
information and agricultural matters. The first session produced 
$373 million in aid, mostly for roads linking the two countries 
,,,hich also of course had strategic importance. There was also 
, 153 50,000 tons of petroleum and $180 million for a refinery •. 
Hand-in-hand with their financial assistance to the government in 
Sanaa, the Saudis have also continued over the years to subsidise 
the tribes, to an extent perhaps equivalent to the alflount of funding 
-- ---~---------
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provided to the YAR government. These subsidies are viewed by Saudi 
officials as an essential effort to establish "a buffer zone of 
Saudi influence against some future central government in YAR which 
may seek to adopt anti-Saudi policies". Ihe Saudi leadership 
believes that, so far, the power of the tribes as a counterforce to 
the central government has served them well and, accordingly, Riyadh 
will most probably maintain this policy, at least in the short term. 
Hhether the Saudis may be overestimating the power of some of these 
tribes in relationship to the central government and the extent of 
the Saudis' influence over them is difficult to say.154 
Hmvever, it would seem on the whole that Saudi Arabia, through her 
two tier policy of maldng YAR financially dependent on her, has 
strengthened her influence in YAR affairs. Indeed, several analysts 
see the Saudis as having been responsible for the overthrow of 
several YAR leaders who became too independent or more closer to 
PDRY, for example, the removal of Abd aI-Rahman al-Iryani from the 
presidency in 1974, and the dismissal of Nubsin al-Aini from the 
premiership in 1975.155 
The drama of higher diplomacy and international politics after 1975 
served as a backdrop against which the YAR and Saudi Arabia dealt 
more routinely with matters that recurrently concerned and sometime 
divided them. On 11th April 1976, Saudi defence minister Prince 
Sultan, the prince in charge of Yemeni affairs, visited Sanaa and 
agreed to increase aid to the YAR.156 
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In April 1976 President Ford announced that he would provide £140 
million worth of u'eapons,lS7 which had been paid for by Saudi 
Arabia. The American deal, however, was envisaged as the first 3-5 
years of a more comprehensive lo-year modernization plan for the YAR 
armed forces. It was also hoped that once this modernization plan 
was completed, the re-equipped YAR anned forces would be modelled on 
the :laudi force structure in equiJXlleIlt and training. Once the 
imnleTllentation of the modernization plan began, however, the Saudis 
show'ed their ambivalence about strengthening the anned forces of 
their more populous neighbour to the south. First, they delayed 
makin,,{ a firm commitment on which arms would be purchased, secondly, 
equip!1lent had to be delivered through the Saudi military mission in 
Sanaa which phased the release of equipnent to the Yemenis only 
after the Saudis were "satisfied that training and re-organisation 
schedules had been met", and thirdly, the Saudis insisted on 
administering the training of the YAR armed personnel. 150 
In this way the Saudi authorities were able to exclude from training 
the YAR officers who had previously received training in the Soviet 
Union. It should be mentioned here that YAR policy bas been to 
exclucle Soviet trained personnel from important positions. In 
short J the whole experience was very frustrating to both Yemenis and 
the Americans and no doubt the former resented the Saudis I heavy 
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159 handedness throughout the whole affair. 
For most of the remainder of 1976, Saudi relations with the YAR 
seeme(i to be on course even as al-Harndi continued to tighten his 
holel on the country. In August 1976, the Saudi development fund 
gave the YAR $86 million in loans and aid, and in October al-Hamdi 
paid a five day visit to Saudi Arabia. Tmvard the end of the year, 
how'ever, al-Harndi began to display a measure of independence in 
foreign policy that later taxed the limits of Saudi tolerance. 160 
Throughout 1977, al-Hamdi used the thinly veiled threat of closer 
ties, if not unification, with PDRY to get the Saudis to do certain 
things and to refrain fronl doing others; for example, to maintain 
generous levels of aid to the government in Sanaa and to cut back 
support for the tribes. 161 .On 22nd .Harch 1977, al-Harndi convened a 
Summit Conference on Red Sea Security at Taiz, , ... hich was attended by 
the heads of state of PDRY, Somalia, and the Sudan in addition to 
himself. 162 The Conference produced no practical results, but al-
HarnrH I s initiative produced mixed feelings among the Saudi leaders. 
In an interview given to al-Siyasah the following month, Crmvn 
Prince Fahd said that Saudi Arabia did not take part in the 
Conference because "we were not infonned on this subject in advance" 
and because "we believe" that the objectives sought "on such 
sensitive subjects" and the balance of political gains and 
complications that might result from them needed to be discussed 
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"objectively and scientifically", implying that Saudi Arabia had 
done that but the participants in the Conference had not.163 
Presinent al-Hamdi used his Red Sea initiative during the sameperiod 
to give the YAR some leverage in its unequal relationship with Saudi 
Arabia. The Red Sea, a vital international waterway, albeit less so 
than prior to the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967, became the 
focus of rene,,,ed attention because of political changes 
164 triggered by the revolution in Ethiopia in 1974. 
In Nay 1977 fights erupted bet,,,een the northern tribes and the 
government's forces', Riyadh sought to mediate. 165 AI-Harndi went to 
Riyadh on 23rd Hay 1977, his prime minister Abd aI-Ghani in early 
June, and al-Hamdi again at the beginning of July. During the 
mediation process, tribal fighters estimated to number 40,000 
occupied the towns of Khamir and S'ada and the surrounding area.166 
Saudi mediation achieved nothing. 
i\1-I1amdi continued to urge the Saudis to end their direct subsidies 
to the tribes and to channel aid for them through the central 
167 government. In 1977, the Saudi leaders privately expressing 
alarm over al-Barndi's stubbornness and impetuosity, concerns 
probably heightened by al-Harndi's requests that they get Shaykh al-
Ahmar out of the YAR so that his government might deal more freely 
'''ith some of the more troublesome tribalists. Good I feelings 
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~ener~ted by the conclusion of the triangular anos deals 
notwithstanding, the YAH 101as complaining to the United States by 
early 1977 that Saudi Arabia was delaying the delivery of arms under 
the uRreement and was refusing to consider promptly requests for 
additional arms. 168 l~evertheless, the Saudi-supervised delivery of 
u. S. arms did begin and by the fall of 1977 was moving along in a 
manner more or less to the satisfaction of the three parties. The 
Yemenis continued to complain in private over Saudi foot-dragging on 
their request for more impressive additions to their arsenal. A 
joke circulating in Sanaa at the time had the Saudi t s agreeing to 
the sale of tanks to the YAR only upon the intervention of a tank 
that could drive and shoot south but not north. l69 
The Saudi -Yemeni Joint Co-ordinating Council met in 1977 in Sanaa, 
to ,·,hich Saudi defence minister Sultan led a big ministerial 
dele~lltion and on each occasion Saudi Arabia cOlllllitted itself to a 
hlg~:] level of budget subsidies and development aid.170 On 20th 
October 1977, the YAR announced its five year plan, it relied 
heavily upon a Saudi promise of $571 million spread over the 
period.17l Jfowever annoyed or dissatisfied the Saudi leaders may 
have been with al-Hamdi, they apparently concluded that it was not 
in their interest to cut their aid and to lessen whatever leverage 
they had over him and his 8Overnment. On their part, al-Hamdi and 
his colleagues acted with some restraint, but were not yet 
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prepared to bite the hand that fed them.172 
On the 11th October 1977, President al-Hamdi and his soldier 
brother, Abdullah, were shot dead and left in a private house on the 
outskirts of Sanaa. The killers were not apprehended, and this act 
marked a turning point in the affairs of the YAR and its 
173 
neighbours. 
A statement by the Saudi government issued on 11th October, 
condemned the assassination174 and called upon the Yemeni people to 
rally around their new leadership. Al-Hamdi' s short lived 
successor, Colonel Ahmed al-Ghashmi, followed a strong pro-Saudi 
orientation and which the Saudis reciprocated ~vith all out support 
175 for him helped to establish and perpetuate that nation. 
On 15th October 1977, Saudi deputy minister of defence Prince Turki 
appeared unannounced in Sanaa to see the new President al-Ghashmi, 
and handed him a letter from King Khalid. On 24th December of that 
year the Saudis connnitted $570 million toward the YAR's $3.5 billion 
five-year development plan, which had started in 1967.176 
As al-Ghashmi had been reputed to be the Saudis' man in the al-Hamdi 
goverl]ment, relations between the client YAR and its Saudi patron 
were not regarded at the outset as problematic. In fact, the a1-
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Ghashmi government lvaS caught by nationalist sentiments and other 
political considerations squarely between the PDRY and Saudi Arabia. 
The new' and very suspect government in Sanaa had to convince the 
radicals in Aden and their North Yemeni comrades that it was not 
. abOtlt to hand the YAR over to the tribalists and Saudi Arabia177 and 
at tlle same time that it had to convince the Saudis that it intended 
to accommodate the tribalists and to be more responsive than a1-
Hamdi had been to Saudi security and strategic concerns. Although 
more patient with al-Ghashmi than with al-llrundi, the Saudis quickly 
came to question the new head of state's loyalty and competence. 
Indeed, they were beginning to have second thoughts by the spring of 
1978 as to whether the cure of a1-Ghashmi 'vas better than the 
disease of al-Hamdi. 178 
l~wever, on 22nd January 1978, Saudi Arabia gave the YAR $400 
million aid for development.179 And a high-ranking Saudi delegation 
had spent four days in Sanaa from the tenth to the thirteenth of 
Fehruary 1978, amid speCUlation that a Saudi-YAR defence pact was to 
be concluded soon. 180 In 1978 it was calculated that one million 
Yemeni citizens worked in Saudi Arabia, and sent home more than 
$1,5000 million. The greatest part of the country's foreign 
181 
exchange. 
lhe al-Ghashmi interlude ended only eight months after it began with 
the hang of a bomb that killed President al-Ghashrni, in his office on 
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24th June 1978.1B2 Killed with him was a man ~vho only moments 
before had arrived with a briefcase, a marl assumed at the time to be 
personal emissary of the PDRY head of state, Chairman Salim Rubaya 
Ali. Apparently, unbeknown to the emissary, the briefcase he 
carried 'vas booby-trapped.183 Again a statement by the Saudi 
government issued that day condemned the killing and held the PDRY 
responsible. 184 On 15th July, less than a month after the 
assassination, Lieutenant Colonel Ali Abdullah Salih was elected 
President and Commander in Chief by the People's Constituent 
185 Assembly. 
However, the Saudi government welcomed the election of Abdullah 
Salih as the YAR President and hoped that the government of the new 
President ~vould continue the good relations that existed between the 
two cmmtries. 186 
Nany ohservers in late 1978 thought that President Sa1ih's 
background and cOlmections made him a natural ally of Saudi Arabia. 
Horeover, the coup attempt in October 1978 convinced many that the 
vulnerable Sa1ih, if he were to survive, had no place to go other 
than deeper into the arms of the Saudis. 187 Moreover, Salih 
appointed Abdullah al-Asnaj long time adviser to Yemeni Presidents, 
close friend of the Saudis, and bitter enemy of the Marxist rulers 
of his native PDRY, foreign minister. Nohammad Khamis, another 
Yemeni with strong Saudi ties, remained head of the powerful and 
feared Central Organization of National Security, a p,ost he had held 
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under thre Presidents since 1975.188 
In September 1978, the Carter administration followed its 
predecessor's policy towards YAR and approved an additional arms 
sale of approximately $400 million, which was also financed by Saudi 
Arahia. 189 The first consignment of this equipment had to be rushed 
to the YAR when the war of February 1979 hroke out between the two 
Yemens.190 During the fighting of February, while the troops of YAR 
~vere reeling backwards, the Saudis, despite their previous promises 
of support and their mobilization, provided the YAR with no 
effective assistance. It was left to Syria and Iraq to save the YAR 
from utter rout by bringing pressure to bear on the PDRy.191 
President Salih resented this lack of help on the part of the Saudis 
and wished to lesson his dependence upon Saudi Arabia by acquiring 
more friends. 
The first phase, lasting from March 1979 until the end of the year, 
1vas characterized by mounting strain between Saudi Arabia and the 
YAR. 192 In the sumner of 1979 there were accounts of clashes 
be t1veen Saudi and Yemeni forces and in November the Na tional 
Democratic Front (NDF) radio reported encroachments in the 
neighhourhood of Sada and in the Jauf. Salih said in February that 
relations bet1veen the two countries were "excellent and ideal", but 
in J'.'larch there were stories of further fighting. It was said that 
200 Yemeni soldiers had been killed, and while this figure is 
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prohably a substantial exaggeration, it did show that there must 
have been some trouble in the area. 193 
The further strain between Saudi Arabia and the YAR was triggered by 
a familiar mechanism. President Sa1ih agreed to a union with the 
PDRY, and tried to reach an accommodation with the radical, anti-
Saudi NDF. 194 The Saudis, resenting Sa1ih's attempt to conciliate 
their enemies so soon after they had helped him in the war against 
the PDRY and NDF, and fearing the assertion of central government 
control over the northern tribes, their ultimate source of leverage 
over Yemeni affairs, sought to constrain his power.195 
The Saudis therefore restricted the supply of .American arms to the 
YAR that they had paid for in September 1978.196 The Saudis were 
ap,ain ambivalent about building up the YAR military capacity, 
reverted to delaying tactics, and withheld the delivery of the 
military equipment. 
The Saudis heavy-handed dealings with the YAR during the crisis 
period were a1most as damaging and humiliating to President Sa1ih as 
the army's poor shrn07ing in the fight with the PDRY. Under strong 
domestic political pressure, Sa1ih needed to shore up his position 
quickly ~qfth the military and with other nationalistic elements in 
the country. The surest way to do this was to stand up to the 
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Saudis by turning to the Soviet Union for arms, even if this cost 
him the support of some tribal leaders and conservatives.197 
Therefore, Salih renewed his country's long-standing military 
relationship with the Soviets. Moscow's response was equally swift 
and generous, as indicated by the large amount of anns provided to 
the YAR since then. Between 1979 and 1981 alone, the Soviet Union 
provided the YAR on easy credit tenns with some $600 million worth 
of major Inilitary equipment. 't<foreover, YAR leaders have always felt 
that, while the Soviet Union has provided considerable military 
assistance, it has not tried to dominate their country. They also 
view YAR relations with the USSR as a counterbalance to Saudi 
influence in their country. 198 
On 21st June 1979, relations between Saudi Arabia and the YAR became 
so frigid that the Saudis suspended all economic aid to bring 
Salih's government to heel.199 However, many Yemenis were angered 
by Saudi Arabia's deep involvement in the tribally-based "Islamic 
Front", regarding it as another instance of Saudi meddling in 
Yerneni affairs. 200 
President Salih dismissed his Chief of Security on 5th January 1980, 
who for years had earned Saudi approval by his activities in this 
important post, and this seemed a further move to the left. 201 A 
few months later he increased Saudi displeasure by flirting with the 
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so-called Steadfastness Front, the grouping of Arab states that were 
most pro-Soviet Union and anti-United States. 202 
On 12th January 1980, the Yemeni Prime Hinister headed a delegation 
to Riyadh that unsuccessfully tried to persuade the Saudis to 
restore their financial aid. According to press reports, the Saudis 
demanded that the YAR break its military relations with the Soviet 
Union, ease out the Soviet experts, and denounce the Soviet invasion 
of Afp,hanistan. In an interview in al-Hatan aI-Arabi of 18th 
January 1980, Crown Prince Fahd declared that co-operation between 
the YAR and the USSR had been blown up out of all proportion and 
asserted that Saudi Arabia and the YAR enjoyed "complete 
tmderstanding on all matters of common interests".203 
JTmvever, the Saudis reached an understanding with President Salih on 
lRth Barch 1980, that ended the confrontation with him and led to 
. . 204 the resumption of Saud1 f1nancial assistance to the YAR. 
According to Saudi sources, the YAR agreed to remove the Soviet 
advisers, and to renotmce the plans to bring the NDF into the 
government. Hhile Saudi Arabia agreed to provide substitute 
advisers and instructors to train the Yemeni army in the use of the 
Soviet ,,,eapons, and to restnne the supply of American weapons under 
Saudi auspices. YAR sources claimed that the understanding involved 
only acceptance of the "principle" of phasing out Soviet advisers, 
----c----------_ 
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and reassurance by the YAR that it was not drifting away from non-
alignment toward a Soviet orientated alliance with PDRY. 205 
The Saudis sent their minister of defence to Sanaa on 13th Hay 1980, 
to follmv up on the 18th March understanding with YAR. 206 Sa1ih saw 
that he could not afford to push matters too far and on 21st August 
1980, he went to Riyadh. Both Salih and the Saudis claimed to have 
achieved "full understanding on all matters" concerning their 
207 
countries. On 15th November 1980, unlike the Steadfastness 
Front, Salih did not boycott the Arab Summit in Amman and his newly 
appointed Prime Hinister Abd al-Karim al-iryani, was regarded as 
208 pro-Saudi. 
Hmvever, on 25th Narch 1981, there were further accounts of frontier 
clashes bet\veen Saudi Arabia and the YAR, in which it was said that 
over a score of soldiers had been killed. But both sides denied 
that there had been any incidents. The Saudi Minister of Interior 
Prince Nayf said that relations were "above suspicion". On 15th 
April 1980, the Saudi-Yemeni Co-ordination Committee resumed its 
meetings in a reported atmosphere of "great fraternity", denounced 
any interference in the affairs of the Arabian Peninsula by external 
forces and ended with promises of considerable Saudi aid for 
deve1opment. 209 
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The l<:eystone of the Sa1ih government's development diplomacy was 
continued generous project funding as well as budgetary support from 
Saudi Arabia, the YAR's biggest and only irreplaceable benefactor. 
The securing of this kind of Saud commitment that would reassure 
lesser donors required that the Sa1ih regime mend relations frayed 
over the previous two years, and this crucial task was also begun 
before the end of 1981. President Salih headed a large delegation 
to Saudi Arabia in early November, the YAR foreign minister was 
there for talks in the middle of the month, as was chief of staff in 
December. 210 
In early 1982, the YAR made the point of publicly announcing that 
Prince Sultan, the Saudi defence minister, long responsible for 
Yemeni affairs, had been personally invited to the development 
conference in early March, President Sa1ih paid another visit to 
Saudi Arabia. On 7th April 1982, ten days before the scheduled 
opening of the conference; Prince Sultan led a large ministerial 
delegation to Sanaa. Statements after the visit indicated that the 
Saudis were prepared to support the second five-year plan at a high 
level of funding. The keystone of the YAR's development diplomacy 
. 1 211 ln p.ace. 
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V Conclusion 
The h'ahhabi State established by Ibn Saud in 1926 had laid claim to 
the whole peninsula and had always tried to intervene in other 
states, except where blocked by their main rivals, the British. In 
193/1 the Saudis had defeated the Imam of the Yemen in a full-scale 
war in which they had laid the basis for deep resentment by annexing 
the three provinces. In the internal North Yemeni crises of 1948 
and 1955 the Saudis had intervened to save the Hamid aI-Din family 
from domestic threats. 
Hhen the September 1962 revolution occurred in North Yemen it did 
not take long for the Saudis to reactivate their interventionist 
campaip,n, and throughout the civil war they provided the main 
logistical, financial and material support to the Imam's royalists. 
This Saudi support was not based on any specific love for the Imam, 
but rather on a fear of the threat that the YAR posed to stability 
inside Saudi Arabia. Hence in 1970, when it was clear that a 
subsidized republic could be no threat, the Saudis abandoned the 
Imam and his family.212 
Saudi support of the Hamid aI-Din during the Yemeni civil war 
aroused mistrust and resentment on both sides which survived the 
peace and created residual tension in Saudi dealings with Yemen 
after the ~yar. AI though Saudi Arabia provided an anpual 
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contribution to the YAR budget, it was made painfully clear that 
this money might be withheld if Yemeni policies displeased the 
donor. Successive governments under al-Iryani's presidency were 
careful to avoid serious provocation, but none succeeded in reaching 
a cordial, frank basis of Yemeni -Saudi co-operation. The Saudi 
practice of paying Yemenis to press its views on the government was 
213 
a continuing irritant. 
To allay Saudi fears YAR leaders have found it necessary every time 
there is a change in leadership in Sanaa - to rush to Riyadh and 
reaffirm the continuation of "eternal" and "historical" relations 
bet~veen the two countries that are based on "good neighbourliness 
and blood ties". These are code-words that reassure the Saudis that 
the YAR will continue to respect the 1934 Taif treaty. Moreover, in 
197ft Saudi Arabia obliged the Yemeni Prime Minister Abd aI-Rahman 
al-Hajri to sign an agreement rene~ving the 1934 treaty but this 
agreement was never ratified because of the strong opposition it 
21Lf 
engendered from all political strata in North Yemen. 
Yemen Arab Republic is of major importance to Saudi Arabia and 
indeed to the entire Arabian Peninsula. Haintaining peace, 
stability and deterring Soviet influence in North Yemen and the 
Arabi,m Peninsula has been and will remain a preeminent Saudi 
priority. In the meantime, Saudi policy has aimed at narrow'ing the 
gap of mutual understanding between itself and North,Yemen through 
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pragmatic political policies and generous foreign aid programs. 215 
Saudi Arabia's foreign policy has been highly consistent, the 
hallmark of North Yemen's foreign policy has been its gross 
inconsistency. Frequent and often violent goverrunent changes in 
North Yemen have left the country without a well-known and well-
defined foreign policy.216 At the same time, North Yemen's attempt 
to play East against '~est has created difficulties in its relations 
,-lith Saudi Arabia. 
Since YAR remains vulnerable to external political, economic, and 
ideological pressures because of its economic and social needs, 
Saudi Arabia would likely welcome increased Yerneni dependence on 
Saudi financial and developmental aid. Such increased Saudi 
dependence would replace aid corning from ideological oriented 
countries, such as the Soviet Union and Red China. Such a 
development ~vould be a major victory for Saudi regional strategy and 
would eru1ance the Saudi led Arab moderation throughout the Arab 
world. In sum, North Yemen fits deeply and strongly into Saudi 
regional strategy and is highly regarded by Saudi decision-makers. 
YAR fits into Saudi Arabia's Islamic strategy because it embodies an 
Islamic state by virtue of its culture, traditions and population. 
As such, Saudi Arabia considers North Yemen to be an important 
component of its strategy and a country which shou1~ act as a good 
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Islamic role model for the rest of the world. In this respect, 
Saudi Arabia has not been disappointed in North Yemen. Islamic 1mV' 
and Islamic judiciary systems are preserved by North Yemen, as is 
Islamic education. These undertakings by North Yemen are made 
easier because, as a Muslim country, North Yemen has received Saudi 
financial aid allocated to Islamic nations. Thus, by actively 
p.romoting Islamic values, North Yemen has made an important 
contribution to advancing Saudi policies in the Islamic world. 
Saudi Arabia, in turn, appreciates the value of North Yemen support 
and hopes for its continued implementation. 
- 605 -
Footnotes 
1 Fouad al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development, London: 
Stacey International, 1980, p. 91. 
2 Hilliam B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980' s : Foreign PolicX, 
Securitx and Oil, Hashington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981, 
p. 10. 
3 There are approximately 500,000 North Yemenis working in Saudi 
Arabia and about 150,000 in various other Arab Gulf States. 
4 See Hichard F. Nyrop, Area Handbook for Yemens, first ed., 
Hashington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 164. 
5 Peter Hansfield, The Middle East : A Political and Economic Survex, 
Fifth ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 132. 
6 Ibid., p. 133. 
7 For more information, see Tareq Y. Ismael, Government and Politics 
of the Contemporarx Middle East, Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 
1970, pp. 381-382, and Mohamuad Kamal, AI-Yemen Shama11h Wa Jnobah, 
[AJ-Yemen North and South], Beirut: Dar aI-11m Lil-Maliyin, 1986, 
pp. 2/+-30. 
- 606 -
8 See David NcC1intock, The Yemen Arab Republic, in The Government and 
Politics of the f'1idd1e East and North Africa, David E. Long and 
Bernard Reich eds., Boulder, Colorado: Hestview Press 1980, pp. 168-
169, and also see S. H. Amin, LmV' and Justice in Contemporary Yemen: 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Yemen Arab Republic, 
G1asgm-l: Royston Ltd., 1987, pp. 49-50. 
9 Peter Nansfie1d, The Hidd1e East A Political and Economic Survey, 
Fifth ed., p. 134. 
10 See C..eorge Lenczowski, The ~1idd1e East in World Affairs, Fourth ed. t 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1980, p. 613. 
11 Tareq Y. Ismae1, Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle 
East, p. 389. 
12 During 1907 and 1908, Hohammad Ali al-Idrissi of Asir revolted 
against the Turkish nominal authority and established the Idrissi 
Dynasty of Asir. 
13 For further information, see Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of 
State) to Sir R. Graham (Rome), Foreign Office, 24th July 1933. No. 
181, K. Bourne and D. C. Watt (eda.), British Documents on Foreign 
Affairs : Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential 
Print, Part II, Series B. Vol. 9, (R. Bidwell ed.), l?oc. 7, 
- 607 -
pp. If2-43; and also see Sir John Simon to Hr. Calvert (Jeddah), 
Forei~l Office, 27th July 1933. No. 196, British Documents on 
Foreign Affairs : Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office 
Confidential Print, Part II, Ibid., Doc. 9, pp. 43-46. 
14 For more information concerning the situation in Asir during 1925 
and 1q26 and the internal struggle for pmver, see Armstrong, H.C. 
Lord of Arabia, Beirut: St. Paul's Press, 19M, p. 203. See also 
Amin Said, i\l-Yemen : A Political History, Vol. 2, Cairo: Dar Ahiya 
al-Kutub al-Arabiyah, 1959, pp. 180-190. And Toynbee, Arnold, 
Survey of International Affairs, Vol. 1, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1927, pp. 321-323. 
15 See Yahya Khalil, Tarikh al-Hamllkah al-Araby-ah al-Saudyah, al-
Hady wa aI-Hader, (History of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Past and 
Present], Beirut: Dar ~~ktubt al-Haiah, Vol. 2, 1970, pp. 189-193. 
16 For the original Arabic text of the t1ecca Agreement of 1926 see 
Najmuat al-Huahadat, Vol. 1, pp. 23-24. The English translation is 
found in J. C. ffurewitz, Dipiomacy in the Near and Middle East : A 
Documentary Record 1914-1956, Vol. 2, Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand 
and Co. Inc., 1956, pp. 148-149; and also found in K. Bourne and D. 
C. Hatt (eds.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and 
Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series 
13, Vol. 5, (R. Bidwell ed.), Doc. 304, [E392/22/91]"PP. 266-267. 
- 60R -
17 In addition to the surrendering of its external affairs to Saudi 
Arabin, the Asiri Consultative Assembly decided in March 1932 to 
relinquish the administration of the country in favour of Saudi 
Arabia. See aI-Rashid, Ibrahim (ed.), Documents on the History of 
Saudi Arabia, Vol. 3, Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 
1976, pp. 162-163. 
113 For further details concerning the Saudi mission to Imam Yahya and 
the Yemeni stands concerning Asir and the Saudi-Asiri Treaty see 
Amin Said, AI-Yemen: APolitical llistory, pp. 79-81. 
19 See aI-Rashid, Ibrahim (ed.), Documents on the His tory of Saudi 
Arabia, Vol. 3, pp. 159-160. 
20 Variolls interpretations have been offered to explain the Asiri 
revolt. The most commonly cited are : 
1. The cessation of the Saudi's financial aid to Amir Hassan for 
a period of six months. 
2. The personal animosity that arose between Hassan al-Idrissis 
and the Saudi governor of Asir. 
3. TI1e dissatisfaction of the Idrissis over the annexation of 
Asir by Saudi Arabia. [This interpretation is erroneous 
because the incorporation of Asir into Saudi Arabia did not 
take place liltil after the Asiri revolt in 193f.1 
- 609 -
The combined effect of the first two factors may have had an effect 
on the Asiri uprising. Some other external factors, however, may 
have had a more profound and important impact. Among the most 
important external factors (which could be the subject of a separate 
study) ~ve may enumerate the following : 
1. The I talian government's interest in extending its influence 
to the Red Sea area during the early 1920's and Nussolini's 
efforts and policies aimed at raising his country's status to 
that of a major power. 
2. The Italian-Yemeni connection and the two countries' mutual 
interests as reflected in the 1926 Italian-Yemeni Treaty of 
i\mity and Commerce and the 1927 "Secret Agreement". The 
agreement dealt mainly with supply of Italian armaments and 
munitions to Imam Yahya to enable him to implement his 
territorial expansionist ambitions in Asir and to face the 
Saudi challenge there while Asir was a Saudi protectorate. 
3. TIle refusal of Saudi Arabia to grant oil concessions to Italy 
on Farsan Island (at the time of the Italian request Farsan 
was a part of the Idrissi territories), and to build a 
military base there. As a means to pressure Saudi Arabia, 
Italy encouraged the revolt and supplied the Idrissis with 
arms and munitions. 
For further information concerning the various interpretations, see 
- 610 -
al-Rashid, Ibrahim (ed.), Documents on the History of Saudi Arabia, 
Vol. 3, pp. 11+6-147, 150-151, 153 and 161. Also see Hans Kohn, 
"The Unification of Arabia", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 13 1934, pp. 
99-101. 
21 For ftrrther information concerning Italy's objectives in the Red Sea 
area and its policies and interests in Yemen, Asir and Saudi Arabia, 
see l~ric Nacro, Yemen and the Hestern Horld, New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1968, especially pp. 62-67; and also see Governor of Aden 
to Hr. Ormsby Gore (communicated by Colonial Office 19th June), 
Aden, 26th 'tlary 1937. (Secret) K. Bourne and D. C. Watt (eds.), 
British Docwuents on Foreign Affairs : Reports and Papers from the 
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Vol. 12, (R. 
Bidwell ed.), Doc. 127, pp. 202-204. For the text of the Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce of 1926 between Italy and Yemen, see .J. C. 
Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East : A Documentary 
Record 1914-1956, Vol. 2, pp. 146-147. For the text of the Secret 
Agreement between the two countries, see J. C. Hurewitz, Documents 
on International Affairs, New York: Columbia University Press; 1928 
pp. 222-224. 
22 For the text of the message, see Amin Said, A1 Yemen : A Political 
History, Vol. 2, pp. 85-86. And for the boundary bet~yeen the two 
countries, see The Geographical Review, Vol. 47, New York: The 
American Geographical Society, 1957, pp. 589-591. 
- 611 -
23 See U~n al-Kura t 19th October 1932 t (Jeddah) and (Mecca). 
24 For more detailed information concerning the Abha Conference and 
Debates, see Amin Said, Tarikh al-Doulah al-Saudiah, Min Moh~ad 
Ibn Saud to Abd aI-Rahman al-Faisal, [History of Saudi Arabia: 
From Hoh~nad Ibn Saud to Abd aI-Rahman al-Faisal, Vol. 1, Riyadh: 
Ki.ng Abd al-Aziz Publisher, 1975, pp. 380-382. And also see, Amin 
Said, Al-Yemen : A Political History, Vol. 2, pp. 91-97. 
25 See Ahmed Assah, Hiracle of the Desert Kingdom, London: Johnson 
Publicati.ons Ltd., 1969, p. 62. 
26 For the Italian government's involvement in the Yemen, see Eric 
Nacro, Yemen and the Hestern \>lorld, p. 66, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to ~rr. Calvert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taif (Saudi 
Arabia), 30th July 1933. (Secret) K. Bourne and D. C. Watt (eds.) 
British Documents on Foreign Affairs : Reports and Papers from the 
Foreiml Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Vol. 9, (R. 
Bid'vell ed.), Doc. 27, pp. 69-70. And also see note 20. 
27 For the text of the declaration of ~var, see Moh~ad al-l-fana, 
Arabia Unified : A Portrait of Ibn Saud, London: Hutchinson 
Benham Ltd., 1980, pp. 209-213; Amin Said, History of Saudi Arabia 
From Hohaunnad Ibn Said to Abd aI-Rahman al-Faisal, Vol. 1, pp. 390-
39ll and Amin Said; Al-Yemen : A Political History, ,vol. 2, pp. 92-96 
- 612 -
28 See Hr. Calvert to Sir John Simon, Jeddah, 3rd October 1933, No. 305 
K. Bourne and D. C. Hatt (eds.), British Documents on Foreign 
Affairs : Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential 
Print, Part II, Series B. Vol. 9 (R. Bidwell ed.), Doc. 51, pp. 111-
112, tlr. Calvert to Sir John Simon, Jeddah, 2nd November 1933, No. 
186 Ibid., (Telegraphic) R, p. 113, and Mr. Calvert to Sir John 
Simon, Jeddah, 24th October 1933, No. 322, Ibid., Doc. 54, pp. 113-
115. 
29 For the British, French, and Italian interests in the Yemen and 
their competition for influence in the Red Sea area, see Eric Macro 
Yemen and the Hestern Horld; also see Ahmed Assah, Miracle of the 
Desert Kingdom, p. 62, and Amin Said, AI-Yemen: A Political 
History, pp. 373-378. 
30 See "Developments in the Saudi-Yemeni Complex". A report to the 
Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 28th August 1931" in a1-
Rashid, Ibrahim (ed.) Documents on the History of Saudi Arabia, 
Vol. 3, pp. 180-191, and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 13, October 1931f, 
p. 102. 
31 For the original text of the 1934 Taif Treaty of Islamic 
Friendship and Brotherhood Between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, and 
Arbitration, Covenant, and exchange of notes, see Majmuat a1-
Huahadat, Vol. 3, pp. 150-160. For the English vers;ion of the 
- 613 -
Treaty, see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 137, 1934, pp. 
670-083, and K. Bourne and D. C. Watt (eds.), British Documents on 
ForeiSI1 Affairs : Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office 
Confidential Print, Part II, Series B. Vol. 10 (R. Bid~vell ed.) 
Doc. 94, pp. 170-176. 
32 For more information, see Khair al-Dyin, Shabah al-Jazirah Fy Ahd 
aI-Halik Abd al-Aziz, [The Arabian Peninsula : Reign King Abd a1-
Aziz] , First ed., Beirut: Dar al-I1am Llmalyain, 1985, pp. 37-42. 
33 See llanfred ,~. Henner, Hodern Yemen: 1918-1966, Baltimore, 
Haryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, p. 142. 
3L, H. st. John Phil by , Arabia, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1930, p. 239. 
35 Ameen a1-Rihani, Around the Coasts of Arabia, London: Constable, 
1930, pp. 166-167. 
36 Amin Said, Al Yemen A Political History, Vol. 2, p. 76. 
37 Toynbee, Arnold, Survey of International Affairs, Vol. 2, London: 
Oxford University Press; 1928, p. 320. 
- 614 -
3B Armstrong, H. C., Lord of Arabia, pp. 202-20Il. 
39 See Ahmad Hussain, Al-Yemen Ki11al al-Trikh, [AI-Yemen Through 
History], 3rd ed., Riyadh, Dar al-Katab Publisher, 1986, p. 83. 
1,0 Toynbee, Arnold, Survey of International Mfairs, Vol. 2, p. 320. 
41 See Hohammad Sayyid, Al-Yemen, Cairo: Dar al-Harif, 1963, pp. 122-
124, and Hanfred H. Henner, Modern Yemen: 1918-1966, p. 144. 
!t2 See Sharaf al-Din Ahmad, Tarikh al-Yemen, [The Yemen History], 
Cairo: Hatbat al-Sinna al-Nuhammadiyya, 1963, pp. 277-278, Hajmuat 
al-Uuahadat, Vol. 1, pp. 23-24, and K. Bourne and D. C. Hatt (eds.) 
British Docwnents on Foreign Mfairs : Reports and Papers from the 
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B. Vol. S (R. 
Bidwell ed.), Doc. 304 t [E392/22/91], pp. 266-267. 
1,3 Khalid Fahd, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Beirut: Dar al-Katab al-Arabi, 
1970, pp. 361-364. 
L,4 See Abel al-Hasi Ali, Al-Yemen ~va al-Imam Yahya, [The Yemen and Imam 
Yahya], Cairo: Al-Matba'a al-Salfiyya, 1927, p. 106. 
IfS Amin Said, Tarikh al-Dawlah al-Sauddyyah t [History of Saudi Arabia], 
Vol. 2, Beirut: Dar al-Katab aI-Arabi, 1961l, pp. 135~138. 
- 615 -
l~n See Hmfred H. Henner, I'fodern Yemen : 1918-1966, p. 145, also see 
al-Rnmadi Jamal, At-Yemen, Cairo: Kutub Qawrniyyah, 1963, pp. 93-95. 
tl7 For the text of the treaty, see Toynbee, Arnold, Survey of 
International Mfairs, 1925, pp. 59(}-593. 
l.n See Hnnfred H. Henner, Hodern Yemen : 1918-1966, p. 1I,t., aI-Rashid 
Ibrahim (ed.), Documents on the History of Saudi Arabia, Vol. 3, 
po. 11,6-147, 15D-151, 153 and 161. And see note 20. 
49 Ahd nl-Rahman Nohamnad, Tarikh aI-Yemen, [The Yemen History], Cairo: 
Hathat al-Tahrir, 19M, p. 113. 
50 Amin ,C}aid, History of Saudi Arabia, Vol. 3, Riyadh, King Abd al-Aziz 
l-ublishing House, 1975, pp. 365-366. 
51 See lfm'll1 al-Kura, llfth Hay 1931. (Hecca). 
52 Amin Said, Ilistory of Saudi Arabia, Vol. 3, pp. 366-370. 
53 See Uill'll1 a1-Kura, 13th January 1932. (Uecca). 
5l~ Hanfred H. Henner, Nodern Yemen 1918-1966, p. 145. 
55 See Khalid Fahd, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, pp. 315-317. 
- 616 -
56 Ibid., pp. 368-370. 
57 See Umm al-Kura, 2l.th August 1933. (Hecca). 
58 See Abdullah al-Jarafi, AI-Nugtataf t-lin Tarikh aI-Yemen, [Memories 
from Yemen' History], Cairo: Dar Ihya al-Kutub al-Arabiyyah, 1951, 
pp. 103-10L~. 
59 See Amin Said, AI-Yemen: A Political Jtlstory, Vol. 2, pp. 92-96, 
and also see Hanfred H. Henner, Hodern Yemen : 1918-1966, p. 146. 
60 See n. s. Jolm Philby, Saudi Arabia, London: Ernes t Benn, 1955, 
p. 323. 
61 Nohammad al-Hana, Arabian Unified : A Portrait of Ibn Saud, pp. 210-
211, and. Amin Said, History of Saudi Arabia : From Mohammad Ibn Saud 
to Abd al-Rahrna al-Faisal, Vol. 1, pp. 382-385. 
62 See Eric Hacro, Yemen and the Hestern Horld, pp. 60-69, and see 
Nj_nister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Calvert, Hinistry for Foreign 
Affairs, Taif (Saudi Arabia), 30th July 1933. (Secret) K. Bourne 
and D. C. \<latt (eds.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: 
Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part 
II, Series B. Vol. 9 (R. Bidwell ed.), Doc. 27, pp. 69-70. 
- 617 -
63 For more information, see Harold Ingrams, The Yemen : Imams, Rulers 
and Hevolutions, London: Camelot Press Ltd., 1963, pp. 60-70. 
(A TI. st. John Philby, Arabia Jubilee, New York: John Day, 1953, pp. 
277-278. 
65 See Hmm al-Kura, 12th May 1934. (Mecca). 
66 For more information, see al-Namlakah al-Arabiyyah al-Saudiyyah, 
Hazarat al-Kharijiyyah. Bayan An al-Ilaqat baYTI al-Hamlakah al-
Saudiyyah Ha aI-Imam Yahya, Imam aI-Yemen, Hecca, [Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, Foreign Ministry : The Communique about the Relations 
be t~iTeen Saudi Arabia and Imam Yahya of Yemen, Mecca : Umrn al-Kura 
Press, 193Ll. And also see K. Bourne and D. C. Hatt (eds.), 
British Documents on Foreigrt Affairs : Reports and Papers from the 
Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part II, Series B. Vol. 10 (R. 
Bidwell ed.), Doc. 94, pp. 170-176. 
67 K. Bonrne and D. C. Hatt (eds.), British Documents on Foreign 
Affairs : Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential 
Print, Part II, Series B. Vol. 10, (R. Bidwell ed.), Doc. 94, pp. 
172-173. Mld Majmuat al-~fuahdadt. Vol. 3 j pp. 150-151. 
68 See Quincy Hright "Arbitration of the al-Arou Hountain", American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. XXXIII, 1939, PP', 357-358. 
- 618 -
69 See Umffi a1-Kura, 24th September 1934. n1ecca). 
70 Saeed, nadeeb, The Saudi-EgyPtian Conflict Over North Yemen, 
Boulder, Colorado: Hestvie~v Press, 1986, p. 13. 
71 For more information, see l<hair al-Dyin, lbe Arabian Peninsula 
Heign King Abd a1-Aziz, 2nd ed., pp. 50-51. 
72 See J. Peterson, Yemen : The Search for a Hodern State, Baltimore, 
Hary1and: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982, pp. 38-41. 
73 See Umm al-Kura, 13th Hay, 1935. (Mecca). 
74 Saud lTazlou1, Tarikh Huluk a1-Saud, [History of the Saudi Kings], 
1st eel., Riyadh: Riyadh Press, 1960, pp. 225-229. 
75 See Hohammad a1-Hana, Arabia Unified : A Portrait of Ibn Saud, p. 
21, and also see Saudi Hazloul, History of the Saudi Kings, p. 228. 
7h Ibid. 
77 For more information, see "Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1937", 
FO 371/21908, pp. 13-15. 
- 619 -
78 David NcClintock, The Yemen Arab Republic, in The Government and 
Politics of the ~1iddle East and North Africa, David Long and 
Bernard ReIch (eds.), Boulder, Colorado: Hestview Press, 1980, p.i70 
79 See Ahmad Hssh, Huajizatun Faug al-Rimal, [A Miracle on the Sands], 
2nd eel., Beirut: al-Natabi al-Ahliyah al-Lubnaniyah, 1966, p. 125. 
no For more informa tion see; George Lenczowski, The Hiddle East in 
Horld Affairs, 4th ed., Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1980, p. 621. 
81 See Harold Ingrams, The Yemen Imams, Rulers and Revolutions, pp. 
90-c)1. 
82 See Hanfred H. Henner, ~fodern Yemen 1918-1966, pp. 111.-117. 
83 Al-Bilad, 19th April 1956. (Jeddah). 
B4 See lfohammad Khalill, The Arab States and the Arab League : A 
Documentary Record, Vol. 2, Beirut: Khayats, 1962, p. 251. 
85 See lncaz, 29th November 1956. (Jeddah). 
86 See Al-Jazirah, 20th May 1956. (Riyadh). 
- 620 -
87 See note 81, chapter 7. 
88 r~p,ar O'Ballance, The War in the Yemen, London: Faber and Faber 
Ltd., 1971, pp. 54-55, and George Lenczowski, The Middle East in 
Horld Mfairs, pp. 621-622. 
89 See AI-Rilad, 25th Narch 1962. (Jeddah). 
90 Peter Bans field , The Hiddle East : A Political and Economic Survey, 
5th ed., p. 138, and Saeed Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over 
North Yemen, p. 18. 
91 For more detailed information, see Scot Gibbons, The Conspirators, 
London: Howard Baker, 1968, pp. 5-25, Edgar O'Ballance, The War in 
the Yemen, p. 67, Adams Schmidt, Yemen: The Unknown Har, New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, pp. 20-36, and George LenczQl;vski, 
The ~liddle East in World Affairs, 4th ed., p. 626. 
92 See George Haddah, Revolution and Military Rule in the ~liddle East, 
Santa Barbara: University of California Press 1974, p. 235, Sharabi 
Hohmmnad, The Road of the Yemeni Revolution, Joint Publication 
Service, 1967, pp. 30-39, and for the English translation of the 
full text of the Yemen Constitution of 1962, see Peaslee, Amos J., 
Constitutions of Nations, 'The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, 3rd 
revised ed.), Vol. II, pp. 1266-1279. 
- 621 -
93 Harold Ingrams, The Yemen Imams, Rulers and Revolutions, p. 132. 
gLI See eha pter two, p. 60. 
95 Foreign Reports Bulletin, (FRB) , 12th October 1962, p. 1. 
96 See Chapter six, pp. L+62-l+67. 
97 Saeed Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict OVer North Yemen, p. 52. 
98 Abd ELl-Rahman al-Baydani, Azimat aI-Amah al-Arabyyiah Ha Thawrat al-
Yemen, [The Arab Crisis and the Yemen' Revolution], Cairo: Dar al-
Alarn, 198/+, p. 83. 
99 Ibiel., pp. 93-95, and. BBC Summary of Horld Broadcast (SHB), Part 4, 
3rd October, 1962, p. 3. 
100 See Chapter six, note 105. 
101 See Hobin Bidwell, The !'ivo Yemens, Boulder, Colorado: Hestview 
Press, 1983, p. 198. 
102 For more information, see Cortada, James, The Yemen Crisis, Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1965, and also see Edgar 
O'Ballance, The War in the Yemen, pp. 78-79. 
- 622 -
103 Hanfred H. Henner, Modern Yemen 1918-1966, p. 200. 
104 See Ruz aI-Yousuf, 9th November 1962, (Cairo), and Christian 
Science Honitor, 6th December 1962. 
105 AI-Abram, 23rd November 1962. (Cairo). 
106 U1caz, 10th December 1962. (Jeddah). 
107 See AI-Jazirah, 13th December 1962. (Riyadh). 
108 The Times, 28th October 1962. (London). 
109 For Inore information about the Egyptian intervention in North 
Yemen, see Chapter six pp. 462-477 •• 
110 See Kathryn Eoals, Modernization and Intervention : Yemen as a 
Theoretical Case Study, PrincetOtl {Jniversity Press 1970, p.l 280. 
111 Hohammad A. Zabarah, Yemen : Traditionalism vs. Nodernity, New 
York, Praeger Publisher; 1982, p. 76. 
112 See AI-Mlram, 20th April 1963. 
113 FAlgar O'Ballance, The War in the Yemen, p. 173. 
- 623 -
114 See (erald de Gaury, Faisal King of Saudi Arabia, IDndon: Arthur 
Barker, 1966, p. 137. 
115 See chapter six, pp. 477-478, and for the terms of the Yemen Peace 
Agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, see chapter 7, 
note 160. 
116 See George Lenczowski, The Niddle East in Hor1d Affairs, llth ed., 
pp. 633-634. and also see Mohammad A. Zabarah, Yemen :. 
Traditionalism vs. Nodernity, p. 106. 
117 Abd aI-Rahman al-Boyidani, The Crisis of the Arab Nation and the 
Yeme1li Revolution. p. 749. 
118 See Fred Halliday, Arabia Hlthout Sultans, Penguin Books Ltd., 1974, 
1lfl-120. 
119 AI-Ahram, 13th December 1968. (Cairo). 
120 Hohamlllad A. Zabarah, Yemen Traditional vs. Modernity, p. 76. 
121 Ibid.,pp.76-77. 
122 For more information, see chapter five, pp. 397-404. 
- 624 -
123 For more information about the Saudi government co-operation with 
North Yemen against the South, see Hordechai Abir, Oil, Power and 
Politics : Conflict in Arabia, the Red Sea and the Gulf, London: 
Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1974, pp. 86-92. 
124 See Akhbar aI-YaUln, 14th February 1970. (Cairo). 
125 See Peter t1ansfield, The Hiddle East A Political and Economic 
Survey, 5th ed., p. 141. 
126 Saeed Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen, p. 86~ 
and ('.,eorge Lenczm>lski, The Middle East in Horld Affairs, 4th ed., 
p. 63ff. 
127 For more information about the national unity between the 
repuhlicans and the royalists, see Ahmed al-Shami, Rayah al-Takyier 
Fi aI-Yemen, [The Yemen toward Change], 1st ed., Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia; 1984, al-Haktbah aI-Amah, pp. 210-232. 
128 Ibid., pp. 312-318, and Robin Bidwell, The Two Yemens, p. 218. 
129 See AI-Riyadh, 29th May 1970, (Riyadh). 
and aI-Ray al-Amm, 2nd April 1970~ (Kuwait). 
- 625 -
130 See i\l-Jazirah, 15th July 1970. (Riyadh). 
and i\l-Riyadh,16th July, 1970. (Riyadh). 
131 For more information about the situation in YAR after the 
reconciliation between the republicans and the royalists, see J. 
Peterson, Yemen : The Search for a Modern State, Baltimore, 
Hary land, The ~Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 
132 See Abd aI-Rahman al-Boyidany, The Crisis of the Arab Nations and 
the Yemen Revolution, pp. 401-404, and also see ~IDhrumnad A. Zabarah, 
Yemen: Traditional vs. Modernity, p. 77. 
133 See Robert \1. Stookey, Yemen : The Politics of the Yemen Arab 
Republic, Boulder, Colorado: Hestview Press, 1978, p. 260. 
13L. See 1',1. S. El Azhary, Aspects of North Yemen's Relations with Saudi 
Arahia in Contemporary Yemen : Politics and Historical Background, 
B. R. Pricihanl (ed.), London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1984, p. 198. 
135 Al-Jazirah, 27th July 1970. (Riyadh). 
and AI-Riyadh, 28th July 1970. (Riyadh). 
136 See Robin Bid~ell; The ~vo Yemens, p. 243. 
- 626 -
137 Nonlechai Abir, Oil, Power and Politics Conflict in Arabia. the 
Red Sea and the Gulf, pp. 88-89. 
138 For more information about the relations between the YAR and the 
USSH, see Stephen Page, The USSR and Arabia, The Development of 
Sov.iet Policies and Attitudes tm18rds the Countries of the Arabian 
Peninsula 1955-1970, London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1971. 
139 See Stephen Page, The Soviet Union and the Yemens ; Influence in 
Asymmetrical Relationships, New York: Praeger Publishers 1985, p.157 
140 Al-TI1awra, 24th July 1975. (Sanaa) 
and International Herald Tribune, 4th August, 1975. 
141 Richard F. Nyrop, Area Handbook for Yemens, p. 142, and George 
Lenczowski, The Hiddle East in Horld Affairs, 4th ed., pp. 635-636. 
142 See Al-Nhar, 15th May 1974. (Beirut). 
143 Al-Thawr a, 24 th December 19 7 L~ • ( Sanaa) • 
144 Al-Hiyadh, 29th January 1975. (Riyadh) 
and for the 1972 unity agreement between the two Yemens, see chapter 
five, pp. 400-401. 
- 627 -
145 AI-Thmrra, 15th February 1975. (Sanaa). 
146 See Robert D. Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic : The Politics of 
Development, 1962-1986, Boulder, Colorado: Hestview Press, 1987, p. 
79. 
1I~8 Al-Thmrra, 14th January 1975. (Sanaa). 
149 ~1iddle Fast Economic Digest, (l'lEED), 22nd August, 1975. 
150 See \'lashington Post, 3rd August 1975. 
and al-Nhar, 5th August 1975. (Beirut) • 
151 See al-Hmmdith, 10th December 1975, pp. 12-14, (Beirut), and Middle 
FBst Economic Digest (MEED), 19th December 1975. 
152 Al-Jazirah, 13th Hay 1977. (Riyadh). 
153 Robin Bidwell, The Two Yemens, p. 295, and Mohammad A. Zabarah, 
Yemen: Traditionalism VB. Hodernity, p. 117. 
154 See H. S. El Azhary, Aspects of North Yemen's Relations with Saudi 
Arabia in Contemporary Yemen : Politics and TJistori2ul Dackground,_ 
- 627 -
H. R. Pridham (ed.), p. 280. 
155 Ibid., p. 281. 
156 AI-Riyadh, 13th April 1976, (Riyadh) 
and Uidd1e East Economic Digest (:t:1EED), 30th April 1976. 
157 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, ~ 
Conmrittee on Europe and the :t:1idd1e East Proposed Anus $a1es to the 
Yemen Arab Republic: Hearing Hay, 1976 (Hashington 1979), pp. 5-7. 
158 N. s. E1 Azhary, Aspects of North Yemen's Relations with Saudi 
Arahia in Contemporary Yemen : Politics and Historical Background, 
B. R. Pridham (ed.), p. 282. 
159 Ibid., p. 283. 
160 ttldd1e East Contemporary Survey (1976-77), Vol. 1, Colin Legum 
(ed.), New York and London: Holmes and Meier Publisher Inc., p. 45. 
161 Robert D. Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic The Politics of 
Development 1962-1986, p. 83. 
162 Al-lhawra, 25th March 1975. (Sanaa). 
- 629 -
163 Nadav Savfran, Saudi Arabia : The Ceaseless Quest of Security, 
Cambridge, Hassachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1985, p. 287. 
16LI Robert D. Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic The Politics of 
Development 1962-1986, p. 83. 
165 Al-11mwra, 19th Hay 1977, (Sanaa) 
and i\l-Jazirah, 20th Hay 1977. (Riyadh). 
166 ~1iddle East Contemporary Survey (1976-77), Vol. 1, p. 655. 
167 See .Al-Nhar, 29th July 1977. (Beirut). 
168 Robert D. Burrowes, Ihe Yemen Arab Republic The Politics of 
Development 1962-1968, p. 84. 
169 Ibid., and Robin Bid,,,ell, The Two Yemens, p. 295. 
170 See f.lohammad A. Zabarah. Yemen: Traditionalism vs. ~Iodernity, PP. 
119-120, and also see AI-Rai aI-am, 26th July 1977 (Kuwait). 
171 See AI-Thawra, 21st October 1977. (Sanaa). 
--------:----------
- 630 -
172 Robert D. ~rrrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic The Politics of 
Development 1962-1986, p. 85. 
173 See Peter Calvocoressi, Horld Politics Since 1945, 4th ed., London: 
Lonp,man Group Ltd., 1982, p. 249, Middle East Contemporary SUrvey 
(1976-77), Vol. 1, pp. 653-659, Al-Thawra, 12th October, 1977, 
(Sanaa) and Al-Riyadh, 12th October, 1977 (Riyadh). 
174 See Al-Jazirah, 13th October 1977 (Riyadh). 
175 See George Lenczowski, The ~fidd1e East in World Affairs, 4th ed., 
p. 6.17, and pp. 651-652, and also see Peter Mansfield, The Middle 
East : A Political and Economic Survey, 5th ed., p. V12. 
176 Nadav Savfran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, 
p. 2n9, and al-Hawadith, 29th November 1977, p. 13-15, (Beirut). 
177 See n.obert D. Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic The Politics of 
Development 1962-1986, p. 89. 
178 Ibid., p. 90. 
179 Al-1Uyadh, 24th January 1978 (Riyadh). 
- 631 -
180 Al-Hay aI-Am, 15th February 1978 (Kuwait) 
and Al-Nhar, 17th February 1978 (Beirut). 
181 Al-1.11mQra, 20th Nay 1978 
1H2 Al-l11Cwra, 25th June 1978 
and AI-Riyadh, 26th June 1978 
(Sanaa). 
(Sanaa) 
(Riyadh) • 
lH3 For more information see, ltred Halliday, "Yemen I s Unfinished 
Revolution: Socialism in the South", MERIP Reports, No. 81 October 
1979, p. 17, also see Al-Thawra, 29th June 1978 (Sanaa). 
184 Al-Jazirah, 26th ,June 1978 
and 1\1-Siya8ah, 27th June 1978 
185 Al-lhawra, 16th July 1978 
and AI-Nhar, 18th July 1978 
186 Al-Hiyadh, 20th July 1978 
and al-Hajlah, 29th July 1978 
(Riyadh) 
(Kuwait). 
(Sanaa) 
(Beirut). 
(Riyadh) 
(Jeddah) • 
187 See Robert D. Burrowes. The Yemen Arab Republic The Politics of 
Development 1962-1986, p. 104. 
1BB Ibid., p. 105. 
- 632 -
189 U.S. House of Representatives Corrnnittee on Foreign Affairs Sub-
Co~mittee on Europe and the ~tlddle East, proposed Arms Transfers to 
the Yemen Arab Republic: Hearing 12th March 1979, (Washington), 
pp. 10-11. 
190 For lnore information about the 1979 war between the two Yemens, see 
Anthony H. Cordesman, 1he Gulf and the Search for Strategic 
Stability : Saudi Arabia, the Nilitary Balance in the Gulf, and 
Trends in the Arab-Israeli Hilitary Balance, Boulder, Colorado: 
lvestvie~v Press 1981l, pp. 449-451; and also see chapter 5 note 79 
and 80. 
191 See Hobin B.idwell t The Two Yemens, p. 330; and al-Hawadith, 5th 
NarcJl 1979, pp. 13-16 (Beirut). 
192 AI-Ray aI-Am, 29th October, 1979 (Kuwait) 
and AI-Mlram, 14th November 1979 (Cairo). 
193 Robin Bidwell, The Two Yemens, p. 331. 
194 See Fred Halliday, "Yemen Puts Its House in Order", ~Uddle East, No. 
66, April 1980, p. 25. 
195 Nadav Savfran, Saudi Arabia The Ceaseless Quest for Security, p. 
386. 
- 633 -
196 ~Iicldle Fast RevieH, 1981, p. 385. 
197 Robert D. BurroHes, The Yemen Arab Republic The Politics of 
Development 1962-1986, p. 105. 
198 For more information, see Katz Mark N., "Sanaa and the Soviet", 
Problems of Connnunism, Vol. 33, January 1984, pp. 21-3ll, and also 
see f1. S. El Azhary, Aspects of North Yemens relations with Saudi 
Arabia in Contemporary Yemen : Politics and Historical Background, 
B. R. Pridham (ed.), p. 283. 
199 See Nimord Novik, Between 'l'wo Yemens, Paper II, Tel Aviv: Centre for 
Strategic Studies, 1980, pp. 16-18. 
200 Al-Thawra, 5th July 1979 (Sanaa) • 
201 "The Changing Face of Arabia", Biddle Fast, January 1982, pp. 14-15, 
and "North Yemen: Is It \-Jar", Economist, 16th February 1982, p. 24. 
202 Al-Nhar, 16th May 1980 (Beirut) 
and Al-Ahram, 5th June 1980 (Cairo). 
203 For more information, see Alan R. Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, 
Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press 1982, p. 104, Nadav 
Savfran, Saudi Arabia : The Ceaseless Quest for Security, p. 339; 
- 634 -
and tvlidd1e East Contemporary Survey (1979-80), Vol. 4, p. 699. 
20/4 Economist, 16th February 1982; and Christian Science Bonitor, 
January 1983. 
205 For more information, see Robert Litwak, Security in the Persian 
Gulf 2 : Sources of Inter-State Conflict, London: Go~ver Publishing 
Co. Ltd., 1981, pp. 91-92; and also see Nadav Savfran, Saudi Arabia: 
TIle Ceaseless Quest for Security, p. 394. 
206 See Hidd1e EBs t Con temporary Survey (1979-80), Vol. If, p. 829. 
207 See Nidd1e East Contemporary Survey (1980-82), Vol. 5, p. 722; and 
also see A1-Thawra, 22nd August, 1980, (Sanaa), Al-Jazirah, 23rd 
Augnst 1980, (Riyadh). 
208 Robin Bidwell, The Two Yemens, p. 331. 
209 Ibid., and Middle East F...conomic Digest (HEED), 15th April, 1981, and 
AI-Na:ja1h, 23rd April 1981, (Jeddah). 
210 See Hobert D. Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic TIle Politics of 
Development 1962-1986, p. 122. 
- 635 -
2.11 Ibid., and also for more information, see Al-Jmohoryyah al-Arabiyyal 
al-Yarnanyyah, Al-Houtamar aI-Am : ~fafahyim Min al-Hytag al-Hatani, 
[The Yemen Arab Republic: The National Co~nunigue], Sanaa, 1984. 
212 For more information, see George Lenczowski, The Hiddle Ec'1st in 
Horlel Affairs, 4th ed' f pp. 614-615. and Fred Halliday, Arabia 
Hithout Sultans, p. 138. 
213 See Robert tv. Stookey, Yemen The Politics of the Yemen Arab 
Republic, p. 276. 
211-+ N. S. El Azhary, Aspects of North Yemens Relations with Saudi Arabia 
in Contemporary Yemen : Politics and Historical Background, B. R. 
Pridham (ed.), p. 196, and The Hiddle East, January 1981. 
215 See Hargarita Dobert, "Development of Aid Programs to Yemen", 
American-Arab Affairs, No.8, Spring 1981~, p. 115. 
216 For more information, see Robert H. Stookey f Yemen The Politics of 
the Yemen Arab Republic, pp. 275-276. 
- 636 -
CHAP.rER EIGHT 
SAUDI ARABIA AND mE ARAB LEAGUE 
I History of the Arab League 
Proposals of Arab Unity 
The Fertile Crescent Scheme 
The Greater Syria Plan 
Egypt's Role in Establishing the Arab League 
Structtrre and Organization of the Arab League 
Arab League Relations with the United Nations 
Conclusion 
II '!he Internal Activities of the Arab League 
Settlement of Inter-Arab Disputes 
Conclusion 
III Saudi Arabia and the Arab League 
Conclusion 
IV Appendices 
Appendix 1: Text of the Alexandria Protocol. 7 October 1944 
Appendix 2: Text of a Letter from Sheikh Yusuf Yassin, the Saudi 
Delegate to Ahmed Maher Pasha, the Egyptian Prime 
Minister, 3 January 1945 
Appendix 3: Text of the Draft Pact of the Arab League Proposed by 
the political Subsidiary Committee. 14 February to 
3 March 1945 
Appendix 4: Text of the Pact of the League of Arab States 
Appendix 5: Arab League Member States 
Footnotes 
- 637 -
I History of the Arab League 
The following is an account of the historical development of the 
Arab League. It includes brief outlines of the "Fertile Crescent 
Scheme" and the "Greater Syria Plan", both of which preceded the 
establishment of the Arab League. The League's creation, including 
the roles of Egypt and Great Britain. is described, as are its 
structure and organization, and its relations with the United 
States. 
PrOposals for Arab Unity 
In the years before the 1945 formation of the Arab League, a number 
of proposals for Arab unity were put forward by various interested 
parties.1 IIowever, a brief history of these plans clarifies their 
importance relative to one another and to the form of the Arab 
League when it was adopted. 
As early as World War I, Great Britain made promises of independence 
and unity for the Arabs, but these promises proved false. Over two 
decades later, on 29th May 1941, the British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, gave his "Mansion House" speech, 
declaring his support for the establishment of an Arab union. Eden 
repeated his support for an Arab union in a statement made public on 
24th February, 1943. 
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Eden's announcement was well received later on by the Arabs, who 
quickly acted upon it. Nuri aI-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq, and 
Emir Abdullah of Transjordan were the first Arab rulers to propose 
schemes for Arab unity. Both projects failed. Their failure was 
largely due to strong opposition from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. 
The "Fertile Crescent Scheme" did provide a basis upon which the 
Arab League was finally established in 1945, but the League was "not 
as Nuri aI-Said had at first envisioned it, but (was formed) on a 
n~re general and looser pattern, and with Egypt taking the 'lead. 2 
In August 1943, Mustafa Nahhas, Prime Minister of Egypt, invited all 
Arab countries to participate in a general Arab Conference in Cairo. 
The purpose of such a meeting was to be a discussion of the future 
union of Arab states. The conference took place in Alexandria during 
the Autumn of 1944. It was attended by the Prime Ministers of 
Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan; representatives of the 
Palestinians, Saudi Arabia and Yemen also were present. Nahhas met 
separately with each delegation to discuss Arab unity and close co-
operation between the Arab states. This unity and co-operation 
among the Arab people was intended to extend to economic, political, 
cultural and social affairs. 3 
The idea of an Arab federation with a central government wa,s 
rejected by all participants except Syria.4 That nation alone 
expressed interest in a central government, claiming, willingness to 
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surrender her independence and sovereignty for the achievements of 
an Arab federation. Sentiments for a united Arab state ran high 
among Syrians, who typically regarded Al-Sham (Damascus) as the 
centre of the Arab nations. The Syrian delegate quoted President 
Shukri al-Qmvatli's statement that "Syria will refuse to have raised 
in her sky any flag higher than her own, save that of an Arab 
union".5 
The other Arab states raised a variety of objections. Lebanon was 
concerned about her independence and her religious minorities. Due 
to lack of support by her politicians and intellectuals, Egypt had 
ruled out any practical consideration of unity with other Arab 
states. King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia favoured economic co-
operation with full sovereignty retained by each member state. Most 
of the Arab countries participating in the conference were not fully 
independent, but still under the control and influence of France and 
Britain; those which were independent refused to sacrifice their 
recently achieved sovereignty. The Arab delegates, in any case, 
were able to agree upon one specific plan for political 
organization. 6 
The Preparatory Committee on Arab Uhity concluded its discussion, 
and on 7th October, the Alexandria Protocol was signed. This 
document provided for the creation of a League of Arab States which 
was to consist of all independent Arab countries. 
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The Preparatory Committee met again on 17th ~mrch 1945, and three 
days later the meeting was transformed into a general Arab 
Conference. The delegates discussed the use of co-ordination in 
functional programmes as an alternative to a federal union. They , 
expressed approval of co-operation in matters of economics, cultural 
and social affairs as a substitute for the political unity which had 
been rejected. Some of the delegates expressed their belief that 
such co-operation, in fact, would lead eventually to political 
unification. On 22nd March, in Cairo, the Pact of the League of 
Arabs States was signed. Signatories were Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Syria and Transjordan followed by Saudi Arabia and Yemen. 7 
The Fertile Crescent Scheme 
Prime Minister Nuri aI-Said of Iraq spelled out the first Arab plan 
for unity in his Bule Book, which consisted of a note on "Arab 
Independence and unity".8 He outlined his proposal for a "Fertile 
Crescent Scheme", and presented it in 1943 to Richard Casey, 
Britain's Minister of State in Cairo. He proposed the following 
1. • •• An Arab League to be formed, Iraq and Syria 
to join at once, the other Arab states to join if 
and when they desired; 
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2. The Arab League to have a permanent Council 
nominated by the member states and presided over 
by one of the rulers of states, to be chosen in a 
manner acceptable to the states concerned; 
3. The Arab Council to be responsible for 
a. defence, 
h. foreign affairs, 
c. currency, 
d. communication, 
e. customs, 
£. protection of minority rights 9 •••• 
Ifowever, both Saudi Arabia and Egypt were excluded from planning and 
initial implementation of the scheme, and their strong opposition 
caused it to fail. 
The Greater Syria Plan 
Emir Abdullah of Transjordan had long advocated the lllity of Bilad 
aI-Sham (Greater Syria), calling for the remrlfication of Lebanon, 
Transjordan, Palestine and Syria under his leadership. At the same 
time, the Prime Minister of Syria, Nazim al-Qudsi, declared that 
Syria intended to maintain her independence and her ,republican 
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regime and was not in favour of unification with Transjordan under 
the Hashimite family. Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt were (and are) 
strongly opposed to any territorial expansion by the Hashimites, and 
Lebanon opposed the plan, as well.10 The British government 
announced that it had no interest in the Greater Syria Project, 
considering the subject to be one which concerned only the people in 
the area. Britain's Minister of State for the Middle East, Oliver 
Lyttleton, travelled to Amman to advise Emir Abdullah that the 
Greater Syria Project should be postponed until after World War II 
had ended. After encountering such widespread opposition, including 
that from Shukkri al-Quwatli's National Bloc of Syria, the "Greater 
Syria Plan" failed. 
Egypt's Role in Establishing the Arab League 
Egypt played an important role in the planning and creation of the 
Arab League primarily because of her large population and strategic 
location. Egypt was the most formidable country in the Middle Fast 
economically and culturally, and her political leadership was 
respected by the entire Arab world. ll It is important to note that 
the Arab League in its 1945 form was a creation essentially 
superimposed by Egypt upon NOri al-Said's project, proposed two 
years earlier, for a union of Iraq and the Arab states.12 
The J~ague of Arab States was dominated by Egypt frqrn the time of 
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its establishment in 1945. The first three Secretaries-General were 
Egyptians: Abdel-Rahman Azzam (1945-1952), Abdel Khaliq Hassouna 
(1952-1972), and Mohamoud Rid (1972-1979). The Secretary-General, 
Azzam, regarded Egypt as the J...eague's natural leader, and indeed, 
13 
without Egypt's money, the league could scarcely have survived. 
Totten Anderson wrote about Egypt's hegemony in the League of Arab 
States, as follows: 
From the moment that Iraq lost the initiative to Egypt 
in the formation of the League, Egypt has appreciated 
I 
the power potential of the "regional arrangement" as 
an instrument of national policy. Headquarters for the 
League were established in Cairo, Azzam Pasha of Egypt 
has been the perennial Secretary-General, and Egypt has 
supplied the largest single share of the budget. 
It is understandable that this development should occur 
since Egyptian nationalism began at the dawn of the 
nineteenth century under the leadership of Mohammad Ali, 
and the process of Westernization was well established 
long before the other Arab states gained independent 
status.14 
After the establishment of the Arab league in 1945, Egypt remained 
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the dominant force and the most influential member state in the 
League. She was the leader in negotiating a security pact among 
the Arab states signed in February 1951.15 Egypt's influence was 
decisive in transforming the original Alexandria Protocol into the 
16 League. 
Thus, 
The Protocol, which was intended to be the instrument 
to encourage and help the growing-together of Arab 
states, had been transformed into a concrete frame 
which congealed each Arab state within its petty 
frontiers. 17 
Egypt also played a major role in the Conference on International 
Organization in San Francisco. Abdul Hamid Badawi, who headed the 
Egyptian delegation to that Conference, made an important 
contribution by defining the functions of regional organizations. 
Table 1 shows member states t share of the budget of the Arab League 
from 1945-1964. Table 2 shows their shares in 1978. 
On more than once occasion, Egypt threatened to dissolve the Arab 
League. Hohammad Heikal, former edt tor of the Egyptian daily Al-
Ahrarn, wrote, "If the Arab League were to be used to paralyse our 
movement, we should even be prepared to freeze the operation of 
that body" .18 
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In general, however, Egypt's financial contributions to the League 
tended to be decreased following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. 
Regarding the decreasing role of Egypt since that time, Sirag 
Zarnzami has written, 
Up to the 1967 war it seemed that the progressive 
revolutionary Arab Countries had the upper hand 
in the Middle East in general and in the Arab League 
in particular. But then the sweeping Israeli 
victory did not only shock the leaders of these 
progressive revolutionary countries. It has left the 
Arab world greatly disorientated. In addition, the 
leadership of the Arab world appeared to be non-
existent.19 
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Table 1 
Member Shares of Arab League Budget (Per Cent) 
Countrx; Date Ratio Established 
1945 1953 1958 1960 1964 
Algeria 
UAR (Egypt) 42.00 40.00 50.29 39.56 23.73 
Iraq 20.00 17.00 15.98 12.57 10.44 
Jordan 3.00 3.00 2.82 2.22 1.93 
Kuwait 14.00 
Lebanon 6.00 6.00 5.64 4.1 .. 3 3.85 
Libya 2.00 1.88 1.48 1.50 
Norocco 15.73 10.68 
Saudi Arabia 7.00 15.50 14.47 11.46 19.97 
Sudan 6.00 4.72 4.11 
Syria 16.00 13.50 * * 7.69 
Tunisia 5.61 4.67 
Yemen 6.00 3.00 2.82 2.22 0.93 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
* After union with Egypt, Syria's share was included under NAR 
Source of data: Robert W. MacDonald, The League of Arab States: 
A studx; in the Dynamics of Regional Organization, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1965,p. 142. 
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Table 2 
Member Shares of Arab League Budget (Per Cent) 
Country 1978 
Algeria 5.88 
Bahrain 1.00 
Egypt 13.70 
Iraq 9.79 
Jordan 1.27 
Kuwait 13.70 
Lebanon 2.45 
Libya 10.77 
Mauritanian 1.00 
Morocco 6.27 
Omam 1.00 
Qatar 3.92 
Saudi Arabia 11.26 
Somalia 1.00 
Sudan 3.72 
Syria 2.45 
UAE 5.88 
Yemen 1.00 
Yemen Democratic 1.00 
Source of data : A. H. Muwafi, "Work Dynamics in the Secretariat-
General for the Arab League", League of Arab States.: Reality and 
Aspirations Symposium, (in Arabic), Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity 
Studies, 1983, p. 612. 
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Britain's Role in Establishment of the Arab League 
Britain supported the formation of the Arab League. It was lithe 
culmination of more than four years of effort which had been 
encouraged by Anthony Eden".20 including his urgings contained in 
the 29th May 1941 "Hans ion House" speech. In that speech, given the 
day before Rashid Ali al-Kailani's revolt against Britain in Iraq 
was aborted, F.den said • 
••• It seems to me both natural and right that the 
cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries 
and the political ties, too, should be strengthened. 
Jlis Majesty's government for their part will give 
their full support to any scheme that commands 
21 general approval. 
However, the Arab League was essentially an Arab organization and 
not a British creation despite Great Britain's encouragement and 
help in its establishment during the Horld Har II period. 22 In an 
address at the Sorbonne in May 1947, Lord Altrincham, then British 
Minister of State in the ~tlddle East, said, 
The Arab League was encouraged by Britain ••• it was 
an autonomous power created by the Arabs themselves 
and represented their unanimous resolve to act, 
~~--~-c-----------
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independently in world affairs. 23 
In addition, it should be noted that Anthony Eden's support for Arab 
unity was in the nature of fence-mending. Great Britain had made a 
promise of Arab independence and unity to Sherif Hussein during 
Hor1d War I, and had broken that promise in two ways. First, 
Britain's commitments to the Arabs during the century's second 
decade were superseded by secret agreements with France to share 
hegemony in the Middle East under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 6th 
May 1916. Second, and perhaps of greater significance to future 
developments, the British issued the Balfour Declaration of 2nd 
November 1917, in effect promising the establishment of a national 
home for the Jews in Palestine. British High Commissioner for 
Egypt, r~neral Henry McMhon, in correspondence with Sherif lfussein 
dated as early as October 1915, had made the British promises to the 
Arabs, but a new mandatory system of government was instituted in 
1920, and introduced into the northern Arab territories of Iraq, 
Trans jordan , Palestine, Syria and Lebanon after World Har 1. 24 
Britain's primary motivation in finally promoting the creation of 
the Arab League undoubtedly was based on her intent to preempt 
French influence in the Middle East following Hor1d Har II. 
According to J. S. Raleigh, Britain's chief considerations in 
supporting the League were : 
- 649 -
1. '!he quest for stability and peace in the Middle 
East. especially in the war. and the belief that 
a strong regional organization would be the best 
means of achieving such stability; 
2. The assumption that if Britain gave full support 
to the Arab national aspirations, a firm Anglo-
Arab alliance could be established, Arab 
gratitude and friendship secured, and British 
positions in the Arab east safeguarded; 
3. The conception that defence pacts and 
arrangements, as well as the maintenance of 
bases, privileges etc., could be more easily 
obtained from a regional body than from the 
individual states concerned; 
4. Unification of Arab states under British 
influence as a tactical move designed (along 
with other measures) to force the French out 
of the Levant; 
5. Administrative convenience in handling the 
wartime supply situation in the Hiddle 
25 East •••• 
-------~-----------------
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History has recorded the results of Britain's inconstancy in her 
Middle East policy during the first half of the century. Great 
Britain is to blame for what has occurred in Palestine, and is 
responsible for many of the continuing crises in the ~tlddle F~st. 
The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 t the Balfour Declaration of 1917, 
the Mandatory System in 1920 and many other factors delayed 
independence and unity in Arab countries for decades. Anthony 
Eden's 1941 declaration of support for the establishment of an Arab 
union was an attempt to regain the Arab friendship Britain had lost 
through her earlier betrayals. 
But in recent years yet another issue arose when an Arab League 
delegation, comprised of seven Arab heads of states, representing 
the Fez Sunlnit Conference tried to visit British Prime Hinister 
Margaret Thatcher. She refused to meet the delegation. 26 
Ambassador Clovis Maksoud referred to the differences between the 
Arab countries and the British government when he said, 
There is quite a bit of residual goodwill between 
Britain and the Arab countries which perhaps 
explains why our disillusionment has been 
accentuated by the ••• unnecessary conditions 
surrounding the visi t of the Arab League 
delegation (to Margaret Thatcher) •••• I do not 
think that her policy and the conditions that 
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were involved in receiving the Arab League 
delegation indicate a measure of uncharacteristic 
insensitivity on the part of Britain.27 
Structure and Organization of the Arab League 
The pact of 1945 established the goals and basic structure of the 
Arab League are to strengthen relations among the Arab states, to 
protect their independence and sovereignty, to consider a general 
way the interests and welfare of the Arab people, and to realize 
close co-operation among the participant states in economic, 
financial, cultural and social matters. The main organs of the 
League are the Council, the permanent committees and the permanent 
Secretariat-General. 
The Council is composed of representatives from the member states, 
each state having one vote (Article 3). Chairmanship of the Council 
at ordinary session rotates among state representatives 
alphabetically. The main functions of the Council are to strengthen 
relations between members, to settle disputes between members or 
between members and non-members, to formulate the general policy of 
the League, to ensure the execution of agreements concluded between 
the participant states, and to review the financial and 
administrative affairs of the League. 
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The permanent committees were created in accordance with Article 4 
of the Pact to assist the Council in the functional matters 
mentioned in Article 2. There are ten permanent corruni t tees: 
poli tical, information, economic. social, cultural affairs, legal, 
communications, administrative and financial affairs, health, and 
petroleum experts. These committees are composed of representatives 
of member states. Each state is represented on each committee, by 
one of more representatives but with only one vote. Decisions and 
resolutions of these committees are made by a simple majority. 
Committee chairmen are appointed by the Council for a term of two 
years. Within their jurisdictions, the functions of the committees 
are to lay down the foundations for technical co-operation among 
members, and to submit recommendations to the Council for its 
consideration and approval. 28 
The permanent Secretariat consists of a Secretary-General, assistant 
secretaries, and "an appropriate number of officials" (Article 12). 
The Secretary-General occupies the top position in the Arab lea~le, 
and his appointment by the league's Council requires a two-thirds 
majority vote by the member states. He is responsible for preparing 
the draft of the budget (Article 13), inviting the Council for 
meetings (Article 15), and keeping copies of every treaty concluded, 
or to be concluded in the future, between the members or between a 
member and a third party (Article 17). He is also responsible 
before the Council for supervising the implementation of 
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resolutions, and for reviewing the administrative and financial 
affairs of the League. 
The pact governs anq regulates relations between members. Article 8 
says, 
Each member state shall respect the systems of 
government established in the other member states 
and regard them as exclusive concerns of those 
states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any 
action calculated to change established systems 
of government. 
lVhile the above forbids interference in the domestic affairs of 
other member states, the pact permits, in Article 9, "closer co-
operation and stronger bonds" between participant states without 
prejudice to the status of other members. Any member may withdraw' 
upon one year's notice before such withdrawal is to take place, and 
any country not approving an amendment may withdraw from the League 
when that amendment becomes effective. 29 Article 9 of the pact also 
provides that, 
Treati~s and agreement already concluded or to be 
concluded in the future between a member state and 
another state shall not be binding or restrictive 
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upon other members. 
30 At the present time, the Arab 12ague has twenty-two member states. 
(see Appendix 5). Egypt was suspended from the Arab League Council 
in March 1979 "Because it violated the Charter of the Arab League by 
signing a separate peace treaty with Israel".31 The decision to 
exclude Egypt from League membership was based on a resolution 
adopted by the Council in 1950: 
No member state may negotiate or actually conclude 
a separate peace treaty or any other political, 
military or economic agreement with Israel. Any 
state which does negotiate may be considered to have 
withdrawn from the Arab League according to Article 
18 of the League Pact. 
Shortly thereafter, the Council approved the following measures to 
be taken by the League in case of violation by any member state: 
1. Political and diplomatic relations with that 
state would be severed; 
2. Frontiers between it and other Arab States 
would be closed, and economic, commercial 
and financial relations would be suspended; 
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3. Financial or commercial contact, whether 
direct or indirect, with its nationals 
would be prohibited. Member states should 
offer mutual assistance to enforce the 
32 
above provisions. 
The League's Council convened in extraordinary session in Baghdad on 
31st March 1979. 33 Egypt had broken ranks with the other Arab 
states when President Sadat negotiated and later signed a separate 
treaty with Israel. 34 As a result, the Council decided, first, to 
relocate the Arab League headquarters temporarily in 1\1nisia, and 
second, to drop Egypt's membership from the League. 35 
The Council's decision to expel Egypt was the first expulsion in 
League history, since 1950 attempts to expel Jordan had failed. 
Relocation of the League's headquarters to nlnisia was an answer for 
those members who had claimed that Egypt dominated the League when 
it was headquartered in Cairo. These states had reacted to Egypt's 
domination by temporarily pulling out of the Teague, preferring to 
refer their disputes to other organizations because of that 
domination or because Egypt was a party to the disputes. 36 
The Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel added a ne,., 
dimension to the long list of regional and international problems 
and disputes which the League faced and with which it had to deal. 
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They remained on the Arab League agenda and were transferred with it 
to the new location. All Arab countries, as well as the League 
itself, rejected the Camp David Accords. They embodied a new 
challenge to Arab unity and even to the Lea~Ie's existence, as SlICh, 
they have required a lo~ of time and attention from League members 
as they try to face new relations and requisite changes. 
The decision to relocate Arab League headquarters resulted in the 
election of a new Secretary-General, passage of an amendment to the 
Pact, and a confrontation with new challenges. Especially in the 
beginning, there were administrative, financial and recognition 
difficulties. Administrative difficulties arose when some of the 
qualified Egyptian staff members had to choose between loyalty to 
the organization and to their home state. Some remained in Cairo 
rather than join the move to Tunisia. Documents, transcripts and 
libraries remained at the old headquarters, as well. Egypt 
confiscated the League's budget, resulting in financial problems. 
Recognition difficulties were posed by regional and international 
organizations, European countries, and the lmited States. 37 
The League succeeded in overcoming their administrative and 
financial problems when a new staff was selected and members 
replaced the necessary money and some of the docwnents. ElIropean 
countries and the United States took some time to restore relations 
with the League in its new location in Tunisia. The problems with 
- 657 -
the libraries, archives and documents never were solved because 
Egypt held on to whatever refined in Cairo. 
Article 10 of the Pact had stipulated that the Lea~le headquarters 
were to be located in Cairo. The decision to relocate, therefore, 
was a clloice between legality and national interest; the Lea~e 
chose the second alternative. In the future, it is necessary for 
the League to avoid any mention of the seat of the Arab League 
38 
administration when the Pact is amended. 
There were advantages and disadvantages in the move away from Egypt. 
The League succeeded in amending the Pact (a process which was be~n 
in Cairo), and achieved an econrnnic strategy at the Mnman Summit. 
Both are now waiting to be ratified. The move also eliminated 
complaints of League domination by a large state, which had been an 
obstacle to the organizations' maturation. fTowever, a new Tunisian 
Secretary-General was elected, repeating the old story in which the 
host country provided leadership. A question arises regarding what 
may happen if the League should move its headquarters to a third 
location. 
In Egypt, the League had had access to all facilities there : 
publishing companies, libraries and the advice of the staffs of five 
universities in Cairo. However, a return to Cairo would not be 
desirable. First, the reason for the decision to relocate still 
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exists: Egypt's treaty with Israel is still effective. Second, the 
League is composed of all independent Arab countries; it was created 
as a reaction to Arab demands for unity and exists to protect the 
interests of all Arab peoples. In the interests of Egypt herself 
and of other Arab countries, Egypt must rejoin the Arab ranks 
directly, rather than continuing her present practice of dealing 
with the region through the small countries of Oman and Jordan. At 
the same time, Arab countries must help Egypt to pull out of her 
political, economic and social difficulties. l.Jhile there is no 
reason to move the League's headquarters again from Tunisia, it is 
advisable to move the specialized agencies and distribute them among 
all Arab capitals. 
Arab League Relations with the United Nations 
Arab delegations at the United Nations Conference on International 
Organizations, held on 25th April 1945, in San Francisco, supported 
regional arrangements and asked for U.N. recognition of the Arab 
League or, at least inclusion in the text of the United Nations 
Charter. Very shortly before this meeting, the Arab Pact had been 
adopted with Article 3 stating that the League would incorporate 
international organizations in the future "to guarantee peace and 
security and regulate economic and social relations". Hhen the Pact 
was signed, a policy of co-operation between the Arab League and the 
United Nations and its specialized agencies was created. The Arab 
- 659 -
delegations were the most cohesive group in the tJnited Nations 
during its early years, joining with delegations from Asia and 
Africa "to speed up the process of disimperialism". 39 That process 
was "accelerated under U,N. auspices or was spurred on by its 
actions".40 
The Arab Pact was registered in the Secretariat of the United 
Nations, which formally recognized the Arab League as a regional 
association.4l This procedure was in accordance with the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals which had given status to regional organizations. On 
1st April 1950, acting on the recommendation of its political 
committee, the Council of the Arab League decided to consider the 
League "a regional organization within the meaning of chapter VIII 
of the United Nations Charter".42 
Another development, in December 1960, created further ties between 
the United Nations and the Arab League. The U.N. Secretary-General 
forwarded a memo to the League's Secretary-General referring to 
"mutual consultation, joint action, exchange of information and 
documentation, exchange of representation and other arrangements for 
1iaison".43 The League also signed agreements of co-operation with 
many of the U.N.'s specialized agencies. One of the results of co-
operation between the two organizations has heen "the introduction 
of Arabic as an official language of the United Nations and a numt~r 
of its specialized agencies".44 
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More recently, on 16th November 1982, the lJ.N. General Assembly 
endorsed by consensus resolution an Arab proposal to expand co-
operation between the United Nations and the League of Arab 
states.45 The General Assembly recommended that this resolution be 
the foundation for consultation to decide whether specific issues 
should be dealt with at the bilateral or multilateral level. 46 The 
League's invitation for a meeting at its Tunis headquarters with 
U.N. representatives was welcomed by the General Assembly. The 
United Nations Secretary-r~neral was asked by the Assembly to do his 
best to organize the meeting, and he prepared a report identifying 
the following potential areas for enhanced co-operation : 
Political and social matters, economic matters, 
technical co-operation, food and agriculture, 
industrial development, information and 
communications, disaster relief, refugees, 
population activities, labour, education, science 
and culture, health, patents and copyrights, posts, 
legal matters, oil and energy, narcotics, maritime 
transport and organizational matters. 47 
A number of the suggestions made in these areas, the report 
concluded, could best be pursued within the framework of agreements 
between the United Nations and the League of Arab States. 
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Conclusion 
The Arab I2ague was created after the Second Horld Har in response 
to demands and pressure from the Arab people to achieve their goals 
of independence and unity. It grew out of Nuri al-Said's "Fertile 
Crescent Scheme"t but was adopted considerably from that original 
idea. The Prime Minister of Egypt, Hus tafa al-Nahhas, took the 
initiative to invite the Arab countries to attend a general 
conference in Cairo and discuss Arab unity. The Arab delegates 
rejected federation and central government, but agreed upon co-
operation and co-ordination of their sovereign states. Many 
believed that such an arrangement would lead to a stronger 
relationship and eventual unity, but unity 'vas also rejected later 
by all of the delegations. With respect to creation of a united 
Arab nation, the Arab I2ague was born a weak arrangement. 
Therefore, proponents of such a federation have been disappointed in 
expecting the League to become a first step on the road to 
unification. 
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II 'lhe Internal Activities of the Arab I..eague 
There are four primary areas in which the Arab League interrelates 
with its member nations, The League takes an active role in 
attempting to settle inter-Arab disputes, seeks full independence 
for all member states, works for the establishment of Arab unity and 
promotes collective security arrangements in the Arab world. The 
following is an evaluation of the League's activities in the 
settlement of inter-Arab disputes. 
Settlement of Inter-Arab Disputes 
The part played by the Arab League in settling members disputes has 
differed over time and from one conflict to another. Factors 
determining its role in such regional conflicts include the nature 
of the disagreement, the number of countries and types of government 
involved, and whether or not the parties to a dispute are all League 
members, since additional factors must be considered if the conflict 
involves a super power. History has recorded the I~ague's 
involvement in settling civil disputes (Yemen 1962; Jordan 1970; 
Lebanon 1975 - present), border conflicts (Sudan-Egypt 1958; 
Algeria-Morocco 1963), disputes between members and non-members 
(Tunisia-France 1961; Arabs-Israel 1948 - present), and disputes 
which evolved into all-out war (or threatened to do so) between Arab 
League member states or between members and non-members. 
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The League has experienced varying degrees of success in its 
endeavours to settle conflicts. Ntunerous disputes have been ignored 
completely by the League in the belief that they were not a threat 
to stability in the region. In some cases, members simply have not 
brought some of their problems to the Lea~le for action. In 
attempting to deal with some disputes the League has made no 
progress, in others it achieved limited success, and in still others 
it was wholly successful,48 
Sudan, Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco, all members states chose to 
approach another organization for peaceful settlement of their 
conflicts without making a prior appeal to the League. This 
situation arose because of a general lack of trust in the 
effectiveness of the League's good offices. Hembers also feared 
Egypt's domination of the Arab organization, especially if Egypt was 
party to a conflict. Jordan and Lebanon submitted a complaint to 
the United Nations in 1958, accusing Egypt of interfering with their 
domestic affairs. Sudan asked the U.N. to settle her border dispute 
with Egypt that same yesr. During the 1963 conflict between Algeria 
and Morocco, the latter preferred to settle her border dispute with 
help from the Organization of African Unity.49 
Only Articles 5, 6 and 19 of the Arab Pact contain provisions 
dealing with the settlement of disputes. Article 5 stipulates that 
resorting to force to settle inter-Arab disputes is prohibited. 
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Under this Article, if a dispute does not affect a CO\IDtry's 
"independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" and if the 
parties entrust the Council with settlement, they must abide by the 
Council's decision, One of the main functions of the Council is to 
mediate conflicts in order to avoid war between the parties 
involved, and the Council's goal in mediation is to conciliate. 
Council decisions in arbitration and mediation are taken by a simple 
majority vote, which is binding only on those members which choose 
to accept it (Article 7). Article 6 provides that "in case of 
aggression or threat of aggression by one state against a member 
state ••• the Council shall by unanimous decision determine the 
measures necessary to repulse the aggression". Unanimous decisions 
of the Council are binding upon all members. The Pact anticipates, 
in Article 19, the founding of an Arab Court of Justice which, up to 
now, has failed to materialize. 
In settling inter-Arab disputes the Council has used all known, 
traditional techniques including mediation, conciliation, good 
offices and formation of a ad hoc committees, fact-finding 
committees and special committees to investigate and follow the 
50 conflicts and report to the League. In dealing with disputes 
between members and non-members, the League in most cases act to 
support and defend its members rather than to mediate. Obvious 
examples of the League's bellicose stance before non-member states 
are the disputes of 1945 between Syria-Lebanon and France, the Arab-
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Israeli conflicts (1948 to present) and the Tunisia-France disptlte 
of 1961. The actions taken by the League in this context are those 
of a regional organization opposed to a non-member state, rather 
than those of an organ of conflict settlement. 51 
Other roles that the Arab League has played in the ever-increasing 
ntlffiber of disputes in the Middle East since 1945 include modifying 
conflicts, preventing hostilities and terminating war and threats of 
war, In addition to the traditional arsenal of diplomatic 
techniques, the League has also learned to count on the services of 
its Secretary-General. Such efforts not~.,ithstanding, a check of the 
Arab League's results at the end of four decades reveals more 
failures than successes in settling conflicts. For example, the 
organization was unable to put an end to the civil war in Yemen in 
1948, to settle the border dispute between Sudan and Egypt in 1958 
or to affect the civil war in Jordan in 1970; it failed to promote 
agreement in the dispute among Algeria, Norvcco and Mauritania in 
1979, or to settle the current crises in Lebanon. 
However, the League can take credit for having settled some 
disputes. In the conflict between Iraq and l(uwait in 1961, a peace-
keeping force was created by the League and sent to Kuwait. A 
second case, in North and South Yemen in 1979, was resolved when the 
League formed a Committee to negotiate the dispute. The Committee 
was comprised of foreign ministers of seven Arab countries plus the 
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Secretary-Genera1, with a military unit that watched the borders for 
withdrawal of forces and supervised the activities on both 
boundaries. The League was thus effective in promoting agreement 
between the two sister states. Conflicts bet,,,een Algeria and 
Morocco (1963) and in North Yemen (1962) also were settled, although 
fighting re-erupted in the latter country until the dispute was 
ended permanently through the' Khartoum Conference of 1967. 52 The 
success in these later cases, however, cannot be attributed to the 
Arab League directly. Credit goes to the Arab Summit Conference of 
1964, in which heads of state convened in Cairo under the auspices 
of the Arab League. The conference was called to discuss the 
Israeli intent to divert the waters of the River Jordan. 53 It also 
should be noted that conflicts between Lebanon and the United Arab 
Republic (1958), Syria and United Arab Republic (1961-62), and Iraq 
and Kuwait (1961) were finally resolved only '''hen new regimes came 
to power in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, respective1y.54 
An analysis of the League's failure, in most cases, to manage 
disputes reveals three main causes. First, the Pact itself, as well 
as the structure and organization of the League, contains 
significant weaknesses in this area. Second, the very nature of 
"inter-Arab relations has been one of highly complex antagonisms". 
Third, ever-increasing intervention by outside powers has made 
regional conflicts almost impervious to attempts at settlement in 
some cases. 
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The Arab League does not have effective organizational machinery 
with detailed, institutionalized, adequate procedures to settle 
disputes. It lacks and needs a peace-keeping force and a Court of 
Justice to settle legal questions. The Pact gives responsibility 
and authority for the settling of disputes to the Council, in 
addition to the traditional functions assigned to it in the 
articles. 55 However, the Council is prevented from performing its 
task of dispute settlement by a series of emasculating restrictions 
and limitations : it is allowed to address disputes that might lead 
to war, but may not deal with other conflicts; it must steer clear 
of disputes involving "independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity" of member states; and members of the League are not 
obliged to be a party to arbitration, nor are they required to 
enforce the Council's decision. Although the Pact calls for 
mediation and voluntary arbitration, other methods have been tlsed 
which are not indicated, resulting in further difficulties. 56 The 
Council meets in ordinary session twice a year, and in extraordinary 
session only upon a call from two members. There is no other 
provision for meeting without such a call. The United Nations, by 
contrast, is much more quick to meet. 57 
The League's ability to settle disputes also is diminished by the 
nature of "inter-Arab relations". Throughout its history the League 
has been a focus for member conflict, exacerbated by disparate 
interests of the leaders. Ideology and/or rivalry among members 
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over the leadership of the region are often causes of these 
conflicts, which may become political even though they involve 
minor, non-political issues". Political warfare between Arab 
leaders can lead to vituperation in the press, recrimination, sealed 
borders, banned trade and travel, threats of war and even ~var 
itself. Victims of wars between Arab League members outnumber all 
those of the wars with Israel and are exceeded only by the numbers 
in the Iran-Iraq war. "Inter-Arab relations are characterized by 
mistrust, suspicion, division and conflicts all the time, 
everywhere". It therefore is no surprise that members mistrust the 
Arab League. Mark Zacher put it rightly : "More than any other 
region, the Arab world has been characterized by shifting patterns 
of dissention and competition".58 Division and tension among 
members can be expected to continue over such issues as the Arab-
Israeli conflict, economic interests, regional and sub-regional 
rivalries, relations with Europe and the super powers, and relations 
between Iran and the Arab countries in the Arabian Gu1f. 59 
A third factor that hinders the Arab League in achieving settlement 
of disputes is the involvement of outside powers. The deployment of 
American and European forces in Lebanon (25th-27th September 1982) 
complicated the situation, made them parties to the conflict, and 
was resented by the population. During the same year Israel invaded 
Lebanon and to this day still occupies a large territory there. The 
League formed a peace-keeping force and deployed it in I~banon, as 
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it had during the 1961 Kuwait-Iraq dispute, but was unable to enjoy 
the same success because of the many parties involved. 
The Arab League's system for settling disputes is inadequate because 
the organization lacks the special machinery for the task and the 
diplomatic, military and legal experts to guide it. In short, the 
Pact of the Arab League was signed in a bygone era, and has not 
grown to fit contemporary local and international developments. 
lVhen the Pact was signed in the 1940's, conditions in the region 
were not directly influenced by the two major world powers; the Arab 
Magrib had not joined the League; Arab oil was not exploited 
corrunercially on a large scale; Israel had not been founded; and the 
majority of Arab states were de jure dependent. Other changes since 
the 1940's include a sharp decline in Britain's and France's roles 
in the region; enhanced roles for the United States and Soviet 
Union; de facto independence of all Arab cOlmtries except Palestine; 
increased League membership; discovery of oil in additional parts of 
the region, which has been widely exploited; acquisition of wealth 
and affluence by oil-producing Arab nations; the creation of new 
international organizations; altered Arab government's and new 
leadership; the founding of Israel; and increased regional 
tensions. 60 
The Arab League lacks effective organizational Inachinery and 
institutionalized procedures for settlement of disputes primarily 
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because the framers of the Pact believed wars would be rare among 
Arab countries. They believed in an inevitable harmony among 
members belonging to one people and sharing the special 
characteristics of common language, culture, history and 
geographical proximity.61 Another reason for the oversights is tllat 
the Arab League is the first such organization in the Arab world. 
The United Nations, the American States and the Organization of 
African Unity all had precedent institutions to serve as a model and 
teacher. 62 
After four decades of activity, however, there is no excuse for 
failing to amend the Pact. The absence of an adequate system for 
settling disputes makes such amendment urgent. Committees have been 
formed to discuss such an amendment, and agreed that all necessary 
provisions should be made to bring the Pact into alignment with 
charters of similar organizations. Approval by menlber heads of 
state is required to effectuate such changes. Unfortunately, work 
on such an amendment has been shelved. 
The Arab League, like most other regional and international 
organizations, has failed more than one test of its ability to 
settle disputes. In discussing the organization's weakness, I~ss, 
Butterworth and Nye wrote, 
••• These organizations are little more than governments 
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linked in permanent conclave. They have no power and 
personality beyond the collective will of governments 
and no capacity to grow apart from the ability of 
63 governments to learn. 
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Conclusion 
The Arab League has ranged all the way from great success to total 
failure in the four primary areas of its internal activities. The 
organization has attempted to settle disputes among members by 
offering its good offices to disputants or by involving its 
Secretary-General in settling conflicts. Its role has been to 
modify conflict and encourage negotiation, preventing the outbreak 
of war in some cases. Its attempts have not all been in vain, but 
it has shown itself weak in many areas. The League's activities in 
achieving independence for Arab states from European occupation have 
been cohesive and decisive whenever it provided aspirations to 
independence with financial, political and military assistance. The 
failures have occurred in the remaining two fields of endeavour. 
Withal, the League is considered to be neither a dynamic machine of 
Arab unity nor a co-ordinator of Arab collective security. The 
"doctrine of ramification" proved effective in the achievement of 
independence to a number of Arab states and not effective in the 
other two internal activities of the League : unity and collective 
security. 
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III Saudi Arabia and the Arab League 
The formation of the Arab League in 19[.5, partly as a result of 
British exertions, had created an arena for inter-Arab politics, and 
Ibn Saud manoeuvred within and without it to check Hashemite 
designs.64 However, Saudi Arabia participated in the first Arab 
League Sunnnit held in Mshas (Cairo), in May 19l.6, to discuss the 
Zionist threat in Palestine.65 
On 12th December, the Arab League Council was due to meet to react 
to the United Nations resolution to partition Palestine, adopted on 
66 29th November 1947. Hell before the meeting there was talk that 
the Arab League Council might consider a resolution calling for 
cancellation of American and British oil concessions in member 
countries (at that time, Saudi Arabia) because of their connection 
with the U.N. resolution. On 3rd December, Ibn Saud received the 
American Minister in Jeddah to express his view of the situation and 
to make a general request for American political and military aid. 
He told the minister that the talk about cancelling the concessions 
was an example of the increased pressure being put on him by the 
Arab League States in order to harm his relations with the United 
States.67 
Ibn Saud indicated agreement with the Arab League States regarding 
the dispute with Zionism but said that he wanted to make "a 
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distinction between such an attitude and the attempts being made by 
my antagonists in the Arab world to draw me into direct conflict 
politically or economically with the United States". He was 
prepared to oppose the pressure being put on him by the Arab League 
States, but for him the "crucial question" was to know "whether and 
to what extent I can count upon United States aid in enabling me to 
resist any incursion from the Arab League States which may be the 
68 
result of my failure to yield to the pressure". 
The Arab League Force in Kuwait was established in 1961, in response 
to Iraqi threats to annex the newly-independent territory of 
Kuwait. 69 On 20th July 1961, the Council adopted a resolution 
admitting Kuwait as a member of the Arab League. 70 
Following the adoption of the Council resolution of 20th July, tIle 
Secretary-General issued invitations to League members to 
participate in the proposed Arab League Force. 71 Libya and the 
Lebanon declined to contribute contingents. Hmolever, uni ts were 
eventually drawn from the United Arab RepubliC, Saudi Arabia, Sudan 
and Jordan. In all, the Force comprised some 3300 troops, of which 
the largest contingents (1200 men apiece) were sent by the United 
Arab Republic and by Saudi Arabia. A Saudi officer, ~mjor-General 
Abdullah Al-Isa, was appointed commander of the Arab League 
Force. 72 
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An Arab League "Arab Brotherhood Mission", the first of its kind, 
led by Abdel Khaliq Hassouna, Secretary-General of the Arab League, 
and was composed of two Saudi members of the League toured the lower 
Arabian Gulf states in October 19M, holding talks with Shaikhs on 
the political development of the region and on the assistance in 
economic, social and educational fields which the Arab League could 
provide. 73 
Prince Faisal, then Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, supported Egypt 
in the Arab League Conference on 5th February 1955, against Iraq 
and the Baghdad pact. 74 
75 However, from the beginning of the Yemeni conflict, the Arab 
League was unable to play any constructive role to settle the war 
peacefully. Egypt, after what happened to it at Shtaura, could not 
effectively utilize the League to serve its interests in the Yemeni 
case. Contrary to what happened in the Iraqi case, for example, 
Egypt's major opponent in this conflict was Saudi Arabia,· which had 
its own supporters in the Arab League. Thus Egypt was determined, 
at first, to achieve its objective in Yemen, namely to secure a pro-
Cairo republican regime in Sanaa, withol1t having to go to the Arab 
League, the latter had to be involved in the presentation. 76 
Saudi Arabia strongly opposed the Yemeni republican regime request 
for a meeting of the Arab Leag1le Council to consider the situation 
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in Yemen, Egypt viewed the republicans as the legitimate authority 
in Yemen and therefore, felt that the League should ignore the 
royalists and respond only to the republicans. 77 
In March 1963 the majority of the Arab League member states 
78 
recognized the republicans in Sanaa. Thus, with the new strongly 
pro-Nasser alliance in the Arab League, the League Council, despite 
strong Saudi opposition. decided to recognize the republican regime 
in Sanaa as the legitimate government of Yemen and arunit it as the 
representative of Yemen in the Arab League. 79 
The republican regime in Yemen appealed to the Arab League to 
attempt to put an end to the dispute between Yemen and Saudi 
Arabia. 80 On 16th September 1963, the political committee responded 
to the republic of Yemen's appeal by sending a recommendation to the 
Council which was adopted as a resolution during the Council's 40th 
ordinary session on 19th September. Shaped by Egypt, the resolution 
was biased in favour of the Yemeni republic; it called on all memher 
states to support the Yemeni request for the restoration of normal 
relations between the Arab states and for the promotion of peace and 
stability in Yemen. The Council also called on Abdel l<haliq 
Jmssouna. the League's Secretary-General and the Chairman of the 
Council, to initiate contacts with the party concerned in order to 
achieve these objectives. Again Saudi Arabia abstained from voting. 
In effect, the Saudi's disagreed with the Council's initiative, l)ut 
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the resolution of the Council was adopted anyway. Soon aftenvards 
Hassouna and other League officials held a series of consultations 
in Cairo at which a peace mission was formed to visit the parties 
81 
concerned in order to attempt to end the Yemeni conflict. 
On 25th September 1963 the Arab League mission, headed by Hassouna, 
arrived in Taif (Saudi Arabia), where it held meetings with Prince 
Faisa1.82 The Secretary-General and other members of the mission 
detailed to Faisal the events of the Cotmcil meeting of 19th 
September in which the Yemeni republican's delegate called for peace 
and aid for his country and expressed his hope that normal relations 
would be established between the Republic of Yemen and its 
neighbours. The mission expressed the League's hope tha t the Saudi 
government would recognize the importance of the restoration of 
peace and stability in Yemen. The Secretary-General reported that 
"we [the Arab League mission] expressed our hope that the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia would do its utmost to eliminate the tension along the 
borders". In other words, the League wanted the Saudis to change 
their view of the Sanaa regime and recognize the republican system 
there. B3 
At the end of the League mission's visit, the Saudi government 
issued an official communique in which it welcomed all attempts 
undertaken to promote Arab solidarity and reSt~e normal relations 
between the sister Arab states.84 The Saudi connnunique emphasized 
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the Saudi government's eagerness to co-operate towards the 
realization of that end and its hope that the League mission find in 
the responses of the other parties concerned that which would 
facilitate the realization of the interests of the Yemeni people. 8S 
On 7th October 1963, the Arab League mission arrived in Yemen. 86 
The mission told President Abdullah al-Sallal of the good news it 
brought from Taif, The Yemeni republicans expressed their gratitude 
and satisfaction over the League Council efforts~7 After visiting 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the League mission returned to Cairo where 
it reported its findings to Egyptian offiCials, including the 
foreign minister. The latter informed Hassouna and other members of 
the League mission that his government had in fact gradually 
withdrawn some of its forces from Yemen as the "Disengagement 
Agreement" required. By and large, however, the League mission 
proved to be important, since it did not put an end to the Yemeni 
conflict.88 
Despite the fact that articles of the League's Pact states, in part, 
that the League Council shall mediate in all differences which 
threaten to lead to war between two member states ••• with a view to 
bringing about their reconciliation, "the Arab League could not do 
much about the fighting in Yemen, even if it wanted to". It was 
clear that a threat of war between Saudi Arabi and Egypt existed 
from September 1962 until May 1967 because of Yemen. However, the 
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Arab League, due to the machinations of the parties involved in the 
conflict, was left on the sideline.89 
In short, after Nasser's military failure in Yemen, he attempted to 
utilize the Arab League and, later, its Summit Conferences, to help 
in extricating himself from the war in Yemen. But this failed 
simply because of Saudi perseverance in and out of the Arab League 
in opposing Nasser's Yemeni objectives. The Saudis ultimately 
succeeded in resisting the League1s efforts to settle the dispute. 
A commentary on the Arab League Council session which ended in Cairo 
on 12th September 1966, stated that the League was meeting at a 
difficult time in inter-Arab relations. "These difficulties are 
rooted in the alliance between the reactionary forces in the Arab 
countries (particularly Saudi Arabia) and international imperialism, 
which has intensified its subversive activities in the Arab world, 
especially against the countries carrying out far-reaching social 
and economic reforms". The communique issued at the close of the 
session was said to be "essentially couched in anti-imperialist 
terms"; it reflected the alignment of forces in the Arab world. 
"Power is in the hands of the revolutionary-democratic elements who 
want their countries to take the non-capitalist path of development. 
The reactionaries are forced by circumstances to strike from behind 
the corner, to indulge in backstage diplomatic activity to plot and 
intrigue".90 These remarks referred particularly to King Faisal of 
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Saudi Arabia and to his plans to establish "the so-called Islamic 
pact".91 
Initially, it was thought that the admission of a new State required 
the unanimous approval of the League members. However, this 
principle has been gradually relaxed. In 1967, Saudi Arabia 
abstained in the vote to admit South Yemen. 92 In 1971, two member 
States, Saudi Arabia and North Yemen, opposed the admission of Oman, 
and Saudi Arabia abstained in the vote on the admission of the 
United Arab Emirates, Nevertheless, all of these States secured 
admission to the Arab League. 93 
During the first stage of Lebanese civil strife in 1975, Saudi 
Arabia played an excellent role in the Arab League to create an Arab 
League force dominated by the Syrians to keep peace in Lebanon. 
Thus providing de facto legitimization for Syrian intervention. 94 
However, Saudi Arabia participated in the Arab League Force in 
Lebanon. 95 The League Force was originally deSignated as a 
"Symbolic Arab Security Force". In accordance with a resolution 
adopted by the League Council on 9th June 1976, the Force was 
empowered to "maintain security and stability in Lebanon".96 The 
resolution stated that the Force "should start to perform its task 
irrunediately replacing the Syrian forces".97 
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When the agreement was reached at the Cairo Summit Conference in 
October 1976, that the "special fund" for the initial six-month 
period should be set at $90 million, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
undertook to provide 20% each of this sum, while the United Arab 
Emirates and Qatar agreed to contribute 15% and 10%, respectively.98 
It was envisaged that the remainder would be paid by other members 
of the League. However, as no other State volunteered funds for the 
upkeep of the Arab Deterrent Force, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have 
contributed the balance.99 
When the South Yemenis increased their disruptive activities, which 
culminated in the June 1978 assassination of the pro-Riyadh 
President al-Ghashmi. 100 In retaliation, the Saudis became the 
prime movers in the Arab League's unprecedented decision to impose 
sanctions, including suspension of financial and technical 
101 assistance, against a member country, South Yemen. 
Notwithstanding Riyadh's skilful diplomatic manoeuvres in the Arab 
League, the South Yemen affair must rank as one of Saudi Arabia's 
less successful attempts to exercise influence over other regional 
actors.102 Similar set-backs occurred in the case of Syria, which 
continued its onslaught against the Lebanese Muslims in 1976 despite 
the withdrawal of Saudi aid, and in the case of Algeria, which 
refused to halt its support for the Polisario guerrillas in the 
Western Sahara despite a promise of massive Saudi aid. From these 
- 682 -
failures, the Saudis learned that there are limits to the 
effectiveness of financial aid as an instrument of foreign policy 
inside the Arab I~ague and in dealing with the Arab countries. I03 
Saudi aid to Arab League countries, 1971.-1980, Table 3. 
However, the decisions made in Baghdad on 31st ~mrch 1979, by 19 
members of the Arab League appeared to be a victory for the radicals 
led by Iraq,104 which demanded a "total rupture" with Egypt for 
signing a peace treaty with Israel, over Saudi Arabia's bloc of 
105 
moderates, which favoured partial sanctions. 
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Table 3 
Saudi Aid to Arab League Countries 1974-1980 
Country/Year Loans and Grants Purpose 
(millions U.S.$) 
Algeria 
1980 15.00 Aid to earthquake victims 
Egypt 100.00 Rebuilding of Suez Canal towns 
1974 damaged during October 1973 
war 
300.00 Rebuilding of Suez Canal areas 
1975 7.70 Construction of Islamic 
University in Assuit 
1976 800.00 To assist Egyptian economy 
Jordan 
1976 215.00 Finance five-year plan 
1980 10.00 Flood and heavy snow-danmge 
repair 
Lebanon 38.10 First instalment of $114.3 
1980 million annual contribution to 
five-year, $2 billion Arab aid 
program agreed upon at the 
November 1979 Tunis Summit 
Yemen Arab 82.00 Budget support 
Republic 30.00 Electricity projects 
(North Yemen) 1116.00 Road construction 
1975 15.00 Grain mills and silos 
13.70 Drilling of artesian wells 
l •• 30 Flood aid 
1977 101.60 Budget support 
1978 101.60 Budget support 
1979 101.60 Budget support 
4.80 Compensation for higher prices 
paid for imports of Saudi oil 
Qnan 100.00 Development projects program 
1975 upon at the November 1979 
Tunis Stunmi t 
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Table 3 (Coot'd) 
Country/Year Loans and Grants Purpose 
(millions U.S,$) 
Somalia 
1975 11.50 Famine and drought assistance 
1979 20.00 Grant 
1980 10.00 BLldget support 
People's 
Democratic 100,00 Development assistance 
Republic of 
Yemen 
(South Yemen) 
1976 
Sudan 
1974 200.00 Development assistance 
1978 2.90 Flood relief 
1980 11.00 Exploration for minerals 
(zinc, silver, copper, gold 
and chromium) 
Syria 
1975 200.00 For weapon purchases 
219.90 For various development 
projects 
1977 50.00 Econonuc assistance 
Tunisia 
1979 7.00 Expenses of Arab Summit 
Conference 
7.00 Expenses of Arab Summit 
Conference 
Djibouti 
1973 10.00 Economic assistance 
Source : Middle East Economic Survey, 1970-1980, as cited in Ragaei 
El-Mallakh, saudi Arabia: Rush to Development (London: Croom Helm, 
1982, p. 379. 
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The Arab League Summit met at Fez, Morocco on 5th July 1981, to 
consider a Saudi plan for peace with States that were whispered to 
106 include Israel, broke up after four hours. The P.L.O. gagged on 
the idea, and shot it down. One war later, the Conference re-
convened and, in four days, gave the Saudis the benefit of Israel's 
victory. The routed P.L,O. was persuaded to endorse TJ.N. 
"guarantees [of] peace among all States". Diplomats perceive this 
107 
as progress, If it is, the peace is dangerously slow. 
The result of the Summit meeting of the League in Fez, proved that 
Saudi Arabia cannot mobilise, let alone speak for, the Arab 
world. 108 It might be able to do so if it could demonstrate a 
scintilla of influence which the United States : the fact that it 
lacks even that was dramatically demonstrated, even before the heads 
of State arrived. 109 
However, the League Summit appointed Saudi Arabia and Jordan to make 
contacts specifically with the United States and other permanent 
members of the Security Council, the Soviet lJnion, France, Britain 
and China to explore the possible ties of a Niddle East 
settlement ,110 
President Hafez aI-Assad of Syria and the kings of Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia and ~IDrocco met privately on 5th September 1982, to discuss 
President Reagan's ~liddle East plan and a possible joint Arab peace 
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111 proposal, Arab League Bource said. 
Mr. Reagan's plan is not on the formal agenda of the Arab League 
Conference, but it is expected to be a major subject of discussion 
despite Israel's dismissal of the initiative.112 
The Arab League Conference requested Saudi Arabia' foreign minister 
Prince Saud to take part in an Arab League delegation visited the 
113 United States on 21st October 1982. The purpose of the 
delegation's visit to Washington is to exchange vie\'ls on how best to 
restore momentum to the Middle East peace negotiations. 1he 
delegation will present the views of the Arab League. The United 
States will present its own views based on the President's 
initiative.114 
The delegation will be expected to seek clarification on the 
President's proposal and the United States ''lill seek clarification 
on the Arab League Session. It will not be a negotiating session, 
aimed at reconciling differences between the two, but rather an 
exchange of views.115 
Saudi Arabi showed unity in the Arab League about the war in which 
116 Arab Iraq confronts non-Arab Iran across the Arabian Gulf. But 
the leaders of 21 members of the Arab League are collectively better 
at gestures than policies. Their foreign ministers, at two 
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successive meetings in Tunis (the headquarters of the Arab 12ague), 
have failed to agree on what to do about the war. H7 
The Arab League SUmmit in Anmlan on 8th November 1987, was intended 
118 to be a single-issue Conference on the war. But Syria, Iran's 
one fairly steadfast Arab ally, realised it would be in the dock if 
the war were the only issue on the agenda. On the advice of that 
veteran realist, and their host King Hussein of Jordan, the other 
people going to Amman have agreed that the usual litany of Arab 
laments, including, of course, the Israel issue, will be talked 
through once again. 119 
IIowever, the Saudis got at least verbal unity behind their protests 
120 
about the Mecca riots in July 1987. 
Conclusion 
Saudi Arabia is a founder member of the Arab League. Ihn Saud 
manoeuvred within the League to check his historical enemy, the 
Hashemite family. He did not agree with the Arab League' policies 
at that time, but he had no choice but to get along with them. 
However, the major event for Saudi Arabia in the Arab League since 
its creation in 1945, was her large participation in the League' 
force to protect Kuwait from Iraq in 1961. 
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Saudi Arabia refused to accept any effort by the Arab League to 
settle the conflict in North Yemen, because King Faisal claimed that 
the Arab League is under the influence of Egypt his opponent in the 
conflict, and many members of the League disagreed with Faisal 
policies in North Yemen. 
In 1975, Saudi Arabia played a good role in the Arab League to 
create an Arab League force to keep peace in I~banon, and Riyadh 
paid most of the fund for the force. 
The Saudis failures, in the cases of the South Yemen, Syria and 
Algeria, Riyadh learned that there are limits to the effectiveness 
of financial aid as an instrument of foreign policy i.nside the Arab 
League and in dealing with the Arab countries. 
Saudi Arabia and its moderates bloc tried very hard inside the 
League to save Egypt from expUlsion from the Arab l~ague after 
signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, but Riyadh "failed". 
This proved that Saudi Arabia had no influence in the League's 
poliCies, and her foreign policy inside the Arab J~ague is very 
weak. 
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IV Appepdices 
Appendix I 
Text of the Alexandria Protocol, 7th October 1944. 
The undersigned, chiefs and members of the Arab delegations at the 
Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference: 
Anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all 
Arab countries to direct them towards the welfare of the Arab 
lvorld, to improve its conditions, insure its future, and 
realize its hopes and aspirations, 
And in response to Arab public opinion in all Arab countries, 
have met at Alexandria from Shawwal 8, 1363 (25th September 
1944) to Shawwal 20, 1363 (7th October 1944) in the form of a 
Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference, and have 
agreed as follows: 
1. League of Arab States 
A League will be formed of the independent Arab States which 
consent to join the 1.eague. It will have a council which will 
be known as the Council of the League of Arab States in which 
all participating states will be represented on an equal 
footing. 
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The object of the League will be to control the execution of 
the agreements which the above states will conclude; to hold 
periodic meetings which will strengthen the relations between 
the states; to co-ordinate their political plans so as to 
insure their co-operation, and protect their independence and 
sovereignty against every aggression by suitable means; and to 
supervise in a general way the affairs and interests of the 
Arab countries. 
The decisions of the Council will be binding on those who have 
accepted them except in cases where a disagreement arises 
between two member states of the League in ~.,hich case the two 
parties shall refer their dispute to the Council for soilition. 
In this case the decision of the Council of the Iea~le will be 
binding. 
In no case will resort to force to settle a dispute between 
any two member states of the League be allowed. nut every 
state shall be free to conclude with any other member state of 
the League, or other powers, special agreements which do no 
contradict the text or spirit of the present dispositions. 
In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be 
prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual 
member state be allowed. 
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The Council will intervene in every dispute which may lead to 
war between a member state of the League and any other member 
state or power, so as to reconcile them. 
A subcommittee will be formed of the members of the 
Pre1iminary1 Committee to prepare a draft of the statutes of 
the Council of the League and to examine the political 
questions which may be the object of agreement among Arab 
states. 
1The word "Preparatory" has been used since it is a more 
accurate translation of the Arabic word "Tahdiriya" than 
"Preliminary". The word "subcommittee" has been replaced 
by "Subsidiary Conunittee" which has been used tn some books 
on the subject. 
2. Co-operation in economic, cultural, social, and other matters. 
A. The Arab states represented on the Preliminary Committee 
shall closely co-operate in the following matters: 
1) Economic and financial matters, i.e. commercial 
exchange, customs, currency, agriculture, and 
industry. 
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2) Communications, i.e. railways, roads, aviation, 
navigation, posts and telegraphs. 
3) Cultural matters. 
4) Questions of nationality, passports, visas, 
execution of judgements, extradition of criminals, 
etc. 
S) Social questions. 
6) Questions of public health. 
B. A subcommittee of experts for each of the above subjects 
will be formed in which the states '"hich have 
participated in the Preliminary Corrunittee vlill be 
represented. This subcommittee ,,,ill prepare draft 
regulations for co-operation in the above matters, 
describing the extent and means of that collaboration. 
C. A committee for co-ordination and editing will be formed 
whose object will be to control the work of the other 
subcommittees, to co-ordinate that part of the work 
which is accomplished, and to prepare drafts of 
agreements which will be subInitted to the various 
governments. 
D. '~en all the subcommittees have accomplished their work 
the Preliminary Committee will meet to examine the work 
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of the subconunittees as a preliminary step towards the 
holding of the Gen~ral Arab Conference. 
3. Consolidation of these ties in the future. 
While expressing its satisfaction at a happy step, the 
Committee hopes that Arab states will be able in the 
future to consolidate that step by other steps, 
especially if post-war world events should result in 
institutions which will bind various powers more 
closely together. 
4. A Special Resolution Concerning Lebanon. 
The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee 
emphasize their respect of the independence and 
sovereignty of Lebanon within its present frontiers, 
which the governments of the above states have already 
recognized in consequence of Lebanon's adoption of an 
independent policy, which the Government of that country 
announced in its progranune of 7th Octoher 1943, 
unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies 
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5. A Special Resolution Concerning Palestine. 
A) The Committee is of the opinion that Palestine 
constitutes an important part of the Arab world 
and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine 
cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and 
stability in the Arab world. 
The Committee also is of the opinion that the 
pledges binding the British Government and 
providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, 
the preservation of Arah lands, and the 
achievement of independence for Palestine are 
permanent Arab rights whose prompt implementation 
would constitute a step towards the desired goal 
and towards the stahilization of peace and 
security. 
The Committee declares its support of the cause of 
the Arabs of Palestine and its willingness to work 
for the achievement of their legitimate aims and the 
safeguarding of their just rights. 
The Committee also declares that it is second to 
none in regretting the woes ~vhich have heen 
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inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by European 
dictatorial states. But the question of these 
Jews should not be confused with Zionism, for there 
can be no greater injustice and aggression than 
solving the problem of the Je~vs of Europe by 
another injustice, i.e. by inflicting injustice on 
the Arabs of Palestine of various religions and 
denomina tions • 
B. The Special Proposal concerning the participation of 
the Arab Governments and peoples in the Arab 
National Fund to safeguard the lands of the Arabs of 
Palestine shall be referred to the Committee of 
Financial and Economic Affairs to exrunine it from 
all angles and to submit the result of that 
examination to the Preliminary Committee at its next 
meeting. 
In faith of which this protocol has been signed at Faruq I 
Uni versity at Alexandria on Saturday, Shawwal 20, l363 (7th 
October 1944). 
Source: The Arab t~orld [Arab Information Centre, New York] V, April 
1959, pp. 15-16, and Muhammad Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab 
League; A Documentary Record Vol 1, Beirut: Khayats 1962, pp 119-120 
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Appendix 2 
Text of a letter from Sheikh Yusuf Yassin to Ahmed Pasha signifying 
his r~vernment's approval of the Alexandria Protocol and stating 
their views on Arab co-operation. 
19 Muharram 1363 
(3 January 1945) 
To His Excellency Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha, the Prime Hinister of Egypt 
and the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the r~neral Arah 
Congress, 
Greetings, 
Your Excellency knows that during the last meeting of the 
preparatory Committee in Alexandria in which I represented the Saudi 
Arabian Government, I did not put my signature on the Protocol then 
signed by the representatives of the Syrian, Iebanese, Iraqi, 
. Transjordan, and Egyptian Governments pending its revieW' by the 
Saudi Arabian Government. 
The Government of Saudi Arabia are desirous and anxious for the 
achievement of the unity of the Arab ranks. They would like this to 
be based on sound principles conductive to the realization of the 
Arab hopes pinned on the meeting of the Congress. The Saudi Arabian 
Government maintain that the adoption of the following principles 
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would serve the common objective and realize the aspirations of the 
Arab nation: 
1. The conclusion of an alliance between the Arab States designed 
to promote their c-operation and to provide for mutual 
assistance for the security of each and all of them; and to 
guarantee good-neighbourliness among them. A significant step 
in that direction had already been taken by the Kingdoms of 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen. 
2. The freedom of each Arab State to conclude wJth any other Arah 
State whatever agreements might be designed to insure her 
security. Such agreements should not be detrimental to any 
other Arab State and should foster good-neighbourliness and 
fraternal co-operation. 
3. Arab solidarity and alliance should be devoid of any 
aggressive designs towards any nation, state, or group of 
states. It should be aimed only at self-defence, the 
maintenance of peace, and the promotion of justice and freedom 
for all. 
4. The prohibition of war between the Arab States. In case a 
disagreement arises between two Arab States over a new issue, 
or the failure of one party to honour its obligations towards 
-----------
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any other government which is a member in the alliance, 
attempts should be made to settle it through conciliation, 
mediation, or arbitration on just and equitable fraternal 
bases. Should either party decline to accept arbitration, or 
to abide by any award given, the other Arab States should 
advise and call upon him to admit what is right. Should that 
party become intransigent and resort to aggression, they may, 
after consultation with each other, decide on such action as 
would stop aggression and establish justice and equity in the 
Arab arena. 
5. In order to avoid problems among the Arab States, it should be 
made clear from the start that the republican regimes in Syria 
and Lebanon shall be maintained, and the complete independence 
of the two states accepted by all. 
6. The efforts aimed at the unification of culture and 
legislation between two Arab States and between them and the 
rest of the Arab countries have much to commend them. The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia represents, hm>1ever, a special case in 
view of her circumstances and the presence of the Holy Shrines 
in her territory. Saudi Arabia will, therefore, refrain from 
adopting any prinCiple in education or legislation whicll might 
contravene the tenets and rules of Islam. 
- --------- ------c------------
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7. The Arab States, as members of one nation with common 
interests, should co-operate in strengthening their economics 
and promoting their commercial relations. This should not, 
however, deprive any state of her freedom to exercise her full 
control over her financial and economic affairs in accordance 
with her special circumstances and interests. 
These are the principles which, in the view of the Saudi Arabian 
C':JOvernment, should form the basis for the unity of Arab ranks. To 
facilitate the achievement of this sublime objective, I, in my 
capacity as a representative of my government and a memher of the 
Preparatory Committee, approve the Protocol signed in Alexandria on 
20 Shawwal 1363 (7th Octoher 1944). 
Knowing Your Excellency's care for the interests of the Arab nation, 
I have no doubt that these principles will have your support within 
the committees in charge of studying this issue, which is of 
interest to all Arabs. 
Hith all my respects to your Excellency. 
(signed) Yusuf Yassin 
Source: Ahmed M. Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arah States: 
Hartime Diplomacy and International Arab Politics 1941 to 1945, 
London, 1977, pp. 275-276. 
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Appendix 3 
Text of the Draft Pact of the Arab League proposed by the Political 
Subsidiary Connnittee (14th February - 3rd Harch 1945). 
Draft Pact for the Lea~le of Arab States. 
In order to implement the Alexandria Protocol dated 20 Shamval 1363 
(7th October 19/14) and signed by the representatives of Egypt, 
Syria, Iraq, Trans jordan , Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Yemen, which 
had provided for the consolidation of the close relations and the 
numerous ties binding the Arab countries and the direction of these 
relations towards the welfare of all the Arab countries, the 
improvement of their conditions, the improvement of their 
conditions, the insuring of their future, and the realization of 
their hopes and aspirations. 
And in response to Arab public opinion in all the Arah countries, 
and on the basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of 
the states participating in the League, 
The Contracting States have agreed on the follmving: 
Article 1 The League of Arab States is composed of the independent 
Arab States which have signed this Pact, and of the other 
independent Arab States which would wish to join the Lea~le by 
depositing an application in the Permanent Secretariat-General, and 
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which the Council of the League may decide to accept in its first 
meeting after the submission of the application. 
Article 2 The league shall have a Council whose task will be to 
achieve the realization of its objectives. The Council shall he 
composed of the representatives of the Arab States participating in 
the League on an equal footing and with one vote for each State 
regardless of the number of her representatives. 
Article 3 The Council shall supervise the execution of agreements 
which these (member) States may concludej hold periodical meetings 
designed to consolidate their ties; co-ordinate, in so far as is 
possible, their political plans in order to achieve their co-
operation and to protect their independence and sovereignty from 
every aggression by suitable meanSj and supervise in a general way 
the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. 
The Council shall also determine the means of co-operating with the 
international bodies which may be created in the future i.n order to 
~larantee security and peace, and to enhance social, economic, and 
other relations for the general good. 
Article 4 The Arab States participating in the League shall co-
operate closely, with due regard to the organization and 
circumstances of each State, on the following matters: 
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a. F£onomic and financial affairs, including commercial 
relations, customs, currency, and questions of 
agriculture and industry. 
b. Communication; this includes railroads, roads, aviation, 
navigation, telegraphs, and posts. 
c. Cultural affairs. 
d. Nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgements, 
and extradition of criminals. 
e. Social affairs. 
f. I~alth matters. 
Article 5 For each of the matters listed in previous articles, 
there shall be set up a special committee composed of 
representatives of the member states of the league. These 
committees shall lay down the principles, and define the scope of 
co-operation. These shall be formulated in draft agreements, to be 
presented to the Council. 
(The League) may co-operate in cultural, social, health, and other 
matters with the representatives of the local governments, or 
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bodies, or local elements, in all Arab countries. 1he Council shall 
determine the way by which these government, bodies, or elements 
shall be represented in the above-mentioned committees in order to 
realize thereby the national objectives included in the Preamble of 
this Pact. 
Article 6 The permanent seat of the League of Arab States shall be 
established in Cairo. The Council may convene at any other place it 
may designate. 
Article 7 The Council of the League shall convene in ordinary 
session twice a year, in March and in Octoher. It shall convene in 
extraordinary session whenever the need arises, at the request of 
two member states of the League. 
Article 8 The League shall have a pernmnent Secretariat-General, 
which shall consist of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries, 
and an appropriate number of officials. 
The Council of the League shall appoint the Secretary-General by a 
two-thirds majority vote. The Secretary-General shall be, at the 
same time, the Secretary of the Council. 
The Annex names the first Secretary-General of the League. The 
Secretary-General shall, with the approval of the Council, appoint 
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the Assistant Secretaries and the necessary officials for the 
functioning of the League. The· Council of the League shall 
establish an internal regulation for the ftmctions of the 
Secretariat-C,eneral and matters related to the staff. 
Article 9 The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the 
budget of the League and shall submit it to the Council for approval 
before the beginning of each fiscal year. The Council shall 
determine the share of each state in the expenses, and may 
reconsider the apportionment of expenses whenever necessary. 
Article 10 The members of the Council of the League, as well as the 
members of the Committees, and the officials specified in the 
internal regulation, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity 
when engaged in the exercise of their functions. The Secretary-
General shall have the rank of Ambassador and the Assistant 
Secretaries that of Ministers Plenipotentiary. 
Buildings and other premises occupied by the organs of the J~ague 
shall be inviolable. 
Article 11 The first meeting of the Council shall be convened at 
the invitation of the head of the Egyptian Government. Thereafter, 
it shall be convened at the invitation of the Secretary-General. 
The representatives of the member states of the League shall in turn 
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assume the presidency of the Council at each of its ordinary 
sessions. 
Article 12 In case of aggression, or threat of aggression, by a 
state against a member state of the League, the state which has been 
attacked or threatened with aggression alone may demand the 
immediate convocation of the Council. The Council shall, by 
unanimous decision, determine the measures necessary to repulse the 
aggression. If the aggressor is a member state, her vote shall not 
be counted in determining unanimity. 
If, as a result of the attack, the government of the state attacked 
finds herself unable to communicate with the Council, the state's 
representative in the Council shall request the convocation of the 
Council for the purpose indicated in the foregoing paragraph. 
Should this representative be unable to communicate with the 
Council, any member state of the League shall have the right to 
request the convocation of the Council. 
Article 13 Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes arising 
between two or more member states of the League is prohibited. If 
there should arise among them a difference which is referred by the 
disputants to the Council for settlement, the decision of the 
Council shall then be enforceable and obligatory. Any disagreements 
related to the state's independence, sovereignty, and territorial 
--- ~-----
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integrity shall not be subject to arbitration. 
The Council shall mediate in all differences which may threaten to 
lead to war between two member states, or a member state and another 
state, in order to reconcile them (Le. the parties). 
Article 14 States of the League which may desire to establish 
closer co-operation and stronger bonds than are provi.ded by this 
Pact may conclude agreements to serve that end. 
Treaties and agreements already concluded, or to be concluded in the 
futlrre, between a member state and another state shall not be 
binding or restrictive upon other members. 
Article 15 Each member state shall respect the systems of 
government established in the other member states of the TEague and 
regard them as the exclusive rights of those states. Fach shall 
pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established 
systems (of government). 
Article 16 If a member state considers it in her interest to 
withdraw from the League, she shall have the right to do so provided 
she notifies the Council of the League of her intention to withdraw 
one year before such withdrawal is to go into effect. The Council 
of the League may consider any state which has failed to fulfil her 
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obligations under this Pact as having become separated from the 
League, this is to go into effect upon a unanimOtls decision of the 
(member) state, not counting the state concerned. 
Article 17 Each membe;~ state shall deposit with the Secretariat-
General one copy of e,'ery treaty or agreement concluded, or to be 
concluded, between herself and another member state, or a third 
state. 
Article 18 Except in cases specifically mentioned in this Pace, a 
unanimous decision by the Council shall be binding on all Inember 
states. Its execution shall, however, take place in each state in 
accordance with her basic laws. Any majority decision by the 
Council shall be binding on those who have accepted it, and shall be 
implemented in each state in the manner stated ahove. 
A majority vote by the Council shall, however, be sufficient for 
decisions on the following matters: 
a. }~tters related to personnel. 
b. Adoption of the budget of the Lea!:,'tle. 
c. Establishment of the internal regulation for the 
Council, the ComInittees, and the Secretariat-C~neral. 
d. Decisions to adjourn the sessions. 
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Article 19 This Pact may be amended with the consent of tW'o-thirds 
of the sta';::es of the League. A state which does not accept such an 
amendment may withdraw as soon as the amend.ment comes into effect, 
without bej.ng bound by the provisions of Article 16 of this Pact. 
Artjcle 20 This Pact and its annexes shall he ratified according to 
the basic la~s of the contracting states and of the states whose 
application ::0 join will be accepted by the Council. 
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the 
Secretariat-'C,eneral of the Council, and the Pact shall be operative 
as r(;!gards each ratifying state fifteen days after the Secretary-
General has received the instructions of ratification from four 
states. 
Article 21 This Pact has been drawn up in Cairo in the Arabic 
language on , in one copy which shall be deposited in 
the safe keeping of the Secretariat-General of the Council. An 
identical copy shall be delivered to each state of the J~ague. 
Article 22 Until the Secretariat-C,eneral of the League has been 
established, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Egyptian 
Government shall perform the functions referred to in Article 20 and 
21. 
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Annex I 
Resolution Regarding Palestine 
Considering the provisions of the Alexandria Protocol with regard to 
the special position of Palestine in the relation of her cause to 
peace and stability in the Arab world. 
Mld since Article 22 of the Covenant of the league of Nations, 
included in the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, has recognised the 
independence of the Arab countries which ceased to be under the 
(sovereignty of the) Ottoman State. And since Palestine is one of 
these countries whose independence was recognized in the above-
mentioned Covenant, which gives her a legitimate right to 
independence. And since the Preparatory Committee resolved 
unanimously on 1st October 1944 to allow a representative of the 
Palestine Arabs to participate in its meetings and functions, the 
Subsidiary Corrunittee has therefore decided to ask the Preparatory 
Corrunittee to recognize the right of Palestine to participate in the 
League of Independent Arab States on an equal footing with the 
founding (States). 
Since Palestine has been unable so far, for compelling reasons, to 
exercise its recognized right to independence, and since the 
recognition of this right is still valid from the legal point of 
view and has not been changed in any way, the Conmlittee therefore 
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suggest:i that the Council of the league should take charge of the 
selection of an Arab representative from Palestine to represent that 
state in the Council of the league until that country can achieve 
its independence. 
Annex 2 
Resolution Regarding the: Arab Cmmtries 
Since the Alexandria Protocol has stipulated that the flmctions of 
the league shall include the supervisiofl, in a general way, of the 
affairs and the interests of the Arab countries, and since this 
objective can only be achieved through co-operation with all these 
countries in all matters with possible means; the Subsidiary 
Committee therefore conveys to the Prep61ratory Committee its 
suggestion that a special annex should be added to the Pact of the 
League including the basis of this co-o?eration and enabling the 
Council to discharge its above-mentioned fllllction. 
Source: Ahmed M. Gomaa, The Foundation of the IR-ague of Arab States: 
Wartime Diplomacy and Inter-Arab Politics 1941 to 1945, London: 
Longman, 1977, pp. 289-293. 
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Appendix 4 
Text of the Pact of the League of Arab States 
His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic; 
His Royal Highness the Amir of Trans-Jordan; 
Ilis ~mjesty the King of Iraqi 
His Hajesty the King of Saudi Arabia; 
His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic; 
His Hajesty the King of Egypt; 
His Majesty the King of the Yemen. 
Desirous of strengthening the close relations and nwnerous ties 
which link the Arab states; 
And anxious to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of 
respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states, and to 
direct their efforts towards the common good of all the Arab 
countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their 
future, the realization of their aspirations and hopes; 
And responding to the wishes of Arab public opinion in all Arab 
lands; 
Have agreed to conclude a Pact to that end and have appointed as 
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their representatives the persons whose names are listed 
hereinafter; who, after having exchanged their plenary powers which 
were found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the 
following provision: 
Article 1 
The League of Arab States, is composed of the independent Arab States 
which have signed this Pact. 
Any independent Arab States has the right to become a member of the 
League. If it desires to do so, it shall submi t a reques t '''hich 
will be deposited with the Permanent Secretariat-General and 
submitted to the Council at the first meeting held after submission 
of the request. 
Article 2 
The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the relations 
between the member states; the co-ordination of their policies in 
order to achieve co-operation between them and to safeguard their 
independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs 
and interests of the Arab countries. It has also as its purpose the 
close co-operation of the member states, with due regard to the 
organization and circumstances of each state on the following 
I· 
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mattersj 
A. Economic and financial affairs, including COnID1ercial 
relations, customs, currency, and questions of 
agriculture and industry. 
B. Communications; this includes railroads, aviation, 
navigation, telegraphs, and posts. 
C. Cultural affairs. 
D. Nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgements, 
and extradition of criminals. 
E. Social affairs. 
F. Heal t h problems. 
Article 3 
The league shall possess a Council composed of the representatives 
of the member states of the League; each state shall have a single 
vote, irrespective of the number of its representatives. 
It shall be the task of the Council to achieve the realization of 
the objectives of the league and to supervise the execution of 
agreements which the member states have concluded on the questions 
enumerated in the preceding article, or on any other questions. 
It 1ikel'/ise shall be the Council's task to decide upon the means by 
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which the League is to co-operate with the international bodies to 
be created in the future in order to guarantee security and peace 
and regulate economic and social relations. 
Article 4 
For each of the question listed in .Article 2 there shall be set up a 
special committee in which member states of the League shall be 
represented. These committees shall he charged with the task of 
laying down the principles and extent of co-operation. Such 
principles shall be formulated as draft agreements, to be presented 
to the Council for examination preparatory to their submission to 
the aforesaid states. 
Representatives of the other Arab countries any take part in the 
work of the aforesaid committees. The Council shall determine the 
condition under which these representatives may be permitted to 
participate and the rules governing such representation. 
Article 5 
Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes arising between t,vo 
or more member states of the League is prohibited. If there should 
arise among them a difference which does not concern a state's 
independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, and if the 
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parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the 
settlement of this difference, the decision of the Council shall 
then be enforceable and obligatory. 
In such a case, the states between whom the difference has arisen 
shall not participate in the deliberations and decisions of the 
Council. 
The Council shall mediate in all differences which threaten to lead 
to war between two member states, or a member state and a third 
state, with a view to bringing about their reconciliation. 
Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be taken hy majority 
vote. 
Article 6 
In case of aggression or threat of aggression hy one state against a 
member state, the state which has been attacked or threatened with 
aggression may demand the immediate convocation of the Council. 
The Council shall be unanimous in determining the measures necessary 
to repulse the aggression. If the aggressor is a member state, his 
vote shall not be counted in determining unanimity. 
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If as a result of the attack, the. government of the state attacked 
finds itself unable to corrunuriicate with the Council, that state's 
representative in the Council shall have the right to reqllest the 
convocation of the Council for the purpose indicated in the 
foregoing paragraph. In the event that this representative is 
unablp. to communicate with the Council, any member state of the 
League shall have the right to request the convocation of the 
Council. 
Article 7 
Unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all menu)er 
states of the League; majority decisions shall be binding only upon 
those states which hEwe accepted them. 
In either case the decisions of the COlllcil shall be enforced in 
each member state according to its respective basic laws. 
Article 8 
Each member state shall respect the systems of government 
established in the other member states and regard them as the 
exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain 
from any action calculated to change established systems of 
government. 
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Article 9 
States of the League which desire to establish closer co-operation 
and stronger bonds than are provided by this Pact may conclude 
agreements to that end. 
Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in the 
future between a member state and another state shall not be binding 
or restrictive upon other members. 
Article 10 
The permanent seat of the League of Arab States is established in 
Cairo. The Council m~y, however, assemble at any other place it may 
designate. 
Article 11 
The Council of the League shall convene in ordinary session t,.,ice a 
year, in March and in October. It shall convene in extraordinary 
session upon the request of two member states of the League ,.,henever 
the need arises. 
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Article 12 
The League shall have a pennanent Secretariat-C':reneral , which shall 
consist of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries, and an 
appropriate number of officials. 
The Council of the League shall appoint the Secretary-General by a 
majority of two-thirds of the States of the League. The Secretary-
General, with the approval of the Council, shall appoint the 
Assistant Secretaries and the principal officials of the Lea~le. 
The Council of the League shall establish an administrative 
regulation for the functions of the Secretariat-(':renera1 and matters 
relating to the staff. 
The Secretary-General shall have the rank of Ambassador and the 
Assistant Secretaries that of Hinisters Plenipotentiary. 
The first Secretary-General of the League is named in an Annex to 
this Pact. 
Article 13 
The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the hudget of the 
League and shall submit it to the Council for approval before the 
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beginning of each fiscal year. 
The Council shall fix the share of the expenses to be borne by each 
state of the League. This share may be reconsidered if necessary. 
Article 14 
The members of the Council of the League as well as members of the 
committees and the officials who are to be designated in the 
administrative regulation shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and 
immunity when engaged in the exercise of their functions. 
Article 15 
The first meeting of the Council shall be convened at the invitation 
of the head of the Egyptian r~vernment. Thereafter it shall be 
convened at the invitation of the Secretary-General. 
The representatives of the member states of the League shall in turn 
assume the presidency of the Council at each of its ordinary 
sessions. 
Article 16 
Except in cases specifically indicated in this Pact, a majority vote 
- 720 -
of the Council shall be sufficient to make enforceable decisions on 
the following matters: 
A. Hatters relating to personnel. 
B. Adoption of the budget of the League. 
C. Establishment of the administrative re[~lations for the 
Council, the committees, and the Secretariat-C~neral. 
D. Decisions to adjourn the sessions. 
Article 17 
Each member State of the League shall deposit with the Secretariat-
General one copy of every treaty or agreement concluded or to be 
concluded in the future between itself and another member state of 
the League or a third state. 
Article 18 
If a member state contemplates withdrawal from the League, it shall 
inform the Council of its intentions one year before such withdrawal 
is to to go into effect. 
The Council of the League may consider any state which fails to 
fulfil its obligations under this Pact as having become separated 
from the League, this to go into effect upon a unanimous decision of 
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the states, not counting the state concerned. 
Article 19 
This Pact may be amended with the consent of two-thirds of the state 
belonging to the League, especially in order to make firmer and 
stronger the ties bet'veen the member states, to create an Arah 
Tribunal of Arbitration,* and to re~llate the relations of the 
League with any international bodies to be created in the future to 
guarantee security and peace. 
Final action on an amendment cannot be taken prior to the session 
following the session in which the motion was initiated. 
If a state does not accept such an amendment it may withdraw at such 
time as the amendment goes into effect, without being bound by the 
provisions of the preceding article. 
* The Arabic text is "Mahkamat I Adl 'Arabiya" meaning literally "An 
Arab Court of Justice". 
Article 20 
This Pact ant its Annexes shall be ratified according to the hasic 
laws in force among the High Contracting Parties. 
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The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the 
Secretariat-General of the Council and the Pact shall become 
operative as regards each ratifying state fifteen days after the 
Secretary-General has received the instruments of ratification from 
four states, 
This Pact has been drawn up in Cairo in the Arabic language on this 
8th day of Rai' II, thirteen hundred and sixty-four (22nd Harch 
1945), in one copy which shall be deposited in the safe keeping of 
the Secretariat-General. 
An identical copy shall be delivered to each state of the League. 
Here follow the signatures: 
1. Annex Regarding Palestine 
Since the termination of the last great war the rule of the 
Ottoman Empire over the Arab countries, among them Palestine, 
which had become detached from that Flnpire, has come to an 
end. She has come to be autonomous, not subordinate to any 
other state. 
The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her future was to be 
settled by the parties concerned. 
- 723 -
However, even though she was as yet unahle to control her own 
affairs, the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919 made 
provision for a regime based upon recognition of l1er 
independence. 
Her international existence and independence in the legal 
sense cannot, therefore, be questioned, any more than could be 
the independence of the other Arab countries. 
Although the outward manifestations of this independence have 
remained obscured for reasons heyond her control, this should 
not be allowed to interfere with her participation in the work 
of the Council of the League. 
The nations signatory of the Pact of the League are therefore 
of the opinion that, considering the special circumstances of 
Palestine, and until that country can effectively exercise its 
independence, the Council of the League should take charge of 
the selection of an Arab representative from Palestine to take 
part in its work. 
2. Annex Regarding Co-operation Hith Countries Hhich Are Not 
Members of the Council of the League 
Hhereas the member states of the League 'will have to deal in 
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the Council as well as in the corrnnittees with matters which 
will benefit and affect the Arab Horld at large; 
And whereas the Council has to take into account the 
aspirations of the Arab countries which are not members of the 
Council and has to ~vorked towards their realization; 
Now therefore, it particularly behoves the states signatory to 
the Pact of the Arab League to enjoin the Council of the 
League, when considering the admission of those countries to 
participation in the corrnnittees referred to in the Pact, that 
it should do its utmost to co-operate ~vith them; and 
furthermore, that it should spare no effort to learn their 
needs and understand their aspirations and hopes; and that it 
should work thenceforth for their best interests and the 
safeguarding of their future with all the political means at 
its disposal. 
3. Annex Regarding the Appointment of a Secretary-General of the 
League 
The States Signatory to this Pact have agreed to appoint His 
Excellency Abd-al-Rahman' Azzam Bey to be Secretary-General of 
the League of Arab States. 
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This appointment is made for two years. The Council of the 
League shall hereafter determine the new regulations for the 
Secretariat-General. 
Source: Hussein A. Jfussouna, The League of Arab States and Regional 
Disputes : A Study of Middle East Conflicts, New York: Oceanan 
Publications Inc., Dobbs Ferry, 1975, pp. L.03-409. 
Name of 
Member States 
Algeria 
Bahrain 
Egypt * 
Iraq 
Jibuti 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
Oman 
Palestine 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
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Appendlx 5 
Arab l~ague Member States 
Date of 
Independence 
5 July 1962 
1 September 1971 
28 February 1922 
15 October 1920 
27 June 1977 
25 ~fay 19l.6 
19 June 1961 
22 November 1946 
24 December 1952 
28 November 1961 
18 November 1956 
18 November 1970 
nla 
1 September 1971 
23 September 1932 
Date of 
Joining league 
16 August 1962 
11 September 1971 
22 March 19L.5 
22 Narch 1945 
4 September 1977 
22 March 1945 
20 July 1961 
22 March 19'.5 
28 March 1953 
26 November 1973 
1 October 1958 
29 September 1971 
9 September 1976 
11 September 1971 
22 March 1945 
* Membership suspended on 31 March 1979. 
nla : not available. 
Capital 
EI-Djazair 
Manama 
Cairo 
Baghdad 
Jibuti 
Amman 
Kuwait 
Beirut 
Tripoli 
Nouakchott 
Rahat 
HU8cat 
Jerusalem 
Doha 
Riyadh 
Name of 
Member States 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tunisia 
UAE 
Yemen AR 
Yemen PDR 
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Arab ~ague Hember States (Cont'd) 
Date of 
Independence 
1 September 1971 
1 January 1956 
17 April 1946 
20 March 1956 
2 December 1971 
nla 
30 November 1967 
Date of 
Joining teague 
14 February 1974 
19 January 1956 
22 March 1945 
1 October 1958 
6 December 1971 
22 March 1945 
12 December 1967 
nla not available. 
Capital 
Nogadishu 
Khartoum 
~nascus 
Ttmis 
Abu Dhabi 
Sanaa 
Aden 
Source: Arab British Commerce, (~ague of Arab States, Special 
Issue, March 1983), p. 11. 
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CONCUJSrON AND REC011MENDATIONS 
It is the intent of this study to identify the factors which have 
,,,eakened foreign policy decisions. The hypothesis has been proven in the 
following conclusions : 
1. The foreign policy decision making process of Saudi Arahia is hased 
on the need to keep the monarchy in power; retention of Islamic 
principles; the security of the Kingdom, and stability of the society. 
On 17th February 1948, Imam Yahya was assassinated outside Sanaa in a 
Coup detat. Abdullah al-Hazir proclaimed himself the new Imam of the 
Yemen. He asked Ibn Saud to recognize him as the legitimate ruler of 
Yemen. In keeping with his foreign policy to keep the monarchy in pmver 
and the security of the Kingdom, Ibn Saud was horrified at the murder of 
a fellmv monarch and the takeover and eschewed al-Hazir's request for 
recognition. 
Saudi Arabia foreign policy has always been opposed to the establishment 
or grm.,rth of revolutionary socialism on the Arahian Peninsula, 
recognizing the danger that any such trend poses for its own autocratic 
and oppressive socio-political system. Consequently, her foreien policy 
always assumed the leading counter-revolutionary role in the area, 
supporting the royalists against the repuhlicans in North Yemen (1962-
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1970), the South Arabian League (SAL) against the National Liberation 
Front (NLF), and the Sultanate against the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (pmJOAG) in Oman. Saudi foreign 
policy-makers has also actively campaigned against Yemen unity, fearing 
that a united Yemen would pose a serious national security threat to the 
Kingdom. 
However, Saudi foreign policy-makers reacted to the Arah national 
ideology of both Nasserism and Ba'thism by emphasizing its foreignness to 
the Arab-Islamic tradition and by promoting even more ardently a pan-
Islamic vie~v of the Horld. In the heat of the confrontation between 
Nasserist pan-Arabism and Saudi pan-Islam in 1964, King Faisal called for 
an "Islamic Pact" and tried to use it against Nasser's pan-Arahism, Arab-
socialism, and against any alien ideology to "Islam" in the Hiddle Fast. 
(See Chapters, Yemen Arab Republic, People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen, Iraq and Egypt). 
2. Foreign policy decisions made \.,ithin this framework has necessitated 
decisions to be made on a crisis to crisis basis, foreign policy makers 
to be reactive rather than pro-active. 
Despite their wealth the Saudis are not pOHerful. Aware of their own 
limitations and vulnerabilities, the Saudis always he have reactive and 
cautiously in foreign policy_ They are not leaders, at best, they are 
consensus builders. 
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3. The foreign policy decisions are not consistent, but are made hased 
on ideologies influenced hy Islam. 
In theory, Saudi Arabia's foreign policy is conceived in the minds of a 
group of men ~.,ho subscribe to Islamic fundamental values and beliefs, as 
a simple but forceful ideology that has contributed most to Saudi 
perceptions of international relations and foreign policy priorities. 
From such an ideology has come the concept of a hi-polar world that 
adapts to the present international environment. In the classical 
Islamic version, the world is divided into the monotheists and atheists. 
It is easy enough to place communism in the latter category and the 
Huslim world and the Hest in the former of this paradigm. As protectors 
of Islam's two holiest places, Hecca and Hedina, the Saudi leadership 
feels a special responsihility to maintain the religious as well as 
political integrity of the Huslim world and believe the Hest led by the 
{Jnited States has a similar responsibility to the political integrity of 
the entire "Free Horld". Thus, the Saudi government's staunch opposition 
to communism, internationally and regionally, has contributed to a 
foreign policy based on close co-operation with the lJ.S. and other 
\<lestern pm.,ers and a refusal to open any serious dialogue with the Soviet 
Union, the People's Republic of China, or other Communist countries. 
Saudi Arabia has always believed that communism and other related 
ideologies (i.e. Socialism, Zionism) are inimical to Islam, a theme that 
ran through official speeches and pronouncements of the late King Faisal, 
the framer of Saudi foreign policy. (See Chapters United States and 
Soviet Union). 
If. Foreign policy decisions made within this framework have ~veakened 
the potential the Kingdom could have effected in relations with other 
countries. 
In practice, flowever, there exists considerable speCUlation as to whether 
Islamic ideology per se constitutes the core of Saudi Arabia's national 
interests. At times the Saudi leadership makes the use of Islamic 
ideology merely to justify its policy or hehaviour in familiar Tslamic 
terms \'lhich is acceptable to the puhlic. By using Islam in foreign 
policy weakened the potential the Kingdom could have effected in 
relations with Egypt, Iraq, People's Democratic Repuhlic of Yemen and the 
Arah League. 
5. The development of a stronger foreign policy hased on planning and 
on a global perspective could give the Kingdom more influence over the 
stability of the Hiddle PaSt. 
It has become increasingly reported that the gap hetween the Kingdom's 
official posttrre as an Islamic state, and daily reality as a capitalistic 
state, is causing social tensions. The problems of the Saudi foreign 
policy-maker in coping with change and managing national and 
international behaviour are serious and complex and cannot be solved in 
any simple \'lay. To illustrate the regional prohlem for the Saudi policy-
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maker, it \"oulcl be appropriate to review the response to Prince Fahd' s 
eight-point plan for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
presented in Autumn 1981. 
It must be noted that this plan deviated from the usual pattern of Saudi 
behaviour in inter-Arab affairs, which was to avoid clear-cut public 
identification with any country of camp, and to work toward mediation and 
consensus-building. It has been the only effective ,,,ay the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia has been able to maintain its relationship with all Arab 
governments. 
In the fall of 19H1, the Kingdom departed from the diplomacy of 
consensus-building and submitted the Fahd plan to the eleventh Arab 
Sunnnit. The plan divided the conference, not hecause of its content, but 
its plannin?, and timing. In other words, Saudi foreign policy-makers 
failed to make a systematic study of the context of the conference, its 
timing, the objectives and the influence of supporters and critics. Its 
biggest failing \Vas the lack of tailoring of Saudi Arabia's capabilities 
to its objectives. This failure meant that Saudi foreign policy-makers 
did not evaluate the chances of success or failure for the move, or did 
they decide "lhether and at for what time to submit the proposal. 
Obviously, the science of planning and managing of foreign policy vJaS 
lacking. 
This lack is significant because it reflects the problems of hoth the 
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Saudi State and its foreign policy, which are essentially problems of 
adaption to a new context at the levels of both social development and 
foreign policy. It is necessary for the Saudi State and Saudi foreign 
policy-makers to reflect on the overall changes, grasp the pace and 
direction, and adjust policy. It is through this political process of 
adaption that oil power could he transformed from cash to capabilities, 
and these capabilities could be used to plan and manage stronger foreign 
policy. 
By tradition and history, the Saudis have not heen ~vell prepared to 
conduct the kind of complex foreign policy that is required today. A 
cautious, reactive, often secretive policy making process is ill adapted 
to the world of oil diplomacy, arms races, Arab organizations, Arah 
Israeli clashes, and superpowers rivalry. 
Gradually, the Saudis have begun to develop a foreign policy bureaucracy, 
an intelligence service, an aid program, a military establishment and an 
oil policy. nut crises still catch the regime poorly prepared. ~li1itary 
modernization has not produced much usable strength. 
The future of Saudi Arabia depends on its relations with other nations. 
The Saudis are more qualified to deal with inter-l\rah politics with other 
Islamic countries than they are vlith other nations, particularly the 
superpowers. The existing style of foreign policy making lacks 
flexibility, and has not prepared the nation to meet the many changes 
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taking place in the Hiddle FEst and the world. The style of making 
decisions often makes it difficult for other countries to work with the 
p,overnment, usually to the disadvantap,e of the Kingdom. 
The position of Saudi Arabia differs from that of any other nation. It 
plays a multi-faceted role as leader in the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, member of the United Nations, the Arab League, Gulf 
Co-operation Council, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, etc. 
The quantity of oil reserves makes it important to almost every 
industrialized and third world countries. In addition, hecause the holy 
cities of Necca and Nedina are within its borders, it has an obligation 
to protect these shrines, and promote the religion. 
('J€ographically, the Kingdom borders on radial states such as Iraq, the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and militant neighbours such as 
Iran and Israel. The history of continual unrest in the region is often 
flamed by the conflict between the two major sects of Islam, the Shi'ites 
and Sunnis. The people of Saudi Arahia are primarily of the Sunni sect, 
while the Shi'ites are the majority in countries such as Iran and Iraq. 
The major conflict that places Saudi Arabia in a very vulnerable 
posi tion, if the fact that the holy shrines are 'vithin the Kinp,dom' s 
borders, and there are those who helieve these shrines should be 
controlled by the Shi'ites. 
Another factor '''hich has had a strong influence on Saudi Arabia's foreign 
- 753 -
policy is the hostility toward communism. The Saudis see communism as 
being diametrically opposed to their way of life because it is a godless 
society. The Saudis have poured millions of dollars into countries to 
lessen the influence of communism in other Arab nations. Hillions of 
dollars l1ave also been given to Islamic countries for their development, 
based on Islrunic principles. 
The conclusion is that these factors all contribute to many potential 
problems for the government, today and in the future. For these reasons, 
the weaknesses in Saudi Arabian foreign policy could have far reaching 
effects, internally and externally. Internally, the regime in Saudi 
Arabia and the society are inseparable. This is not a ne~V' phenomena, but 
can be traced to ancient tribal times ,V'hen the leader gave personal 
direction to the society, and the society was dependent upon him for 
survival. Today the population of the Kingdom is made up of many 
different tribal groups. Although tribal distinctions are less today 
than they were in the past, the culture is still strongly influenced by 
tribal relationships. 
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